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THE MOSLEM REBELLION
IN NORTHWEST CHINA
1862-1878

A STUDY OF GOVERNMENT MINORITY POLICY

BY

WEN-DJANG CHU

MOUTON & CO

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In Memory of my Beloved Father

KING CHU

1887-1951

PREFACE

The great Moslem rebellion in Northwest China in the sixties and seventies of the 19th century has undoubtedly been greatly underestimated in most history books. Some writers have devoted a short paragraph to this subject; others have dismissed it with one sentence. This is hardly justifiable, because the aforesaid rebellion lasted more than 15 years, spread from Shensi to Sinkiang, covering almost one fourth of China's territory, and directly disturbed the life of more than 10,000,000 people. According to one source:

*The population of Kansu was reduced from 15,000,000 to 1,000,000, . . . nine out of every ten Chinese were supposed to have been killed, and two out of every three Mohammedans . . . All the villages and farmsteads for miles and miles in all directions were in ruins, and the huge culturable hills were for the most part deserted.*¹

Other contemporary writers confirmed this tragic story. For instance, Tso Tsung-t'ang reported in one of his memorials: "With the exception of the 2,000 or more Moslems who fled together with Pai Yen-hu, there are no more than 60,000 of the original 700,000 to 800,000 Shensi Moslems who have survived to be rehabilitated in Kansu."² Yet strange though it may seem, very few people know much about this great uprising which uprooted the entire social life of Northwest China.

When the author first visited Northwest China, he knew no more about the Moslem Rebellion than what he had read from the short paragraphs in his history textbooks. It was there where he learned the serious effects of the past conflicts. The more he understood the situation, the more he became dissatisfied with the coverage of the

¹Marshall Broomhall: *Islam in China*, P. 155. Cf. Mark Bell: "The Country of the Dungan Rebellion of 1861 and 1895-6," *The Asiatic Quarterly Review*, 3rd Series, II, July, 1896, p. 25.

²P'ing-ting Shen-Kan Sinkiang Hui-fei Fang-lüeh, CCLXXXVI, 8; Tso Tsung-t'ang; T. C. 12 y., 12 m., 22 d. or February 8, 1873.

story by ordinary history books. He felt it a duty to present a more complete picture of this important historical event. This work is a part of his effort.

Due to the scarcity of material from Moslem sources, the present work is forced to emphasize the domestic policy of the Manchu government. The author does not intend to touch upon the diplomatic field nor to elaborate upon the story from the Moslem point of view. He refers to military development and other factors only when they are helpful in understanding the policy.

The main sources of material are the documents compiled by the Manchu government in *P'ing-ting Shen-Kan Sinkiang Hui-fei Fang-lieh* (平定陝甘新疆回匪方略), supplemented by *Ta-ch'ing Shih-lu* (大清實錄) as well as numerous collections of works by the leading participants of the day, such as Tso Tsung-t'ang (左宗棠), Yang Yüeh-pin (楊岳斌), Liu Jung (劉蓉), Liu Chin-t'ang (劉錦棠), Yüan Pao-heng (袁保恆), Li Hung-chang (李鴻章), Tseng Kuo-fan (曾國藩), Tseng Chi-tse (曾紀澤) and others. Local gazettes were frequently consulted to clarify particular facts relating to the given locality. Accounts preserved by contemporary people are heavily depended upon to check the official documents for errors and deliberate whitewashing. Secondary works and semi-official reports are usually used to provide a general background.

Since most Westerners did not have much opportunity to participate in or even to observe the making of governmental policy of the period, there is very little material in Western languages which can help build up the main part of this work. There are, nevertheless some significant exceptions, such as the papers of Sir Robert Hart of the Chinese Customs House on the question of raising foreign loans. Several secondary Western works such as Marshall Broomhall's *Islam in China*, and Captain W. L. Bales' *Tso Tsungt'ang* touch incidentally upon Manchu government policy, but they are far too brief and often incorrect, though sometimes useful. Western sources are especially enlightening on problems about the Moslem religion and people. They are also helpful in clarifying the international background.

It is hard work to plow into the virgin soil of those hundreds of *chüan* (卷) of bone-dry documents without the help of an index. Yet it is a great thrill to be able to present a systematic study of

the confusing policy of the Manchu government in suppressing the Moslem rebellion in Shensi, Kansu and Sinkiang from 1862-1878.

The author wishes to record his deep gratitude to Professors Hellmut Wilhelm, Hsiao Kung-ch'uan, Franz Michael and William Stull Holt, to all of whom he is indebted for invaluable advice. He also desires to express his sincere appreciation to Mr. Fang Chao-ying, Drs. Crawford M. Bishop, John K. Fairbank and Donald A. Irwin, who kindly took the time to read the manuscript carefully and to comment at length. But for their generous assistance the work would be guilty of many mistakes. Special gratitude must go to Professor John R. Krueger of Indiana University for painstakingly reading the complete manuscript and for his editorial criticisms and suggestions on styling; to Dr. Ruth Krader and her staff at the Far East Library of the University of Washington for their patient and professional assistance; to Tsing Hua University for the generous grant of a Tsing Hua Fellowship which enabled the author to finish this research.

University of Pittsburgh
August, 1963.

Wen-djang Chu
(朱文長)

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

1. THE EMPIRE-BUILDERS

In 1644, the Manchus, a foreign people, penetrated the Great Wall and started an alien rule in China. They proved to be a great dynasty which conquered numerous tribes and clans inside as well as outside China proper. They built up a great empire with a territory comparable to that of any dynasty in Chinese history, with the exception of the Yüan (元). A succession of extraordinarily brilliant emperors—K'ang-hsi (康熙 reigning 1661-1722), Yung-cheng (雍正 reigning 1723-1736) and Ch'ien-lung (乾隆 reigning 1736-1796)—not only consolidated what their predecessors had acquired but continually expanded what they themselves had. Besides Chinese, they conquered Mongols, Tibetans, Koreans, Indo-Chinese, Burmese, and Moslems.

In Northwestern China, the Manchus met very strong resistance. It took the all-out effort of three generations to conquer the land. Each of the three above-mentioned great emperors of the Manchu (Ch'ing 清) dynasty had a share in the hard task of subduing the stubborn Dzungarians (準噶爾), members of a Mongolian tribe living in the northern part of Chinese Turkistan, later the province of Sinkiang (新疆), or T'ien Shan Pei Lu (天山北路). Victory was not complete until 1757, when 80% of the 600,000 or more Dzungarians had been destroyed by disease and war, and the balance had fled to Russia or been captured.¹

In the southern part of Chinese Turkistan, or T'ien Shan Nan Lu (天山南路) lived the Uigur (維吾兒), who by this time (1757) had been converted to the Moslem religion. The chiefs of the tribe

¹Wei Yüan: *Sheng-wu-chi* (魏源：聖武記), III, 28-48; 49-63. IV, 1-15aa. *Deux insurrections des Mahométans du Kan-su* (1648-1783), recit traduit du Chinois, par M. Camille Imbault Huart. Cf. Eugene Schuyler: *Turkistan*, II, 166-169; E. H. Parker: "Manchu Relations with Turkistan" in *The China Review*, XVI, June, 1888, No. 6, 321-331; Wolfram Eberhard: *A Short History of China*, 293-295.

were two brothers, Burhanal-Din (布拉尼敦), or the Big *Hodja* (大和卓木), and Khozi Khan (霍集占), or the Little *Hodja* (小和卓木). They had become involved with the Dzungarians and decided to fight the Manchus. Their resistance did not last long. Both Yarkand (葉爾羌), and Kashgar (喀什噶爾), the capitals of the two *Hodjas*, fell in 1759. This completed the conquest of the entire region, both the northern and the southern parts, of Chinese Turkistan, which later was known as Sinkiang, or the "New Dominion."²

2. THE MOSLEMS

The nearly total destruction of the Dzungarians left northern Chinese Turkistan open. Toward the close of the reign of Ch'ien-lung (1736-1796), a great influx of population into the region of Dzungaria was secured by encouraging the migration of Chinese and Dungsans (better known as Chinese Moslems),³ from the provinces of Kansu and Shensi, to whom extensive tracts of land were allotted.⁴ Uigurs (維吾兒) from southern Chinese Turkistan were also moved by the government into the Ili area.⁵ Manchus from Peking, Solon (索倫) Man-

²Wei Yüan: *Sheng-wu-chi*, IV, 17-24. Arthur W. Hummel, ed.: *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period*, 73. (Hereafter referred to as *ECCP*.) Concerning the history of the conquest of Sinkiang by the Manchus, see: K. S. Latourette: *The Chinese, Their History and Culture*, (Hereafter referred to as *The Chinese*.) chapter IX; Hummel, *ECCP*, under the names of Ch'ang-lin, 67-69; Chao-hui, 72-75; Fu-heng, 252-253; Hsüan-yeh, 327-331; Hung-li, 369-373; Yin-chen, 915-920. Also: Imbault-Huart: *Recueil de Documents sur l'Asie Centrale*; Maurice Courant: *L'Asie Centrale aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles: Empire Kalmouk ou Empire Mantchou?* Lepage: *Soumission des Tribus Musulmanes du Turkestan par la Chine, 1757-1759* (Mission d'Ollone: *Recherches sur les Musulmanes Chinois*, Paris, 1911, pp. 321-355); P. Pelliot: "Les Conquêtes de l'Empereur de la Chine" in *T'oung Pao*, 1920, pp. 183-274. E. H. Parker: "Manchu Relations with Turkestan" in *The China Review*, XVI, No. 6, June 1888, pp. 321-340.

³There are various explanations of the meaning of the word "Dungan," or "Tungan" (東干), by various authors. Among these different explanations, it seems that the one presented by Hartmann, namely, "to return to the true faith," is more acceptable than the others. Martin Hartman: "China" in *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, II, 850.

⁴William F. Meyers: *The Chinese Government*, 102; Schuyler: *Turkistan*, II, 173-174.

⁵Hsü Ts'ung-hao: *Hsin-chiang Chih-lüeh* (許崇灝: 新疆誌畧), 63; Schuyler: *Turkistan*, II, 169-170.

chus from the region of the Amur, Sibe (錫伯) Mongols from the Jehol region, Chahars, and Oirats (額魯特) were sent to Ili as garrison forces. Chinese criminals, including many political offenders, were also sent to the area to serve their prison terms as slave labor.⁶

The Uigurs were different from the Chinese in race, language and costume, as well as in religion. They were people with fair skins, high-bridged noses, deep eye-sockets, and heavy beards.

The Dungans were believed to be descendants of the ancient Uigurs who entered China during the T'ang dynasty (618-907), and possibly had mixed blood of Hsiung-nu (匈奴), Ti (氏), Ch'iang (羌), Persian, Arab⁸ and Chinese ancestors. With the exception of their religion and its accompanying traditions, the Dungans had long since been assimilated by the Chinese people in language, costume, and in many other ways. Because of this fact, they were known to the Chinese as *Han Hui*, or "Chinese Moslems" (漢回), a term which is quite misleading. In fact, they were not Chinese who believed in the Moslem religion, but a group of mixed-blood descendants of ancient Uigurs who had been assimilated by the Chinese. To distinguish the "Chinese Moslems" from the Uigurs in Chinese Turkistan, the latter were called "ch'an t'ou Hui-hui" (纏頭回回), or "ch'an Hui" (纏回), "turban-wearing Moslems," because they constantly wore white turbans on their heads.

The Dungans did not have such fair skins as the "turban-wearing Moslems," but still kept their high-bridged noses, their deep eye-sockets, and their heavy beards. In provinces where Dungans were the only Moslems they were simply called "Moslems," though the term "Moslem" in a broader sense ought to include both Dungan and "turban-wearing Moslems."

Whereas Uigurs or "turban-wearing Moslems" were mostly living in Chinese Turkistan, or Sin-kiang, "Chinese Moslems" were widely scattered in different parts of China. The areas where the largest groups of "Chinese Moslems" were living were Yunnan province in

⁶Mayers: *The Chinese Government*, 101-102; Schuyler: *Turkistan*, II, 170-173.

⁷Hsü: *Hsin-chiang Chih-lüeh*, 63.

⁸Mayers: *The Chinese Government*, 102. Also P. Dabry de Thiersant: *Le Mahométisme en Chine et dans le Turkestan Oriental*, I, 47-52. (Hereafter referred to as Thiersant: *Le Mahométisme*.) Cf. Ts'en Chung-mieh: "The Origin of the Term Hui-hui," in *Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology* (Academia Sinica), XII, 91-94. 岑仲勉:「回回一詞之語源」見中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊第十本,頁91—94。

the southwest and the provinces of Shensi, Kansu, (including present day Ch'inghai, Ninghsia) and Sinkiang in the northwest.⁹

These differences of religious faith led to constant conflicts between Chinese and Moslems. These conflicts in the northwestern provinces were particularly dangerous, because the area was so close to the frontier and involved numerous races as well as foreign nations.¹⁰

3. THE BASIC MANCHU POLICY

No one has explained exactly what the basic policy of the Manchu government was toward Northwestern China and the Moslems living there. However, after examining the existing records, one may reduce it to two points: namely, first to hold the natural frontier line west of Sinkiang; and, secondly, to keep a delicate balance of power between the various peoples so that the Manchus could rule them all.

Along the western frontier of Sinkiang there are mountain ranges which form a natural defense line. If that line were broken, the whole of Sinkiang would be very hard to defend. The distant deserts which separate China proper from Sinkiang make the supply line for any expeditionary forces sent out from China proper danger-

⁹There is a voluminous literature on Islam in China both in Chinese and in Western languages. Concerning the literature in Chinese, see Isaac Mason: *Notes on Chinese Mohammedan Literature*, reprinted from *Journal of the North-China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. LVI, 1925. It contains more than 300 titles of Chinese Moslem publications, of which Mr. Mason collected over 240. Claude L. Pickens Jr.: *Annotated Bibliography of Literature on Islam in China* is another comprehensive work. It was originally prepared in New York, printed in successive sections of the *Friends of Moslems*, commencing with Vol. XXII, January, 1948. It contains literature in Chinese as well as in Western languages. For general information about Islam in China, see Martin Hartmann: "China" in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, I, 839-854; (hereafter referred to as Hartmann: "China" EI); Marshall Broomhall: *Islam in China, a Neglected Problem* (hereafter referred to as Broomhall: *Islam*); H. M. G. d'Ollone: *Recherches sur les Musulmans Chinois* (hereafter referred to as Ollone: *Recherches*); P. D. de Thiersant: *Le Mahométisme en Chine et dans le Turkestan Oriental*; the Archimandrite Palladius (Piotr Ivanovich Kafarov); translated by Rudolf Loewenthal: *The Mohammedans in China* reprinted from the *Digest of the Synodal Commission*, XVI, Nos. 3/4, March/April, 1943. (Other Western works concerning special topics will be mentioned in other related sections.)

¹⁰Cf. Harrison Forman: *Changing China*, 52-61.

ous, difficult and expensive to maintain. Yet the deserts are not an insurmountable barrier. For people with proper means, such as a strong cavalry, it is a wide-open highway. In fact, during the Manchu dynasty there were numerous invaders, and even Peking, the capital of the empire, was under direct threat. Obviously, this was the main reason why the Manchu government decided to conquer and hold Sinkiang: by other means if possible, but by military force if necessary.

The whole military record of the Manchus in northwest China is a footnote to the above mentioned point. A voluminous explanation, however, can be avoided by the following abridged quotation:

People often complain that the defense of Sinkiang is too expensive. Is that true? In Sinkiang we are stationing a little more than nineteen thousand soldiers and fourteen hundred officers. They are only troops shifted from Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Shensi and Kansu to garrison Sinkiang. The annual payroll amounts to a little more than 678,900 taels of silver, which would have to be paid to them if they were in their original posts. In an Imperial decree in 1772, Emperor Ch'ien-lung claimed: "Since we took over Sinkiang, it has become possible to demobilize a part of the frontier forces as well as the inland garrisons. Besides taking care of the expenses in Sinkiang, the empire saves more than 900,000 taels of silver every year. During these past ten or more years, the government has accumulated these savings up to more than 10,000,000 taels. Hence, during the earlier years of my reign, the treasury had a deposit of around 33,000,000 to 34,000,000 taels, and now the total has increased to 78,000,000 and more taels." Thus, the territory of Sinkiang is not only far from wasting money, but has actually saved the nation's economic resources.¹¹

Furthermore, in northern Sinkiang there are more than 238,600 mou

¹¹When Sinkiang was under Chinese control, it took less soldiers to hold the natural boundary, which was comparatively easier to defend. On the contrary, when Sinkiang was in the hands of a formidable enemy, the whole interior of China became exposed and required a standing army to be ready for potential as well as actual attacks. While the total number of soldiers had to be increased because of the unfavorable geographical position, the cost of national defense increased in proportion. That was the reason why Ch'ien-lung could demobilize part of his army after he conquered Sinkiang and save money. It was especially advantageous because rich southern Sinkiang could share a substantial part of the financial burden.

[each mou is approximately one-sixth of an acre] of "garrison farms"; in southern Sinkiang there are another 49,000 mou. These farms furnish the government an annual income of 14,300 tan¹² of various grains. There are more than 100,000 garrison farmers under the command of the general-in-chief in Urumchi (烏魯木齊提督). Besides the government-owned farms, the rest of the land is open for the common people to establish homesteads. The land cultivated there has been so successful that it is as rich as the land in China Proper. The people there are paying the same kind of taxes and services to the government, and enjoying a life similar to that of their fellow countrymen who are still living in China Proper. During their lifetime they have seen no military action. To compare with the earlier days under K'ang-hsi (1662-1772) and Yung-cheng (1723-1735), when the battle fires were threatening Peking, when the people on the frontier were exposed to constant danger, when the government had to transport all supplies across the distant desert to Kobdo (科布多) and Barkol (巴里坤) to continue a desperate struggle which consumed up to more than seventy million taels of public funds, which period has been more wasteful? Besides, China Proper is becoming more and more overpopulated. In Sinkiang we have found a rich underdeveloped land for our expansion. It is simply stupid to think of giving up Sinkiang to save expenses which have never been wasted.¹³

In simple words, the Manchu government considered it militarily safer to defend the country west of Sinkiang, instead of that at the door steps of Peking; and it was also financially more advisable to exploit the rich resources of the new dominion to maintain the frontier army, as well as to relieve the economic pressure on the resources of China Proper.

The second point—to keep a delicate balance of power between the various peoples so that the Manchus could rule them all—can be detected from the governmental establishments set up in Sinkiang after the area was subdued. Instead of transforming the land into a regular province, the Manchu government set up the Military Governor of Ili (伊犁將軍), the Military Lieutenant-Governor of Urumchi (烏魯木齊都統) and numerous Assistant Military Governors (參贊大臣), Commandants of the Forces (領隊大臣), and Agents (辦事大臣).¹⁴

¹²Each *tan*, or picul, is usually approximately 133.333 pounds. However, it varies in some areas.

¹³Wei Yüan: *Sheng-wu-chi*, IV, 13-15.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, IV, 12; 24-25.

All of these officials were exclusively "banner men" (the Manchu military forces).¹⁵ Five divisions (*tui* 隊) of military colonists were established in the strategic Ili region, drawn from the following sources, *viz.* Manchus from the Capital, Solon Manchus from the region of the Amur, Sibe Mongols from the Jehol region, Chahars and Oirats. Even the provinces of Shensi and Kansu were constantly under the rule of the "banner men," though not as exclusively as in Sinkiang. The refusal to send Chinese to be leading officials in Sinkiang was clear proof that the Manchu government intended to keep the area under direct and firm Manchu rule. The planned migration of different peoples from different parts of the empire into Sinkiang was another illustration of this policy, which tended to make it easier for the Manchu officials to control all of them.¹⁶

One of the advantages of this Manchu control was the fact that Manchus, being the common master over all, were not prejudiced against either Moslems or Chinese. Hence they could, at least theoretically, have less bias and weigh every issue on its own merits. This developed into the policy, which later was coined into a slogan: "We do not discriminate against either Moslems or Chinese, but we do discriminate against people who are evil" (不分漢回只問良莠). Of course, the so-called "evil" here meant action against the interests of the Manchu Government. As long as this policy had been faithfully carried out, Manchu rule over northwestern China was satisfactory.

4. GRADUAL ASSIMILATION AND THE IMPACT OF REVOLUTION

After two centuries of a generally successful regime in China, the empire as well as the ruling class had undergone a gradual change. One of the most striking and interesting developments was the process of assimilating the Manchus into Chinese civilization.

In 1644, when a small but strong army of Manchus stormed over the Great Wall, they were sturdy horsemen and sharp-shooters. They were brave and ready to fight. But by 1844 this gallantry had gone. Manchus were so adapted to Chinese civilization that they had lost nearly all of their own culture, including their many virtues. A typical

¹⁵See below section 5.

¹⁶Schuyler: *Turkistan*, II, 174.

and vivid example may be found in a popular work of fiction called *Erh-nü ying-hsiung chuan*, or *The Romance of a Young Hero and Some Heroines* (兒女英雄傳). Since this novel was written by a Manchu to express his own unrealized dreams, it becomes all the more significant to find there what the Manchus were thinking and doing in the middle of the nineteenth century. The "hero" in this novel was such a weakling that he had to depend upon a girl to rescue him from danger. When he was appointed as an official to Uliasutai (烏里雅蘇臺) in Mongolia, the entire family virtually mourned for the appointee.¹⁷

This gradual process of assimilation weakened the Manchus physically, and in many cases corrupted them morally. With the decline of their physical strength and fighting spirit, they became less formidable in military power, which was an essential element needed to hold the Empire together.¹⁸

The Opium War of 1840-1842 exposed the weakness of the Manchu government and became the prelude to a series of domestic revolutions as well as foreign invasions. Among these new disturbances were the T'ai-p'ing, the *Nien* and the Moslem rebellions. The T'ai-p'ing (太平天國) built up an empire of its own, spread its influence from Kwangsi province in the utmost south to the outskirts of Tientsin, a city only eighty-four miles southeast of Peking, the capital, and barely missed overthrowing the Manchu dynasty as a whole. This uprising lasted from 1850 to 1864. Only by desperate effort did the Manchu government defeat the T'ai-p'ing forces. The campaign left the country half-destroyed and half-exhausted.¹⁹

The *Nien* (捻) were less formal, but even more destructive. A type of guerrilla warfare was carried on by swift-moving cavalry in the

¹⁷Wen-k'ang: *Erh-nü Ying-hsiung Chuan*. Preface by Hu-shih, 1-26; Chapter IV-VI; XL, 3-23; 56.

¹⁸Latourette: *The Chinese*, 5401543. Franz Michael: "Military Organization and Power Structure of China during the Taiping Rebellion" in *Pacific Historical Review*, XVIII, 469-483.

¹⁹Cf. W. J. Hail: *Tseng Kuo-fan and the Taiping Rebellion*; G. E. Taylor: "The Taiping Rebellion: Its Economic Background and Social Theory" in *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, Jan. 1933, Vol. XVI, 545-614; T. T. Meadows: *The Chinese and their Rebellions*; T. Hamberg: *The Visions of Hung-Siu-Tchuen*.

provinces of Shantung, Honan, Anhwei, Hupeh, Shensi, Shansi and Chihli. The *Nien*, a kind of secret society long in existence, intensified its activities from 1851 on and formally rebelled in 1853. It continually played a tragic role of destruction until 1868, when its troops were finally trapped and destroyed, after numerous famous government generals had failed in earlier tries.²⁰

All these conflicts were going on when the Moslem rebellions broke out in Yunnan (1855-1873), Shensi, Kansu and Sinkiang. In this work, the field is limited to the Northwestern provinces.

5. MILITARY FORCES AND POLITICAL POWER GROUPS

One of the key factors which marked the rise and decline of the Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty was its military forces. In order to understand the Moslem rebellion, it is necessary to explain briefly the forces involved on the Government side.

The "*Eight Banners*." In the beginning, Manchus built their basic forces on a system of "Banners." In 1601, the Manchu chief Nurhaci organized his men into four fighting units of 300 men each, known as *niru* (牛录, later changed to *tso-lin* 佐領), or company. These units were distinguished by yellow, white, blue, and red banners. As his conquests brought more men to his side, the number of companies increased, and these were distributed under the four Banners. In 1615, he divided each of the original Banners into two divisions, the new ones being distinguished by borders on their flags. Under each of these Eight Banners there were five *jalan* (扎欄 or 甲喇, later changed to *ts'an-ling* 參領) which in turn comprised five *niru* each. In later years the number of *jalan* and *niru* increased, but the number of Banners remained fixed at eight. Thus was founded the Eight Banner System (八旗制度), primarily a military organization, which proved of great value to Nurhaci and to his successors in their wars of conquest. But the system also had social, political and economic aspects, owing to the fact that each company comprised not only the 300 warriors but also their families. Except for a few princes, everyone under Nurhaci's rule belonged to this organization. In time

²⁰Siang-tseh Chiang: "The Organization of the Nien Rebellion and the Struggle between the Nien and the Loyalists (1851-1868)." 27.

of peace, the men and women of the company worked as farmers or as craftsmen, the affairs of each company being directed by a hereditary captain. In time of war, the captain was ordered to supply a certain number of men from his company—the number depending on the seriousness of the situation. The captain also provided for all the needs of the conscripts by collecting provisions or money from his constituents as a whole. On the battlefield the men were grouped under their respective Banners, which were fighting units. Thus, by means of the Eight Banner System, Nurhaci organized his entire state into a war machine which proved for half a century, at least, to be an invincible military organization.²¹

When later more and more Mongols and Chinese surrendered to the Manchus, separate Mongolian Eight Banners and Chinese Eight Banners were established. Altogether there were twenty-four Banners. At the time when the Manchus invaded China Proper in 1644, there were 320 *niru* in the Manchu Eight Banners, or 96,000 soldiers; 131 *niru* in the Mongolian Eight Banners, or 39,300 soldiers; 171 *niru* in the Chinese Eight Banners, or 51,300 soldiers. The total was about 186,600 soldiers.²² These were the main forces which the Manchu government used to fight the earlier wars. The Manchus, however, soon found that this force was not enough to handle the situation. The Bannermen were too few to guard the vast territory of China, and furthermore, their excellent ability to fight on horseback was not too effective in the mountainous and swampy areas of southern China. Hence the Manchu Court decided to utilize the surrendered Ming soldiers and organized them into *Lü-ying* (綠營 Green Battalions, or Green Banners 綠旗).²³ The Green Battalions thus became one part of the regular troops of the Manchu Empire. But due to racial prejudice and historical background, the Manchu Court trusted the Eight Banners much more than the Green Battalions. The best weapons were issued to the Eight Banners but denied to the Green Battalions. Numerous other privileges were granted to the members of the Eight Banners, but not to those of the Green Battalions. In the most important strategic cities,

²¹ECCP, 596. Cf. Michael: "Military Organization..." in *PHR*, XVIII, 470.

²²*Huang-ch'ao Wen-hsien T'ung-k'ao*, CLXXIX. Lo Erh-kang: *Lü-ying Ping-chih*, 1, 7. Hereafter referred to as Lo: *Lü-ying*.

²³Lo: *Lü-ying*, 1-3.

there were the Eight Banners serving as garrison forces. This was an army which could be counted on to be loyal to the Manchu Court under any circumstances. As long as the Eight Banners were strong, the control of the country was in the hands of the Manchu Court.²⁴

Due to their general decline in physical strength as well as in military technique, the Eight Banners gradually became less and less effective as the years went by. As early as 1657, only thirteen years after the Manchu entry into Peking, an edict of the Emperor Shun-chih admitted a decline in the fighting strength of the Eight Banners.²⁵ In later campaigns, such as the one against Cheng Ch'eng-kung, the famous supporter of the Ming dynasty in Formosa and the one against "San Fen," or the Three Feudatories (三藩), the Eight Banners were usually kept in the rear, while soldiers of the Green Battalions were fighting at the front. Even in those campaigns in northwestern China where the geographical situation was more favorable to the Manchu horsemen, they needed the help of the Chinese Green Battalion to accomplish their victories. After the period of Ch'ienlung, the Eight Banners were no more effective fighting forces.²⁶

The *Green Battalions*. As stated above, the Green Battalions, or the Green Banners, were reorganized from the Ming army which surrendered to the Manchus after the latter entered China Proper in 1644. The Manchu Court assigned the color green to its banners to distinguish it from the Eight Banners. The Court used this Chinese army to guard its vast territory. The military system under the Mings had been a well-designed institution for this very purpose, yet at the same time it concentrated power in the hands of the central government. The Manchu Court immediately realized its value and adopted the same system. This system remained about the same during the Ch'ing dynasty with very few basic changes until the last years, when it was first "reformed," and finally abolished. In brief, the Green Battalion was a system of garrison forces stationed at strategic positions all over the country. At its prime, in Peking, the national capital, the Green Battalion developed into a force of five battalions with ten thousand soldiers.²⁷ Outside of Peking, in China Proper, spreading over eleven military regions, around 66

²⁴Lo: *Lü-ying*, 5.

²⁵*Ch'ing-shih-kao*, V, 16.

²⁶Lo: *Lü-ying*, 6-7.

²⁷*Ibid.*, 26-27.

military centers, the Green Battalions had 1,169 battalions, with a total strength of 643,344 men.²⁸ On the frontier, there were also Green Battalions in Sinkiang, Mongolia and Tibet.²⁹ Its organization was similar throughout the country, though the strength varied according to the needs of the district. In districts where little potential danger existed, very few troops were stationed. However, along the western frontier and the eastern sea coast, where a potential enemy might come, numerous military centers were established and more troops were stationed. The eleven military regions in China Proper were Chihli, Shantung, Shansi, Honan, Liang-Kiang, Min-Che, Hu-Kwang, Shen-Kan, Szechwan, Liang-Kwang, and Yün-Kwei. Each region included from one to three provinces, forming a convenient geographical unit for military actions. The governor-general, or the governor of the region, became the supervisor of the Green Battalions of the area. In each region, one or more strategic centers were named. At each of these centers, a *chen* (鎮), the largest unit of the Green Battalions, established its headquarters. The commander of the *chen* was the *Tsung-ping* (總兵), or Brigadier-general. There were 66 *chen* in China Proper. Some of them commanded a large number of troops while others commanded very few, depending on the degree of importance of the place. Above the *Tsung-ping*, there was another rank, *T'i-tu* (提督), General-in-chief or Provincial Commander-in-chief, who usually commanded two or more *chen*. In some provinces the governor was concurrently appointed to be the *T'i-tu*. In other provinces, the *T'i-tu* were specially appointed.

Here lies the significant point. Though in this system, the *Tsung-ping* was the one who directly controlled the army, he was under the supervision of the *T'i-tu*, the governor, and the governor-general. Furthermore, he had no power to control revenue. On the other hand, though the *T'i-tu*, governor and governor-general were higher officials and had greater power, they could only direct the bulk of the army through the *Tsung-ping*, who was the commander of the *chen*, the largest unit of the Green Battalions. Furthermore, the overlapping powers granted to the *T'i-tu*, governor and governor-general were designed to check each other, so that the central government could control them all.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 90-158.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 42-43.

One also finds a system of checks and balances. In the organization of the Green Battalions, each of the high commanders or supervisors, namely, the *Tsung-ping*, the *T'i-tu*, the governor, the governor-general, had some troops under their direct control. This part of the army was called *piao* (標). The bulk of the army, divided into units such as *hsüeh* (協), *ying* (營), and *hsin* (汛), was stationed at various other places. Each had its commanding officer. A high commander must depend upon these lower-ranking commanding officers to control each of these scattered units. Without their cooperation, the high commanders could not act effectively. Yet the *piao*, which was under the direct control of the higher officers, was bigger and stronger than any of the *hsüeh*, *ying*, or *hsin* standing alone. In other words, the high commanders could not rebel against the central government because the system did not allow them to have absolute control of the bulk of the army; while the lower officers also could not rebel because no one of them when standing alone was a match for any of the high commanders.³⁰

This system of checks and balances was effective for two reasons. In the first place, the soldiers were all recruited from the vicinity where the army was stationed. In later years, they often came from families who had served in the army for generations. The soldiers might be sent to other places to serve, but eventually they would return to their original battalion when the mission ended. On the other hand, the officers of the Green Battalions usually came from outside, and no one was supposed to stay in one post long. The soldiers were thus attached to the garrison posts, but not to the officers. When an officer was transferred, he was forbidden to bring soldiers with him. Hence no one could dominate the Green Battalion and turn it into a private army.³¹

In the second place, all officers and soldiers of the Green Battalions were registered³² and paid by the central government.³³ The officers in this army from the *T'i-tu* down could not move troops without the order of the governor or the governor-general, who were civilians knowing little about fighting. The governor and the governor-general could

³⁰Lo: *Lü-ying*, 183-185.

³¹*Ibid.*, 177-181; 242-247.

³²*Ibid.*, 231-242.

³³*Ibid.*, 291-293.

only use the army within their jurisdiction. In the case of big campaigns, no commander could move any troops without permission of the Manchu Court.³⁴

This was a good system for a central government eager to control the country. As long as the Green Battalion system worked, even if the Eight Banners were weak, power would still be in the hands of the Manchu Court.

After the middle years of Ch'ien-lung (1736-1796), empire-building came to a stop. A long period of stable conditions kept the Green Battalions inactive, and the army became stagnant. According to Lo Erh-kang, there were three basic weaknesses in the system of Green Battalions. First, the fixed pay was too low for the high costs of living of the later days. The soldiers had to take up side jobs to make a living. Secondly, the army was scattered in too many guarding posts and the soldiers were used in too many kinds of miscellaneous jobs. Both of these two factors hurt the effective control of the officers over the soldiers. Discipline collapsed and the training program failed. Thirdly, the traditional method of calling soldiers from various battalions to form a fighting unit in a war proved to be disastrous because the officers and the soldiers were strangers to each other, and very little cooperation could be expected within a short period of time.³⁵

Thus, long before the Moslem rebellion started in 1862, the regular army, both the Eight Banners and the Green Battalions, had become too weak to face any real challenge.

The *Local Corps* (*T'uan-lien* 團練). In spite of the fact that China had always been an empire and Chinese scholars had promoted the idea of "only one sun in the sky and only one king in the kingdom," numerous forces were working against the centralization of power. The vastness of the country and the inadequate communication between areas had been helpful to the forces of disintegration. The influence and order, even of a strong dynasty, often stopped at the level of county government. The business of the local community below the level of the county was often managed by community leaders. These leaders became influential and powerful for various reasons. Some

³⁴*Ibid.*, 213-216.

³⁵Lo Erh-kang: *Hsiang-chün Hsin-chih*, Chapter I, section 1. This is a gift copy sent by the author to Dr. Franz H. Michael in the author's own handwriting. There is no page number. Hereafter referred to as Lo: *Hsiang-chün*.

were former officials; some had degrees or titles; some were wealthy; some were the only educated ones around; some were leaders of a certain religion or a certain secret society. No matter what their qualifications were, they were the people who dominated the common folk. In peaceful times, these leaders often kept a balance of power among themselves as well as against the government. But this balance could easily be upset whenever things went wrong. At periods of emergency, when government military forces were weakened or preoccupied by open rebellions in other areas, the need for self-protection prompted the local community leaders to organize military forces of their own.

*According to the size of the group or its locality, these local units varied from two or three hundred to five hundred men; and most of them were organized under officers for each one hundred, twenty-five, and five men, respectively. Their equipment consisted mostly of spears, halberds, and bows and arrows, but fire weapons were also used in increasing numbers.*³⁶

These local corps, being organized by the local groups, were not necessarily defensive, nor to be sponsored by the gentry who were friendly to the government. They often expressed the local economic discontent. In order to support the local corps, the leaders had to raise money one way or another from the timid common folk. While private sources of income were tapped, the local corps, especially those of the gentry, soon reached a position where they could contend for control of the local land tax or rice tribute.³⁷

In 1862, when the T'ai-p'ings invaded Shensi, both the local Moslem and the Chinese gentry had organized local corps. The Manchu government encouraged them to resist the T'ai-p'ings, but instead of doing so, the Moslems and the Chinese local corps soon started to fight each other. They had long had old grudges to be settled. With both the Moslems and the Chinese people well organized, a small incident touched off the big rebellion. Since local corps existed almost everywhere, each became a potential source of disintegration.

The *Hsiang-chün*, *Ch'u-chün* and *Huai-chün*. After the T'ai-p'ings rebelled, the Manchu Court found the regular army helpless. Neither the Eight Banners nor the Green Battalions could stop the T'ai-p'ings.

³⁶Michael: "Military Organization . . ." in *PHR*, XVIII, 473.

³⁷*Ibid.*, 473-475.

In desperation, the Court thought of utilizing local corps to support the regular army. Within two months in 1853 it authorized forty-three different people to sponsor local corps in ten provinces. Among these, one became famous. He was Tseng Kuo-fan (曾國藩 1811-1872), a native of Hsiang-hsiang, Hunan and a *chin-shih* of 1838. In 1849, he was promoted to be junior vice-president of the Board of Ceremonies. In 1852, he returned home to observe the mourning period for his mother's death. He was called from his home because of the emergency. After he went to Changsha, he realized that mere local corps would not be able to suppress the T'ai-p'ings. He started to build up an entirely new army, the *Hsiang-chün* (湘軍), or the Hunan Army. He borrowed his idea mainly from the famous Ming general, Ch'i Chi-kuang (戚繼光).³⁸ The *Hsiang-chün* was an army built around personalities. The officers were mainly Hunan scholars, whereas the soldiers were mainly Hunan peasants. It started in 1852 with three battalions, each of 360 men. In the spring of 1853, 2,000 more soldiers were recruited from Hsiang-hsiang, Tseng's home county and 1,000 from Hsin-ning (新寧). They fought some early battles successfully.³⁹ Due to necessity, Tseng also started a navy. In 1854, Tseng reorganized his *Hsiang-chün* and unified the organization. He changed the number of men in each battalion from 360 to 500. Altogether, he had ten army battalions and ten navy battalions. With this force of about 10,000 men Tseng started to direct his campaigns against the T'ai-p'ings in person.⁴⁰ The lowest unit of the *Hsiang-chün* was a team, or *tui* (隊), with one corporal, or *shih-chang* (什長), ten soldiers, and one cook. (In teams carrying long guns there were twelve soldiers.) Two teams with long guns plus six regular teams made a company, or *shao* (哨). Each company had one commander, one vice-commander, five guards and one cook besides the teams. Four companies plus six teams of "Battalion commander's guards" (營官親兵) (two of these six teams were carrying mortars) formed a battalion (營). Each battalion had one commander.⁴¹ Tseng and his colleagues chose only the generals. They trusted each general to

³⁸Lo: *Hsiang-chün*, Chapter II, section 1. Tseng Kuo-fan: *Memorials*, 1.

³⁹Lo: *Hsiang-chün*, Chapter II, section 2.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, Chapter II, section 3

⁴¹*Ibid.*, Chapter IV

organize his own army. The general in turn would choose the commanders of the battalions. These battalion commanders would choose their own company commanders who in turn would choose their own corporals. The corporal would choose the soldiers under him. Each soldier had to have a clean record and must have some sponsor to guarantee his behavior. The soldiers knew their commanders and *vice versa*. No loafers, no rascals, no strangers were taken in. They all came from Hunan (though some officers were exceptions), often from the same county. Many were relatives. The pay was high; the discipline and training were strict. The soldiers and officers owed everything to their superior and were loyal to him alone. The commanders in turn had to raise the needed funds and had to take care of every need of their followers, as a father would take care of his children.⁴²

This new army proved to be effective in fighting the T'ai-p'ings. After the total collapse of the regular army outside of Nanking in 1860, the Manchu Court finally appointed Tseng Kuo-fan to be governor-general of Liang-Kiang. This Governorship was what Tseng needed to raise funds for his young army. But so far the Manchu Court had deliberately denied him this kind of post because the Court was well aware that once Tseng obtained such a post, his army might be beyond their control. This appointment indicated that the Court had no more faith in either the Eight Banners or the Green Battalions. It reluctantly made the decision to risk its future with these Chinese generals. Besides Tseng, it appointed Tso Tsung-t'ang to reinforce Chekiang and Li Hung-chang to reinforce Shanghai. Each organized an independent army on the pattern and organization of the *Hsiang-chün* (湘軍). Tso recruited his soldiers from Hunan. To distinguish his troops from Tseng's, he called his army the *Ch'u-chün* (楚軍). Li recruited his soldiers from the vicinity of his home, Ho-fei of Anhwei (安徽合肥) and called the army the *Huai-chün* (淮軍).

After Nanking, the capital of the T'ai-p'ings, fell, Tseng Kuo-fan immediately disbanded all the troops of the *Hsiang-chün* except that group under Liu Sung-shan. He did so mainly for two reasons. First, the influence of the *Hsiang-chün* had been so great that the Manchu Court was obviously feeling uneasy about it. Tseng, being loyal to the Court, disbanded the army to show that he had no ambitions.

⁴²Chen Ch'ang: *T'ing-chün Chi-lüeh* (霆軍紀畧), I, 20-22. Lo: *Hsiang-chün*, Chapters IV and VII.

Second, Tseng had discovered that the discipline and morale of the *Hsiang-chün* had declined. The continued existence of this army would become a burden instead of an asset to him as well as to the Manchu government. Tso's *Ch'u-chün* and Li's *Huai-chün*, however, continued.

Any army organized on the pattern of the *Hsiang-chün* was firmly controlled by its leader. When the leader of such an army won control of an area and its revenue, the whole group became a strong regional force that would destroy the empire. By the rise of the *Hsiang-chün*, *Ch'u-chün* and *Huai-chün*, the generals were so closely tied to the army that the Manchu Court found that it had either to use the general or to disband the army. Since the Court could not afford to lose an army, it appointed the generals governors and governors-general in order to raise funds to feed the army. By this time, the treasury of the central government was too poor to take care of the troops.⁴³

During the period before the outbreak of the Moslem rebellion in Shensi, the influence of the Manchu Court had declined together with the failure of the Eight Banners and the Green Battalions. The struggle between the local Moslem and Chinese military corps, each a regional force, led to an open Moslem rebellion. The emergency called for the use of armies organized on the pattern of the *Hsiang-chün*. These armies were themselves regional forces. They helped to suppress the Moslems, but there were conflicts between the various groups. These conflicts often influenced governmental policy. A good example was the policy of the recovery of Sinkiang. Tso Tsung-t'ang and his group, who were expanding their influence into the northwest, were eager to recover Sinkiang, while Li Hung-chang and his group, who were eager to dominate the coastal provinces, were more enthusiastic to keep the funds for their own uses. When the arguments were presented to the Manchu Court, the Court found that its own interests coincided with those of Tso, so it favored and supported the policy of recovering Sinkiang.

6. COLLAPSE OF THE BASIC POLICY

When the Moslem rebellion broke out in Shensi in 1862, the west-

⁴³Lo: *Hsiang-chün*, Chapter XIII, sections 2 and 3.

ern provinces of Kansu and Sinkiang were quiet. However, when the government failed to extinguish the fire immediately, it naturally spread. In city after city, town after town, new riots started, until the whole area stretching from Shensi to Sinkiang was involved. It was climaxed by the Russian occupation of Ili in 1871,⁴⁴ and the establishment of the Kingdom of Kashgaria by Yakoob Beg (阿古柏 ca. 1820-1877) of Khokand (浩罕) in 1873.⁴⁵

The weakened and disheartened Manchu government had already been overwhelmed by the problems of the T'ai-p'ing, the *Nien*, and the Moslems in Yunnan, not to mention constant pressure by European nations.

From the beginning of the Moslem rebellion in the northwestern provinces, the Manchu government tried to cling to the basic policy laid down in the heyday of the dynasty mentioned above. Nevertheless, the developments which had taken place during the preceding years made this policy ridiculously unreal for the Manchu government of 1862.

In the first place, to hold Sinkiang in the face of so many contenders required a sizable and efficient army, well-supplied, well-fed, well-trained, and well-led; but this was the very thing which the government could not provide. The leading local officials in Sinkiang were exclusively "banner men." They were unable to furnish the necessary leadership to hold Sinkiang. Once the people in Sinkiang were out of control, the work of sending an expedition all the way across the desert from China Proper became increasingly difficult. Yet the Manchu government realized the danger of deserting Sinkiang, besides the unforgivable sin of losing a piece of territory "received from our ancestors."

The result was an exhibition of split personality. On the one hand, the Manchu government cursed and rejected every hint to give up Sinkiang, yet on the other, it watched the slow downfall of the frontier cities one by one, without making any serious effort to save them. It was not that the officials in the Court were really heartless, but rather that the government had become so feeble that it could hardly do very much. This collapse of the first part of the basic policy was bluntly

⁴⁴Schuyler: *Turkistan*, II, 174-188; O. K. Heins: "Rising of the Dungans or Mussulman Population in Western China" in *Edinburgh Review*, April, 1868, pp. 381-383.

⁴⁵Heins: "Rising of the Dungans..." in *Edinburgh Review*, April, 1868, pp. 389-393. Cf. Marshall Broomhall: *Islam in China*, 147-163; W. L. Bales: *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 212-229.

pointed out by the outspoken Li Yün-lin (李雲麟),⁴⁶ the acting military Governor of Ili. He said in a memorial to the Throne:

Within two years from the start of the trouble in Sinkiang, the whole area was lost. Though there were urgent decrees ordering the different forces to rush to the scene, the Court never had any serious consideration of the actual ability of these general, or the whereabouts of the needed supplies, or the real strength of the designated army. There was only wishful thinking that by strict orders there might be a chance of an accidental success. . . .

Your Majesty is planning to retake Sinkiang, yet you have never calculated the plan in reality. Your Majesty is in reality deserting Sinkiang yet you refuse to accept the bad name.⁴⁷

The first part of the basic policy, to hold Sinkiang, had become wishful thinking and hopeless drifting by 1866.

To carry out the second part of the basic policy (to keep a delicate balance of power between the various peoples so that the Manchus could rule them all), it was necessary to have a strong, efficient Manchu bureaucracy which would be loyal to the Throne and fair to the subjects. With a few exceptions, the Manchu officials were unfortunately no longer strong and efficient. They were not even loyal or fair. As has already been mentioned, the average Manchu was afraid of being sent to the frontier. After the trouble in Sinkiang started, the Court subsequently found that at least twelve of the twenty-three leading offices in Sinkiang were vacant because the appointed officials were not on the job. Of these twelve, ten never did arrive, despite repeated instructions issued by the Court demanding their prompt arrival.⁴⁸

⁴⁶Li Yün-lin belonged to the Chinese Plain White Banner, and started his career as a student volunteer in Tseng Kuo-fan's army for suppressing the T'ai-p'ings. By accumulating merit, he reached the rank of Deputy Lieutenant-General. He was proud, critical, careless, and fond of extravagant talk. More than once he brought trouble upon himself. By this time he had been demoted to an office in Sinkiang. Then Ili fell and the Court found the former senior officers there either dead or absent. Li was thus appointed to act as the Military Governor for the time being. *Ch'ing-shih-kao, Wen-yüan*, III, 16 (清史稿·文苑卷三, 頁十六).

⁴⁷I-Hsin ed.: *P'ing-ting Shen-kan Hsin-chiang Hui-fei Fang-lüeh* (奕訢等: 平定陝甘新疆回匪方略), hereafter referred to as *Fang-lüeh*, CXXXVII, 18-20; memorial of Li Yün-lin; T'ung-chih (同治), 5th year, 7th month, 4th day.

⁴⁸*Fang-lüeh*, LXXX, 17-18; Decree to the Cabinet; T. C. 3 y., 10 m., 4 d. and Mayers: *The Chinese Government*, 103.

When Ili and Tarbagatai (塔爾巴哈臺) were in danger, instead of rushing help to these cities, the neighboring Assistant Military Governor at Kobdo (科不多參贊大臣), Kuangfeng (廣鳳), withheld the badly needed military funds sent to those cities. Watching the besieged cities dying for lack of supplies, he was thinking of taking over the sum when those cities fell.⁴⁹

Ili fell on March 8, 1866, and Tarbagatai fell on April 11, 1866. Both cities had been besieged for months. At the beginning of the siege, a Manchu general, Ch'eng-lu (成祿) was dispatched to rescue Sinkiang. In the spring of 1873, six years after the cities fell, he was still inside Kansu, nine hundred miles away from Ili, dragging his feet and making every excuse to avoid a march into Sinkiang. The other Manchu generals with the same mission, Lien-chieh (聯捷 -January 25, 1866) and Ho-ling (鶴齡) did not even go that far. However, both Ch'eng-lu and Lien-chieh, on their way west, had left a notorious record of extorting money from the public and mistreating the people.⁵⁰

In the earlier days, the Manchus, from the Emperor down to the rank and file, were neutral in dealing with the racial and religious problems between Chinese and Moslems. They behaved like a common master, sitting high and aloof and ruling over all. Because they were foreigners themselves, they treated Chinese with the same attitude they treated Moslems. After their thorough assimilation into the Chinese civilization, the Manchus of the nineteenth century became a different people. They had adopted Chinese philosophy and religion, as well as Chinese prejudices. From the Empress Dowager down to the local officials, no matter how long or how loudly they talked about their fairness in dealing with the Chinese-Moslem conflict, they were anti-Moslem in their hearts. Consequently, whereas in earlier days all conflicts between Moslems and Chinese were utilized to promote the Manchu empire, in the nineteenth century similar conflicts were sure to involve Manchus and draw them into trouble on the Chinese side. The Manchus were no longer aloof, no longer fair. The old practice of "no discrimination against either Moslems or Chinese, but only discrimination against people who are evil," was no longer a policy, but only empty words: No empty words could effectively hold people, especially aggressive ones, for long.⁵¹

⁴⁹*Fang-lüeh*, CXXVIII, 2-3, Kuang-feng, T. C. 5 y., 2 m., 9 d.

⁵⁰Tso: *Memorials*, XLIII, 28; *Fang-lüeh*, CXXII, 19-20; Yang Yüeh-pin; T. C. 4 y., 12 m., 4 d.

⁵¹*Fang-lüeh*, XLI, 8-9; to To-lung-a and others; T. C. 2 y., 4 m., 14 d.

MAP I SHENSI IN 1862

- Provincial Border
- ~ River
- City
- Capital

○ *Ku-yuan*


○ *P'ing-liang*

KANSU

SHENSI

SHANSI

HONAN



P'u-ch'eng

Tu-ti Ch'ao-ti
(*T'ung-chou*)

T'ung-kuan

Hua-ying

Hua-chou

Wei-nan

San-yuan

Chin-yang

Kao-ling

Ling-t'ung

Sian

Hsien-yang

Wei River

Chou-chih

Hu-hsien

Chien-yang

Feng-hsiang

Pao-chi

became dangerous.⁴ It happened that in the latter part of May, in the county of Hua-chou, some Moslems went to a Chinese to buy bamboo poles. The Chinese raised the price, which the Moslems refused to pay. A quarrel developed, followed by a fight. Several Moslems were injured and some died. The free-for-all was halted by peacemakers and the mob dissolved. Instead of settling the case then and there, the Chinese sneaked into the Moslem village in the evening and set a big fire. Since both the Moslems and the Chinese had already been organized into local corps, the fighting that followed was violent and on a large scale. It soon spread to Wei-nan and Ta-li and the rebellion was on its way.⁵

At this time, Moslem towns and villages in the area of Sian were quiet and peaceful. Nevertheless, one of the Chinese gentry, Mei Chin-t'ang (梅錦堂), led a group of more than two thousand Chinese local corps and drove into the Moslem villages in the county of Ch'ang-an. They burned down Moslem houses and killed many Moslems. Then they went to attack a Moslem village, Hui-ch'u-pao (輝渠堡), in the county of Hu-hsien. The entire village with hundreds of peaceful homes was burned down; thousands of dead Moslems were left lying in the ashes. Similar incidents happened in many other places where the Moslems had neither the intention nor the means to start trouble. Innocent people, in groups large and small, were murdered. Their houses were destroyed. While the old and weak fell victims, the young and the strong fled to the northern bank of the Wei River, and having organized die-hard groups of rebels, came back for revenge. More Chinese villages and towns were then ransacked and more Moslems joined the rebels.⁶

Being alarmed, Ying-ch'i (瑛棨),⁷ the governor of Shensi, sent out

⁴W. L. Bales: *Tso Tsungt'ang*, 221-222. Baron F. von Richthofen: *Baron Richthofen's Letters 1870-1872*, 104-105.

⁵"The memorial from Ying-ch'i, the governor of Shensi, to the Throne," *Fang-lieh*, XIII, 7. Ying-ch'i, T. C. 1 y., 5 m., 26 d. Cf. Wen-djang Chu, "The Immediate Cause of the Moslem Rebellion in Northwest China in 1862", in the *Central Asiatic Journal*, III, No. 4, (1958), 309-316.

⁶*Fang-lieh*, XXII, 5; "Sheng-pao", T. C. 1-y., intercalary 8 m., 23 d.

⁷Ying-ch'i belonged to the Chinese Plain White Banner. He was the Financial Commissioner of Shensi when he became acting governor of Shensi in the early part of 1861. In that summer he was appointed governor. *Hsü Shensi T'ung-chih Kao*, XI, 11.

a leading member of the native Chinese gentry, Chang Fei (張芾),⁸ to negotiate peace with the rebels. Chang Fei, former Senior Vice-president of the Censorate, was then at home, organizing local corps to defend Shensi against the T'ai-p'ings. On June 2, he left Sian for the troubled spots. Besides his grandnephew, Chang T'ao (張濤), his group included four government officials, two of the native gentry, Chiang Jo-no (蔣若訥), a Chinese, and Ma Pai-ling (馬伯齡), a Moslem. When some friends advised Chang at the last minute to change his mind, he refused to give up the mission. On June 3, they crossed the Wei River and stayed overnight at Yu-fang-chieh (油坊街) in the county of Lin-t'ung (臨潼). Magistrate Miao Shu-pen (繆樹本) met Chang in the town and played host to the group. In the meantime, thousands of Chinese local corps from different areas rallied around the town to provide protection for the group. This, however, was not what Chang planned. He advised the local corps to leave. When they showed hesitancy, Chang angrily ordered them to dissolve and leave immediately. "Otherwise, I am going to accuse you of rebellion." The local corps left reluctantly.⁹ Chang did this because he believed the promise given by some Moslem leaders, who had said, "As soon as the Chinese local corps are dissolved, we will disband too."¹⁰

That evening, the Moslem leaders of Ts'ang-t'ou (a Moslem town) came with a dozen or more people, pleading that they were not intending to rebel. They used violence only because the Chinese had attacked and insulted them. Chang comforted them and said: "You are all good subjects. The only man wanted is the conspirator, Jen Lao-wu." Chang said this without knowing that Jen was right there in front of him in the group. Greatly irritated, Jen quietly left the room. Eventually, the other Moslems left too, without saying much except to whisper to Ma Pai-ling, a member of the Moslem gentry, warning him to go home immediately. Ma passed the warning on to Chang, but

⁸Chang Fei (1820?-1862) was a native of Ching-yang, Shensi. He received his degree of *chin-shih* in 1835 and became a Han-lin Bachelor. In 1859 he became the Senior Vice-President of the Censorate. In 1860 he returned home to observe the customary mourning period. In 1861 he was called out to lead the organization of local corps. *Ch'ing-shih Lieh-chuan*, II, 20-25.

⁹*P'ing-hui-chih*, vol. 1, in *Hui-ming Ch'i-i*, III, 61.

¹⁰*Fang-lüeh*, XXII, 4-5; "Sheng-pao," T. C. 1 y. intercalary 8 m., 23 d.

Chang refused to give up his mission. Jen soon returned with force and kidnapped Chang, Ma, Miao, Chiang and others.¹¹ On June 7, Jen took them to Ts'ang-t'ou-chen. Two days later, at noon, Chang Fei, Miao Shu-pen, and Chiang Jo-no were taken to a river bank and murdered.¹² Ma Pai-ling was confined for more than half a year before he managed to escape.¹³

In the great turmoil that followed, thousands of people, Moslems as well as Chinese, died. Not all of the Moslems were willing to rebel. Many were killed by their fellow Moslems because they refused to cooperate.¹⁴

The rebels swept eastward and besieged the city of T'ung-chou (同州). There they continued a fierce attack for eight days and eight nights. On June 29, the Moslems turned westward and assailed the west suburb wall of Sian, the provincial capital.¹⁵ Ma Te-chao (馬德昭), the defending general, temporarily repulsed the invaders, but did not bring much relief to the nervous population of that city. The rebellion had spread far and wide; like wildfire. Before long, Sian was almost isolated, with only the southern side linked by occasional messengers to the outside world. The daily increasing number of refugees fleeing into the city made the already serious problem of supplies even more complicated. Salt, fuel and other daily necessities became more and more scarce. Learning that some salt and charcoal were stored in a town named Ts'ao-tien (草店) on the river bank in the outskirts of the city, General Ma personally directed an operation to secure these supplies. He was ambushed, but nevertheless managed to bring back to Sian seventeen wagonloads of salt and charcoal, a very meager supply for such a large city.¹⁶ Meager though it was, such a blessing was not to be continued. Incessant assaults by the rebels kept General

¹¹*P'ing-hui-chih*, vol. 1, in *Hui-ming Ch'i-i*, III, 61.

¹²*Fang-lüeh*, XIX, 10-11; The report of an eyewitness, a Moslem soldier, Ma Hsi-lu (馬錫祿), quoted in "Ying-ch'i" T. C. 1 y., 8 m., 17 d. Cf. Thiersant: *Le Mahométisme en Chine*, I, 162-163.

¹³*P'ing-hui-chih*, vol. I, in *Hui-ming Ch'i-i*, III, 62. *Fang-lüeh*, XXXIV, 14; "Ying-ch'i." T. C. 2 y., 2 m., 6 d. He returned to Sian on T. C. 2 y., 1 m., 12 d. or March 1, 1863.

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵*Fang-lüeh*, XIV, 9; "Ying-ch'i" T. C. 1 y., 6 m., 15 d.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, XV, 1-2; "Ying-ch'i," T. C. 1 y., 6 m., 29 d.

Ma and others so busy that they could hardly do anything but patch up the weak defenses of the city.¹⁷

A great rebellion was under way.

2. MAKING THE POLICY

When the Moslem rebellion broke out in 1862 in Shensi, the Manchu government already had its hands full of trouble. The T'ai-p'ing Rebellion was still in process, while the *Nien* and the Yunnan Moslems were making headway. Just two years before, the British and the French expeditionary forces had occupied Peking and burned down the Summer Palace. The late Emperor Hsien-feng himself had to flee to Jehol, where he eventually died. A four-year-old boy was now on the Throne, and a *coup d'état* had just taken place. The two Empresses-Dowager, allied with Prince Kung, had wrested the power from the hands of Tuan-hua (端華 - 1861) and Su-shun (肅順 - 1861). The Court was struggling against all the forces of disintegration.¹⁸

Under these circumstances, the main theme of the policy of the Manchu Court was to put first things first and let other things wait. "The first thing" was undoubtedly the tremendous task of suppressing the T'ai-p'ings. All other things, including the Moslem rebellion, became secondary. Not that the Manchu Court had no ideas or was unwilling to adopt a policy to handle the Moslems, but the Court was too busily occupied by the T'ai-p'ings and the *Nien* and lacked the capacity to act. Hence, from the very beginning, the Moslem problem was handled on a day-to-day basis, depending heavily on the reports from the field. The initiative of policy-making was left in the hands of the local authorities, namely, the governors, the governors-general, the Commanders-in-chief, the Special Commissioners and whosoever could present their views before the Throne. Sometimes these people contradicted each other. Sometimes the same person changed his mind. The Court, in a helpless and pitiful way, usually tried to follow every piece of advice. This created a shifty and drifting policy, or a policy of temporizing. Since with rare exceptions the policy of the government was initiated by the local authorities, it is necessary to study the problem through these people.

¹⁷*P'ing-hui-chih*, vol. 1, in *Hui-ming Ch'i-i*, III, 63.

¹⁸Cf. K. S. Latourette: *The Chinese*, 349-361; H. H. Gowen and J. W. Hall: *An Outline History of China*, 259-276; *ECCP*, 666-669.

3. TO USE WORDS OR TO USE THE SWORD?

When Ying-ch'i (瑛棨), the governor of Shensi, learned that there had been fighting between Chinese and Moslems, he decided to send out officials and native gentry to persuade the local corps of both sides to dissolve.¹⁹ This was immediately approved by the Court, with the advice to punish Moslem conspirators and leaders, but to comfort law-abiding Moslems. The Court did not mention punishing any Chinese.²⁰

After Chang Fei was kidnapped by the Moslems, a gradual change of policy took place, due to great pressure by the local Chinese gentry who were the organizers of the Chinese local corps. They requested a thorough suppression of the Moslems with military forces. Ying-ch'i would have liked to follow this advice had there not been difficulties involved. In the first place, the best soldiers of Shensi, i.e., the Green Battalions, had long since been sent out to reinforce other provinces in the great struggle against the T'ai-p'ing and the *Nien*. In the second place, among those who remained, mainly the Green Battalions, a great number were Moslems. It was clear that they would not be willing to fight against their fellow-Moslems. If forced to do so, there might be a dangerous mutiny within the army (the Green Battalions). Knowing the situation well, Ying-ch'i requested the court to send To-lung-a (多隆阿), the well-known warrior, to Shensi together with his battle-seasoned *Ch'u-yung* (楚勇). "Not until we have good troops on hand can we carry out either military suppression or political compromise, or both."²¹

To-lung-a (多隆阿 1817-1864) belonged to the Manchu Plain White Banner and had joined the garrison in Heilungkiang as a soldier. In 1853, he and his banner troops followed Sheng-pao to fight the T'ai-p'ings in Honan. In 1858 he was transferred to Hupeh where he led his cavalry to fight side by side with the new troops organized by Hu Lin-i (胡林翼 1812-1861),²² the governor of Hupeh. In 1859 Hu expanded this army and soon recommended To-lung-a to be its commander under his own supervision. To-lung-a made good use of this army and in 1861 recovered Anking, the capital of Anhwei prov-

¹⁹*Fang-lüeh*, XIII, 5; 6-7; Ying-ch'i, T. C. 1 y., 5 m., 11 d.

²⁰*Ibid.*, XIII, 5; edict to Ying-ch'i, T. C. 1 y., 5 m., 11 d.

²¹*Ibid.*, XIII, 8-9, Ying-ch'i, T. C. 1 y., 5 m., 26 d.

²²One of the leaders of *Hsiang-chün*. See *ECCP*, 333-335.

ince. In 1862 he recovered the strategic city Lu-chou. With this brilliant record, To-lung-a's prestige grew so high that Ying-ch'i, the governor of Shensi, requested the Court to send To to suppress the Moslem rebellion in Shensi.²³

Following Ying-ch'i's suggestion, the Court ordered To-lung-a to rush to Shensi. One of To's lieutenants, Lei Cheng-kuan (雷正綰),²⁴ was instructed to move immediately before the other outfits were ready. At the same time, Ying-ch'i was directed to handle the situation with justice and care.²⁵ But Ying-ch'i had his trouble. He reported:

*Outside the city wall of Sian, burning and killing are going on everywhere. The best the garrison troops can do is to protect themselves. It is useless to send them out to fight. The army under General K'ung Kuang-shun (孔廣順) is as good as a straw man—useful only when the mob is to be scared away. . . . It will be a great help to me as well as to the people, if Your Majesty would immediately send Ch'eng-ming's (成明) army over to Shensi. . . .*²⁶

Ch'eng-ming was the commander of an army of about two thousand men, who were originally the Green Battalion forces garrisoned in Peking but at this time stationed at the southwestern corner of Shansi, just on the other side of the Yellow River. Ying-ch'i's request was rejected and besides, at the time, the T'ai-p'ings' activities in the south were again active and To-lung-a was ordered to stay where he had been.²⁷

Realizing that no effective military force could be expected to arrive for a long time, Ying-ch'i requested the Court to promulgate an edict to the whole population, calling upon the Moslems, as well as the Chinese, to abide by law and order. This was granted on July 5, 1862, with an order to Ying-ch'i saying :

It is necessary to destroy the leading conspirators, but to comfort the

²³*Ch'ing-shih-lieh-chuan*, LV, 37; *Ch'ing-shih-kao, lieh-chuan*, CXCVI, 4.

²⁴Lei Cheng-kuan (雷正綰 -1897) was a native of Chung-chiang, Szechwan. Starting as a sergeant in 1854, he rose to the post of Brigadier-general in 1861 by fighting the T'ai-p'ings. He helped To-lung-a recover Lu-chou in 1862, and it was at this time that he was called to Shensi. *Ch'ing-shih Lieh-chuan* LX, 40-43.

²⁵*Fang-lüeh*, XIII, 9; edict to Ying-ch'i; T. C. 1 y., 5 m., 26 d.

²⁶*Ibid.*, XIII, 9; Ying-ch'i, T. C. 1 y., 5 m., 29 d.

²⁷*Ibid.*, XIII, 15-17; edict to To-lung-a, T. C. 1 y., 6 m., 7 d.

*law-abiding people. It is not a question of whether one is Chinese or Moslem, but whether he is violating the law. . . .*²⁸

In this edict, the Court first admitted that government officials had been unfair to Moslems in the past, and His Majesty had deep regret and complete sympathy with the Moslems. However, it continued, the Empire never had discriminated against Moslems. In the eyes of His Majesty, they all had been his children with equal importance in the family. At the beginning of the present incident, it recalled, Ying-ch'i, the governor, had already arranged with Chang Fei, a member of the gentry, to send out officials and gentry everywhere to settle the problem in a peaceful way. Those Moslems who had not yet been involved in violence had vowed not to start trouble. But unfortunately, the edict pointed out, some evil Moslems, coveting other person's property, took the opportunity to blackmail people, and even murdered many Moslems who refused to rebel. "These evil men are not only violating the law, but they have clearly become a great menace to you good Moslems, who undoubtedly are sharing the resentment of the government against these evil men." Then the Court declared that strong reinforcements had been summoned from different places. They were coming to punish the very few conspirators who had started the trouble, but would not hurt the law-abiding ones. Even those Moslems who had been unwillingly involved would be excused as soon as they disbanded themselves. On the other hand, no Chinese would be allowed to take revenge. If any Chinese should organize more mass fighting, he would be executed. At the end, the Court threatened that if one should still refuse to surrender after this explanation, he was "digging his own grave," and no curse would fall on the government when he was executed.²⁹

Obviously, this edict did not bring the result the government expected. The Moslem answer to it was an open attack upon the western suburb of Sian and eight days and nights of besieging of T'ung-chou. This development helped the government to settle its policy, at least for

²⁸*Ibid.*, XIV, 4; edict to Ying-ch'i, T. C. 1 y., 6 m., 9 d

²⁹*Ibid.*, XIV, 5-7; edict to the cabinet, T. C. 1 y., 6 m., 9 d. Though this edict was published in the name of the Emperor, one must realize that the Emperor was still a minor at the time, and was not in a position to make decisions. The people who were responsible in the court at this stage were the Empress Dowager, Tz'u-hsi, Prince Kung, and others.

the moment. It decided to use force. A new order was issued to To-lung-a to march into Shensi. Ch'eng-ming, who had been held back to defend the Yellow River, was also instructed to cross the river to save T'ung-chou.³⁰

4. THE APPOINTMENT OF SHENG-PAO

Following the order of the Court, Ch'eng-ming crossed the Yellow River and stationed his troops at the east side of T'ung-chou.³¹ To-lung-a, however, was unable to come, because the T'ai-p'ings were launching an offensive again. It happened that Sheng-pao was free for the moment nearby. He volunteered to the Court to save Shensi from the Moslems. According to his memorial, "The problem of Shensi is not the lack of troops, but the lack of leadership. Once I arrive, the trouble will be speedily finished."³² The Court had little choice but to appoint him to be the commander of all troops in Shensi and ordered him to rush to the theatre of war.³³

With reinforcements of 850 Shansi "Green Battalion" soldiers, Ch'eng-ming had an army of about 3,000 men. According to his infor-

³⁰*Fang-lüeh*, XIV, 12-14, Edict to To-lung-a and Ch'eng-ming; T. C. 1 y., 6 m., 15 d. Cf. Bales: *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 223; Broomhall: *Islam in China*, 153; Thiersant: *Le Mahométisme en Chine*, I, 163. They say the emperor "in rage ordered the total extermination of all the Mohammedans of the Shensi province." This is not quite true. Though the edict did use the word "extermination," it was aimed at those Moslems who attacked the cities only. Furthermore, it advised the officials to punish the ringleaders but to spare the followers, according to the conditions of each individual case. Of course, the execution of an order seldom if ever was carried out properly. On the other hand, one can also imagine that rumors spread far and wide about the decree to "exterminate" the Moslems and made reconciliation difficult.

³¹*Fang-lüeh*, XV, 6; Ch'eng-ming, T. C. 1 y., 7 m., 8 d.

³²*Ibid.*, XVII, 1; Sheng-pao, T. C. 1 y., 7 m., 19 d.

³³*Ibid.*, XVII, 2; Edict to Sheng-pao and others, T. C. 1 y., 7 m., 19 d. The fact that To-lung-a did not come to Shensi until January, 1863, was unknown to both Bales and Broomhall. This was one of the reasons why these two writers confused the record of To-lung-a with Sheng-pao and other generals who took charge of the situation before To-lung-a's arrival. Cf. Bales: *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 223, and Broomhall: *Islam in China*, 154. Richthofen made a similar mistake when he reported: "The first General sent by the Chinese Government against the rebels was To Ta-jen... all the success which he had... from 1861 to 1866..." To-lung-a died in 1864. Cf. Richthofen: *Letters*, 105.

mation, there were at least 8,000 Manchu Banner troops in Sian, the provincial capital, besides several thousand more Green Battalion soldiers. Based on this, he believed that there should be no difficulty in driving a wedge through the Moslems, who were massing on the main highway between Sian and T'ung-kuan. He suggested that the generals in Sian should push eastward to meet him half-way, while he himself drove westward from T'ung-kuan.³⁴

Soon Ch'eng-ming was reinforced by a new army of local corps from Honan, an addition which boosted his total strength to 4,550 men, or more than double the size which he originally commanded. This sizable increase, nevertheless, failed to help him carry out his plan. In the very first real contest he faced in August, he was soundly beaten. Of the 3,000 men engaged in the battle, only about 1,200 survived. The only thing he could do was to retreat to the city of Ch'ao-i for recuperation.³⁵ From this time on, Ch'eng-ming was out of the picture in either planning of strategy or making of policy.

Sheng-pao (勝保 -1863) belonged to the "Manchu Bordered White Banner." He received his degree of *chu-jen* in 1840 and later served in the army led by Ch'i-shan (琦善 -1854)³⁶ against the advancing T'ai-p'ings. In 1853, Sheng-pao was appointed as a commander and pursued the T'ai-p'ings from Yangchow to Shansi. When the T'ai-p'ings marched into Chihli, the Court was alarmed. It demoted Sheng-pao and in 1855 exiled him to Sinkiang. Next year he was recalled from exile and sent to suppress the *Nien*. In the crucial *coup d'état* of 1861, he sided with Prince Kung and the Empresses-Dowager, a move which won him special favor from the Court and made him prouder than ever. In 1862, he was particularly favored because Ch'en Yü-ch'eng, the leading T'ai-p'ing commander north of the Yangtze, was delivered to him by Miao P'ei-lin (苗沛林), the leader of a group of local corps in Anhwei. He was at this time appointed Imperial Commissioner for military affairs in Shensi to suppress the rebellious Moslems.³⁷

³⁴*Fang-lüeh*, XV, 16-17, Cheng-ming, T. C. 1 y., 7 m., 10 d.

³⁵*Ibid.*, XVIII, 6-7; Ch'eng-ming, T. C. 1 y., 8 m., 6 d. also XIX, 22; Ch'eng-ming, T. C. 1 y. 8 m., 26 d.

³⁶*ECCP*, 126-128.

³⁷*ECCP*, 508-509; *Ch'ing-shih lieh-chuan*, XLVII, 39-47. *Fang-lüeh*, XXVII, 12; To-lung-a; and 13, to To-lung-a; T. C. 1 y., 11 m., 14 d. Also XXX, 5; to To-lung-a, T. C. 1 y., 12 m., 4 d.

But the Court was not happy about this appointment. In a secret edict to Sheng-pao, the Court frankly told him, "At the time when To-lung-a was assigned to Shensi, the public was well pleased. When he was not able to arrive, and Sheng-pao was appointed, criticism mushroomed. People predicted that Sheng-pao would wind up white-washing everything, and fail to achieve what success To-lung-a would most likely bring." Then the edict named all Sheng-pao's shortcomings and warned him not to commit another deceitful act.³⁸

5. THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE SIAN AND T'UNG-CHOU FRONTS

At this stage, the fundamental policy of using force had already been established. The question to be decided was how to use this force. In Sheng-pao's opinion, the only reasonable move was first to drive his main force in T'ung-kuan westward along the highway to lift the siege of Sian. He argued that:

*Since most of the Moslem bases are located west of Hua-yin, my drive toward Sian will force them to withdraw to protect their homes, and consequently relieve the pressure on Ch'ao-i and T'ung-chou, a result which serves the same purpose as a direct rescue of the two cities.*³⁹

The Court disagreed with Sheng-pao. It pointed out that some of the important Moslem bases, such as Wang-ke-ts'un (王閣村), and Ts'ang-t'ou-tsui (倉頭嘴), instead of being situated west of Hua-yin, were right there in the area of T'ung-chou. Therefore, the Moslems would not necessarily move west when Sheng-pao drove toward Sian. On the contrary, they might take advantage of the weak defense in the east to hit the already shattered army under Ch'eng-ming, and endanger the defense of the neighboring province of Shansi. Furthermore, the battalions under Lei Cheng-kuan and Mu T'u-shan, both lieutenants of To-lung-a, were expected to reach Sian from the south in a few days, hence there was no reason for Sheng-pao to approach Sian in a hurry. The Court concluded by ordering Sheng-pao to turn to T'ung-chou and Ch'ao-i, then push southwestward to smash the Moslem bases, Wang-ke-ts'un and others, one by one.⁴⁰

³⁸*Ibid.*, XVIII, 22-24; Secret edict to Sheng-pao, T. C. 1 y., 8 m., 12 d.

³⁹*Fang-lüeh*, XIX, 1-2; Sheng-pao, T. C. 1 y., 8 m., 13 d.

⁴⁰*Fang-lüeh*, XIX, 4-6, Edict to Sheng-pao, T. C. 1 y., 8 m., 13d.

In spite of this order, Sheng-pao had already moved. He reached Sian and lifted the siege.⁴¹ Foreseeing the possibility that Sheng-pao would choose to stay in the more comfortable seat of the provincial capital, the Court warned him to leave that city at once and start an active offensive in other areas. The Court put special emphasis on T'ung-chou and Ch'ao-i, the eastern cities neighboring Shansi. At the same time, it rejected Sheng-pao's request to appoint Ying-ch'i as his deputy-commander. Instead, Lei Cheng-kuan was appointed.⁴²

Just as the Court predicted, Sheng-pao sent Lei Cheng-kuan to Hsien-yang to start an offensive in the west, but requested permission for himself to stay in Sian, so he could "direct the operations of the whole theater from the center." Knowing that the Court was interested in the area of T'ung-chou and Ch'ao-i he reported that the Moslems over there "had already withdrawn to nests in Wei-nan," and conditions were no longer serious.⁴³

This was definitely not what the Court thought. Sheng-pao must leave Sian, a new edict demanded, shifting his main force to the area of T'ung-chou, then pinch westward toward Lei Cheng-kuan's army in the west to crush all the Moslems between.⁴⁴ But Sheng-pao considered the situation of the T'ung-chou area to be so calm that he even suggested demobilizing the infantry under Ch'eng-ming, who was responsible for the defense of the area at that time.⁴⁵ The real situation was quite contrary to what Sheng-pao reported. Since fall, the Moslems had taken the offensive. Soon the cities of T'ung-chou and Ch'ao-i were both isolated. When this fact became known, it drew a biting rebuke from the Court.⁴⁶ Yielding to pressure, Sheng-pao finally moved to T'ung-chou, where he decided to follow the strategy of the Court, pushing southwestward slowly but surely, demolishing all resistance on the way. This strategy for fighting decisive, hard battles was a good one, but one which proved to be beyond Sheng-pao's ability. Before long his offensive was completely stopped in front of the massed Mos-

⁴¹*Ibid.*, XX, 10; Sheng-pao, T. C. 1 y., 8 m., 29 d.

⁴²*Ibid.*, XX, 13-14; Edict to Sheng-pao; T. C. 1 y., 8 m., 29 d.

⁴³*Ibid.*, XXI, 5-6; Sheng-pao, T. C. 1 y., Intercalary 8 m., 5 d.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, XXI, 10; Edict to Sheng-pao, T. C. 1 y., Intercalary 8 m., 5 d.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, XXIV, 8-9; Sheng-pao, T. C. 1 y., 9 m., 23 d.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, XXIV, 11-12; Ch'eng-ming, T. C. 1 y., 9 m., 23 d. and XXIV, 15-17; Edict to Sheng-pao, T. C. 1 y., 9 m., 23 d.

lems defending Wang-ke-ts'un, and Ch'iang-pai-chen (羌白鎮), the centers of Moslem activities.⁴⁷

Behind this disagreement of policy, the motives were purely selfish. Sheng-pao was eager to enjoy a more comfortable life in the city of Sian, instead of taking to the field.⁴⁸ The Court was afraid of invasion from any direction that might possibly endanger Peking. To clean up the T'ung-chou area would decrease the threat to the province of Shansi; to tighten the defense of Shansi would reassure the safety of Peking.⁴⁹

6. MILITARY ACTION VS. POLITICAL COMPROMISE

Sheng-pao was appointed to follow the policy of suppressing the Moslems by force, a policy which he first thought he could easily carry out.⁵⁰ It did not take him long to find that he was wrong. Within two months of his arrival in Shensi, he reported to the Court: "There are no less than a hundred thousand rebels. . . . Purely military action seems impossible to dissolve them. Political reconciliation to a certain extent is necessary. . . ." So he started to post notices encouraging the Moslem rebels to redeem themselves by surrendering their leaders. "At the same time," he emphasized, "I am directing my soldiers in the front lines to put constant pressure on the Moslems, not allowing them to have a breathing spell."⁵¹

In fact, Sheng-pao was in trouble. He had already reported numerous battles as well as victories, but real victories had not been achieved. It became more and more difficult to conceal the truth, which started leaking out and had even reached the Court. He must do something before it was too late. The suggestion of appeasement was one way out.⁵²

His suggestion was politely declined. While the Court admitted that it was willing to protect the law-abiding Moslems, it refused to appease any rebel until the Moslems were utterly defeated and stripped of their fighting spirit.⁵³ This was the thing which Sheng-pao could not deliver.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, XXVII, 1; Sheng-pao, T. C. 1 y., 11 m., 4 d.

⁴⁸*Ch'in-Lung Hui-wu Chi-lüeh*, vol. III in *Hui-ming Ch'i-i*, IV, 227.

⁴⁹*Fang-lüeh*, XIX, 5; Edict to Sheng-pao, T. C. 1 y., 8 m., 13 d.

⁵⁰See above, note 32.

⁵¹*Fang-lüeh*, XXII, 8-9; Sheng-pao, T. C. 1 y., Intercalary 8 m., 23 d.

⁵²*Ibid.*, XXIII, 7-8; To-lung-a, T. C. 1 y., 9 m., 9 d.

⁵³*Ibid.*, XXII, 11-12; Edict to Sheng-pao, T. C. 1 y., Intercalary 8 m., 23 d.

The next best thing he could do, and in fact did, was to admit frankly that the Moslems were too numerous for his army to conquer. To crush the rebels, he needed help.⁵⁴ This, of course, was inconsistent with his other statements, especially those in which he requested the demobilization of the infantry under Ch'eng-ming,⁵⁵ and the decline of further help from To-lung-a.⁵⁶ In each case, behind the scenes, there was a reason. He requested the demobilization because by doing so he could take over the monthly ten thousand taels of silver Ch'eng-ming received from the province of Shansi.⁵⁷ He refused To-lung-a because he was afraid that To might take his place as commander, a shift which was actually under consideration by the Court at the moment.⁵⁸

To solve the problem of getting more help and yet keeping his position, Sheng-pao suggested calling ten thousand selected local corps under Miao P'ei-lin from Anhwei to his theater. Miao P'ei-lin had organized a powerful local corps which moved around in the provinces of Honan and Anhwei, shifting sides among the T'ai-p'ings, the *Nien*, and the Manchu government. When Sheng-pao was in the area, Miao had built up a special relation with him. Now that both were in difficulties, Sheng-pao, at Miao's suggestion, believed that to call Miao to Shensi would solve both the problem of how to handle Miao in Anhwei and how to defeat the Moslems in Shensi.⁵⁹ Even if this suggestion should be rejected by the Court, Sheng-pao would find a good alibi for not being able to defeat the Moslems. He could kill three birds with one stone.

To the Manchu Court, however, this was the last straw. The very name of Miao P'ei-lin meant suspicion and contempt. The safest way to handle this cunning old fox was to keep him where he was. To invite Miao to a strategic land like Shensi was inviting trouble. A severe rebuke was instantly sent to Sheng-pao, ordering, "Not one man nor one horse under Miao shall be allowed to enter Shensi! If this order is ignored, Sheng-pao shall be punished by the heaviest terms without mercy."⁶⁰ On the same day, another secret, urgent edict was sent to

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, XXIII, 10; Sheng-pao, T. C. 1 y., 9 m., 10 d.

⁵⁵See above page 35, note 45.

⁵⁶*Fang-liieh*, XXIII, 7; To-lung-a, T. C. 1 y., 9 m., 9 d.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, XXIV, 8-9; Sheng-pao, T. C. 1 y., 9 m., 23 d.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, XXIII, 8; Edict to To-lung-a, T. C. 1 y., 9 m., 9 d.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, XXIII, 9-10; Sheng-pao, T. C. 1 y., 9 m., 10 d.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, XXIII, 12-14; Edict to Sheng-pao, T. C. 1 y., 9 m., 10 d.

To-lung-a, instructing him to intercept Miao if Miao should ever try to move into Shensi. "To allow Miao to enter Shensi," the Court said, "is like bringing a tiger into a house. . . . Stop him by force, if necessary." In the same edict, To was alerted to be ready for the situation in Shensi. "Anticipate the date that you will arrive in Sian. Report it to the Court in advance by the fastest way, and wait until further notice to act."⁶¹

Sheng-pao was a stubborn man. Instead of submitting to this rebuke, he made the same proposal two more times—a move which created more anger but no change in the situation.⁶²

7. THE CHANGE OF COMMAND

In spite the undercurrent of all the above-mentioned conflicts, the Court was still openly calm. On the very day, November 14th, when the Court rebuked Sheng-pao in secret, it published an edict rewarding Sheng-pao's lieutenants who had fought a battle near Hsien-yang, west of Sian.⁶³ That was the calm before the storm. As soon as the Court learned from To-lung-a that he would arrive at T'ung-kuan on January 8, 1863, an edict was issued to strip Sheng-pao of all power; to order To-lung-a to take over the command; to put Sheng-pao under arrest and send him to Peking for trial. If Sheng-pao should resist, "execute him on the spot."⁶⁴ All of Sheng-pao's residences and property throughout the country were to be searched and confiscated. His property in T'ung-kuan and Sian was to be distributed among his soldiers.⁶⁵

Long before To-lung-a ever came to Shensi, he reported to the Court that it was against the will of his troops to move to the west. Many of his soldiers deserted after learning of the plan to move, and it was only his personal influence which held the rank and file in line. He also hinted broadly that it would be very difficult to avoid failure if he had to work side by side with Sheng-pao.⁶⁶ The Court immediately

⁶¹*Ibid.*, XXIII, 14; Edict to To-lung-a, T. C. 1 y., 9 m., 10 d.

⁶²*Ibid.*, XXV, 4-5; Edict to Sheng-pao, T. C. 1 y., 10 m., 2 d.; also XXV, 8-9; of the same date.

⁶³*Ibid.*, XXIV, 21-22; Edict to the Cabinet, T. C. 1 y., 9 m., 23 d.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, XXVII, 13-15; Edict to To-lung-a, T. C. 1 y., 11 m., 19 d.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, XXVII, 21-22; Edict to To-lung-a, T. C. 1 y., 11 m., 16 d.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, XXV, 23; To-lung-a, T. C. 1 y., 10 m., 14 d.

hinted that, if and when To should arrive in Shensi, there would be no grounds for any such worries.⁶⁷

The Court kept its promise and ordered To to take over Sheng-pao's command.⁶⁸ To avoid any unnecessary trouble, the Court openly stressed that the accusation was on Sheng-pao alone, and Sheng-pao's lieutenants were safe. In secret, it warned To-lung-a time and again that Sheng-pao's troops included many dangerous elements which must be handled with care.⁶⁹

To did handle the situation with considerable care. Only one group of the most unruly, former *Nien*, deserted some time later. As a whole, To did a fine job in taking over the command. He arrested Sheng-pao on the very day he arrived at the headquarters in T'ung-chou (同州). Next day, January 17, 1863, he sent Sheng-pao to Peking under heavy guard,⁷⁰ while at the same time he started his drive against the very center of the Moslem rebels.⁷¹

8. TO-LUNG-A'S STRATEGY AND AN OBSTACLE—YING-CH'I

At this stage, with a strong army in Shensi, the policy of using force against the Moslems was generally accepted by all those in the government. However, there were differences of opinion as to the exact place to use force. The Court noticed the heavy concentration of rebels in eastern Shensi, yet the cry of Governor Ying-ch'i in Sian was hard to neglect. Consequently, an ambiguous order was issued to To-lung-a, saying:

*On one hand, you are to attack the Moslem bases in Ch'iang-pai-chen, Wang-ke-ts'un [in the east] ; on the other hand, you are to clear out the rebels in Hua-chou, Wei-nan to reach the capital Sian [in the west].*⁷²

To-lung-a made a clear-cut answer saying that he would concentrate his forces on the eastern front. After the Moslem bases in the east fell,

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, XXV, 24; To To-lung-a, T. C. 1 y., 10 m., 14 d.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, XXVII, 12; To-lung-a, and 13, To-lung-a, T. C. 1 y., 11 m., 14 d.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, and XXVIII, 4; To To-lung-a, T. C. 1 y., 11 m., 19 d. Also XXX, 5; To To-lung-a, T. C. 1 y., 12 m., 4 d.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, XXX, 3; To-lung-a, T. C. 1 y., 11 m., 27 d. Also XXX, 17-18; 19; To-lung-a, T. C. 1 y., 12 m., 11 d.

⁷¹*Ibid.*, XXX, 4; To-lung-a, T. C. 1 y., 12 m., 4 d.

⁷²*Ibid.*, XXVIII, 16-17; To To-lung-a, T. C. 1 y., 11 m., 25 d.

he would then force his way westward through Hua-chou and Wei-nan to reach Sian. Before the realization of this strategy, however, he would leave Lei Cheng-kuan, Ch'eng-lu and their troops west of Sian to handle the western front.⁷³ He sincerely believed that as soon as eastern Shensi was recovered, the pressure on the west would automatically be relieved.⁷⁴

At the insistent request of Governor Ying-ch'i, the Court ordered To-lung-a to dispatch several battalions of infantry and cavalry to Sian. To considered this move unnecessary and undesirable. In a resounding memorial to Peking, To-lung-a complained that the main reason for the past failures in Shensi was the governor's habit of holding all the troops at Sian to protect himself. Instead of sending reinforcements to Sian, To suggested that Ying-ch'i should send troops out to fight the T'ai-p'ings in southern Shensi. On the other hand, To believed that the main forces of the Moslems were in the area from Ta-li to Wei-nan. So he must concentrate all his strength to fight there. "When I win in the east, the pressure on the western front and the provincial capital will eventually be relieved."⁷⁵

In spite of To-lung-a's criticism, Ying-ch'i continued his policy of holding troops around him. Even when Lei Cheng-kuan had successfully retaken the city of Ching-yang as To-lung-a planned,⁷⁶ Ying-ch'i suggested giving up that city, so Lei's troops could be called back to Sian to protect the food-supply line of the capital.⁷⁷ The Court doubted the wisdom of this move and referred it to To-lung-a for a decision.⁷⁸

Sian *was* in trouble. When Ying-ch'i gave up the initiative, the Moslems besieged Hu-hsien and ransacked the countryside near Sian. The food-supply line which ran from Hu-hsien to Sian was cut off. The storage of grain inside the city of Sian was down to one month's supply.⁷⁹ In view of the emergency, To-lung-a agreed to move Lei Cheng-kuan to Hsien-yang, and promised to rush to the rescue of

⁷³*Ibid.*, XXX, 11; To-lung-a, T. C. 1 y., 12 m., 9 d.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, XXX, 20; To-lung-a, T. C. 1 y., 12 m., 11 d.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, XXXI, 14-17; To-lung-a, T. C. 1 y., 12 m., 25 d.

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, XXXI, 18; To-lung-a, T. C. 1 y., 12 m., 15 d.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, XXXII, 33-34; Ying-ch'i, T. C. 2 y., 1 m., 15 d.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, XXXII, 36-37; To To-lung-a, Ying-ch'i and Lei Cheng-kuan, T. C. 2 y., 1 m., 15 d.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, XXXII, 33-34; Ying-ch'i, T. C. 2 y., 1 m., 15 d.

Sian in case of real danger.⁸⁰ This soon drew a protest from Lei Cheng-kuan, who was seriously ill at the moment. He refused either to give up Ching-yang or to leave San-yüan to the mercy of the Moslems. Lei insisted that the loss of these two strategic towns would endanger Sian instead of saving it.⁸¹

9. THE SLOW DRIVE AND PEACE OFFENSIVES

When Ying-ch'i became more of a burden than a help to To-lung-a, the latter was fighting some of the fiercest battles in the campaign. Beginning January 17, 1863, he fought incessantly, and for more than thirty days he did not even enjoy a good night's sleep.⁸² At this point, To-lung-a had rejected numerous requests of the Moslems for peace, thinking that they were not sincerely ready to surrender.⁸³ However, when he found that the supplies of food and munitions of his army were low, and many of his lieutenants were sick and wounded, while the Moslems were rallying in alarming numbers behind the rebel leaders, he decided to open a peace offensive, for a delaying action, as well as for splitting the Moslems.⁸⁴ He not only negotiated with the rebels, but he even sent his officers over to the Moslem camp to check the horses and weapons surrendered.⁸⁵ This was immediately reported to the Court by Ying-ch'i with criticism, saying that To was compromising with the untrustworthy Moslems, who might rebel again, once the army left.⁸⁶

The facts were not exactly as Ying-ch'i described. After a delay of more than ten days in negotiation, To-lung-a received enough supplies of food and munitions from the rear. Once he found his position safe, he called in the Moslem representatives and told them: "You know as I know, you are not sincerely surrendering. I will not be tricked by you. Go back and ready to fight out a life-and-death decision. Wait till you are really beaten, physically and spiritually, then come

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, XXXIV, 4; To-lung-a, T. C. 2 y., 2 m., 4 d.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, XXXVI, 3; To-lung-a, T. C. 2 y., 2 m., 14 d.

⁸²*Ibid.*, XXXII, 8; To-lung-a, T. C. 2 y., 1 m., 8 d.

⁸³*Ibid.*, XXXII, 5-6; To-lung-a, T. C. 2 y., 1 m., 8 d.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, XXXVI, 14-15; To-lung-a, T. C. 2 y., 2 m., 19 d.

⁸⁵Lei Cheng-kuan: *To-chung-yung-kung Ch'ing-lao-lu* (雷正綰：多忠勇公勤勞錄) IV; in *Hui-ming Ch'i-i* (同民起義) IV, 290.

⁸⁶*Fang-lieh*, XXXIV, 12-13; Ying-ch'i, T. C. 2 y., 2 m., 6 d.

again to talk peace."⁸⁷ So it was To-lung-a who tricked the Moslems instead of the Moslems tricking him.

When the Court first heard Ying-ch'i's unfavorable report, it questioned To-lung-a on the wisdom of making peace at that time. As soon as To made the necessary explanation, the Court left policy making to To and promised not to interfere constantly.⁸⁸

On March 19, To-lung-a captured both Ch'iang pai-chen (羌白鎮) and Wang-ke-ts'un (王閣村),⁸⁹ the strongholds immediately facing him, only to find more strongholds blocking his way. The hard battles, the bad dry weather, the inadequate food, the unsanitary environment and the hardships suffered without any reasonable precautions, worked together to cause a plague in To's army. To himself suffered from abscesses all over his body, and was unable even to ride horseback.⁹⁰ Soon he also was stricken by the plague. In order to avoid exposure of his weakness, he continued his offensives. In spite of his courage, nevertheless, his drive slowed down.⁹¹

Ying-ch'i now was definitely out of favor with the Court. In fact, one of the decrees sent out by the Court angrily called him a "wooden idle." Yet Ying-ch'i's criticism did make the Court become more and more impatient with To-lung-a's slow progress. Once the Court even questioned To's integrity in handling the treasure captured from the Moslems. Though To was not forced to give up his policy of emphasizing the eastern front, he was ordered time after time to reenforce Sian.⁹² Under such pressure, To-lung-a found it necessary to send one of his best lieutenants, Ts'ao K'e-chung (曹克忠), to Sian, to reestablish the food-supply line which had been cut off by the Moslems.⁹³

Ts'ao arrived at Sian with a handful of cavalry and strict orders from To-lung-a to take seven battalions of soldiers away from Ying-ch'i and to station them between Hu-hsien (鄆縣) and Sian. His mission was twofold: first, to reopen the supply line from Hu-hsien to Sian; secondly, to start an offensive. He was forbidden to join the forces

⁸⁷Lei Cheng-kuan: *To-chung-yung-kung Ch'ing-lao-lu*, IV; in *Hui-ming Ch'i*, IV, 290.

⁸⁸*Fang-liieh*, XXXVI, 16; To To-lung-a, T. C. 2 y., 2 m., 19 d.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, XXXIV, 10; To-lung-a, T. C. 2 y., 2 m., 8 d.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, XXXVI, 14; To-lung-a, T. C. 2 y., 2 m., 19 d.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, XXXVIII, 16-17, 19; To-lung-a, T. C. 2 y., 3 m. 23 d.

⁹²*Ibid.*, XXXVII, 14-16; To To-lung-a, T. C. 2 y., 3 m., 8 d.

⁹³*Ibid.*, XXXVIII, 2-3; To-lung-a, T. C. 2 y., 3 m., 14 d.

hoarded by Ying-ch'i inside and around Sian. This program was immediately approved by the Manchu Court.⁹⁴ Ts'ao arrived at Sian on May 18, 1863, and sticking firmly to his orders, insisted on taking over seven battalions from Ying-ch'i, and bringing them out of Sian to the battlefield. Ying-ch'i reluctantly yielded. With these seven battalions Ts'ao restored the supply line and recovered a large area around Sian.⁹⁵

Slowly but surely, To-lung-a's drive in the east made headway. On May 19th, he captured Ts'ang-t'ou-chen, on the 21st, P'ang-ku-chuang (龐谷莊), on the 23rd, Hsiao-i-chen (孝義鎮), all Moslem strongholds.⁹⁶ In June, he reported to the Throne that east Shensi was virtually clear. He put great emphasis on the importance of the strategic area of San-yüan and insisted to hold it by all means.

*At the same time, my main force is daily pushing westward. Once the defense of the provincial capital is reassured, I will send Ma Te-chao's troops to rescue the besieged city of Feng-hsiang. After saving Feng-hsiang, he is to continue to move west to lift the siege of P'ing-liang in Kansu.*⁹⁷

The Court agreed to the necessity of keeping Lei in the area of San-yüan, nevertheless the continuous calls for help from Feng-hsiang and P'ing-liang were so desperate that the Court could not neglect them. To satisfy everybody and nobody, the Court ordered To-lung-a and Ying-ch'i to rescue those two far-away cities at once.⁹⁸

To Ying-ch'i, the most important thing was to save his own skin. He reported to the Court that the Moslems had been defeated by To-lung-a, and were rushing westward and storming Sian. In order to save the new crops around the city, he had arranged a peace negotiation to delay the Moslem actions. If this arranged peace should prove to be successful, he would be satisfied to settle the whole issue with the

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, XXXVIII, 2-4; To-lung-a and To To-lung-a, T. C. 2 y., 3 m., 14 d.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, XLII, 10-11; Ying-ch'i, T. C. 2 y., 4 m., 10 d.

⁹⁶No doubt all these victories were won with great bloodshed. Richthofen reported: "This was accomplished with great loss of men among his own troops. All the Mohammedans whom To got hold of, women and children included, were killed. The rivers are said to have been coloured red with blood at that time." Richthofen: *Letters*, 105.

⁹⁷*Fang-lüeh*, XLI, 14-16; To-lung-a, T. C. 2 y., 4 m., 21 d. Also XLII, 16; To-lung-a, T. C. 2 y., 5 m., 1 d.

⁹⁸*Ibid.*, XLI, 16-17; To To-lung-a, T. C. 2 y., 4 m., 21 d.

Moslems. In case the peace should turn out to be short-lived, he confided, at least the crops would have been collected, and then he could afford to wait for To-lung-a's arrival to fight the Moslems.⁹⁹ In another memorial Ying-ch'i told the Court that he did obey the order to send Ma Te-chao to rescue Feng-hsiang only to find Ma's troops stopped by "the weeping gentry and subjects of this city." He said that there were only about 7,000 soldiers in Sian while there were 8,000 in Feng-hsiang. So he asked for further instructions.¹⁰⁰ At this moment when Ying-ch'i was playing tricks of bureaucracy, Feng-hsiang had been surrounded for ten months and survived only because of the extremely rare courage of the defenders.¹⁰¹

The Court granted Ying-ch'i permission for Ma Te-chao to stay, and tabled his suggestion of punishing himself.¹⁰² For the time being, Ying-ch'i was safe. However, when he informed the Court that a city in the east, P'u-ch'eng, was in danger, he offended To-lung-a. P'u-ch'eng was in the zone which To had reported cleared of rebels.

To fiercely assailed the Governor in a memorial to the Court, denying that P'u-ch'eng was in danger and said that from the fall of 1862 to July, 1863, when this memorial was sent, the Moslems had never seriously threatened Sian. They only wandered around, miles away from the city. Instead of going out to defeat the rebels, To said, Ying-ch'i hoarded all his troops around him, closed the city gate, and just sat down to wait.¹⁰³

The Manchu Court immediately discharged Ying-ch'i and appointed Liu Jung (劉蓉)¹⁰⁴ as governor. Before Liu could arrive from Sze-

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, XLV, 8-9; Ying-ch'i, T. C. 2 y., 5 m., 5 d.

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*, XLVII, 1-3; Ying-ch'i, T. C. 2 y., 6 m., 20 d.

¹⁰¹*Chang Chao-tung: Shou-ch'i Chi-shih, in Hui-min Ch'i-i*, IV, 273. Cf. Chapter III, section 3.

¹⁰²*Fang-lüeh*, XLVII, 5; To To-lung-a and Ying-ch'i, T. C. 2 y., 6 m., 20 d.

¹⁰³*Ibid.*, XLVII, 6; To-lung-a, T. C. 2 y., 7 m., 2 d.

¹⁰⁴Liu Jung (劉蓉 -1873), a native of Hsiang-hsiang, Hunan (湖南湘鄉). In 1854, as a student, he participated in Tseng Kuo-fan's navy to fight the T'ai-p'ings. In 1855 he was promoted to be a district magistrate. In 1860 he followed Lo Ping-chang (駱秉章) into Szechwan to assist Lo in military affairs. In 1861, he became the acting Financial Commissioner of Szechwan. In the summer of 1863, he was sent to supervise the military affairs in southern Shensi. Before long he was appointed as Governor of Shensi to succeed Ying-ch'i. *Ch'ing-shih lieh-chuan*, II, 47-51. Liu was a close relative of Tseng Kuo-fan. The army under his command was a branch of *Hsiang-chün*. The members were

chwan (四川), Chang Chi-hsin (張集馨)¹⁰⁵ was ordered to be acting governor.¹⁰⁶ To Chang, one of his pressing jobs at the time was the defense of Sian. He observed that the three thousand able-bodied Moslems still remaining inside the city wall were timid. After reassuring to the Moslems their security, he believed that they would not start trouble. However, Chang did plan to face possible uprisings by arranging with Ts'ao K'e-chung (曹克忠) a scheme to call in Ts'ao's troops outside of the city to wipe out the Moslems in Sian, in case they should rebel.¹⁰⁷

After To-lung-a and his main forces arrived at Sian on September 4, 1863, he ordered Ma Te-chao to rescue Feng-hsiang. When Ma delayed, To sent a long memorial to the Court to impeach Ma. Ma was eventually dismissed.¹⁰⁸

10. THE PEACE ARRANGEMENT OF T'AO MAO-LIN IN FENG-HSIANG

To save Feng-hsiang, another general, T'ao Mao-lin (陶茂林)¹⁰⁹ was dispatched with three thousand soldiers. T'ao moved steadily westward, and lifted Feng-hsiang's siege on November 23, 1863. After

Hunanese and the training and organization were same as Tseng Kuo-fan's army. Cf. Wang Ting-an: *Hsiang-chün-chi*, XIII, 14-16.

¹⁰⁵Chang Chi-hsin (張集馨 1800-December 24, 1878) was a native of I-cheng, Kiangsu (江蘇儀徵). He received his *chin-shih* degree in 1829, and was appointed Han-lin compiler (second class). After serving a term as Prefect of So-P'ing-fu (朔平府) in Shansi, he was promoted to be an Intendant in Fu-kien. Later he served as an Intendant in Shensi, as Judicial Commissioner of Szechwan, where he was promoted to be the Financial Commissioner of Kweichow. Before he took over this office he was transferred to Kansu and then to Honan. In later years he served in Chihli, Kansu, Fukien, Kiangsi, either as Judicial Commissioner or as Financial Commissioner, or as an officer commanding an army to fight against the T'ai-p'ings. But those years were also filled with heartbreaking failures. Three times he had been stripped of his honors and titles, twice sentenced to exile. He regained his standing every time until he was finally appointed to be the Judicial Commissioner of Shensi and acting governor. *Hsü-pei-chuan-chi* (續碑傳集), XXXVII, 9-10.

¹⁰⁶*Fang-liieh*, XVII, 12; To To-lung-a and others, T. C. 2 y., 7 m., 2 d.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, XLVIII, 14-15; Chan Chi-hsin, T. C. 2 y., 8 m., 3 d.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, L, 1; To-lung-a and others, T. C. 2 y., 8 m., 7 d.

¹⁰⁹T'ao Mao-lin (陶茂林 -1890) was a native of Changsha, Hunan. He joined the *Hsiang-chün* to fight the T'ai-p'ings in Hupeh, Kiangsi. In 1860 he served

suffering several defeats, and being threatened by the increasing pressure of the victorious government forces, the local Moslems begged for peace. T'ao immediately faced the same problem that many other generals had faced, namely, whether he should accept this peace offer or turn it down. The native officials and the Chinese gentry who had led the fight against the Moslems in the past had absolutely no faith in the Moslems, and objected to any reconciliation. However, when T'ao considered the numerous Moslem villages and towns which stretched out more than 170 *li* (approximately 56 miles) from Feng-hsiang toward the neighboring counties, he hesitated. To use force against so many people would certainly mean a great loss to his own army, even if he could do the job. So he called the Moslems in and treated them quite well, hoping that they would be cooperative.

When reports came in that the Moslems were still committing arson and robbery outside the city, T'ao questioned the Moslem leaders. They gave various alibis, denying that they were involved. The leading official of the city, Chang Chao-tung (張兆棟), who became a popular hero for leading the local corps to fight the hectic defense of Feng-hsiang from the first attack of the Moslems on August 28, 1862, to the arrival of T'ao's troops on November 23, 1863, was highly skeptical. He decided to report his opinion to To-lung-a. To sent an officer, Ch'ing-ju (慶瑞), to participate in the affair. The local Chinese officials and gentry raised three questions against the proposal: first, the ringleaders had not yet been punished; secondly, the women captured by the Moslems had not yet been returned; thirdly, what would be the program to rehabilitate the Moslems? T'ao himself could not answer and ordered that these were to be discussed in a meeting between the Moslems and the Chinese. On December 27, 1863, the meeting was held. T'ao and

under To-lung-a and became a colonel. In 1861 he participated in the campaign to recover An-ch'ing of Anhwei. In the recovery of Lu-chou, he was credited as the officer who led the vanguard to storm the city wall. After To-lung-a was transferred to Shensi, he followed To to fight the Moslems. In campaigns to lift the siege of T'ung-chou, to recover Ch'iang-pei-chen and Wang-ke-ts'un. T'ao was credited as the officer with the most merit. He was appointed to be Brigadier General of Han-chung (漢中鎮總兵), and was sent to be commander of an expeditionary force to lift the siege of Feng-hsiang. After the siege was lifted, he was promoted to be general-in-chief of Kansu (甘肅提督). *Ch'ing-shih-kao*, *lieh-chuan*, CCXVII, 2.

Ch'ing pleaded with both sides to build up good will and stop further fighting. They also ordered the Moslems to return all captured prisoners. These terms were accepted. Then the Moslems asked for the return of their former properties. T'ao ordered that the Moslems be allowed to return to their old homes and claim their possessions. Before any Chinese gentry had a chance to say a word, the meeting was over.¹¹⁰

Based on T'ao and Ch'ing's report, To-lung-a believed that it was time to accept the Moslem "surrender" and requested the Court for a change of policy from one of using force, to one of pleading and persuasion.¹¹¹ This request was granted, with the reservation that the ring-leaders must be surrendered for punishment. The Court also directed that the Moslems who occupied the two strategic cities in Kansu province, Ku-yüan (固原) and P'ing-liang (平涼), had committed too serious a crime for pardon, and must be defeated thoroughly before accepting their surrender. At To-lung-a's suggestion, Lei Cheng-kuan was granted the authority to command all troops inside Kansu to carry out the Court's policy.¹¹²

Due to the pressing situation in Kansu, T'ao moved westward with his troops to Ch'ien-yang (汧陽) on January 20, 1864, and left the settlement of the Moslems in Feng-hsiang to Ch'ing Jui (慶瑞). Soon T'ao learned that a new invasion of Pao-chi (寶鷄) by the Szechwan bandits was under way. He returned to Feng-hsiang and ordered his troops to rescue Pao-chi. Six hundred newly surrendered Moslem cavalry soldiers were directed to join this rescuing force. Instead of obeying the order, the Moslems rushed back to Feng-hsiang. When they found they were shut out of the city gate, they ran away to the countryside and started to ransack the villages again. The Szechwan bandits soon left the area. It was no longer possible for T'ao to pretend that the Moslems were cooperative. He arranged a general offensive, together with Lei Cheng-kuan and Ts'ao K'e-chung against the Moslems, only to find that the Moslems were retreating into Kansu.¹¹³

¹¹⁰Chang Chao-tung: *Shou-ch'i Chi-shih* in *Hui-min Ch'i-i*, IV, 280, 282-283.

¹¹¹*Fang-lüeh*, LVI, 8-10; To-lung-a, T. C. 2 y., 11 m., 17 d.

¹¹²*Ibid.*, LVI, 11-12; To To-lung-a and others, T. C. 2 y., 11 m., 17 d.

¹¹³*Ibid.*; also *Fang-lüeh*, LIX, 8; To-lung-a, T. C. 3 y., 1 m., 24 d., and LIX, 14-15; To-lung-a, T. C. 3 y., 2 m., 1 d., also LX, 2; Lui Cheng-kuan, T. C. 3 y., 3 m., 2 d.

11. TO-LUNG-A'S DECISION NOT TO ENTER KANSU AND HIS DEATH

It happened that on November 19, 1863, the group of T'ai-p'ings under Lan Ta-shun came back again, and occupied Chou-chih. Not only did they cut off T'ao Mao-lin's supply line, but also they threatened Sian itself. To-lung-a could not tolerate this group any more than he could endure a thorn in his side. He decided to take back this city himself.¹¹⁴ In December, To-lung-a summarized his position in a memorial to the Throne saying that due to the threat of the T'ai-p'ings and the Szechwan bandits in southwest Shensi, he could not move his main force into Kansu, lest his entire army might be trapped inside Kansu without supplies. For the time being, the best he could do was to send Lei Cheng-kuan and T'ao Mao-lin to recover Ku-yüan and P'ing-liang. He also pleaded for reinforcements so that he could rescue Kansu in the future without endangering Shensi.¹¹⁵ The Court approved the program and permitted him to call in the seven battalions in Lu-chou. It also promised to consider the possibility of shifting more troops from south of the Yangtze to Shensi.¹¹⁶

All this time, To-lung-a himself was trying to wrest the small but solidly walled city of Chou-chih away from the Szechwan bandits, allies of the T'ai-p'ings. The bandits under Lan Ta-shun there were extremely strong and stubborn. With equal stubbornness, To-lung-a determined to recover the city. He finally succeeded on March 31, 1864, but only with a price too high for him to pay. He was fatally wounded the day before the city fell.¹¹⁷ He did not die until May 18th, but the great warrior was no longer able to complete his unfinished job.¹¹⁸

For years, this illiterate general made his reports by dictating to his secretaries.¹¹⁹ When he was confined to his deathbed, some of his

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*, LV, 6; To-lung-a, T. C. 2 y., 10 m., 19 d.

¹¹⁵*Ibid.*, LVII, 14-15; To-lung-a, T. C. 2 y., 11 m., 13 d.

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*, LVII, 17-18; To To-lung-a, T. C. 2 y., 11 m., 13 d.

¹¹⁷*Fang-lüeh*, LX, 1; To-lung-a, T. C. 3 y., 3 m., 2 d. Cf. Wang Ting-an, *Hsiang-chün-chi*, XIII, 16-17.

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*, LXIV, 15; Mu-t'u-shan, T. C. 3 y., 4 m., 20 d. In *Tso Tsung'ang*, 225, Bales says: "In 1866 To-lung-a was captured by the Moslems and beheaded." This statement is contrary to all eyewitnesses and documents of the day. For details see Wen-djang Chu: "The Death of To-lung-a" in the *Central Asiatic Journal*, Vol. III, No. 3, pp. 237-242.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, XXXI, 12; Hsi-lin, T. C. 1 y., 12 m., 17 d.

lieutenants made to the Court, in his name, a claim of having cleared out all the rebels in Shensi. The purpose was to try and get some rewards for the lieutenants before To-lung-a's death. Though this claim was rapped by the Court as exaggerated,¹²⁰ the fact remains that it was To-lung-a who broke the back of the Moslems in Shensi. From this time on, the center of the problem of Moslem rebellion shifted to Kansu.

In April, 1864, in the name of To-lung-a, a suggestion was sent to the Court to move his troops out of Shensi to either Hupeh or Honan.¹²¹ No matter whether this suggestion was made by the foresight of To-lung-a on his deathbed, or was the wish expressed by his lieutenants, it indicated that his troops were not willing to stay in Shensi any longer. The Court, however, was not quite ready to think that way. Seeing the successes of the past, naturally it hoped that To's troops would manage to complete the mission of suppressing the Moslems in both Shensi and Kansu.¹²² This illusion was soon dispelled. The acting governor, Chang Chi-hsin, made observations on the spot, and secretly reported to the Throne, warning that those seasoned fighters under To-lung-a could hardly be held under control without To-lung-a's personal presence.

This was all very natural. For years To-lung-a fought under the commander of the *Hsiang-chün* and he had become one part of the *Hsiang-chün* system, even though his army was called by a slightly different name, *Ch'u-yung*. Under that system, the personality and personal relations of the commander were important. He was the spirit of the army and the one to hold the army together. When he died, few others could take over the command except those who had had close association with the army in the past. In this case, there were several rival generals under To-lung-a but no one was strong enough to control the whole army, especially the part that used to be under the direct personal command of To-lung-a. Mu-t'u-shan,¹²³ the acting commander-in-chief, could effectively control the cavalry but not all the infantry. Within a few days after Mu took over, and Chang reported, discipline collapsed and morale became low. To avoid further deteri-

¹²⁰*Ibid.*, LXI, 18-19; To To-lung-a, T. C. 3 y., 3 m., 17 d.

¹²¹*Ibid.*, LXI, 22; To-lung-a, T. C. 3 y., 3 m., 19 d.

¹²²*Ibid.*, LXI, 27-29; To To-lung-a and others, T. C. 3 y., 3 m., 19 d.

¹²³See chapter III of this work for the life of Mu-t'u-shan.

oration, Chang suggested sending four thousand of these infantry troops to Hupeh, under the command of Kuan-wen, the Governor-general of Hu-kwang; another four thousand and the cavalry to Honán under the command of Seng-ko-lin-ch'in; leaving Lei Cheng-kuan and T'ao Mao-lin to handle the Moslems in Kansu, and Ts'ao K'e-chung to defend Sian.¹²⁴ Obviously, this was a reasonable breakdown of To-lung-a's army. A part returned to Hupeh because they had originally been called to service in Hupeh. The cavalry under Mu-t'u-shan was sent to Honan, because they were originally Eight Banners, and Seng-ko-lin-ch'in, a Mongol Prince, could easily control them. That part of the infantry which returned to Honan had been under the command of Seng-ko-lin-ch'in before. Some of them came from Honan with Sheng-pao. Lei, T'ao and Ts'ao were old officers in *Hsiang-chün*, and each was influential enough to control one part of To-lung-a's *Ch'u-yung*. Understanding the meaning behind Chang's suggestion, the Court accepted his idea with only slight modifications.¹²⁵ On May 25, 1864, Tu-hsing-a was appointed as To-lung-a's successor to be the commander-in-chief in Kansu, with Lei Cheng-kuan as his deputy.¹²⁶ Obviously the Court selected Tu-hsing-a because he had special relations with To-lung-a's army. All the three generals left behind in Shensi and Kansu, i.e., Lei, T'ao, Ts'ao, had served under Tu-hsing-a's command.

¹²⁴*Fang-lüeh*, LXII, 1-3; Chang Chi-hsin, T. C. 3 y., 3 m., 22 d.

¹²⁵*Ibid.*, LXII, 4-6; to Chang Chi-hsin, T. C. 3 y., 3 m., 22 d.

¹²⁶*Ibid.*, LXIV, 17; to the cabinet, T. C. 3 y., 4 m., 20 d.

Chapter III


THE DEVELOPMENTS IN KANSU

I. THE AREA AND THE OFFICIALS

In 1862, when the Moslem rebellion broke out in Shensi, the term "Kansu" covered the later provinces of Kansu, Ninghsia, a part of Chinghai (the Hsi-ning area) and a part of Sinkiang (the area stretching from Ti-hua, or Urumchi, eastward to cover Chen-hsi, or Barkol, and Hami). This area was under the jurisdiction of the Governor-general of Shen-Kan, who was stationed at Lanchow and had authority over both the provinces of Shensi and Kansu.

The local government system under the Manchu Empire was complicated and confusing. The governor-general of Shen-Kan was not the sole authority over the two provinces. There were the governor of Shensi and the Manchu General-in-chief of Sian (西安將軍), both stationed at Sian; there was the Manchu General-in-chief of Ninghsia (寧夏將軍), stationed in the Tartar city of Ninghsia; there was the Imperial Agent at Hsi-ning (西寧辦事大臣), stationed at Hsi-ning; there was the Military Lieutenant-Governor of Urumchi (烏魯木齊都統), stationed at Urumchi. Each of these officials was independent of the governor-general of Shen-Kan and responsible directly to the Throne for things that happened in the area around the city where the official was assigned. Yet the governor-general was still held responsible for the whole area of Shensi and Kansu. The system was purposely designed to have all officials well checked. Theoretically, there was a line of division of labor. For instance, the Manchu Generals-in-chief and the Military Lieutenant-Governor had charge of the Manchu garrison, whereas the governor was responsible for the local administration. But, in practice, especially in the field of making policy in the suppression of rebellion, the line of division became very vague and unstable. It changed from time to time, and largely depended on the personalities involved.

Generally speaking, the governor of Shensi, being the leading authority stationed in that province, took charge of affairs in that province,



MAP II
KANSU AND NINGHSIA

- Provincial Border
- ~ River
- Highway
- Capital
- City
- Town

1. Lung-shan-cheng
2. Lien-hua-ch'eng
3. Chang-chia-ch'uan
4. Chang-wu

NINGHSIA

KANSU

Hsning River
Yellow River

An-hsi
 Tun-huang
 Chia-yü-kuan
 Su-chou
 Kao-fai
 Fu-yi
 Kan-chou
 Yü-men
 Shih-tsui-tzu
 Ping-lo
 Ning-hsia
 (Tartar city)
 Lin-chou
 Chin-chi-pao
 Ting-pien
 Sui-te
 An-pien
 Ching-pien
 Pao-an
 Ye-nan
 Kan-ch'uan
 Ching-yang
 Ching-yüan
 Yü-wang
 Ning-an-pao
 Chung-wei
 Yü-cha
 Yen-cha
 Lan-chou
 Hui-ning
 Ching-ning
 Ping-liang
 Tung-chih-yüan
 Hsi-feng-cheng
 I-chüu
 Ho-chou
 Chin-hsien
 An-ting
 Lung-te
 Ching-chou
 Tung-wei
 Ch'ang-chou
 Lung-chou
 Kung-chang
 Ching-chou
 Yen-Kuan
 Feng-hsiang
 Stian
 Man-chung

while the governor-general of Shen-Kan had more direct control over affairs in Kansu. In the particular area of the latter province, Ninghsia, which was a geographical unit by itself, consisted of two cities with the same name. Both were situated west of the Yellow River. One was the Tartar city of Ninghsia, later the city of Ning-shuo (寧朔), where the Manchu General-in-chief of Ninghsia was stationed. The other was the Chinese city, later the city of Ninghsia, the capital of Ninghsia province, where the Intendant of Ninghsia (寧夏道) was stationed. The General-in-chief, always a Manchu, had charge of the Manchu garrison. The Intendant of Ninghsia had charge of local administration of five counties and departments in the area. The Intendant could be either a Manchu or a Chinese and took orders from the governor-general of Shen-Kan. The Manchu General-in-chief outranked the Intendant, but the latter did not take direct orders from the former, unless it was specially ordered by the Court. In 1862, the Manchu General-in-chief of Ninghsia was I-liang (奕梁) who belonged to the Manchu Bordered Yellow Banner and had been there since 1856.¹ The Intendant was Hou Yun-teng (侯雲登 -1863) who was a native of Shang-ch'iu, Honan, and a *chin-shih* of 1841. Hou came to Ninghsia as the Intendant in 1860.² In Lanchow, the newly appointed governor-general of Shen-Kan, Hsi-lin (熙麟 -1864) was still on his way, and the Financial Commissioner of Kansu, En-lin (恩麟) was acting as the highest official in the area. En-lin belonged to the Manchu Bordered Yellow Banner. He became the Intendant of Lanchow in 1856. In 1859 he was promoted to Judicial Commissioner, and in 1862 to Financial Commissioner.³ Since En-lin was actually the one who took charge of the office of governor-general of Shen-Kan, he was responsible for the making of policy for Kansu, though his influence in the area Ninghsia was less direct.

2. EN-LIN'S POLICY

(a) *A shaky defense against growing danger*

According to the regulations of the Green Battalions, in Kansu, east of Chia-yü-kuan, there were to be two generals-in-chief, one stationed

¹*Shuo-fang-tao-chih* (朔方道志), XIII, 22-23.

²*Ch'ing-shih-kao*, CDXC, 14.

³(Hsüan-t'ung) *Kansu hsin t'ung-chih* (甘肅新通志), LII, 12, 15, 18, 19.

in Kan-chou, another in Ku-yüan (甘肅提督駐甘州，固原提督); five Brigadier Generals, one stationed in Ho-chou, one in Su-chou, one in Liang-chou, one in Ninghsia, and one in Hsi-ning.⁴ But in 1862, in the whole of Kansu, even if one counted Ninghsia and Hsi-ning, there was only one officer with the full rank of Brigadier General (總兵), acting as the General-in-chief of Kan-chou. He was Ting-An (定安), another banner man. All the other positions were vacant, with minor officers acting as generals. The number of soldiers was below par. For instance, in Ninghsia, where 2,188 Chinese soldiers were supposed to be stationed,⁵ there were only a little more than one thousand.⁶ These were lax in discipline. For instance, when the soldiers in Liang-chou were ordered to move east, they delayed for half a month before a moving date was reported. When the set date drew close, it was postponed. From that time on, a date was not even reported. All further orders were simply ignored. Morale was low. Rumors were spread that the acting Brigadier General of Liang-chou (護涼州鎮總兵) Lien-ch'ing (連慶), another banner man, had collected contributions for making uniforms, but no uniforms were received. This was reported to be the excuse for the soldiers' refusing to leave Liang-Chou.⁷ The provincial treasury was short of funds. To pay the army in full would require more than fifty thousand taels of silver a month. All the cash on hand in the fall of 1862 was not enough even to pay the army for one month.⁸ So the soldiers simply received no pay for one year.⁹

Knowing these weaknesses from the inside, En-lin, the acting governor-general, decided to avoid causing trouble. In other words, his policy was to keep calm and hope for the best.¹⁰ Of course, his program did include a few positive moves to check the spread of the Moslem rebellion from Shensi into Kansu. First, he alerted the Green Battalion commanding officers of Kan-chou, Liang-chou, Su-chou and Ho-chou to select one thousand good soldiers in each place ready for action.

⁴Chi-huan and others: *Ch'ing-ch'ao T'ung-tien*, LXXII, 2555.

⁵*Ibid.*

⁶*Fang-lüeh*, XX, 5; En-lin; T. C. 1 y., 8 m., 26 d.

⁷*Ibid.*, XXIII, 2-4; En-lin; T. C. 1 y., 9 m., 2 d.

⁸*Ibid.*, XXIX, 19; En-lin; T. C. 1 y., 11 m., 28 d.

⁹*Ibid.*, II, 1; En-lin; T. C. 2 y., 8 m., 4 d.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, XXIII, 3-4; En-lin; T. C. 1 y., 9 m., 2 d.

Secondly, he ordered the intendants of P'ing-ch'ing-ching (平慶涇道) and Ninghsia (寧夏道) to direct the departments and counties along the border of Shensi to start organizing and training of local corps to defend strategic spots. Thirdly, he sent Green Battalion soldiers to guard T'ing-k'ou (亭口), a strategic entrance from Shensi into Kansu near the border between Ch'ang-wu of Shensi and Ching-chou of Kansu. Fourthly, because of lack of funds, he tried to negotiate with Shensi to send him as a loan the land tax of the counties in Shensi bordering Kansu. Since every year the treasury of Shensi was responsible for sending Kansu a substantial amount of subsidy, this loan could be cancelled by this account.¹¹ Fifthly, he ordered a close check on all merchants and travellers coming from Shensi, picking out any suspected spies, so that no agent would be able to enter Kansu to create trouble. For a few months, there was quiet. En-lin was glad that his policy of keeping calm worked.¹²

Actually, it did not. For, on September 11, 1862, there were reports about a great conflict at Pai-chi-chen (白吉鎮) in Pin-chou of Shensi between the Moslems and the Chinese. "More than two hundred Moslems who came from Ning-chou, Kansu, participated." Since there had been no Moslem residents in the department of Ning-chou before and these people were positively Kansu Moslems, they must have been Moslems from the far areas of Kansu who had infiltrated through the border.¹³ When hundreds of them could sneak out of Kansu without letting the border guards know of their movements, they could certainly also sneak into Kansu together with their comrades of Shensi. No matter how they achieved this, it proved that En-lin's preventive program was ineffective, and the Moslems were quite well organized.

(b) *The open riots*

In fact, soon more than ten thousand Moslems openly invaded eastern Kansu. The local Moslems promptly joined the ranks of the rebels.¹⁴ In the eighth moon (around October of 1862) some Moslems came from Wei-nan, Shensi (陝西渭南) to P'ing-yüan-so (平遠所) in

¹¹*Ibid.*, XX, 5-6; En-lin; T. C. 1 y., 8 m., 26 d.

¹²*Ibid.*, XXII, 18; En-lin; T. C. 1 y., Intercalary 8 m., 25 d.

¹³*Ibid.*, XXII, 18-19; En-lin; T. C. 1 y., Intercalary 8 m., 25 d.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, XXIX, 10-11; En-lin; T. C. 1 y., 11 m., 28 d.

Yen-ch'a-t'ing, Kansu (甘肅鹽茶廳) and joined with some local leaders to organize the Moslems. They robbed and injured some Chinese. When the Independent Sub-Prefecture Chuang Yü-sung (廳同知莊裕崧) personally directed an arrest, a local Moslem leader, Ma Chao-yüan (馬兆元 -1863), circulated word and put up posters saying that government forces were going to annihilate all Moslems. Alarmed by this rumor, Moslems from different places came and joined Ma Chao-yüan. Ma Chao-yüan then approached other local Moslem leaders, such as Ma Hua-lung (馬化澗 -March 2, 1871)¹⁵ of Chin-chi-pao (金積堡), Chou Fa (周法) of T'ung-hsin-ch'eng (同心城), Wang Ta-kuei (王大桂 -1863) of Yen-ch'a and "coerced" them to follow him. He led his group to a town in the department of Ling-chou and started burning, robbing and threatening, trying to force all the Moslems there to help him attack Ling-chou with the aim of using Ling-chou as a base to fight against the government.¹⁶ The department magistrate of Ling-chou was Chang Jui-chen.¹⁷ Chang pleaded for help from Ninghsia. More than 500 Manchu Banner troops were sent, who, on October 28, crossed the Yellow River. Before all of them could enter the city wall of Ling-chou, half were ambushed and suffered severe casualties. By this time, the Tartar city of Ninghsia had less than 1,000 Manchu Banner soldiers left. All had been unpaid for a long time. I-liang, the Manchu General-in-chief there, decided to let Ling-chou face its fate alone, without sending any more reinforcements.¹⁸ Intendant Hou Yün-teng led some Banner troops and some Green Battalions. With the help of the local corps he somehow managed to drive the Moslems under Ma Chao-yüan temporarily away from the besieged Ling-chou, but in pursuing the retreating Moslems, Hou suffered defeat.¹⁹ Then in December there were more riots. In P'ing-lo (平羅),

¹⁵Cf. Chapter IV of this work.

¹⁶*Fang-lüeh*, XXXV, 9-10; En-lin; T. C. 2 y., 2 m., 13 d.

¹⁷張瑞珍, a native of Shou-chou, Anhwei, was a *chin-shih*. He was appointed to be the department magistrate of Ling-chou just before Ma Chao-yüan rebelled. With unusual courage and wisdom he defended the city successfully for more than forty days. Knowing that very little outside help would come, Chang sent some relatives to Lanchow where they hired a number of mercenaries. This small group of professional fighters arrived in Ling-chou in time to help lift the siege. He was soon promoted to be acting Intendant of Lanchow. *Shuo-fang-tao-chih*, XV, 7-8.

¹⁸*Fang-lüeh*, XXVIII, 6-8; I-liang; T. C. 1 y., 11 m., 21 d.

¹⁹*ibid.*, XXXVII, 8; The Censorate; T. C. 2 y., 2 m., 29 d. Also XXVIII, 8-9; I-liang; T. C. 1 y., 11 m., 21 d.

a county north of Ninghsia, more than three thousand local Moslems gathered. When the magistrate appeared at the scene, he was attacked and wounded. Chasing him, the rebels started to attack the city wall. Intendant Hou rushed to save the city, but was beaten back and retreated to the Chinese city of Ninghsia.²⁰

(c) *Reconciliation Attempted*

In the face of this rising tide, En-lin made several moves. He called for reinforcements from Hsi-ning and Su-chou, and also requested the Court to dispatch either Lei Cheng-kuan or Ma Te-chao, two generals then in Shensi, to Kansu. But neither his order nor his request furnished a true solution to the problem. Both Hsi-ning and Su-chou had their own problems to worry about, and even if troops *could* be spared, they were too far away. Ma Te-chao never did intend to leave Sian.²¹ Lei Cheng-kuan was tied down in battles.

En-lin decided to make reconciliation his main policy, and use it as a weapon to split the Moslems. Pressed by sheer necessity, he made the decision; then presented his policy to the Court as follows:

Among the Moslems, there are certainly evil ones, but doubtless, there are also numerous peaceful, law-abiding people. If we decide to destroy them all, we are driving the good ones to join the rebels, and create for ourselves an awesome, endless job of killing the Moslems. Besides, in Kansu, with a few rare exceptions, there are Moslems living in every city. In the army, there are proportionately even more Moslems than Chinese among the rank and file. If we should offend them all, the damage would be beyond imagination. Therefore, I am ordering my troops to separate the law-abiding Moslems from the evil ones. I would excuse all who surrender, and destroy only those who resist. But this policy has already been criticized by the local Chinese. . . . In order to strengthen my hand, may I request Your Majesty to publish a decree stating the policy of no discrimination against either Chinese or Moslems, but only to distinguish good people from evil. . . . With this decree on hand, I can then reprint it and post the copies everywhere, so that both officials and subjects can know what to do.²²

²⁰*Ibid.*, XXVIII, 9; I-liang; T. C. 1 y., 11 m., 21 d. Cf G. F. Andrew: *The Crescent in North-west China*, 79-80.

²¹Fang-lüeh, L, 1; To-lung-a and others; T. C. 2 y., 8 m., 7 d.

²²*Ibid.*, XXIX, 13-15; En-lin; T. C. 1 y., 11 m., 28 d.

This request was granted. On January 17, 1863, a decree similar to an earlier one was announced through the cabinet especially for Kansu, promising protection to the innocent, forgiveness to the repentant, but punishment to those who resisted and caused trouble. Chinese subjects were warned not to continue killing Moslems.²³

Even before this decree had been promulgated, the policy of reconciliation brought some effective results in Kansu. On November 10, 1862, more than one thousand Moslems gathered outside Yen-ch'a-t'ing (鹽茶廳 now Hai-yüan 海原). People inside the city wall were frightened. The Independent Sub-Prefect of the city, Chuang Yü-sung (莊裕崧), figuring that with the handful of soldiers in the small city he could hardly manage to have an effective defense, consulted with Lieutenant-Colonel Wan Nien-hsin (參將萬年新) who was at the moment acting as the Brigadier General of Liang-chou, and decided to go to the Moslems to negotiate. He convinced the Moslem leader Wang Ta-kuei (王大桂 -1863) that the government was not intending to kill all Moslems as a current rumor claimed. Wang Ta-kuei not only surrendered, together with his followers, but promised to go together with Chuang to the neighboring county, Ku-yüan. (固原) to persuade Moslems in different villages to give up fighting. This was effectively carried out in different towns of Ku-yüan. When several Moslem leaders, including Ma Piao (馬彪 -1862) and Ma Hsin-ch'eng (馬新成 -1862), refused to cooperate, Wang Ta-kuei immediately killed them, together with more than forty Moslems who came from Hsi-ning. The remnants were dispersed. Wang also arrested seven other rebels and sent them for trial before the government court in Ku-yüan. The rebel leader of Ku-yüan, Yang Hsiang (楊祥 -1862), heard of Wang's surrender, and, planning to flee with twenty or more die-hard rebels, was stopped and killed by Wang's followers. As a reward, the government granted Wang the title of the sixth degree.²⁴

This policy continued to be effective for a while. Wang Ta-kuei informed Yang Ping-ch'eng (楊柄鏗), the acting Judicial Commissioner of Kansu, who was then in the field carrying out En-lin's policy of reconciliation, that whereas Ma Chao-yüan was the ringleader, the Moslems in T'ung-hsin-ch'eng and Chin-chi-pao were not willing rebels. If

²³*Ibid.*, XXIX, 17-18; to the cabinet; T. C. 1 y., 11 m., 28 d.

²⁴*Ibid.*, XXIX, 6-8; En-lin; T. C. 1 y., 11 m., 28 d.

the authorities would accept their surrender, it was possible to arrange it. Yang authorized Wang to arrange such a surrender and secretly ordered him to arrest Ma Chao-yüan. Wang carried out both orders. The area around Liang-chou and Yen-ch'a was thus temporarily pacified.²⁵

When the Moslems and the Chinese started similar trouble in Hochou, En-lin frankly admitted that since there were neither enough soldiers nor enough money, the only way left was to make peace with the rebels. He did so not because he liked to give way to the rebels, but just to tide things over during the trouble.²⁶ His attitude was even clearer in another memorial to the Court concerning northern Kansu. He said: "I accepted the rebels' petition and ordered them to give up the occupied city-walls. This was only to slow them down. Soon, when our main forces arrive, we will completely destroy them. By no means is there any real reason for me to appease them."²⁷ This confession shows that his policy was quite flexible.²⁸

3. OPERATIONS IN THE DISTRICT OF NINGHSIA

In 1863, a new Manchu General-in-chief of Ninghsia, Ch'ing-yün (慶昫) was sent to succeed I-liang. He belonged to the Manchu Plain Blue Banner,²⁹ and arrived at Ninghsia in early summer. He was very critical of the policy of reconciliation then practiced in the area. He was also very critical of Hou Yün-teng, the Chinese Intendant of Ninghsia. Ching-yün reported that the Moslems in Ninghsia were not trustworthy; that local officials were too eager to make peace; that the officials were suppressing the Chinese and emboldening the Moslems; that the Chinese local corps were loyal subjects; that the reason why the rich subjects had refused to make financial contributions was because of the selfishness of local officials. He was very unhappy to learn from Hou Yün-teng that the Tartar city was short of funds, though not of soldiers, whereas the Chinese city of Ninghsia was short of both.³⁰

To show its trust in the new Manchu General-in-chief, the Court

²⁵*Fang-lüeh*, XXXV, 9-12; En-lin; T. C. 2 y., 2 m., 13 d.

²⁶*Ibid.*, XXXII, 29-30; En-lin; T. C. 2 y., 1 m., 15 d.

²⁷*Ibid.*, LXV, 12; En-lin; T. C. 3 y., 5 m., 6 d.

²⁸Compare pp. 57-58 of this chapter.

²⁹*Shuo-fang-tao-chih*, XIII, 23.

³⁰*Fang-lüeh*, XLV, 11-12; Ch'ing-yün; T. C. 2 y., 5 m., 8 d.

granted Ch'ing-yün the authority to supervise and to direct the Intendant of Ninghsia as well as the other local officials. It also encouraged Ch'ing-yün to fight the Moslems with military force.³¹

A few months later, Ch'ing-yün obviously changed his mind. He contacted some local Moslems who successfully convinced him of their views. He reported to the Court in October, 1863, saying that the disputes in Ninghsia were all started by the Chinese local corps and the Moslems were only retaliating for what they had suffered. He also condemned the Chinese local corps for lack of discipline, and for making revenge a mere excuse to carry out robbery. He claimed that he was going to hold both Chinese and Moslems within bounds. Without noticing the contradiction to his earlier reports, the Manchu government praised Ch'ing-yün for observing things correctly, and encouraged him to maintain a balanced, peaceful co-existence between Moslems and Chinese.³²

Following this line of thinking, Ch'ing-yün forced the Chinese to dissolve their local corps, give up their weapons, and withdraw from fortified posts. Knowing that the defense of the city was lax, the Moslems with the support of Ma Hua-lung captured the Chinese city of Ninghsia. The next day they took Ling-chou. More than one hundred thousand Chinese inside Ninghsia were butchered. Hou Yün-teng was killed in action.³³ Then Ch'ing-yün put the blame on Hou, saying that it was Hou who had sent the Chinese local corps out to attack the Moslems. The Moslems, now under the leadership of Ma Wan-hsüan and He Chuang-t'u (馬萬選, 赫壯圖), however, did not consider Ch'ing-yün to be any better than Hou. They started to attack the Tartar city on December 12, 1863.³⁴ They took the city and killed numerous Manchu Banner garrison soldiers. Ch'ing-yün escaped.³⁵ It was at this time that the Manchu government realized its mistake in appointing Ch'ing-yün. Yet it could do no better than to continue to use him and hope for

³¹*Ibid.*, LXV, 13-15; to Ch'ing-yün and others; T. C. 2 y., 5 m., 8 d.

³²*Ibid.*, LII, 21-22; Ch'ing-yün; T. C. 2 y., 9 m., 10 d.

³³*Shuo-fang-tao-chih*, XIX, 2. Also *Fang-lüeh*, LVI, 13; Hsi-lin; T. C. 2 y., 11 m., 21 d.

³⁴*Fang-lüeh*, LVII, 1-2; Ch'ing-yün; T. C. 2 y., 11 m., 24 d.

³⁵This is based on *Shuo-fang-tao-chih*, XXXI, 2. However, according to Ch'ing-yün's own report, the Moslems stayed inside the city for only a short while. Cf. *Fang-lüeh*, LVII, 1-2; T. C. 2 y., 11 m., 24 d. It is possible that Ch'ing-yün managed to hide the truth from the Court.

the best.³⁶ An edict was issued to Liu Ch'ang-yu (劉長佑 Dec. 16, 1818-1887, Aug. 14), Governor-general of Chihli, to dispatch two thousand picked soldiers from Chihli Green Battalions to reinforce Ninghsia.³⁷ This force was led by No-ch'in (訥欽), the Provincial Commander-in-chief of Chihli, and arrived at Ting-pien, Shensi on April 27, 1864.³⁸

After To-lung-a died, Tu-hsing-a (都興阿 -1875), a Manchu of the Plain White Banner, was appointed to succeed To as the commander in the field.³⁹ On June 7, 1864, the Manchu Court directed Tu-hsing-a to move up north to save Ninghsia. He arrived at Ting-pien on June 27, and took over No-ch'in's army. By this time, there were about 3,800 inexperienced soldiers. Later, another thousand Green Battalion soldiers from Shensi, one thousand infantry and several hundred cavalry of local corps were added to his command. Besides, the acting colonel of the area of Yen-sui-chen, Chao Yen-lang (趙延煊), had enlisted one thousand refugees as an auxiliary force. But half of these refugees did not even have weapons, and all were short of supplies.

Under pressure, Tu-hsing-a had to advance with the army he had. He sent his vanguard north to cross the Yellow River on August 6, 1864, at Shih-tsui-tzu (石嘴子), a spot about one hundred kilometers north of Ninghsia, to avoid crossing before a hostile enemy. Then he drove along the western bank southward toward the city of Ninghsia.⁴⁰

Tu-hsing-a's offensive was successful. He recovered the city of Pao-feng on August 16, then lifted the siege of P'ing-lo.⁴¹ On September 2, 1864, Mu-t'u-shan (穆圖善 -1887) was ordered to reinforce Tu-hsing-a in Ninghsia.⁴² Mu-t'u-shan, a Manchu of the Bordered Yellow Banner, started his career as a soldier in Heilungkiang. From 1853 on, he fought in Honan, Hupeh, and Anhwei. In 1862, he helped To-lung-a to capture the strategic city of Lu-chou in Anhwei. Then he followed

³⁶*Fang-lüeh*, LVII, 4-5; to To-lung-a, Ch'ing-yün and others; T. C. 2 y., 11 m., 24d.

³⁷*Shu-fang-tao-chih*, XXXI, 2. It says here that Liu was ordered to lead the force. But since Liu was then the governor-general of Chihli, it was impossible to leave the job. After checking all the records, it has been determined that Liu did not go to Ninghsia at all. Cf. "Liu Ch'ang-yu" in *ECCP*, 515-516.

³⁸*Fang-lüeh*, LXIII, 9-10; No-ch'in; T. C. 3 y., 4 m., 6 d.

³⁹For Tu-hsing-a's life see *Ch'ing-shih-lieh-chuan*, LV, 36-40

⁴⁰*Fang-lüeh*, LXXII, 6-7; Tu-hsing-a; T. C. 3 y., 7 m., 19 d.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, LXXVI, 2; Ch'ing-yün; T. C. 3 y., 8 m., 16 d.

⁴²*Ibid.*, LXXIII, 13-14; To Tu-hsing-a and Mu-t'u-shan; T. C. 3 y., 8 m., 2d.

To-lung-a to Shensi to fight the *Nien* and T'ai-p'ings, as well as the Moslems. In 1864, after To-lung-a was injured, he once acted as commander.⁴³

Starting on September 27, Mu moved his troops northward. After To-lung-a's death, the Court divided To's army into five groups. The cavalry and the four thousand infantry sent to Honan were under Mu-t'u-shan. It was this army which Mu now led to Ninghsia. Besides, he enlisted a number of volunteers in Shensi so that he could have twelve battalions at full strength, i.e., six thousand men, plus cavalry.⁴⁴ On November 10, Mu and Tu-hsing-a met at Hua-ma-ch'ih. They decided to drive toward Ninghsia.⁴⁵ They joined their forces outside Ninghsia in January, 1865, and tried to win a speedy victory,⁴⁶ but before long they bogged down.⁴⁷ As the situation in both Kansu and Sinkiang deteriorated, the Court became increasingly impatient. It demanded action,⁴⁸ but the answer it received was disappointing. The Moslems had dug holes in the dikes and flooded the area. The governmental forces which were surrounded by water could hardly do much fighting.⁴⁹ Furthermore, the flood plus the lack of food caused contagious disease. The Manchu General-in-chief, Ch'ing-yün, was one of the victims and died on June 14, 1865.⁵⁰ Mu-t'u-shan was appointed to fill his post on July 6th.⁵¹ Though the siege of the Tartar city was lifted on July 2nd, no decisive victory was in sight.⁵²

When hardship increased and the possibility of complete victory decreased, most of the soldiers and the officials, including Mu-t'u-shan, were tired of war and preferred to negotiate a peace with the Moslems. As early as the summer of 1865, Mu-t'u-shan had hinted to Tu-hsing-a for peace negotiations. Tu politely rejected the plan and indirectly warned Mu, who was his deputy commander-in-chief, not to deflate

⁴³*Ch'ing-shih-lieh-chuan*, LVI, 1-5.

⁴⁴*Fang-lüeh*, LXXVII, 7-8; Mu-t'u-shan; T. C. 3 y., 9 m., 5 d.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, LXXXII, 8; Tu-hsing-a and Mu-t'u-shan; T. C. 3 y., 10 m., 26 d.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, XC, 20; Tu and Mu; T. C. 4 y., 1 m., 6 d.; XCII, 9-11; Tu and Mu; T. C. 4 y., 1 m., 23 d.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, XCIII, 8-10; Tu and Mu; T. C. 4 y., 2 m., 8 d.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, C, 22-23; to Tu and Mu; T. C. 4 y., 5 m., 4 d.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, CII, 3-4; Tu and Mu, T. C. 4 y., 5 m., 21 d.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, CIII, 5-6; Tu and Mu; T. C. 4 y., 5 m., 21 d.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, CIII, 12; to the cabinet; T. C. 4 y., intercalary 5 m., 14 d.

⁵²*Ibid.*, CIV, 14-19; Tu and Mu; T. C. 4 y., intercalary 5 m., 28 d.

morale by talking peace. A few days later, a messenger sent by Lien-chieh (聯捷 -January 25, 1866), a Manchu commander on his way to Sinkiang, arrived at Tu-hsing-a's camp. Lien-chieh was then promoting a peace settlement with the Moslems in Kansu and his messenger had visited the Moslems in Ninghsia directly before seeing Tu-hsing-a. Tu was greatly annoyed and immediately put the messenger in jail. Since the morale of the whole army was already low, a rumor soon developed to the effect that the Moslems were sincere in desiring surrender but that it was "the commander-in-chief (Tu-hsing-a) alone" who was blocking the peace. Tu realized the fact that the soldiers were tired of fighting in this desolate area, so he continuously pressed them to join the battle, hoping that action would boost morale. This was half-heartedly carried out by his lieutenants. At that time, the Moslems were also desperately short of food.⁵³ On January 10, 1866, six Moslem leaders, led by Ma Wan-hsüan, came to arrange a surrender. On the 13th, Tu and Mu jointly accepted the surrender. On the 23rd, the Moslems gave up the Chinese city of Ninghsia.⁵⁴ Tu was not satisfied with the speed with which the Moslems moved out of the city, nor the quantity of armament and horses they had given up. Consequently, on January 31st, Tu ordered the execution of eleven Moslem hostages and sent troops into the city to drive out the Moslems remaining in the city. Mu-t'u-shan, however, was of a very different opinion. He considered the Moslems had surrendered a great deal (including 26 cannon, more than 1,000 rifles, and over 10,000 swords and spears) and had satisfactorily fulfilled the terms of surrender. When he found out that Tu-hsing-a was sending troops to raid the city, he ordered his troops to protect the Moslems. The general feeling of the officials as well as the soldiers was against Tu-hsing-a. Not until Tu angrily forced his own troops to enter the city did they reluctantly obey. But within a moment Tu's troops had retreated, obviously beaten by Mu-t'u-shan's men, and in the brief skirmish one was killed and more than twenty injured. That evening the soldiers got out of control. They rushed into the Chinese city and started robbing and burning for a whole night. After this incident, both Tu-hsing-a and Mu-t'u-shan sent in their resignations to the Court, but the facts were against Tu-hsing-a.⁵⁵

⁵³*Ibid.*, CCIII, 6-11; Mu-t'u-shan; T. C. 8 y., 10 m., 2 d.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, CXXV, 6-8; Tu-hsing-a; T. C. 5 y., 1 m., 9 d.

⁵⁵Compare the conflicting reports of Tu-hsing-a and Mu-t'u-shan. *Fang-lüeh*, CXXV, 1-3, and 3-4; Mu-t'u-shan; T. C. 5 y., 1 m., 4 d. CXXV, 4-5, T. C. 5 y., 1 m., 4 d. and 6-10, T. C. 5 y., 1 m., 9 d. both by Tu-hsing-a.

Before the Court knew anything about this conflict of policy between the two commanders, it had already transferred Tu-hsing-a to be the military governor of Sheng-ching in Manchuria.⁵⁶ As it conveniently became a move to save his face, Tu was ordered to take over the new job and leave Mu-t'u-shan to finish the mission in Ninghsia.⁵⁷ After Tu-hsing-a's departure, Mu-t'u-shan's policy of peaceful settlement was smoothly carried out throughout the whole area.⁵⁸ Even Ma Hua-lung was excused. Mu not only cleared Ma of all past accusations but reported to the Court: "Ma Hua-lung is very honest. . . and very much trusted by the Moslems in Kansu. If he should be sent out to different places to persuade the Moslems. . . the Moslems everywhere would surrender without a fight. Then," Mu optimistically continued, "the security of northwest China would be as solid as a rock, and counting the demobilization of the more than a hundred battalions in Kansu, the saving of money and food alone would be from one million to two million taels of silver a year. The whole situation would be greatly improved."⁵⁹ This policy was immediately approved by the Court.⁶⁰

4. HSI-LIN AND HIS TEMPORIZING POLICY

Hsi-lin (熙麟 -1864, November 15) belonged to the Manchu Bordered Yellow Banner. He obtained his *chin-shih* degree in 1838 and after years of routine rotation, he was appointed governor-general of Shen-Kan in the early fall of 1862.⁶¹ He arrived in Shensi in November,⁶² and at there he waited and hesitated. Once he even sent in his resignation to the Court, which promptly turned it down.⁶³ He finally left Shensi for Kansu on February 28, 1863, by-passing the area where the Moslems were. On his way he was informed by the acting governor-general, En-lin, of the bad news of the loss of Ku-yüan to the Moslems on February 18. Hsi-lin was not at all happy when he realized that

⁵⁶*Fang-lüeh*, CXXIV, 15; to the cabinet; T. C. 4 y., 12 m., 25 d.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, CXXIV, 10-11; to Tu, Mu and Yang Yüeh-pin; T. C. 5 y., 1 m., 9 d.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, CXXVIII, 8; Mu; T. C. 5 y., 2 m., 17 d.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, CXXIX, 9-10; Mu; T. C. 5 y., 3 m., 21 d.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, CXXIX, 13; to Mu; T. C. 5 y., 3 m., 21 d.

⁶¹Ch'ing-shih-kuan: *Ch'ing-shih-lieh-chuan*, XLVIII, 26-27.

⁶²*Fang-lüeh*, XXV, 13; Hsi-lin; T. C. 1 y., 10 m., 11 d.

⁶³*Ibid.*, XXXI, 12-13; Hsi-lin; T. C. 1 y., 12 m., 17 d. Also 13-14; to Hsi-lin: same day.

there were almost 4,000 Moslem cavalry waiting ahead of him in Ku-yüan, while he had only about 700 foot-soldiers under his command.⁶⁴ More bad news was in store. The Moslems outside of P'ing-liang burned down a bridge, and the Chinese inside the city wall closed the city gates and killed all thirty to forty Moslems still living inside. Local officials were unable to stop either side, and all the Moslems in the nearby area, tens of thousands of them, built up an alliance to besiege P'ing-liang.⁶⁵ Hsi-lin arrived at Ch'ing-yang on March 22, 1863. Knowing that he was outnumbered, he rejected the local gentry's request to advance to P'ing-liang, the city that was about to be besieged. From the strategic point of view, Hsi-lin's decision was a necessity. However, from the political point of view, it was bound to bring repercussions. A new governor-general, just arrived in Kansu, and at first sight of the enemy, he retreated! That certainly would not help to build up his prestige, which was so important in the handling of future difficulties. Hsi-lin knew this well. Since it was simply impossible for him to fight, he turned to the idea of reconciliation. He had on hand a copy of the edict of reconciliation promulgated by the Cabinet on January 17, 1863. He put it to good use. He printed numerous copies of it, added some explanations of his own, and posted them everywhere to request Moslems to dissolve their bands within forty days. By doing this, he calculated that for at least forty more days he could be excused for not taking any positive action. By the end of forty days, he assumed that some reinforcements might arrive. Then he would be able to concentrate his strength to strike one weak enemy and so win the needed first victory to build up morale as well as prestige.⁶⁶ Hence Hsi-lin was not actually thinking of making peace with the Moslems.

Both En-lin and Hsi-lin's successes were bound to be limited. In the first place, not all Moslems were ready and willing to give up; in the second place, even if most of them were, they would be destroyed by those stronger ones who insisted on rebellion. The weak government forces were not able to protect them at all. The fall of Ku-yüan was the first straw in the wind. When Wang Ta-kuei, the now much-

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, XXXIV, 5-7; Hsi-lin; T. C. 2 y., 2 m., 4 d.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, XXXV, 5; En-lin; T. C. 2 y., 2 m., 13 d.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, XXXVII, 10-12; Hsi-lin; T. C. 2 y., 3 m., 8 d.

decorated Moslem leader, was sent by the government to persuade the rebels of Ku-yüan to surrender, he was welcomed into the city. However, on March 18, 1863, suddenly all gates were shut and the rebels stormed the residence of Wang. Wang fled in a hurry and lowered himself down the city wall with a rope. His followers inside Ku-yüan were either murdered or arrested. The rebels followed Wang. On March 24, 1863, they started to attack Yen-ch'a-t'ing. Soon they took the city, chased Wang Ta-kuei to his own village, and then killed him and his whole family.⁶⁷

Now the Manchu Court demonstrated its deep distrust of Moslems. Even after Wang Ta-kuei, the surrendered Moslem, had fought and died for the government, the Court secretly directed To-lung-a, Hsi-lin, En-lin and the other officials as follows:

*Was Wang Ta-kuei really murdered? The Moslems are very deceitful by nature. En-lin should not be so naive as to trust them in earnest, for then, you might not be tricked. . . Watch carefully so that they do not develop any conspiracy from inside.*⁶⁸

A number of disasters followed. P'ing-liang, the leading city of northeastern Kansu fell to the Moslems on September 24, 1863.⁶⁹ Tiao, a city in southern Kansu fell to the Moslems on October 8, 1863.⁷⁰ The Chinese city of Ninghsia (寧夏漢城), the leading city in northern Kansu, fell on December 4, 1863. The neighboring city of Ling-chou followed the same fate the next day.⁷¹ Ho-chou, another strategic city in southwestern Kansu fell on October 31, 1864, after ten months of siege.⁷² Su-chou, in western Kansu, reported its first alarm of Moslem riots in February, 1864. This, however, was soon crushed.⁷³

On June 9, 1864, the Court accepted Hsi-lin's resignation and appointed Yang Yüeh-pin to succeed him as governor-general of Shenkan.⁷⁴ Yang did not come to Kansu until much later. But by this

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, XLI, 3-5; En-lin; T. C. 2 y., 4 m., 14 d.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, XLI, 8-9; to To-lung-a, Hsi-lin, Ying-ch'i, En-lin and others; T. C. 2 y., 4 m., 14 d.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, LII, 8; Hsi-lin; T. C. 2 y., 8 m., 24 d.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, LXVI, 8; En-lin; T. C. 3 y., 5 m., 21 d.

⁷¹*Ibid.*, LVI, 13; Hsi-lin; T. C. 2 y., 11 m., 21 d.

⁷²*Ibid.*, LXXXIII, 5-7; En-lin; T. C. 3 y., 11 m., 5 d.

⁷³*Ibid.*, LXII, 14-16; En-lin; T. C. 3 y., 1 m., 5 d.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, LXV, 14-15; to Tu-hsing-a, Hsi-lin and others; T. C. 3 y., 5 m., 6 d.

time, the Moslem rebels in Shensi had already been defeated by To-lung-a's army, and two of To-lung-a's lieutenants, Lei Cheng-kuan and T'ao Mao-lin had already started their adventure to drive into Kansu.

5. THE POLICY OF LEI CHENG-KUAN AND OTHERS

(a) *The partial military victory under Lei*

Lei Cheng-kuan (雷正綰 -1897), a native of Chung-chiang, Szechwan (四川中江) was a sergeant (把總) when he left for Hupeh in 1854. There he joined the *Ch'u-yung*. In 1858 he followed To-lung-a to fight in Anhwei. By accumulation of merit, he was promoted to be Brigadier General of Shen-an-chen (陝安鎮總兵) in 1861. Next year when Sian was in danger, he was ordered to come to Shensi. He arrived in mid-autumn, and was promoted to be Provincial Commander-in-chief of Shensi (陝西提督) as well as Sheng-pao's deputy Commander. He continued to be the deputy of To-lung-a and Tu-hsing-a when they successively took over the job of commander of the area.⁷⁵ After To-lung-a's death, and while Tu-hsing-a was much occupied in the campaigns in Ninghsia, Lei played the leading role in the battles of Kansu. Besides Lei, there was an army under T'ao Mao-lin, another general in the late To-lung-a's troops. Both of them were sent to relieve P'ing-liang, only to find that the city was already in the hands of the rebels. However, they stormed into P'ing-liang on June 2, 1864. The fighting went on through the night, and the last resistance was broken in the early afternoon of the next day.⁷⁶

Whereas the rebels were hard pressed, a group of more than four thousand Moslems from Li-chün-pao (李俊堡) under Chang Pao-lung (張保隆) captured Ku-yüan and surrendered it to the government. Chang was one of the followers of Wang Ta-kuei who had been killed by the rebels for cooperation with the government.⁷⁷ The recovery of this strategic city of Ku-yüan improved the position of the government forces.

In reporting Chang's offer, En-lin, the acting governor-general in

⁷⁵*Ch'ing-shih-lieh-chuan*, LX, 40-43.

⁷⁶*Fang-lieh*, LXVII, 5; Hsi-lin and Lei Cheng-kuan; T. C. 3 y., 5 m., 28 d.

⁷⁷See pp. 58-59, 66.

Lanchow, told the Court that he accepted it because of necessity, not because he was trusting the Moslems. This apology was in harmony with the answer of the Manchu Court:

*The Moslems are cunning, deceitful, and untrustworthy. This time, however, since Chang Pao-lung has killed numerous rebels and surrendered the city, it seems that he is acting in good faith. Perhaps it is because of the fact that the government forces had recovered P'ing-liang, and he was afraid of our strength. . . .*⁷⁸

Obviously, the Manchu Court overlooked the fact that Chang captured Ku-yüan earlier than the government forces recovered P'ing-liang.⁷⁹

From P'ing-liang, the highway stretched through Lung-te (隆德) and Ching-ning (靜寧) to Lanchow, the capital of the province. South of this line were Chang-chia-ch'uan (張家川), Lung-shan-chen (龍山鎮), Lien-hua-ch'eng (蓮花城), Yen-kuan (鹽關), Ti-tao (狄道), and Ho-chou (河州); north of this line were Yen-ch'a (present-day Hai-yüan(海原), Yü-wang-ch'eng (預皇城), Ling-chou (靈州), Chin-chi-pao (金積堡), and Ninghsia; all centers of the Moslem rebels. To reopen the highway between P'ing-liang and Lanchow, would not only reestablish the necessary supply and communication line for the government, but also effect a cut-off of the connection between the northern Moslem centers and the southern. It would make their separate defeat possible.⁸⁰

After this highway was finally more or less under control, Lei and T'ao joined forces to attack Moslem centers in the south. They took Chang-chia-ch'uan on September 3, 1864. A few days later, they took Lung-shan-chen. Soon they learned the bad news that Ku-yüan had fallen into the hands of the rebels again, but they could not afford to give up their southern campaign at this moment. They decided to continue the battle as it had been planned. In their anxiety, they suffered a defeat on September 17 when they attacked the third target, Lien-hua-ch'eng.⁸¹ In order to back Lei up, the governor of Shensi, Liu Jung (劉蓉) dispatched Ts'ao K'e-chung's (曹克忠) troops into Kansu.⁸²

⁷⁸*Fang-lüeh*, LXX, 21; to Tu-hsing-a, Lei Cheng-kuan and En-lin, T. C. 3 y., 6 m., 29 d.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, LXX, 19-20; En-lin; T. C. 3 y., 6 m., 29 d.

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, LXXII., 7; Lei Cheng-kuan; T. C. 3 y., 7 m., 19 d.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, LXXVI, 19-21; Lei Cheng-kuan; T. C. 3 y., 8 m., 29 d.

⁸²*Ibid.*, LXXVII, 11; Liu Jung; T. C. 3 y., 9 m., 5 d.

Ts'ao was one of the best generals under the late To-lung-a. After Ts'ao's arrival, Lien-hua-ch'eng was captured on November 3, 1864. Then Lei sent T'ao to Lanchow, left Ts'ao in Lien-hua-ch'eng, and moved his own troops back to P'ing-liang, pending the next move. During the fighting, all three armies suffered losses. In order to replace the losses, Lei, T'ao, Ts'ao sent officers to Hupeh and Honan to enlist new soldiers. These officers tried to get more recruits without scrutinizing either the quality or their background. Many rascals and ex-bandits were taken. This was certainly against the tradition of the *Hsiang-chiün* and sowed the seeds of later disasters.⁸³

The sudden attack on Ku-yüan by the Shensi Moslems was a setback, but it incidently postponed a problem for the policy-makers in the Manchu government. When these Shensi Moslems, under the leadership of He Ming-t'ang (赫明堂), offered to surrender after they lost P'ing-liang and Ku-yüan, a problem was created, namely, one of how to rehabilitate them. Desolate Kansu could not afford to accommodate them. The hostile Shensi Chinese would not allow them to return to Shensi. As the helpless En-lin reported to the Court: "The number is too large for either peace or war."⁸⁴ He got an equally helpless answer from the Court:

*Since, according to your report, there are too many people involved, and no place to rehabilitate them, then . . . just talk softly to them and be ready for any incident . . . Lei Cheng-kuan . . . shall try to arrange some way to handle them, but be sure not to allow any further danger to develop.*⁸⁵

At the moment, Lei was far away in Lien-hua-ch'eng and had his hands full of trouble.

The fact that the rebels came from Shensi only made the problem more complicated. Since Kansu was poorer than Shensi, these Moslems naturally preferred to go home once the war was over. But their property had long since been confiscated. One Shensi official expressed the general feeling by saying: "At most we may tolerate

⁸³*Ibid.*, LXXI, 20-24; Lei Cheng-kuan; T. C. 3 y., 10 m., 20 d. Also CI, 17-20; Liu Jung; T. C. 4 y., 5 m., 18 d.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, LXXI, 9; En-lin, T. C. 3 y., 7 m., 13 d.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, LXXI, 11; to Tu-hsing-a, Lei Cheng-kuan, and En-lin; T. C. 3 y., 7 m., 13 d.

them without insisting on their execution. How can it be possible to return to them their confiscated property?"⁸⁶ Another official said:

*In the area of Sian and T'ung-chou, the murdered Chinese amounted to a million. The hatred is deep in people's hearts. If one allows the Moslems to return, how can one expect them to get along? Besides, the deserted villages of the said area have long been desolate. No one knows exactly where the former Moslem properties lie. If we would allow them to occupy wherever they claim, it is bound to provoke endless quarrels and more riots will occur.*⁸⁷

Chang Chi-hsin, the Judicial Commissioner of Shensi (陝西按察使張集馨), one of these opponents, was assigned by the Court to visit Kansu and arrange for the rehabilitation of those Shensi Moslems who chose to surrender.⁸⁸ Chang's embarrassing mission was avoided by the sudden uprising of these Moslems.

On September 4, 1864, Sun Yi-pao (孫義保), a Shensi Moslem leader, attacked Ku-yüan from outside and He Ming-t'ang, the surrendered Shensi Moslem leader, opened the gate from the inside. Chang Pao-lung, the Kansu Moslem leader who had cooperated with the government, was driven out.⁸⁹

In the south, when Lei Cheng-kuan learned that Ch'in-chou (秦州) in southeastern Kansu was besieged, he ordered Ts'ao K'e-chung to save that city. Ts'ao successfully lifted the siege on November 13, 1864, pursued the rebels and, on December 6, took over the Moslem stronghold of Yen-kuan (鹽關). Two days later, he destroyed another, Kao-lou-pao (高樓堡). The area near Ch'in-chou was thus pacified. Lei then pulled Ts'ao's main forces northward, leaving four battalions to defend Ch'in-chou.⁹⁰

Lei and Ts'ao joined forces to stop an attempt of the Moslems to

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, LVII, 18-19; Chang Chi-hsin; T. C. 2 y., 11 m., 16 d.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, LXXVI, 17; Tu-hsing-a; T. C. 3 y., 8 m., 28 d. When Tu-hsing-a mentioned "the murdered Chinese amounted to a million," he was making a rough estimate and followed the Chinese custom of exaggeration.

⁸⁸*Fang-lüeh*, LXXIII, 19-21; to Tu-hsing-a, Chang Chi-hsin and others; T. C. 3 y., 8 m., 3 d.

⁸⁹*Fang-lüeh*, LXXVI, 21; Lei Cheng-kuan; T. C. 3 y., 8 m., 29 d. Also LXXVIII, 20-22; En-lin, T. C. 3 y., 9 m., 14 d.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, LXXXVII, 20-23; Lei Cheng-kuan; T. C. 3 y., 12 m., 8 d.

reinvade Shensi.⁹¹ Then, with the help of the surrendered Moslems under Chang Pao-lung, they recovered Ku-yüan on February 26, 1865.⁹²

North of Ku-yüan, stretching for hundreds of miles to Ninghsia, there were very few Chinese. About seventy to eighty per cent of the villages belonged to Moslems. Not all these Moslems were hostile. Many of them, like Chang Pao-lung, were friendly to the government. Lei pleaded for the full support of the Court to his plan of using Moslems to fight against Moslems in a campaign to recover northern Kansu.⁹³

As a whole, in the spring of 1865, Lei Cheng-kuan could claim that the counties T'ung-wei (通渭), Ning-yüan (寧遠), Lung-hsi (隴西), Hui-ning (會寧) and the highway between Ching-chou, P'ing-liang and Lanchow were all clear of the rebels.⁹⁴ However, although he won some initial victories in his campaign driving north,⁹⁵ he soon began to have reverses.

(b) *The self-defeating program*

Kansu was a poor province. Traditionally it depended upon subsidies sent in from the eastern provinces to balance the budget. When the eastern provinces were stricken by wars, these subsidies dwindled. As early as the winter of 1862-1863, En-lin, the acting governor-general, reported that the treasury of the province had hardly enough money to pay one month's expenses of the military forces. He started to withdraw the savings of the past, a sum of 103,150 taels of silver, from the commercial "bank."⁹⁶ In the fall of 1863, En-lin sounded a warning, saying that the soldiers had not been paid for almost a year, and that there was a possibility of riots.⁹⁷ Then in the winter of 1863 to 1864, En-in reported that ever since the summer of 1862, he had received not a single tael of subsidies from the eastern provinces. For more than a year, he had spent all the savings and cash on hand. He

⁹¹*Ibid.*, XCI, 19-22; Lei Cheng-kuan; T. C. 4 y., 1 m., 16 d.

⁹²*Ibid.*, XCIII, 18-24; Lei Cheng-kuan; T. C. 4 y., 2 m., 17 d.

⁹³*Ibid.*, XCV, 1-6; Lei; T. C. 4 y., 2 m., 26 d.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, XCVII, 15-17; Lei; T. C. 4 y., 3 m., 26 d.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, C, 9-11 Lei; T. C. 4 y., 4 m., 11 d.

⁹⁶*Ibid.*, XXIX, 18-19; En-lin; T. C. 1 y., 11 m., 28 d.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*, IL, 1; En-lin; T. C. 2 v., 8 m., 4 d.

had used up all copper and lead stockpiled to coin money. He had passed out all the paper money issued by the Board of Revenue. He had urged the people to contribute many times.⁹⁸ Three months later, he reported that he had ordered the counties and districts near P'ing-liang to levy food and hay from the people to supply the army. These supplies, he suggested, could later be considered as "contributions" credited for rewards of official titles, or to be credited to the regular tax.⁹⁹

In spite of these financial difficulties, more troops were called in. In the spring of 1864, not satisfied with the Green Battalions under him, En-lin enlisted one thousand volunteers in Lanchow and organized into three battalions under his direct command, with the name of *Hsüan-wei ch'in-chün* (宣威親軍). Besides this, he sent an official to Szechwan to recruit five thousand more Szechwan volunteers to be trained. This army was an imitation of the *Hsiang-chün*.¹⁰⁰ Hsi-lin, the governor-general stationed at Ch'ing-yang, also had built up his army in that area. Besides the Green Battalions under his command in the area, he also enlisted volunteers. There were around 8,900 of these two groups in Ch'ing-yang and its vicinity. In Ting-pien, he had two more battalions of volunteers. He also sent a lieutenant-colonel, Wang T'ai-lai, to recruit 3,300 Hunan volunteers. These volunteers were organized on the pattern of the *Hsiang-chün*. After Hsi-lin handed over his military supply bureau to an acting official, Wen-yü (文煜), the military expenses of his bureau alone included the following figures:

The Pay Roll of the Military Supply Bureau of Ch'ing-yang in the summer of 1864 (慶陽糧臺) (not including those troops west or south of Lanchow, nor those under Ts'ao K'e-chung, En-lin and T'ao Mao-lin. The figures were only in round numbers).

Name of the Commander	Number of battalions	Number of soldiers	Monthly pay in teals
Lei Cheng-kuan (Ch'u-yung)	30	15,000	70,000-80,000

⁹⁸*Ibid.*, LVIII, 8-9; En-lin; T. C. 2 y., 12 m., 21 d.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, LX, 22; En-lin; T. C. 3 y., 3 m., 12 d.

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*, LXVI, 12, 14; En-lin; T. C. 3 y., 5 m., 21 d.

<i>Wen-yü (Ch'ing-yang etc.) (Green Battalions and volunteers)</i>	10	8,900	37,000
<i>Wen-yü (Ting-pien) (volunteers)</i>	2	1,400	7,000
<i>Chao Yen-lang 趙延煥 (enlisted refugees)</i>	2	1,000	
<i>Tu-hsing-a (Banner Cavalry)</i>		1,000	10,000-20,000
<i>Ch'en T'ien-yu 陳天佑 (not identified, possibly local corps)</i>	2	1,000	7,000
<i>Wang T'ai-lai 王泰來 (volunteers from Hunan)</i>	6	3,300	13,000
Total	52	31,600	160,000*
<i>Equipment and munitions</i>			100,000

*This total of monthly pay was given in the original document. Since the individual items were given in approximately round numbers, the total might come up to 160,000 and more.

The above list included only regular expenses. There were numerous extra expenses. For instance, the troops under T'ao Mao-lin were supposed to be paid by Shensi province, but since Shensi could not supply them regularly, a sum of 5,000 taels was taken from the Ch'ing-yang military supply bureau for emergency use to buy tents. On the income side, Wen-yü received only 50,000 taels from the Ho-tung (河東道) (in Shansi) salt intendant, and 20,000 taels from the province of Shantung.¹⁰¹ Three months later, in the late fall of 1864, Wen-yü reported a set of figures a little different from the above but with the same trend:

¹⁰¹Both the list and the other data are based on *Fang-lüeh*, LXIX, 9-11; Wen-yü: T. C. 3. y., 6 m., 19 d.

*The Ch'ing-yang military supply bureau needs two hundred thousand taels a month to take care of the regular pay of the army under Tu-hsing-a, Lei Cheng-kuan and the bureau itself. I have been at Ch'ing-yang for six months. During this period of time I should have paid more than 1,200,000 taels to discharge all obligations. Nevertheless, I have received only 240,000 taels altogether from the provinces of Shantung and Shansi and the Ho-tung salt intendant.*¹⁰²

The natural results was to leave the soldiers unpaid or even unfed. There were numerous victims. Ku-yüan was lost for the second time because Chang Pao-lung and the other defenders had no food and had to leave their posts to reap crops in the countryside. It enabled the rebels to surprise the defenders and to take the city.¹⁰³ Similar things happened in Ho-chou, where the troops were so short of food that they did not even have the strength to resist the attackers.¹⁰⁴ Another victim was T'ao Mao-lin whose army was supposed to be supplied by the military supply bureau of Shensi. When he and his army moved into Kansu, the Shensi bureau, which had been under tremendous pressure all the time, naturally reduced and delayed the supply. On the other hand, the bureau in Ch'ing-yang considered this army to be outside of its jurisdiction, and refused to give it regular help. From September, 1863, to April, 1865, T'ao, entitled to receive 950,000 taels, actually received only 24,000 taels. That was only a little more than 2.5 per cent.¹⁰⁵ Yet, in the summer and early fall of 1864, T'ao was in the center of the battles, when he joined forces with Lei Cheng-kuan to wipe out the Moslem centers south of P'ing-liang, as mentioned above. On October 12, the Manchu Court received a warning from Tu-hsing-a, the commander of the area at the time, that if this condition of lack of both food and equipment were to continue, T'ao's troops might collapse.¹⁰⁶ This warning went unheeded. Instead, T'ao was sent to Lanchow to help En-lin.¹⁰⁷ Another warning came from Chang Chi-hsin who was then in Kansu. Chang's report came on January 6, 1865, saying that since

¹⁰²*Ibid.*, LXXIX, 3; Wen-yü; T. C. 3 y., 9 m., 19 d.

¹⁰³*Ibid.*, LXXVIII, 20-21; En-lin; T. C. 3 y., 8 m., 4 d.

¹⁰⁴*Ibid.*, LXXXIII, 7; En-lin; T. C. 3 y., 10 m., 2 d.

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*, CV, 26-27; T'ao Mao-lin; T. C. 4 y., 6 m., 4 d.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*, LXXVIII, 12; Tu-hsing-a; T. C. 3 y., 9 m., 12 d.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, LXXXI, 23; Lei Cheng-kuan; T. C. 3 y., 10 m., 20 d.

the defeat near Chang Chia-ch'uan, the morale of T'ao's troops had been very low.¹⁰⁸

From January, 1864, to the summer of 1865, T'ao's soldiers received pay only twice, first in August of 1864, then in April of 1865. The money they received was far below what they should have received, only 1.3 taels for each person altogether. Even food was short, so they were ordered to go out and steal grain and then grind it into flour by their own labor. Things were already bad enough, but oil was added to the fire when the soldiers discovered that the officers were cheating them. Even though food had been stolen from the farmers, the same amount of flour, or the equivalent value, was taken from the soldier's regular ration or pay as if food had been actually issued by the government. In May, 1865, from six to seven thousand of T'ao's soldiers, or about seventy per cent of the entire army, deserted in a group.¹⁰⁹ They fled eastward into Shensi, robbing and raping on their way.¹¹⁰ After they entered Shensi, however, they were disarmed and put under control.¹¹¹ The desertion of T'ao's army exposed the city of An-ting to the direct attack of the Moslems. Even Lanchow, the capital of the province, was endangered.¹¹² An-ting was besieged from May 1, 1865, until Lei Cheng-kuan sent six battalions back from the front line to lift the siege on June 13.¹¹³ Lei Cheng-kuan, Ts'ao K'e-chung and T'ao Mao-lin were the three pillars carrying the military burden in Kansu. Now one of these three had collapsed.

6. THE POLICY OF YANG YÜEH-PIN

(a) *Yang Yüeh-pin, the man and his task*

Yang Yüeh-pin (楊岳斌 1822-1890), originally named Tsai-fu (載福), was a native of Shan-hua, Hunan. In 1853 when Tseng Kuo-fan organized the *Hsiang-chiün*, Yang was called to Heng-yang to be

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, LXXXVII, 16; Chang Chi-hsin; T. C. 3 y., 12 m., 8 d.

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, CI, 14-15; Liu Jung; T. C. 4 y., 5 m., 18 d.

¹¹⁰Liu Jung: *Yang-hul-t'ang wen-chi* 劉蓉: 養壽堂文集., IX, 1.

¹¹¹*Fang-lüeh*, CI, 10-12; Yang Yüeh-pin, Liu Yung; T. C. 4 y., 5 m., 18 d.

¹¹²*Ibid.*, C, 12; En-lin; T. C. 4 y., 5 m., 2 d.

¹¹³*Ibid.*, CIII, 22-25; En-lin; T. C. 4 y., intercalary 5 m., 19 d.

one of the ten battalion commanders in the new navy. From that time on Yang helped Tseng Kuo-fan defeat the T'ai-p'ings. In 1864 the Court appointed Yang to be governor-general of Shen-kan.¹¹⁴ But even after the T'ai-p'ings were suppressed, he was not ready to go. He was wounded and sick, and had only naval forces but no army. Besides, he did not have any money.¹¹⁵ After much delay, he had 5,000 new soldiers ready. On May 14, 1865, he arrived at Sian, Shensi.¹¹⁶

Yang was industrious, thrifty, brave and took his responsibilities seriously. He required his subordinates to be well-disciplined and expected them to achieve much. But Yang himself was not a well-educated man. Nor did his past experience in a comparatively simple environment, the navy, help him much in building up his capacity to deal with complicated problems and human relations. When he became an independent agent, his courage and earnestness could not make up for his lack of resources.¹¹⁷ Unfortunately, the task he had to face in Kansu was one of the most difficult assignments of the day. It did not take him long to find this out after he arrived at Sian, where he consulted with Liu Jung, the governor of Shensi.¹¹⁸ The picture Liu painted for him was not very bright:

Every month one hears reports that new victories have been won, yet the rebels have never been materially reduced in strength: . . . The officers prefer to drive the rebels round and round so they can report more victories and win rewards. This is trouble number one. Lei Cheng-kuan had 29 battalions. Now he has more than 40. T'ao Mao-lin had 17 and now he has 30. Ts'ao K'e-chung had 14 and now has more than 20. The number of battalions has increased, but the number of soldiers has not. According to the regulations, one battalion is 500 men; now, each of their battalions has only about 300. . . . When officers were sent to Hupeh and Honan to enlist new soldiers, they tried to get more people, but without scrutinizing either their quality or

¹¹⁴*Ch'ing-shih-lieh-chuan*, LIV, 30-34; *Ch'ing-shih-kao, lieh-chuan*, CXC VII, 1, P'eng Yü-lin; 5, Yang Yüeh-pin. *ECCP*, 617-620.

¹¹⁵*Fang-lüeh*, LXXX, 4-5; Yang Yüeh-pin; T. C. 3 y., 10 m., 1 d.

¹¹⁶*Ibid.*, C, 24; Yang Yüeh-pin, T. C. 4 y., 5 m., 5 d.

¹¹⁷*Ibid.*, CXXXI, 19; Liu Jung; T. C. 5 y., 4 m., 24 d. Also CXXXVIII, 11-13; Lin Chih-wang; T. C. 5 y., 7 m., 22 d. Cf. Bales: *Tso Tsung-f'ang*, 225.

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*, C, 24; Yang; T. C. 4 y., 5 m., 5 d.; CI, 17-20; Liu; T. C. 4 y., 5 m., 18 d.

their background. Many rascals and ex-bandits were taken. The officers themselves were not qualified either. On their way back, the newly enlisted men lacked discipline, and caused considerable disturbance and damage to the people. The fundamental motive is to cheat the government by taking pay which they did not entitle to take. This is trouble number two.

Traditionally, people recommended by the military commanders in the field are promptly promoted. Because life in the army is hard, and fighting at the front is dangerous, without special rewards, it seems hard to encourage people to serve faithfully. Now, any person, no matter how bad a record he might have had in the past, as soon as he has sent enough bribes to the commanders, is recommended as a staff member who has made superior contributions in winning battles, as if he actually did participate in fighting like others. . . . This is trouble number three.

Kansu is notorious for its poverty. The savings among the people are scarce. During these war years, the harvests have especially been meager. To buy food for the army with cash, however, is still possible. Instead of doing so, the troops arbitrarily demanded "contributions," which in many cases turned out to become bare-faced robbery. When hatred accumulated, the people banded together to resist. The strong ones thus escaped through rebellion, while the weak ones died for their innocence. . . . This is trouble number four.

With any one of the above-mentioned troubles in existence, an army would destroy itself. And now Kansu has them all. . . . If there were a good leader, things might be improved. But let us look around: En-lin is incompetent, T'ao Mao-lin is corrupted. . . . Lei Cheng-kuan is brave but now indulges in opium. . . . Tu-hsing-a is wise, but cowardly; Mu-t'u-shan is kind, but helpless. The other people like Yü-t'ung (玉通), Ch'eng-lu (成祿) and Lien-chieh (聯捷) are even worse. Besides, within one province, eight different people (the people named in this paragraph) have the right to give direct reports to the Throne. Neither one is responsible to the others, and each one has his own ideas. How can one expect things not to go wrong, when there are so many cooks to spoil the broth?¹¹⁹

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, CI, 17-20; Liu Jung; T. C. 4 y., 5 m., 18 d. Also in Liu Jung: *Yang-hui-t'ang Wen-chi*, IX, 25-28; T. C. 4 y., 5 m., 12 d. There are some slight differences between these two versions of the same article.

In spite of this dark picture, Yang Yüeh-pin left Sian with his Hunan soldiers on June 23, 1865, for Lanchow by way of P'ing-liang. The first suggestion he made to the Court was to stop any further enlistment of new soldiers by the commanders in Kansu.¹²⁰

At this time, Lei Cheng-kuan and Ts'ao K'e-chung were marching toward Chin Chi-pao (金積堡), a Moslem stronghold south of Ninghsia and Ling-chou. The Moslem leader there was Ma Hua-lung. On the one hand, Ma made a half-hearted peace offer to slow down the government forces; on the other hand Ma filled up all the wells with earth, and managed to cut off the supply lines of both Lei and Ts'ao. On July 29, 1865, Ma delivered his *coup de grâce* to the thirsty and hungry forces of both Lei and Ts'ao who were utterly routed.¹²¹ From this time on, Lei Cheng-kuan never did manage to recover his prestige. Ts'ao was slightly better, but his best days were also over. The three pillars holding Kansu had all collapsed, the problems fell squarely on the head of Yang Yüeh-pin. Yang was not disheartened, but he soon faced the harsh facts. Here are some examples of what he learned:

1) There were seven battalions of Lei Cheng-kuan's troops stationed in An-ting and Hui-ning, counties east of Lanchow. They robbed, killed, raped and had a number of lawsuits on record against them. When Yang arrived, he investigated, and arrested three soldiers. After trial, these three were convicted and executed. The two officers in charge of the seven battalions, instead of being ashamed and repentant, simply moved the whole seven battalions away, deserting as a group, without saying even a word to the new governor-general.¹²²

2) On his way to Lanchow, Yang brought with him five thousand Hunan soldiers and two thousand auxiliary forces (carriers and others). To avoid disturbances, he sent officials to buy food with cash before the troops arrived. He never could stockpile enough for ten days' rations. There was simply not much grain on the market.¹²³

3) Yang found it was common practice in Kansu under En-lin for any official appointed to an area not yet demolished to contribute

¹²⁰*Ibid.*, CII., 23-24; Yang Yüeh-pin; T. C. 4 y., intercalary 5 m., 6 d.

¹²¹*Ibid.*, CX, 8-12; Lei Cheng-kuan; T. C. 4 y., 6 m., 7 d.; CX, 16-17; Yang Yüeh-pin; T. C. 4 y., 7 m., 9 d.; CXI, 23; Yang Neng-ke; T. C. 4 y., 7 m., 21 d.

¹²²*Ibid.*, CX, 13-15; Yang Yüeh-pin; T. C. 4 y., 7 m., 9 d.

¹²³*Ibid.*

a large sum of money to the provincial treasury before he left for the post. This was one way to raise funds, but it also furnished a good excuse for the appointee to justify his exploitation after his arrival at his job. It also encouraged him to neglect his duty.¹²⁴

4) Yang learned that Kansu had been greatly devastated by burning and robbery. In the counties he passed through, such as: P'ing-liang, Ching-chou, Lung-te, Ching-ning, Hui-ning, An-ting, the cities and nearby villages were all destroyed. The people were utterly poverty-stricken.¹²⁵

5) That part of Kansu west of the Yellow River had been comparatively quiet. But beginning in January, 1865, a series of incidents broke out. On January 30, the Moslems attacked the walled city of P'ing-fan. Next day they retreated to the countryside.¹²⁶ On February 18, 1865, riots started in Liang-chou. For three days and three nights, the Manchu garrison there, together with the Chinese local corps, fought against the Moslems. It ended in a merciless slaughter of the Moslems.¹²⁷ On March 22, the Moslems attacked and took Chia-yü-kuan, the strategic pass where the Great Wall ended in the west. Using Chia-yü-kuan as their base, the next day they attacked Su-chou, the first large city east of the pass. In great confusion they captured the city and drove out the leading officials, except the Department Magistrate Ch'en Yung (陳墉) whom they used as a hostage as well as a spokesman.¹²⁸ West of Chia-yü-kuan, or outside the Great Wall, riots started on March 21 in Yü-men, then spread to An-hsi in April, and to Tun-huang in May. Some of these were suppressed, some were not. On April 11, Chia-yü-kuan was recovered by the government forces. The Moslems there fled to Su-chou.¹²⁹ East of Su-chou, riots started in the county of Kao-t'ai and Fu-yi on March 27.¹³⁰ On April 2, the Moslems rebelled in Kan-chou. After fierce fighting they retreated to the countryside.¹³¹ In brief, the only area in Kansu which had been quiet, was now also on fire.

¹²⁴*Ibid.*

¹²⁵*Ibid.*

¹²⁶*Ibid.*, XCIV, 23; En-lin; T. C. 4 y., 2 m., 23 d.

¹²⁷*Fang-lüeh*, XCVI, 1-2; Shui-yun; T. C. 4 y., 3 m., 8 d.

¹²⁸*Ibid.*, CI, 21-23; En-lin; T. C. 4 y., 5 m., 18 d. Also CV, 27-29; En-lin; T. C. 4 y., 6 m., 4 d.

¹²⁹*Ibid.*, CV, 15-16; En-lin; T. C. 4 y., 6 m., 4 d.

¹³⁰*Ibid.*, XCVIII, 4; En-lin; T. C. 4 y., 4 m., 1 d.

¹³¹*Ibid.*, IC, 1-2; Lei Cheng-kuan; T. C. 4 y., 4 m., 9 d. Also 13-14; En-lin; 4 m., 15 d.

Facing these tremendous odds, Yang analyzed the Moslem positions and decided to put emphasis first on the area of southern Kansu (Ho-chou and Ti-tao), then, later, to fight the Moslems of the northwest. He also begged the Court to give him ample time and authority to pacify and rebuild the land.¹³² As usual, the Manchu Court expressed its confidence in a newly-appointed governor-general by saying some nice words and giving blanket approval of his program.¹³³ When Yang reported the defeat of Lei Cheng-kuan and Ts'ao K'e-chung near Chin-Chi-pao, he defended Ts'ao and accused Lei.¹³⁴ Based on Yang's report, the Court left Ts'ao without punishment, but stripped Lei of the honor of wearing the Yellow Riding Jacket, as well as of the title of *Baturu* (巴圖魯), and also of his post as deputy commander of the area.¹³⁵

Yang arrived in Lanchow on August 8, 1865, and took over the seal of the governor-general from En-lin.¹³⁶ He soon found that his ten battalions of Hunan soldiers were not enough to take care of the situation. He maneuvered in different ways, but the best he could do was to stay on the defensive. The situation continued to deteriorate.¹³⁷

There were unmistakable signs for coming disaster. That summer, the soldiers in Kansu were receiving a daily ration of half a catty of flour (approximately eleven ounces) per person. Many times this ration had to be made up of elm tree bark mixed with alfalfa.¹³⁸ On August 15, the seven battalions of Lei Cheng-kuan's troops who had deserted An-ting on the pretext of not receiving their back pay, started open riots. They moved eastward with their weapons to Shensi by way of P'ing-liang and Ching-chou.¹³⁹ On October 5, thousands more of T'ao Mao-lin's soldiers reached Shensi after mass desertion.¹⁴⁰ On

¹³²*Ibid.*, CX, 14-16; Yang Yüeh-pin; T. C. 4 y., 7 m., 9 d.

¹³³*Ibid.*, CX, 17-19; to Yang; T. C. 4 y., 7 m., 9 d.

¹³⁴*Ibid.*, CX, 16-17; Yang; T. C. 4 y., 7 m., 9 d.

¹³⁵*Ibid.*, CX, 19; to Yang; 19-20, to the cabinet; same date.

¹³⁶Yang Yüeh-pin: *Yang-yung-ch'ueh-kung-i-chi* (楊岳斌：楊勇愨公遺集) Memorial, IV, 46.

¹³⁷*Fang-lüeh*, CXII, 4-6; Yang; T. C. 4 y., 7 m., 26 d.

¹³⁸*Ibid.*, CXV, 1; Liu Jung; T. C. 4 y., 8 m., 26 d.

¹³⁹*Ibid.*, CXII, 6; Yang Yüeh-pin; T. C. 4 y., 7 m., 26 d.

¹⁴⁰*Ibid.*, CXVI, 13; Liu Jung; T. C. 4 y., 9 m., 14 d.

October 7, Lei Cheng-kuan was informed of his punishment and became very indignant. He called in his lieutenants and poured out his feelings with words as well as tears. Immediately some officers decided to rebel. The mob robbed Ku-yüan and delivered it into the hands of the Moslem ringleader, He Ming-t'ang. Then they rushed eastward and robbed P'ing-liang. On October 11, in wave after wave, they arrived at Ching-chou.¹⁴¹ Shensi was shocked. Governor Liu Jung reported to Peking in obvious alarm. He reminded the Court that there were already various groups of rebellious soldiers invading Shensi. In case Lei should openly rebel with his twenty-odd battalions, Shensi would be overwhelmed. So Liu suggested doing everything possible to reconcile Lei, while at the same time calling in reinforcements from Szechwan and Ninghsia. "Merely to make Lei hesitate for a while would do much good." But, fundamentally, he needed money to keep other troops from total collapse.¹⁴² The Court followed his advice and sent out a number of soft-worded, face-saving decrees to comfort Lei.¹⁴³ This did the trick and made it possible for Lei to come back to the Court as a prodigal son. At the same time, in Ching-chou, one of Lei's lieutenants, Chou Hsien-ch'eng (周顯承), successfully stopped the rebellious troops and put them under control once more.¹⁴⁴ This, however, started a quarrel between Chou and Lei, which lasted for months. Lei's army was thus split and thereafter became weak.

(b) *The economic exhaustion which led to Yang's failure*

The inherited economic difficulty was getting worse. On October 2, 1865, Yang Yüeh-pin reported:

I recently checked the treasury and there were only a little more than one thousand taels of silver left. . . . The essential supplies for the

¹⁴¹*Fang lüeh*, CXVI, 10; Liu Jung; T. C. 4 y., 9 m., 14 d. Also CXX, 12-13; Liu Jung; T. C. 4 y., 10 m., 19 d. Also CXXIX, 1-2; Chao Ch'ang-ling and Yang Yüeh-pin; T. C. 5 y., 3 m., 7 d.

¹⁴²*Ibid.*, CXV, 14-15; Liu Jung; T. C. 4 y., 9 m., 2 d.

¹⁴³*Ibid.*, CXV, 23; to Tu-hsing-a and others; T. C. 4 y., 9 m., 5 d.; CXV, 24-25; to Yang Yüeh-pin and others; T. C. same date; CXX 15-16 to Yang; T. C. 4 y., 10 m., 19 d.

¹⁴⁴*Ibid.*, CXVI, 3-6; Yang Neng-ke; T. C. 4 y., 9 m., 13 d.

army, such as iron, gunpowder, cloth, bamboo and wood, all have to be imported from outside. Because of short supply, the prices increased several times. A catty of iron [1-1/3 lb.] costs more than 600 cash; a ch'ih [Chinese foot] of cloth is more than 70 cash. A piece of spear stick is 1,700 to 1,800 cash. . . . The whole storage of gunpowder in the military supply bureau is six liang [Chinese ounce]. When I first arrived in Kansu in June, a catty of flour cost 40 cash; now it is 80 cash. The price of rice is twice as much, and often is a mere quotation. The hay for feeding horses is as dear as 24 to 25 cash a catty. . . .

Recently, when I led an expedition from Lanchow to Ching-yuan (靖遠) and returned, I found some places where I could not get even a bushel of grain, or a ladleful of water, or a bundle of firewood or an "inch" of hay, while many of the local residents did not even have a roof over their heads! The trip took us less than half a month, during which, however, more than twenty horses starved to death, and for at least one whole day we could not find anything to cook with.¹⁴⁵

One month later, Yang reported that he could not store up even three days' supplies to plan for a three-day offensive.¹⁴⁶ In November, the soldiers of Ts'ao K'e-chung could get only one meal of diluted "flour soup" a day. Many of the soldiers deserted because they could no longer endure starvation. Hence Yang had to order Ts'ao to retreat from his hard-earned position in the front lines to a place in the rear where they could obtain food more easily.¹⁴⁷

During that winter (1865-1866), conditions in Lanchow were terrible. The price of wheat soared to more than 70 taels of silver for one *tan*, and yet it was hard to find a seller. Many people took their entire family to the bank of the Yellow River and drowned themselves in order to escape suffering. Soldiers could not get even their one daily meal of diluted flour soup. When Liu Jung, the governor of Shensi, tried to send some wheat, he found the highways through P'ing-liang and Ku-yüan to Lanchow blocked. To ship one *tan* of grain by way of mountain paths would cost sixteen to seventeen taels of silver for the expense of shipment alone. Then it might be stolen by bandits.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁵Yang Yüeh-pin; *Memorials*, V, 10-12.

¹⁴⁶Fang-lüeh, CXVII, 10; Yang Yüeh-pin; T. C. 4 y., 9 m., 24 d.

¹⁴⁷*Ibid.*, CXIX, 2; Yang Yüeh-pin; T. C. 4 y., 10 m., 15 d.

¹⁴⁸*Ibid.*, CXXVI, 2-3; Liu Jung; T. C. 5 y., 1 m., 23 d.

The problem of supplying Yang Yüeh-pin's Hunan soldiers was even worse. They were used to eating rice. The price of rice in Lanchow in March of 1866 was 300 taels of silver for one *tan*.¹⁴⁹ One of the reasons for the lack of food was the blockade thrown around Lanchow by the Moslems. If Yang Yüeh-pin should continue to stay in Lanchow without action, he and his forces would suffer slow starvation. If he should choose to leave Lanchow for a more aggressive program to relieve the city from outside, he might find the capital attacked without his being on hand to defend it. Finally, he made up his mind to take the risk, and so tried a more positive way of approach. He left Lanchow on February 24, 1866, leaving the city in care of Lin Chih-wang (林之望), the Financial Commissioner of Kansu, and Lo Hung-yü (羅宏裕), the acting Adjutant Colonel commanding the brigade of the Green Battalions of the office of the governor-general (署督標中協).¹⁵⁰ At this time, Tsao K'e-chung and his troops (*ch'u-yung*) had been called down from the north to save Kung-ch'ang (鞏昌). He lifted the siege on November 20, 1865,¹⁵¹ and had been stationed there ever since. Yang was thinking of using Ts'ao's army based at Kung-ch'ang to attack the Moslem strongholds in southern Kansu, Ti-tao and Ho-chou. These strongholds were so close to Lanchow that Yang could feel their hot breath on his neck. Ever since he came to Kansu, he had thought of clearing this area first. So he visited Kung-ch'ang and talked the plan over with Ts'ao. Yang then left the plan for Ts'ao to carry out, and he himself moved to Ching-chou in eastern Kansu.¹⁵² There he expected to take a first-hand look at the remnants of Lei Cheng-kuan's troops. After the outbreak of the mass desertion, Lei lost control of most of his troops. Chou Hsien-ch'eng, an officer under Lei, successfully stopped most of the deserting soldiers and put them under his own control. Then a series of charges and counter-charges started between Lei and Chou. Chou was removed from his post because of Lei's attack. The army under Chou was handed over to T'an Yü-lung (譚玉龍), another officer formerly under Lei but now independent. Any effective use of this army would be impossible unless the quarrel between the leaders were properly

¹⁴⁹*Ibid.*, CXXXII, 19; Lin Chih-wang; T. C. 5 y., 4 m., 30 d.

¹⁵⁰*Ibid.*, CXXVI, 29-30; Yang Yüeh-pin; T. C. 5 y., 1 m., 29 d.

¹⁵¹*Chi-lüeh*, II, 57.

¹⁵²Yang Yüeh-pin: *Memorials*, VIII, 4.

settled. Yang went there to investigate and to seek a settlement.¹⁵³

In Ching-chou, Yang comforted Lei Cheng-kuan and successfully persuaded him to hand over the two ringleaders of the earlier riot.¹⁵⁴ He also decided to abolish the military bureau in Ch'ing-yang and to take over its troops.¹⁵⁵ The whole case of the feud between Lei and Chou was closed.¹⁵⁶ On April 20, 1866, he arrived at Ch'ing-yang, and smoothly took over the troops just as he had planned. Then nine days later, he learned the sad news of a riot in Lanchow.

In the early morning of April 17, 1866, the five battalions of Green Battalions under the office of the governor-general mutinied. They stormed the office of the governor-general and the military supply bureau in Lanchow. They killed more than one hundred officials and Hunan soldiers, and stole everything there from cannon, rifles, gunpowder and munitions, to clothes and personal effects. For three days the gates of the city wall were shut and the surviving officials were under house arrest. The rebels set up gun positions on the city wall, and declared that if Yang came, they would open fire. By this time, the price of a *tan* of wheat in Lanchow had increased to one hundred eighty taels of silver, which was more than one ounce of silver for a pound of wheat. Learning this bad news, Yang immediately ordered his own Hunan troops stationed in counties near Lanchow to rush to the capital. He himself planned to leave for Lanchow on May 2.¹⁵⁷

To lose the capital of the province was a major crime for a governor-general. It was a severe blow to Yang. The Court pressed him to go immediately back to Lanchow to recover the city. At the same time, the Board of Civil Office was ordered to consider his punishment.¹⁵⁸

According to the report of Lin Chih-wang, the Financial Commissioner of Kansu, who was in Lanchow and obviously under the influence of the rioting Green Battalion soldiers, the story was a little

¹⁵³*Fang-lüeh*, CXXVI, 29-30; Yang Yüeh-pin; T. C. 5 y., 1 m., 29 d.

¹⁵⁴*Ibid.*, CXXVIII, 12-13; Yang Yüeh-pin; T. C. 5 y., 2 m., 23 d.

¹⁵⁵*Ibid.*, CXXVIII, 13-15; Yang and Liu Jung, T. C. 5 y., 2 m., 24 d.

¹⁵⁶*Ibid.*, CXXIX, 1-4; Chao Ch'ang-ling and Yang Yüeh-pin; to Yang, Chao, Liu; to the cabinet; T. C. 5 y., 3 m., 7 d.; also CXXIX, 4-6; Chao and Yang; to the cabinet; T. C. 5 y., 3 m., 9 d.

¹⁵⁷Yang Yüeh-pin: *Memorials*, VIII, 17-18. This same memorial appears in *Fang-lüeh*, CXXIX, 16-17, but in much briefer form; T. C. 5 y., 3 m., 24 d.

¹⁵⁸*Fang-lüeh*, CXXIX, 17-19; to Yang Yüeh-pin; T. C. 5 y., 3 m., 24 d.

different. He reported that in Lanchow the army had been short of food for a long time. Whenever there was food available, most of it went to the soldiers Yang had brought over from Hunan, which left the native soldiers of the Green Battalions under even more difficult conditions. On April 17 these soldiers gathered and petitioned Lo Hung-yü, the acting adjutant colonel commanding the brigade, for food. Lo rebuked them and a riot started. "I rushed to the scene to comfort and dissolve the mob. On the one hand I issued food to the [Green Battalion] soldiers, while at the same time I ordered them to guard the city gates so that no outside bandits could endanger the city."¹⁵⁹

The Governor of Shensi, Liu Jung, observing from the side lines, had a cooler head. He reminded the Court that the Moslems in Ku-yüan, Ling-chou, and Chin-chi-pao were very strong. Should Yang Yüeh-pin ever move toward Lanchow, these Moslems would attack his rear everywhere. By that time, Yang would be facing a strong fort which he could not take, with numerous stout enemies encircling him from behind. All supply lines would be cut off and Yang would be in an impossible position. The fundamental problem of Lanchow, Liu analyzed, was one of food supply. Instead of going into the half-dead capital to join the starving mob, the first move should be to clear the supply line for Lanchow. He suggested that Yang drive the Moslems away from Ku-yüan and reestablish the transportation line from P'ing-liang to Lanchow. Only then Yang could enter Lanchow without serious danger. Furthermore, Liu argued, the rebels in Lanchow could not last long with such a critical food condition. By leaving them alone for a while, they would calm down and surrender. At the same time, Liu suggested directing Ts'ao K'e-chung to approach Lanchow. If he could get in, all the better. If not, he could establish his troops outside the city and cut off any possible support to the rebels from the Moslems.¹⁶⁰

The Court was wise enough to adopt Liu's idea. It sent another order to Yang, advising him not to rush back to Lanchow as the earlier order had demanded.¹⁶¹ In fact, Yang had already found that he had

¹⁵⁹*Ibid.*, CXXIX, 19-20; Lin Chih-wang; T. C. 5 y., 3 m., 24 d. Cf. Andrew: *The Crescent in North-west China*, 81-82.

¹⁶⁰*Fang-lüeh*, CXXX, Liu Jung; T. C. 5 y., 4 m., 2 d.

¹⁶¹*Ibid.*, CXXX, 4-6; to Yang Yüeh-pin and Liu Jung; T. C. 5 y., 4 m., 2 d.

more urgent work to do than to return to Lanchow. On May 17, 1866, four more battalions of *Ch'u-yung* stationed in Lung-chou deserted.¹⁶² Then Lung-te fell into the hands of the Moslems; Chuang-lang was besieged; and Ning-chou was under attack. The whole of eastern Kansu was in trouble, and more trouble was in the making. Lei Cheng-kuan recovered Ku-yüan on May 25, only to find that the city was critically short of food. A catty of flour cost more than 1,000 cash.

There was some good news, however. Ts'ao K'e-chung reported that the trouble at Lanchow was not serious. He could settle it as soon as his troops reached Lanchow. The real trouble, he claimed, was food. He warned that if Yang did not arrange for enough supplies for his soldiers, even his own army would desert. Similar reports came from Yang's own Hunan army stationed in Chin-hsien (金縣) and An-ting. "The only reason that they are still here is the desperate efforts of the officers to hold them together." If Yang should delay the supply a little bit more, all troops would collapse.¹⁶³

When Yang moved west to Kung-ch'ang (鞏昌) to support Ts'ao, T'an Yü-lung's troops in eastern Kansu deserted.¹⁶⁴ Ironically, this time it was Lei Cheng-kuan's turn to pick up at P'ing-liang nine battalions of these soldiers who originally belonged to him. But the others went into Shensi.¹⁶⁵

Meanwhile, Ts'ao K'e-chung managed to enter Lanchow on June 16, 1866, and put the rioting Green Battalion soldiers under control. Yang Yüeh-pin was then welcomed back to his seat on July 11.¹⁶⁶ Soon Ts'ao became ill. In spite of Yang's desperate persuasion, Ts'ao insisted on leaving his troops as well as Kansu. Ts'ao's own explanation for his leaving was his failing health. However, reading between lines of Yang's reports to the Court, one can detect his dissatisfaction with Ts'ao. Yang had lost his last and only trump card.¹⁶⁷

Yang was a very sad man when he turned in his resignation. This was accepted by the Court on September 25, 1866. On the very

¹⁶²*Ibid.*, CXXXI, 16-17; Yang Yüeh-pin; T. C. 5 y., 4 m., 23 d.

¹⁶³Yang Yüeh-pin; *Memorials*, VIII, 47-55.

¹⁶⁴*Fang-lüeh*, CXXXV, 1-2; Yang Yüeh-pin; T. C. 5 y., 5 m., 28 d.

¹⁶⁵*Ibid.*, CXXXVII, 11-12; Yang Yüeh-pin; T. C. 5 y., 6 m., 28 d.

¹⁶⁶*Ibid.*, CXXXVII, 11-12; Yang Yüeh-pin; T. C. 5 y., 6 m., 28 d.

¹⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 13; also CXL, 14; Yang; T. C. 5 y., 8 m., 28 d.

same day, Tso Ts'ung-t'ang was appointed to succeed Yang as governor-general of Shensi and Kansu.¹⁶⁸

After Yang insisted on leaving, Mu-t'u-shan (穆圖善), the Manchu General-in-chief of Ninghsia, was ordered by the Court on April 1, 1867, to go to Lanchow to take over the post as governor-general for the period until Tso Tsung-t'ang should arrive.¹⁶⁹

With the deterioration of conditions in Kansu, where the rebellious soldiers were pouring into Shensi, the Moslems followed closely on their heels. They invaded Shensi by different routes. One group even reached San-yüan (三原), a city about forty kilometers north of Sian.¹⁷⁰ At the same time, Liu Jung had already been released from the post of governor of Shensi, but was still responsible for the military situation in that province. The new governor, Ch'iao Sung-nien (喬松年 -1875), however, was not cooperative. Soon a personal feud developed between the two.¹⁷¹ The disagreement of the high officials became very damaging when the *Nien* (捻) under Chang Tsung-yü (張總愚 -1868) stormed into Shensi from the east. Liu Jung was pressed by Ch'iao to fight, but lacked material support from Ch'iao. In a battle east of Sian, the starved and thinly-clad *Hsiang-chün* soldiers under Liu Jung were routed by the *Nien* in a blizzard on January 23, 1867. Liu lost more than two thousand of his best soldiers in one day.¹⁷² Sian was barely saved by Huang Ting (黃鼎 -1876), the only general under Liu Jung who kept his army intact in that great defeat.¹⁷³

In a word, things were "in a mess" while waiting for the arrival of Tso Tsung-t'ang.

¹⁶⁸*Ibid.*, CXXXIX, 17-18; Yang Yüeh-pin and to Tso Tsung-t'ang; T. C. 5 y., 8 m., 17 d.

¹⁶⁹*Ibid.*, CL, 5-6; To Mu-t'u-shan and Yang Yüeh-pin; T. C. 6 y., 2 m., 27 d.

¹⁷⁰*Ibid.*, CIL, 12-13; Ch'iao Sung-nien; T. C. 6 y., 2 m., 16 d.

¹⁷¹*Sh'ing-shih-kao*, CDXXXI *Lieh-chuan* (列傳) CCXII-, 6; Ch'iao Sung-nien.

¹⁷²Liu Jung: *Yang-hui-t'ang Wen-chi*, VIII, 26-27; Letter to Tseng Kuo-fan.

¹⁷³*Ch'ing-shih-kao*, XD, 15; Huang Ting. Also P'eng Hsün: *I-chün Chi-lüeh*, (彭詢: 彝軍紀略), 17-18; Huang was a Szechwanese. In 1863 he organized his *I-chün*, a Szechwan army organized and trained after the pattern of *Hsiang-chün*. Huang followed Liu Jung to Shensi. Later, his army participated in the campaign against Chin-chi-pao. *I-chün chi-lüeh*, preface. 1-2: also text, 1.

Chapter IV

TSO TSUNG-T'ANG

1. THE MAN AND HIS PREPARATION¹

Tso Tsung-t'ang (左宗棠 November 10, 1812-September 5, 1885), a native of Hsiang-yin, Hunan, became *chu-jen* in 1832. After failing the third time in the metropolitan examinations, he determined not to try again. Tso then studied seriously in history, the classics, geography and agriculture. He familiarized himself with *Ch'ing-ting Huang-yü Hsi-yü T'u-chih*, (欽定皇輿西域圖志), an official work on Chinese Turkestan (Sinkiang) compiled during the years 1756-1782. In 1839, he compiled an historical atlas of military strategy for his own reference. In the winter of 1849-1850, when Lin Tse-hsü (林則徐 1785-1850) passed Hunan on the way back home (Fukien) from Yünnan, Tso visited Lin on Lin's boat. There they talked an entire night exchanging views on all kinds of topics. Among other numerous subjects, Lin talked with Tso of his own experiences in western Sinkiang.²

Tso was proud and ambitious. He often claimed to be as smart as Chu-ke Liang (諸葛亮), or in western parlance, "as wise as Solomon." When the T'ai-p'ing rebels invaded Hunan, the governor, Chang Liang-chi (張亮基 1807-1871), gave Tso full responsibility in military affairs. Later, Tso served on the secretarial staff of Lo Ping-chang (駱秉章 1793-1867), the new governor of Hunan. Beginning in 1854, he acted as Lo's chief assistant in supervising military affairs in Hunan for more than five years.³ Afterwards Tso organized an inde-

¹With the exception of those parts specially designated, this section is based on *Ch'ing-shih-kao*, CCCXVIII (*Lieh-chuan* CIC), 1-8 *Tso Tsung-t'ang* and *ECCP*, 762-767. Cf. *Ching-shih-lieh-chuan*, LI, 34 b *et. sq.* and *Hsu-pei-Chuan-chi* (續碑傳集) VI, 3a *et. sq.* Cf. Bales: *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 53-72; 88-89; 104-195.

²Lo Cheng-chün: *Tso Wen-hsiang-kung Nien-p'u* (羅正鈞: 左文襄公年譜), II, 25-26.

³*Ibid.*, II, 31-35.

pendent army for service in Kiangsi and Anhwei. He showed his ability as a general in his victories won in Kiangsi, Anhwei, Chekiang, Fukien and Kwangtung. It was he who wiped out the last group of T'ai-p'ings under Wang Hai-yang (汪海洋 -1866) in Chia-ying, Kwangtung. At the time of his appointment as governor-general of Shensi and Kansu (September 25, 1866), he had been the governor-general of Fukien and Chekiang with an earldom of the first rank, and the designation K'o-ching (一等恪靖伯).

Before his appointment, Tso once suggested to the Court the ways to fight the Moslems as follows: first, to build up a fleet of wagons; second, to build up military colonies; third, to build up a native army in Honan and Shensi around a group of selected veterans from the south. He thought that since both the Nien and the Moslems were strong in cavalry, the fleet of wagons could block them. When the carts were moving, they could carry cannon and serve other logistic purposes. When they stopped, they could be arranged in a circle around the tents of the soldiers to serve as a fort against the sudden attacks of enemy cavalry.⁴ He had not yet realized that the great distances in a desert required a much faster means of transportation than carts. Even after he was appointed governor-general of Shen-kan, he established a battalion with two hundred carts when he was in Hupeh, and planned to enlarge it to four hundred vehicles after his arrival in Sian.⁵ But after he actually arrived in Sian, he did not mention the battalion of carts any more. In later years, he even became an ardent objector to using wagons, though he had always been an enthusiastic supporter of using cannon. Concerning the second point, he argued that the most serious trouble in Kansu was the lack of food. When people deserted their farms after the war, the army had to bring in all their food from the distant rear. If soldiers could be directed to raise crops where they were stationed, they would have food close at hand. He also proposed to encourage and support civilians in re-establishing their farms. To buy tools and seeds might cost money in the beginning, but the investment would eventually pay off. Tso tried this out time and again, and it proved very successful.

⁴Tso Tsung-t'ang: *Tso Wen-hsiang-kung Ch'üan-chi, Memorials*, XVIII, 7-8. (左文襄公全集·奏疏). Hereafter referred to as Tso: *Memorials*.

⁵Tso Tsung-t'ang: *Tso Wen-hsiang-kung Ch'üan-chi, Letters*, IX, 7; 10; hereafter referred to as Tso: *Letters*.

On the third point, Tso believed that the southerners were not used to the cold weather and the native food. (Traditionally, the southerners prefer to eat rice, while the people in the northwest would eat wheat, barley, millet, corn, potatoes, and other grains.) So he thought of using only selected southerners as a nucleus to build up an army of natives.⁶ But, in later developments, he found the situation in the field was too critical to wait for the establishment of a new army of natives.⁷ Furthermore, to the great disappointment of Tso, the natives of Shensi and Kansu were often too weak and too timid to make good soldiers.⁸

On his way to Shensi, Tso Tsung-t'ang met one of his old friends, Wang Po-hsin (王柏心) in Hupeh. Wang had been a secretary on the staff of both Lin Tze-hsü and Lo Wen-chün (羅文俊), the former Provincial Director of Education of Shensi and Kansu (陝甘學政). Wang had travelled widely in Shensi and had kept a rather complete diary on his trips in the area. Besides his precious knowledge and ideas, which helped Tso tremendously, he also gave Tso optimistic encouragement which was very rare at the time.⁹

Many of Wang's ideas laid the foundation of Tso Tsung-t'ang's policy. Wang analyzed the situation in Shensi and Kansu, frankly explained to Tso all the weaknesses and dangers of the governmental forces in the area. Then, based on these cruel facts, he suggested starting the whole program by the slow but sure process of building up military and civilian colonies (屯田). That was to use the army and support the civilians tilling the deserted land. "It might take two or three years to get anywhere, but not until you have accumulated enough food can you go into Kansu with the assurance of victory." Wang advised Tso to tell the Court frankly from the beginning that there was no quick cure.

You must take your time. Advance only when you have plenty of food and well-trained soldiers. You may just as well plan your campaign on a three-year basis. . . . After you have enough food supply, than you will find yourself much happier than in depending on other provinces to supply the food. Once you are ready to strike, hit the meanest Moslem leader hard. Deal with him firmly without mercy. When the

⁶Tso: *Memorials*, XVIII, 8.

⁷Tso: *Letters*, VIII, 69.

⁸*Ibid.*, X, 40.

⁹Lo Cheng-chün: *Nien-p'u*, IV, 23.

others become quite frightened by the punishment he receives, then you can accept their surrender. After their surrender, move them in mass migration to Hsi-ning, Chieh-chou... or the northern border of Shensi, where they can build villages and towns of their own without outside intervention. No Chinese should mingle with them. Around these new Moslem centers, military posts should be set up at strategic points to keep close watch. At the same time, select good leaders among the Moslems to rule them and make them responsible to the government... In this way, I can assure you you will have a peace for one hundred years.¹⁰

This advice was conscientiously followed by Tso Tsung-t'ang in his later moves. Four years later, in 1871, after Ma Hua-lung of Chin-chi-pao was defeated, Tso wrote to Wang, saying:

Ever since I came to the west, all policy and strategy have been based on your brilliant advice. The prescription as applied certainly cured the old disease. If there is anything accomplished, it is your merit. How dare I claim the credit?¹¹

For these words to be uttered by a man who claimed himself to be "as smart as Chu-ke Liang," was noteworthy. Suggestions came from other sources, too. For instance, the ex-governor of Shensi, Liu Jung, wrote a very enlightening letter to Tso, who obviously accepted it as guidance in his later moves. Liu gave Tso the following ideas:

1. Since there is not enough food supply for the army, there is no sense in sending an expeditionary force into Sinkiang now. Wait till
 - A. Kansu is clear of bandits;
 - B. The farms are re-established,
 - C. Enough food is stockpiled, and
 - D. The cavalry is well trained,
 then go beyond the Great Wall to retake Sinkiang.

2. Shensi is the only base from which you can launch your expedition into Kansu. No matter how, you must count on Shensi to supply the food, material, and means of transportation that are essential to your army. You must have people in Shensi who can cooperate with you. A slight bit of indifference on their part will cause great trouble.

3. To deal with the rebels in Kansu, you must first clear eastern

¹⁰A letter from Wang Po-hsin to Tso, quoted in *Nien-p'u*, IV, 22-23.

¹¹*Nien-p'u*, VI, 3.

Kansu, then those in Ho-chou and Ti-tao. After these two groups are wiped out, all the others will give up.

4. It is not difficult to fight the rebels. The trouble is how to obtain money, food and means of transportation. You must get about four to five million taels of silver, with good soldiers and plenty of food, and then you may finish the job within one year. Otherwise you will suffer a great deal and get little accomplished, and at least three or four years will be required.

5. There are too few qualified men in Shensi and Kansu. Seldom can a native satisfactorily serve as an officer in the army or an official in the government. The place is stricken with poverty, and assignments are difficult, so outsiders also hesitate to come. You have to prepare beforehand enough helpers who have a selfless zeal to fight for the cause.¹²

These various pieces of advice and his own ideas crystallized into Tso's memorial to the Court on March 14, 1867, when he was in Han-kow. He outlined his plan and the Court approved it.¹³ On February 22, 1867, the Court appointed Tso as Imperial Envoy with the authority to command the military affairs of Shensi and Kansu. Following Tso's request, Liu Tien was relieved of the burden of being Judicial Commissioner of Kansu and became his full-time Deputy Commander.¹⁴

Tso was fully aware of the poverty of Kansu and Shensi, and considered this fact to be the core of the problem. Long before he arrived in Shensi, he had wielded his personal influence and charm to approach the different governors and governors-general, asking them to give him financial support. He wrote to Chiang I-li (蔣益澧-1874), the governor of Kwangtung.¹⁵ He negotiated with Ma Hsin-yi (馬新貽 1821-1870), the governor of Chekiang, and Yang Ch'ang-chün (楊昌濬 - 1897), the Financial Commissioner of Chekiang,¹⁶ and many others. The general response was encouraging. On December 25, 1866, the Court approved Tso's request to require Fukien province to subsidize his army with forty thousand taels a month, Chekiang province seventy thousand taels a month, and Kwangtung province forty thousand taels

¹²Liu Jung: *Yang-hui-t'ang Wen-chi*, VII, 37.

¹³Tso: *Memorials*, XXI, 18-21.

¹⁴*Fang-liieh*, CXLVI, 13; to the cabinet; T. C. 6 y., 1 m., 18 d.

¹⁵Tso: *Letters*, VIII, 57.

¹⁶*ibid.*, VIII, 53.

a month. The quotas of other provinces were to be decided later.¹⁷

Tso also considered that the average southerner would be afraid of going to the northwest. Therefore he thought of bringing with him only three thousand of his Hunan troops (*Ch'u-chün* 楚軍) who were in Fukien and three thousand new soldiers recruited in Hunan. The plan was to use these six thousand as a nucleus to build up a new army in Shensi and Kansu with native manpower. This plan was changed at first because the emergency in Shensi could not await the training of a new native army. It was later given up completely because Tso found that the Chinese in Shensi and Kansu did not make good soldiers.¹⁸ In any event, Tso called more of the Hunan Army to his command. At the time when he left Hankow for Shensi in 1867, he had nineteen battalions and ten companies (*shao* 哨) of infantry, and five groups of cavalry (五起) (each group being half a battalion). These were all his old *Ch'u-chün*. Besides, there were seven battalions of new recruits, organized recently by Liu Tien in Hunan according to the tradition of the *Hsiang-chün*. Tso also called two battalions of infantry under Wu Shih-mai (吳士邁), three battalions of infantry under Chang Yüeh-ling (張岳齡), eight battalions of infantry and one battalion of cavalry under Kao Lien-sheng (高連陞)—all Hunan commanders directly or indirectly linked with his *Ch'u-chün*.¹⁹ This was a total of thirty-five battalions and ten companies of infantry, plus three and a half battalions of cavalry, an army of more than 20,000 men.²⁰

Tso had no confidence in his Hunan cavalry, who had had no experience in fighting in north China. Hence he requested the Court to summon for him 2500 cavalymen from Kirin (吉林) and 3000 horses from Chahar (察哈爾). It turned out to be a great disappointment to Tso. More than half of the horses died, and numerous recruits deserted on their way to Shensi. Tso actually received only about one thousand horses from Chahar, and 400 cavalymen from Kirin.²¹

¹⁷Tso: *Memorials*, XX, 56.

¹⁸Tso: *Letters*, VIII, 69, 71.

¹⁹Tso: *Memorials*, XXI, 24, 54; XXX, 39. Liu Tien was Tso's deputy. Wu Shih-mai (吳士邁) was a secretary of the Imperial Patent Office (中書科中書). Chang Yüeh-ling (張岳齡) was the newly appointed Judicial Commissioner of Kansu. Kao Lien-sheng (高連陞) was the Provincial Commander-in-chief of Kwangtung.

²⁰*Ibid.*, XXII, 57; XXIX, 10.

²¹*Ibid.*, XXII, 68.

2. TSO TSUNG-T'ANG'S POLICY

(a) *The Destruction of the Nien*

Tso Tsung-t'ang arrived at T'ung-kuan (潼關), Shensi, on July 19, 1867. Two days earlier, his Deputy Commander, Liu Tien, arrived at Lan-t'ien (藍田), a city about forty kilometers southeast of Sian. Tso found that different groups of Moslems, including some Chinese who had the same faith, were raiding side by side with the deserters from the army and the *Nien*. Besides these three, there were native bandits in groups of hundreds or even thousands, ransacking villages and towns. "It seems that not even one county of Shensi is still intact."²² The only consoling fact was that Liu Sung-shan (劉松山 1833-1870), the famous Hunan general, had already arrived at Sian on February 3,²³ and had stabilized the situation at Sian by defeating the *Nien* in a battle. He had driven them away from Sian, though not very far.²⁴

The outlook as a whole was still very gloomy. Tso managed to win many skirmishes, but due to lack of cavalry, he was unable to gain decisive victories. He reported to a friend:

*The officers here in Shensi are leftovers of second or third-rate ability. . . . In Kansu, the authorities enlisted numerous soldiers despite shortage of funds, so half of them starved and turned bandits. In fact, only sixty per cent of the bandits now invading Shensi are Moslems, while the other forty per cent are mutineers from various provinces. It is not easy to finish this task.*²⁵

Tso made a very clear diagnosis of the confused situation from the beginning. He said in a memorial to the Court:

Shensi's main trouble was the Nien and the Moslems. The Moslems are cunning, but the Nien bandits are strong. . . . The Moslems' aim is to disturb Shensi; the Nien's aim is to break into Honan. That is the reason why these two groups of rebels have never really merged together. We shall destroy the Nien before the Moslems. In the first place the Nien bandits are stronger than the Moslems. Once we destroy the former, the latter's morale will decline. In the second place, once the Nien are confined to Shensi, they will disturb only Shensi, but once

²²Tso: *Memorials*, XXII, 11-12.

²³*Ibid.*, XXI, 7.

²⁴Liu Jung: *Yang-hui-t'ang Wen-chi*, VII, 38.

²⁵Tso: *Letters*, IX, 68-69.

*the Nien sneak into Honan they will destroy the interior. Comparing the two evils, the disturbance of Shensi is certainly the lesser.*²⁶

In October and November there were numerous engagements and thousands of Moslems were killed. But when Tso's troops were driving north, his plan of bottling up the *Nien* in Shensi failed. During those months, boats on the Yellow River were detained along the eastern bank to avoid the crossing of the *Nien*. Then it was reported that the suddenly changed weather had frozen the Yellow River in one night, and the *Nien* crossed the river on the ice and poured into Shansi. From there they rushed to Chihli, driving toward Peking. The Manchu Court was alarmed. It stripped all field commanders of their ranks and honors but ordered them to stay on the job to redeem themselves. Tso was one of these victims.²⁷ He decided to chase the *Nien* into Shansi himself, and left Shensi in the care of his Deputy, Liu Tien.²⁸ He did not return until November 26, 1868.²⁹ During Tso's absence, Liu Tien was responsible for Shensi and Mu-t'u-shan for Kansu.

(1) *A Watch-dog in Shensi*

Liu Tien (劉典 - 1879, January 7) was a native of Ning-hsiang (寧鄉), Hunan. As a student, he was authorized in 1858 to organize the local corps. That summer, he arrested more than a hundred bandits and crushed a local rebellion. He was then promoted to be a "Sub-Director of Studies" (訓導). In 1860, when Tso Tsung-t'ang first established his own army (*Ch'u-chiün*), Liu was called on to take charge of the Military Secretariat (營務處). While Tso rose to prominence, Liu rose together with him. During all these years, Liu followed Tso in different provinces, assisted in most of the battles and became Tso's right hand man. In 1862, Liu was promoted to be the Judicial Commissioner of Chekiang when Tso was the governor. Later he was Tso's deputy in different fields. This time when Tso left, Liu was assigned to take charge of military affairs in Shensi.³⁰ On February 26, 1868, he was appointed to succeed Ch'iao Sung-nien, acting as

²⁶Tso: *Memorials*, XXII, 26.

²⁷*Ch'ing-shih-kao*, CDXVIII (*Lieh-chuan* CIC), 3.

²⁸Tso: *Memorials*, XXIV, 52-53.

²⁹*Ibid.*, XXIX, 30.

³⁰*Ch'ing-shih-lieh-chuan*, LV, 10-13.

the governor of Shensi.³¹ With his usual diligence, he steadily improved conditions. Less than nine months later, on November 10, he was able to report to the Court: "There are no Moslem rebels in Shensi now." He pointed out, however, that in northern Shensi there were still numerous local Chinese bandits, and right across the border in Kansu there was a new nest of the Moslem rebels, Tung Chih-yüan (董志原), in Ning-chou. From this nest the Moslems could invade Shensi whenever defense were weak. In other areas, such as Ch'ung-hsin, Ling-t'ai, Cheng-ning, Ho-shui, Kan-ch'üan, Yen-an, Pao-an, Ching-pien, Ting-pien, An-pien, there were existing threats of new invasions, but no Moslems were there. It took constant vigilance by the border guards to keep the Moslems out. Due to the shortage of manpower, Liu put all his men on guard duty, and could no longer spare any to form an attacking force. So he decided not to do anything about Tung Chih-yüan until Tso's return.³²

(2) *A Caretaker in Kansu*

(A) *Mu-t'u-shan's Policy of Compromise*

After Mu-t'u-shan successfully negotiated a peace with the Moslems in Ninghsia, he was ordered to advance to Lanchow. By more compromises he accepted the surrender of more Moslems on his way and peacefully arrived at Lanchow.³³ On April 1, 1867, the Court ordered Mu-t'u-shan to take over the seal of the governor-general of Shen-Kan from Yang Yüeh-pin and take care of business until Tso Tsung-t'ang could arrive at Lanchow.³⁴ The problems in Kansu were complicated

³¹*Fang-lüeh*, CLXVI, 20; to the cabinet; T. C. 7 y., 2 m., 4 d.

³²*Ibid.*, CLXXXIV, 13-17; Liu Tien and others; T. C. 7 y., 9 m., 26 d.

³³*Ibid.*, CXLV, 15-16; Mu-t'u-shan; T. C. 6 y., 1 m., 7 d. Also CLI, 14-17; Mu-t'u-shan; T. C. 6 y., 3 m., 13 d.; CLI, 20; same date.

³⁴*Ibid.*, CL, 5; to Mu-t'u-shan and Yang Yüeh-pin; T. C. 6 y., 2 m., 27 d. Also Tso: *Memorials*, XXI, 53. Bales in *Tso Tsung-t'ang* said: "It is quite certain that if Mutoshan had been making any showing against the rebels, he would not have been demoted. In the fall of 1866, Tso Tsung-t'ang was appointed Viceroy of Shen-Kan, and Mutoshan was reduced to Governor of Kansu." (p. 226) He makes several mistakes. First, there was no Governor of Kansu in the bureaucratic system. Secondly, Mutoshan was not demoted. Thirdly, Mu was not responsible for affairs in Lanchow before 1867. Fourthly, Tso was appointed Viceroy of Shen-Kan (or Governor-general of Shen-Kan) to succeed Yang Yüeh-pin, instead of Mu-t'u-shan in 1866. Fifthly, Mu was acting as Governor-general of Shen-Kan because Tso was not able to take over the office in Lanchow at that time.

and difficult. It was not surprising to find Mu-t'u-shan, facing tremendous odds, practicing a policy of compromise. During his campaign in Ninghsia, the long tiresome grind had worn out his will to fight. Then the compromise between him and Ma Hua-lung had seemed to work out all right. He was credited with the recovery of Ninghsia and with keeping Ma Hua-lung in peace. He had been honored by the Court for these achievements, and now he was entrusted with a greater responsibility. He found no particular reason for giving up his formula of success. In the early summer of 1866, long before he was called to succeed Yang, he suggested to the Court the possibility of using Ma Hua-lung as middleman to make peace with the Moslems of different areas.³⁵ When Liu Jung, the governor of Shensi at that time, suggested to him that he push south to fight a group of Shensi Moslems in Kansu, he simply ignored Liu.³⁶ Instead of cooperating with Liu in this kind of campaign, he criticized Liu for not allowing the Moslems to return to Shensi. He considered Liu Jung, who refused to give way to the Moslems, to be a hindrance to his policy. He requested the Court to send some trusted high officials to the scene to reappraise Liu's policy.³⁷ At the time when Mu-t'u-shan was ordered to go to Lanchow, he had already negotiated a peace with those Moslems in the area of Lanchow. These Moslems surrendered about two hundred horses, eight hundred swords and spears, two hundred firearms, a quantity good enough to save face. However, they had not submitted their records, nor had their leader Yang Wen-chih (楊文治) reported in person. When these Moslems "surrendered," Mu-t'u-shan requested the Court to sponsor the return of the Moslems to Shensi over the firm objections of the Shensi Chinese.³⁸

(B) *Mu-t'u-shan's Quarrel with Tso Tsung-t'ang — Round One: Money.*

With these Moslems reconciled, Mu-t'u-shan did not have too much difficulty in entering Lanchow. As soon as he took over the seal of the governor-general, his attention was immediately absorbed by a different problem. There were too many soldiers, and too little funds.

Traditionally, Kansu depended heavily upon subsidies from other

³⁵*Fang-lüeh*, CXXXIII, 10; Mu-t'u-shan, T. C. 5 y., 5 m., 10 d.

³⁶*Ibid.*, CXXXV, 15-16; Mu-t'u-shan; T. C. 5 y., 6 m., 10 d.

³⁷*Ibid.*, CXXXVII, 5-7; Mu-t'u-shan; T. C. 5 y., 6 m., 23 d.

³⁸*Ibid.*, CLI, 14-17; Mu-t'u-shan; T. C. 6 y., 3 m., 13 d.

provinces. In those days, most of these funds had to be shipped into Kansu in the form of bullion. In order to take care of this bulky, heavy commodity, Yang Yüeh-pin, the former governor-general of Shen-kan, requested Lin Shou-t'u (林壽圖 1822-1898), the Financial Commissioner of Shensi, to establish and take charge of a military supply bureau of Kansu in Sian. The subsidies from different provinces would be shipped to Sian. From there Lin would distribute them in proportion to the garrisons of Kansu in various areas. Soon difficulties developed. In the first place, the subsidies would often not reach Sian in time, nor in the promised amounts. On the other hand, the transportation lines to Lanchow were often cut. Besides, the Kansu soldiers in P'ing-liang, Ku-yüan, Ch'ing-yang, and Ching-chou were not only closer to Sian, but formed the first line of defense against the Moslems for Shensi province. Naturally, if there should be some meager funds on hand, Lin Shou-t'u would first send them to eastern Kansu instead of to Lanchow, leaving the people in the capital without funds. Because of this, even in Yang Yüeh-pin's time, the latter had already sent an official, Ch'en P'ei-yeh (陳丕業), to be stationed in Han-chung (漢中), a city in southern Shensi, to handle the transportation of the funds, purposely avoiding Sian in order to assure the delivery of funds to Lanchow. But because Han-chung was more or less out of the way, it did not help conditions in Lanchow too much either. After Tso Tsung-t'ang was appointed governor-general of Shensi and Kansu, naturally, the authorities of the different provinces sent their subsidies to Tso to help him start his expedition. Tso then established his own military supply bureau in Hankow to take care of transporting both funds and supplies. At that time Yang Yüeh-pin was still in Lanchow. Tso, a Hunanese, and a friend of Yang also, thoughtfully reported to the Court that he would not take away those funds due to Yang before he actually succeeded Yang in Kansu.³⁹ However, when Mu-t'u-shan was ordered to take over the job from Yang, apparently Tso considered Mu-t'u-shan to be an outsider to his Hunan group. At the same time, when he had to bring more troops into Shensi, he could not afford even to make a friendly gesture. He openly took the funds assigned to Kansu and spent them on things which he needed. He also assumed that since there were numerous mass desertions among the Kansu army, Mu-t'u-shan would not need as much

³⁹Tso: *Memorials*, XXI, 31; also 41.

money as Yang because there were less soldiers than before. But the most important reason of all was that his own army needed the money.⁴⁰

From Mu-t'u-shan's point of view things were different. In his memorial to the Court in the summer of 1867, he listed the subsidies assigned to Kansu as follows:

<i>Sources</i>	<i>Monthly amounts in taels</i>
<i>Nanking</i>	<i>20,000</i>
<i>The custom house of Shanghai</i>	<i>10,000</i>
<i>Chekiang</i>	<i>50,000</i>
<i>Hupeh</i>	<i>35,000</i>
<i>Hunan</i>	<i>10,000</i>
<i>Kiangsi</i>	<i>20,000</i>
<i>Kwangtung</i>	<i>10,000</i>
<i>Total</i>	<i>155,000</i>

He reported that the military supply bureau in Sian had already taken more than four hundred thousand taels away from Kansu before the first month of the current year (the sixth year of T'ung-chih). He suggested that all funds assigned to Kansu be shipped by way of Hanchung from then on. By bypassing Sian, he would get what he should receive.⁴¹

In order to avoid further misunderstanding, Tso wrote a personal letter to Mu-t'u-shan, requesting his cooperation and presented his own policy in a very frank way. Tso explained that, at the moment, he would concentrate military and financial power to regain the control of Shensi from the rebels (including the Moslems, the *Nien*, the local bandits and mutineers). After Shensi was cleared, then he would select the best soldiers to be sent into Kansu with the entire amount of the funds, while discharging the rest to save money. He said:

Since I am sharing the responsibility of the same job with you, I have no prejudice against either Shensi or Kansu. However, to handle a case like this, there must be a place to start from: Like a family in financial trouble, if the brothers work hard and cooperate, soon things will turn out all right. If the brothers quarrel and divide, the whole

⁴⁰Tso: *Memorials*, XXIII, 11-12. Tso's different attitude toward Yang and Mu-t'u-shan can be seen in a letter to Yang Chang-chün (楊昌濬) in Tso: *Letters*, IX, 17.

⁴¹*Fang-lüeh*, CLVII, 2-5; Mu-t'u-shan; T. C. 6 y., 5 m., 23 d.

*family will be doomed.*⁴² *But brothers or no brothers, Mu-t'u-shan's troubles were real too.*

He had to take care of 140 battalions, with a monthly budget of more than 400,000 taels. There were other soldiers under the office of the governor-general not included in the above figures. Besides, due to the shortage of food, he had to pay a price of more than 27 taels for a *tan* of wheat in Lanchow.⁴³

Mu-t'u-shan continued to press Tso Tsung-t'ang for money. At least three times he persuaded the Court to put pressure on Tso. Tso artfully delayed his answer for almost six months. Then he reported back in a memorial dated November 29, 1867. There were three issues involved. Issue number one: how much money could Tso spare for Kansu? Issue number two: should the Sian military supply bureau for Kansu be abolished? Issue number three: should Tso emphasize Shensi more than Kansu—at least for this period of time?

Originally, the funds assigned to Kansu were separated from those for Shensi, but in the spring of 1867, in order to get the badly needed cash, Tso Tsung-t'ang mortgaged the subsidies of the last half of the fiscal year 1867-1868 of both Kansu and Shensi to foreign bankers in Shanghai. When the borrowed money was actually delivered at Sian, Tso first had to spend it on his own army. Tso pointed out, however, that he had not neglected Kansu, even when his own soldiers' pay was from three to four months overdue. He had sent more than three hundred seventy thousand taels to Kansu since he arrived at Shensi on July 19, 1867. Besides, he knew that through other channels there had been another two hundred and ten thousand taels delivered to Mu-t'u-shan. In the near future, he promised, he would send another fifty thousand taels to Lanchow. Consequently, Tso claimed, Mu-t'u-shan actually might be receiving more money than ever before.

In the second place, Tso pointed out that Mu-t'u-shan's plan to abolish the Sian military supply bureau for Kansu, would leave those troops stationed at Ching-chou, (soldiers formerly under Ts'ao K'e-chung, now under Chang Tsai-shan (張在山), a lieutenant of Ts'ao's), without a dependable source of supply. They might collapse at once. Since the northeastern corner of Kansu was far from Han-chung, the supply center proposed by Mu-t'u-shan, but close to Sian, Sian was a

⁴²Tso: *Letters*, IX, 41.

⁴³Fang-lüeh, CLXII, 1-4; Mu-t'u-shan; T. C. 6 y., 10 m., 24 d.

more convenient center to distribute supplies, at least for northeastern Kansu. Tso pointedly said that Mu-t'u-shan's real aim was to by-pass Sian so that no one could touch the funds. The fact remained that it took only sixteen days to ship supplies from Sian to Lanchow, whereas the same shipment going from Han-chung to Lanchow would take twenty-seven days. This, of course, did not include the trouble involved in taking the supplies out of the way to Han-chung in the first place. Therefore, Tso concluded, the Sian military supply bureau must stay where it was.

In the third place, Tso said, there was no definite record of how many soldiers were really there in Kansu. Many of them had deserted. Those who remained lacked fighting spirit and ability. He suggested that Mu-t'u-shan check the real number of soldiers and report to him so that he could decide where the funds should be used for the best purposes. Of course, according to this policy, Shensi should at the moment have priority over Kansu in use of the funds.⁴⁴

Mu-t'u-shan rebutted with vigor, saying that for the past half-year he had received only thirty thousand taels from Tso, and insisted that there actually were one hundred forty battalions in Kansu which could not be cut down. Besides his own troops, which he brought with him from Ninghsia, he had inherited most of these "one hundred and forty battalions" from the past. They included the Kansu Green Battalions, the volunteers enlisted by En-lin and Hsi-lin, the army of Ts'ao K'e-chung (now under Chang Tsai-shan), the army of Lei Cheng-kuan, remnants of the army of T'ao Mao-lin, and other miscellaneous groups. Most of them had fewer soldiers than they claimed to have. However, there were exceptions. For instance, when numerous Chinese refugees fled the Moslem persecution from Ho-chou and Ti-tao, Yang Yüeh-pin, the former governor-general, grouped them together and authorized their leader Fan Ming (范銘) to organize them into an army. This took care of the refugee problem, and because they had personal grudges against the Moslems, they would fight. Actually they did fight well, but the supply problem became unique. Since it was an army organized by the refugees themselves, each "soldier" brought his family with him. When Mu-t'u-shan came to Kansu, he "limited" Fan Ming's army to thirteen battalions. In other words, he promised to pay for thirteen battalions. Actually,

⁴⁴Tso: *Memorials*, XXIII, 10-15.

Fan Ming had many more people than that under him. This made the supply condition even worse.⁴⁵

To settle the quarrel, the Court ordered that the subsidies assigned to Kansu should be directly delivered to Mu-t'u-shan.⁴⁶ A few months later, at Mu-t'u-shan's request, the Court made some adjustment so that some of the funds assigned for Kansu would be sent to Tso.⁴⁷

Mu-t'u-shan's position was not very comfortable. On one hand, he reported that some of his soldiers had to "eat grass" because of the shortage of food.⁴⁸ On the other hand, he called for more soldiers from outside because he "had no army to fight with,"⁴⁹ though he insisted that he had a huge army of one hundred forty battalions. In every way, Mu-t'u-shan was following the old trend of holding a big army without providing enough supplies.

(b) *The Use of Fewer and Better Soldiers*

After the *Nien* were destroyed, the Court restored to Tso on August 19, 1868 those honors earlier stripped from him.⁵⁰ A few days later, the Court directed Tso to return with his own army for the unfinished job in Shensi and Kansu. At the same time, the Court asked him to consider the possibility of taking other troops with him.⁵¹ He rejected the suggestion immediately in no uncertain terms:

⁴⁵*Fang-lüeh*, CLXV, 11; Mu-t'u-shan; T. C. 7 y., 1 m., 6 d. Also CLXVII, 8-11; T. C. 7 y., 2 m., 14 d. Concerning Fan Ming, see CXCIV, 7-8; T. C. 8 y., 6 m., 25 d.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, CLXVII, 16; To Tso, Mu-t'u-shan and Liu Tien; T. C. 7 y., 2 m., 14 d.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, CLXXXIII, 21-24; The Board of Revenue; T. C. 7 y., 4 m., 16 d.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, CLXXXVI, 15; Mu-t'u-shan; T. C. 7 y., 11 m., 26 d.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, CLXXXVIII, 2; Mu-t'u-shan; T. C. 8 y., 1 m., 7 d.

⁵⁰Tso: *Hsieh-che* (謝摺), I, 42.

⁵¹See Chapter I, section 5 for the military organizations of the period. There were many people who organized troops after the pattern of the *Hsiang-chün*. Usually they named their armies after the name of the province where they raised the funds and soldiers. Thus they were called the Honan Army (*Yü-chün* 豫軍), Anhwei Army (*Huan-chün* 皖軍) etc. In the campaign against the *Nien*, many armies were used. After the campaign was over, many of these armies were bound to be demobilized. To save their army, which meant to save their own jobs, the generals volunteered to fight in Shensi and Kansu. The so-called "other troops" in this case, judging by what Tso mentioned in his memorial quoted below, were the *Yü-chün*, or Honan Army, the *Huan-chün*, or Anhwei Army, and a part of *Huai-chün*. Cf. K. S. Latourette: *The Chinese*, 361-362; Lo Erh-kang: *T'ai-p'ing-t'ien-kuo shih-kang*, 63-68; 77-80.

Concerning the military affairs of Shensi and Kansu, it is more difficult to raise money than to raise soldiers; it is more difficult to arrange transportation for supplies than to raise food. . . . Before this, Sheng-pao, To-lung-a and Yang Yüeh-pin tried to bring as many soldiers with him as possible, thinking to drive the Moslems out in a hurry. The result was that there were too many soldiers and not enough funds. Hence the soldiers rebelled and deserted, and caused much damage which could have been avoided. It is very much like a poor man without enough food to take care of himself for the next day trying to invite a number of guests for a great banquet. It is simply silly!

Somebody suggested that those people of Anhwei are stout fighters. If we should use them in Shensi and Kansu, it is said, we would defeat the Moslems on the one hand and avoid possible troubles caused by them in their homeland on the other. It sounds like a clever plan, but I do not think so. . . . The normal way to avoid the future troubles caused by a spoiled, proud army returning home is to select the right officers to discipline them while they are still in the army, and to appoint the right officials in the local government to educate them once they get out. . . . Instead of doing these fundamental things, they are thinking of unloading the trouble into Shensi and Kansu. . . . It is not justifiable. . . .

Others suggested that since Anhwei was going to support these troops anyway, why should I not take them with me? But according to the system of the Huai Army (淮軍), every thousand men requires about six thousand taels a month, a sum similar to the system of my army, the Ch'u Army (楚軍 Hunan Army), with the exception that they issue only nine months' pay for one year instead of twelve. This arrangement makes each man's pay only a little more than three taels a month. . . . The shortage of pay has become the source of dissatisfaction and disobedience. The other Anhwei armies besides the Hwei Army and the Honan Army, receive a monthly pay of 2.4 taels, plus food, with a total slightly more than three taels. Once they are in Shensi and Kansu where the prices of foodstuffs are twice as much as in other places, how could they be satisfied without extra subsidy? If I should actually subsidize them, where could I get the money? . . . In case a new mutiny were caused, . . . it would not help the conditions of Shensi and Kansu at all. . . .

The Court approved this policy.⁵² Even so, however, Tso had al-

⁵²Tso: *Memorials*, XXVIII, 24-27.

ready had a larger army than he had in 1867 when he first arrived in Shensi. On March 12, 1869, Tso reported that his *Ch'u-chün* included fifty-five battalions of infantry, fifteen battalions of cavalry. According to the regulations of *Ch'u-chün*, each battalion of infantry had 688 men, and each battalion of cavalry had 588 men, both including cooks and carriers. Adding the staff and service men of headquarters, the grand total was about 50,000 men and 5,000 horses. This was an increase of almost 30,000 men to his army of more than 20,000 men in 1867. The increase was mainly later recruits from Hunan, and did not include other separate units, such as the *Lao Hsiang-chün* under Liu Sungshan, the Anhwei Army (*Huan-chün* 皖軍) under Kuo Pao-ch'ang (郭寶昌), the Szechwan Army (*Ch'uan-chün* 川軍) under Li Hui-wu (李輝武), and the army under Mu-t'u-shan in Kansu.⁵³

(c) *The Clearance of Rebels in the Inland before Pushing Campaigns to the Frontier*

In his argument with Mu-t'u-shan about the distribution of funds for Shensi and Kansu, Tso Tsung-t'ang demonstrated his policy of emphasizing the interior more than the frontier. He frankly stated:

*When the enemy comes from outside, we shall rush to the defense of the frontier. But when the trouble comes from inside, we have to clear the interior first, then drive to the frontier. . . . Being the governor-general of both Shensi and Kansu. . . I can by no means neglect Kansu today. Nevertheless, even in the future when I actually go into Kansu, I still have to consider Shensi as the home base. . . . It has to wait till Shensi is clear, . . . then my army can handle Kansu. The money sent into Kansu today is only to keep the area from total collapse. There is no sense in putting all the money into Kansu now. Even in the future when I can concentrate my strength in Kansu, I still have to protect my supply line running through Shensi. . . .*⁵⁴

Tso pursued this policy all through the years. He first helped to destroy the Nien in Chih-li, Honan, and Shansi. Then he moved west

⁵³*Ibid.*, XXX, 36-41. Cf. note 50.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, XXIII, 13-15.

to clear Shensi. Then he handled the Moslems in Kansu, first in the northeastern area, then in Ho-chou and Ti-tao, then in Hsining, then in Su-chou, moving gradually from east toward west. When he was ordered to recover Sinkiang, he started with the eastern and northern part of it and finally came to the farthest, southern Sinkiang. When the time was not ripe, he simply refused to go. For instance, several times he was requested to reinforce Sinkiang or Su-chou. He simply neglected these requests, sometimes for years.⁵⁵

To him, this policy was the only practical one, though often embarrassing. The Manchu Court knew this and liked the idea, but, as the government responsible to the whole nation, could not neglect urgent calls from officials on the frontier.

In the fall of 1868, after the *Nien* were destroyed, Tso was called into Peking to be given an audience with the Emperor and the Empresses Dowager. There, the Empress Dowager, Hsiao-Ch'in, instructed him to drive the Moslems from the east toward the west, an idea which of course was exactly what Tso had already in mind.⁵⁶ On September 27, 1868, a written edict was sent to Tso to restate this policy of driving the rebels westward.⁵⁷

(d) *The finances of the expeditionary forces*

To cut down the number of soldiers was a negative move. No matter how good the quality of the soldiers might be, to re-establish and maintain the peace and order of such a vast area as northwest China required considerable manpower. To support these men required money. The poverty and exhaustion of Shensi and Kansu were cruel but real facts. Tso Tsung-t'ang knew the situation all too well. He made a thorough analysis for the Court when he was planning, in the fall of 1868, to renew his campaign in Shensi.

All know that the financial problem is hard to solve in Shensi and Kansu, but there is more than one reason that makes it so much worse than that of other areas. In the first place, most of the area is barren without much produce. Secondly, there is not much water transportation, which makes trading and commercial activities difficult.

⁵⁵ Tso: *Memorials*, XXI, 40.

⁵⁶ *Nien-pu*, IV, 48; Tso: *Letters*, XI, 6.

⁵⁷ *Fang-liieh*, CLXXXI, 22; To Tso and others; T. C. 7 y., 8 m., 12 d.

Third, in other provinces the disturbances of the T'ai-p'ings and the Nien bandits were limited either in time or in area, but in Shensi and Kansu, the Chinese and the Moslem population had been mingled together in every community. Once the violence started, they fought back and forth with a momentum hard to stop. For the past six and more years there has been ceaseless strife. The new farms have been deserted and the old storages exhausted. The searches and pillages were frequent and thorough. In fact, there is no place to hide.

Fourth, since the trouble started, most of the people, Moslems as well as Chinese, have died. Most of the domestic animals have been stolen and eaten because of the shortage of food. There are neither enough men nor animals to produce food.

Fifth, though the pay of the soldiers might not be the same in the other provinces, they could at least have their daily meals. Grains are usually low in price and available. But in Shensi and Kansu, food prices are several times higher than in other places. If a soldier were to eat two catties of refined grain daily, the cost would be more than one tenth of a tael. Even if we can issue cash to them every day, they will not get anything except grain. But there are other essentials too. For instance, how are we going to pay for their shoes, clothes or even salt and vegetables?

Sixth, in other provinces, besides land taxes, there are sales tax, transit tax, contributions and other miscellaneous incomes to cover extra expenses. In Shensi, there are only about one hundred thousand taels of likin⁵⁸ each year for extra emergencies. In Kansu there is not even this income. Contribution⁵⁹ is impractical in both provinces, since no one would buy a title when he hardly has the money to buy his food.

Seventh, . . . In Shensi and Kansu the supply lines cover either rough mountainous trails or distant barren deserts. The only means of transportation are mules, donkeys, horses or men. None of these is easy to get, and they all involve the difficult problem of feeding them.

Eighth, . . . In other places, when peace is negotiated, the surrendered rebels can easily be dispersed by giving them some money and sending them home. In Shensi and Kansu, the rebels are not from outside but the natives. They have no other place to go, and the government has

⁵⁸A provincial tax at inland stations on articles in transit.

⁵⁹A system of selling governmental ranks, titles, or offices.

to arrange a complete program of rehabilitation, providing their present daily bread and their future farms, houses, seeds, animals and other necessities. The expenses are tremendous, far beyond those required for maintaining an army. . . .

In a word, Shensi is now short from 1,500,000 taels to 1,600,000 taels a year; and Kansu is short more than 2,000,000 taels a year, even not counting the expenses of rehabilitation. Fortunately, the Nien bandits are now wiped out, and all the other provinces have been pacified. It is possible to use their resources. . . to support the military expenses of Shensi and Kansu.⁶⁰

In order to meet Tso's urgent need, the Court allocated one million taels to Tso for his expenses. On October 10, 1868, orders were sent to the custom-houses of Shanghai, Foochow, Hankow, Canton and Chekiang for this sum. Among these, Shanghai was assigned to provide five hundred thousand taels.⁶¹

Regarding the regular budget, long discussions and arguments took place and Tso Tsung-t'ang was asked to give the details of what he needed. This he presented in a long memorial on March 12, 1869. He listed all the troops under him and Liu Tien, but not those under Mu-t'u-shan (Kansu army), Liu Sung-shan (*Lao Hsiang-chün* or "Old Hunan Army"),⁶² Kuo Pao-ch'ang (郭寶昌 Anhwei Army) and Li Hui-wu (李輝武 Szechwan Army). The last three armies were then in Shensi, but had separate budgets supported by their own sponsoring provinces.⁶³ The data of the Kansu Army were not available at the moment.

*The expenses of Tso Tsung-t'ang's expeditionary force,
March 12, 1869⁶⁴*

<i>Number of battalions of infantry</i>	55
<i>Number of men (including auxiliary forces) in each battalion of infantry</i>	688

⁶⁰Tso: *Memorials*, XXVIII, 48-49.

⁶¹*Fang-lüeh*, CLXXXII, 12-14; to Tseng Kuo-fan and others; T. C. 7 y., 8 m., 25 d.

⁶²*Ch'ing-shih-lieh-chuan*, LI, 2-5; Tseng Kuo-fan: *Memorials*, XXXIV, 10-13.

⁶³*Lao Hsiang-chün* was supported by Kiangsu. At that time, Tseng Kuo-fan was the governor-general of Liang-kiang. After Tseng left, his successor, Ma Hsin-i (馬新貽) was very cooperative and continued the subsidy. Kuo Pao-ch'ang was supported by the funds of Anhwei, and Li Hui-wu was supported by the funds of Szechwan.

⁶⁴Tso: *Memorials*, XXX, 36-43.

Total number of infantry	37,840
Number of battalions of cavalry	15
Number of men (including auxiliary forces) in each battalion of cavalry	588
Total number of cavalry	8,820
Staff of the headquarters and other offices, approxi- mately	3,340
Number of horses	5,000
Total amount of pay and food according to regula- tions, monthly in taels	210,000
Total amount of pay and food according to regula- tions, annually in taels	2,520,000
Rice consumed monthly, in tan (100 catties)	15,000
Average market price of rice per tan (100 catties), in taels	4
Subsidy for each tan of rice, required to offset the high market price, in taels	1
Total monthly food subsidy in taels	15,000
Regular monthly pay for feeding each horse, in taels	3
Daily quantity of feed for each horse, in catties:	
Husks of grain	3
Beans	3
Hay	12
Market price of the feed for each horse each month, in taels	5
Required monthly subsidy for each horse to offset the high market price, in taels	2
Total monthly subsidy for horses, in taels	10,000
Total of annual subsidy of both men and horses in taels	300,000
Annual expenses for tents, uniforms, munitions, in taels	300,000*
Monthly expenses for transportation of rice, munitions and other supplies, in taels	120,000 to 130,000*
Annual expenses for transportation, in taels	1,500,000*
Grand total of annual expenses, in taels	4,620,000**

*These figures include the expenses of Liu Sung-shan, Kuo Pao-ch'ang, Li Hui-wu and the Kansu troops stationed in Shensi.

**Not including expenses of rehabilitation and the payment of local forces.

In order to meet these expenses, the Court approved on March 17, 1869, a budget submitted by the Board of Revenue which called for an increase of subsidies from the different provinces, listed as follows:⁶⁵

<i>Provinces</i>	<i>Original monthly subsidy, in taels</i>	<i>Sum increased to the monthly subsidy, in taels</i>	<i>Sum increased each year, in taels, from the 1st month of the 8th year of Tung-chih*</i>
<i>Anhwei</i>		20,000	240,000
<i>Chekiang</i>	70,000	50,000	600,000
<i>Hupeh</i>		40,000	480,000
<i>Kiangsi</i>	20,000	40,000	480,000
<i>Fukien</i>	40,000	40,000	480,000
<i>Kiangsu</i>	100,000	30,000	360,000
<i>Kwangtung</i>	40,000	30,000	360,000
<i>Total</i>	<u>270,000**</u>	<u>250,000</u>	<u>3,000,000</u>

*In leap years, when there were thirteen months in the lunar calendar, an extra month's pay would be added to this sum.

**The data of the original subsidies of each province were not complete here, but the Board of Revenue gave the total of the above seven provinces as 4,700,000 taels a year before the increase. Besides these seven provinces, Shantung, Shansi, Honan, Hunan and Szechwan also subsidized the Shensi-Kansu Army with an annual total of 1,700,000 taels. There was also a sum of 140,000 taels down from "contributions" each year. These made the original subsidy a total of 6,540,000 taels. With the newly increased sum, it made a grand total of 9,540,000 taels a year.

Of course, a budget on paper did not mean money on hand. For instance, even the one million taels of special funds which the Court thoughtfully assigned to Tso Tsung-t'ang in October, 1868, was not so easy to get as it seemed at first. The new governor-general of Liangkiang, Ma Hsin-i (馬新貽 182-1870), reported on December 18, 1868, to the Court that the custom-house of Shanghai could not deliver the 500,000 taels before the assigned date, February 10, 1869, though

⁶⁵Fang-lieh, CXC, 15-20; the Board of Revenue, to Tso and others; T. C. 8 y., 2 m., 5 d.

he would try to send it later if revenue receipts should show improvement.⁶⁶ The result was quite discouraging. Up to April 4, 1869, six months after the Court issued the edict, Tso received only 100,000 taels of the 500,000 designated.⁶⁷

There were troubles in other provinces too. For instance, in the new budget, Hupeh was ordered to increase its annual subsidy to 480,000 taels. Li Hung-chang, the governor-general of Hu-Kuang at the time, reported that after discharging other obligations, the best Hupeh could do was to increase the amount to 300,000 taels a year, or nearly 200,000 taels short of the goal.⁶⁸

The total of the differences was substantial. For instance, from February 11, 1869, to June 9, 1869, the total subsidies assigned, old and new, were 2,300,000 taels, but only 700,000 taels were delivered. More than two thirds of the sum did not materialize.⁶⁹

After the completion of the first year, Yuan Pao-heng (袁保恆 1826-1878), the chief of the military supply bureau in Sian, reported to the Court the following figures:

<i>Provinces</i>	<i>The monthly quota of the increased subsidy, in taels</i>	<i>The sum actually delivered, in taels</i>	<i>Shortage in taels</i>
<i>Anhwei</i>	20,000	20,000	
<i>Kiangsi</i>	40,000	40,000	
<i>Hupeh</i>	40,000	20,000	20,000
<i>Kiangsu</i>	30,000	20,000	10,000
<i>Fukien</i>	40,000	10,000	30,000
<i>Chekiang</i>	50,000	0	50,000
<i>Kwangtung</i>	30,000	0	30,000
<i>Monthly total</i>		110,000	140,000
<i>Annual total</i>		1,320,000	1,680,000

Among the *old* subsidies, more than 1,500,000 taels had not been delivered. Added together, the shortage in delivery was more than

⁶⁶Ma Hsin-i: *Ma-tuan-min-kung Tsou-yi* (馬端敏公奏議) VII, 13-14; see *ECCP*, 554-556 for Ma's life.

⁶⁷Tso: *Memorials*, XXX, 68.

⁶⁸Li Hung-chang: *Memorials*, XV, 4.

⁶⁹Tso: *Memorials*, XXXI, 44-46.

3,200,000 taels in the first year.⁷⁰ The impact was painful. Tso spent all the funds for essentials such as food, fodder, fuel, uniforms, weapons, munitions, but found it hard to keep up with the required pay to the soldiers. Even at the time of the May festival, the traditional date to clear old accounts, he could not give his men even one month's pay. Though he kept his soldiers from starvation and no one complained, the efficiency of their fighting was impaired.⁷¹

Tso, under pressure, tried to analyze the reasons behind the facts. He listed three reasons, among which *one* was significant. Tso reasoned that the authorities of the various provinces thought that if they supported Tso with soldiers, they had fulfilled their obligations and need not support Tso with funds any more. There were plenty of armies subject to demobilization at the time. To demobilize was no simple affair. On the contrary, if the governor of a province would, instead, send the army to Shensi with low pay, he could kill two birds with one stone. Not only did it save him trouble in handling a group of unruly veterans, but he would win a good name for helping neighbors. In the eyes of the Court, he was unselfish, so he might win some special favor for this performance. In the eyes of the generals, he was kind for saving their jobs. It was economical, too. Not only the expenses of demobilization could be saved, but by sending a low-paid army, it would provide him a good excuse for not sending the more expensive subsidies to Shensi and Kansu. In revealing this fact, Tso restated his profound conviction:

*To use the resources of the southeast to support the army of the northwest has been well-tested since ancient times. I have never asked the other provinces to provide me with soldiers. What I need most is money. If any one is sincere in helping me, raise money please! But don't increase the army any more.*⁷²

This was Tso Tsung-t'ang's policy, which the Manchu Court did its best to follow. The practical problem, nevertheless, was still there. On October 13, 1871, Tso Tsung-t'ang reported that the total shortage in delivery of subsidies had accumulated to 12,000,000 taels. The pay

⁷⁰Yüan Pao-heng; *Memorials*, II, 8-9.

⁷¹Tso: *Memorials*, XXXI, 44-46.

⁷²Tso: *Memorials*, XXXI, 47-48.

of his soldiers hence was reduced from three months full pay for one year in 1869-1870, to two months full pay for one year in 1870-1871, and he was not sure that he could issue even one month's full pay to his men during the fiscal year 1871-1872. Since he had never cut down on essentials for the soldiers, they were still well fed and full of spirit, nevertheless it was too close to danger for comfort. He also had never hesitated to pay the expenses for rehabilitation of the people once an area was restored. But certainly the shortage of funds made it much more difficult to carry out his program. In fact, he was spending the pay of the soldiers to restore the farms, which he considered essential to assure further successes, because it made a local supply of food available for the next stage of the campaign.⁷³ Among the outside sources, the ones which had kept the best record up to that time (October, 1871) were Kiangsi province and the Foochow custom-house. Both had a record of one hundred per cent delivery. Tso appreciated this cooperation, and requested the Court to reward those responsible persons accordingly. They were: governor-general of Fukien and Chekiang, Ying-kuei (閩浙總督英桂 -1879), Manchu general-in-chief of Foochow and acting governor-general of Fukien and Chekiang, Wen-yü (福州將軍兼署閩浙總督文煜 1884), the governor of Fukien, Wang K'ai-t'ai (福建巡撫王凱泰 1823-1875) and the governor of Kiangsi, Liu K'un-i (江西巡撫劉坤一 1830-1902).⁷⁴

From the point of view of those local authorities who failed to deliver their quotas, they had their difficulties too. Their views can easily be found in the memorials of the various governors and governors-general.⁷⁵ However, in spite of delays and short delivery, the policy of using the resources of Southeast China to finance the expedition in the Northwest was carried out. When the campaigns in Shensi and Kansu were finally over, Tso Tsung-t'ang reported that during the period from his appointment as the governor-general of Shen-kan on September 25, 1866, to February 16, 1874, the end of the fiscal year in which Su-chou was recaptured, he had received from governmental sources outside of Shensi and Kansu a grand total of thirty-one million, nine

⁷³Tso: *Memorials*, XL, 5-6.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*, XL, 26.

⁷⁵Ting Pao-chen: *Ting-wen-ch'eng-kung Chou-kao* (丁寶楨: 丁文誠公奏稿) II 8-9; Chien Ting-ming: *Memorials*, II, 5-8 etc. (錢鼎銘奏稿)

hundred eighty-three thousand one hundred ten taels (31,983,110.852475 taels), an average of about 4,000,000 taels a year.⁷⁶ This was a very substantial sum for the treasury of the day, and constituted the main part of Tso Tsung-t'ang's funds.

(e) *The Securing of Needed Funds through Loans*

(1) *The Reasons for Loans*

Since subsidies usually would arrive behind schedule and not in substantial quantity, Tso Tsung-t'ang found it necessary to borrow money. As early as the spring of 1867, when Tso was still in Hankow, he borrowed money from a Chinese merchant, though it was only 120,000 taels for a short period of three months, and did not bother to inform the Court about it.⁷⁷ On April 22, 1867, Tso presented his difficulties before the Court as follows:

The subsidies sent by the various provinces come from the southeast. . . . Usually it takes more than one hundred days to finish the journey. So even if the various provinces should send the funds on schedule, the time when I receive them would already be several months later. During these several months, if there should be opportunities to attack, I would have to pass them up to wait for the necessary funds. This means that the funds would always come "too late." Then when the subsidies arrive, I have to distribute them immediately to the army. When the soldiers receive the money, they have to spend it immediately to repay their debts, to clear the account they owe for food, and in a moment both the army and the soldiers are out of cash again. If then I should drive the soldiers to fight, no one can foresee when the funds would come from next time. . . . This would make the funds always seem to be "too little." . . . I recall that when Shanghai was in danger some time ago, the custom-house of Shanghai did issue a kind of bond with the endorsement of the governor-general and the governor, borrowing money from some foreign merchants to cover the military expenses. When I was in Fukien, I did the same thing to tide over the difficulties. . . . When there is a war in foreign countries,

⁷⁶Tso: *Memorials*, XLV, 38-45.

⁷⁷Tso: *Letters*, IX, 11

*it is a common practice for the governments to issue and allot certain taxes to repay them. . . . Should China follow these precedents, it would be to our advantage. Therefore, it would be much better to borrow a good amount of money and carry out my program on schedule, than to enter Shensi without funds and to be involved in all kinds of trouble and lose the campaign.*⁷⁸

Then he went on to propose a loan of 1,200,000 taels from foreign merchants in Shanghai, to be arranged for him by Hu Kuang-yung (胡光墉 ·1883).⁷⁹ Hu was a merchant in Hangchow, Chekiang, whose wealth had been built up through speculation in the money market. When Tso Tsung-t'ang first came to Chekiang, Tso was seriously considering impeaching Hu. But soon Hu convinced Tso that he could be a great help to him.⁸⁰ With the support of Tso, and the wonderful opportunities which opened up after the defeat of the T'ai-p'ing rebels, Hu made a large fortune and had a hand in many lines of business, such as: silk, tea, pawn-shops, banks as well as the famous drug-store, Hu-ch'ing-yu-t'ang (胡慶餘堂).⁸¹ At the time when Hu helped Tso to arrange foreign loans, he was the leading staff member of the Purchasing and Shipping Office of Tso Tsung-t'ang's expeditionary forces in Shanghai, with the title of candidate-intendant of Fukien (福建補用道). Hu arranged the loan for Tso, with the nominal help of Ying pao-shih (應寶時 1821-?, *Chu-jen*, 1844), the Intendant of the Su-Sung-T'ai circuit (蘇松太道).

(2) *The Loans*

In the past, Tso had trusted his staff members, especially Hu Kuang-yung, to borrow money for his army. This time, when the total needed amounted to more than one million taels, Hu found it necessary to seek new resources other than the Chinese merchants. Since Tso was will-

⁷⁸Tso: *Memorials*, XXI, 63-64.

⁷⁹See I-shih: "T'an Hu Hsüeh-yen" in *Chung-ho* monthly, IV, No. 6, 27-36; June 1943, Peiping (一士:「談胡雪岩」中和月刊四卷六期, 民三十二年六月)。

⁸⁰Li Tz'u-ming: *Yüeh-man-t'ang Jih-chi*, VII, section 2, 30-31; under T. C. 5 y., 4 m., 23 d. 李慈銘: 越縵堂日記·第七冊·丙集上, 頁30-31, 同五、四月二十三日 Tso Tsung-t'ang: *Tso-wen-hsinag-kung shu-tu*, supplement, Chia-shu, I, 65-66. (左文襄公書牘附家書卷一)。Tso: *Memorials*, XX, 71.

⁸¹I-shih: "T'an Hu Hsüeh-yen" in *Chung-he* monthly, IV, No. 6, 31.

ing to pay a high rate of interest, it was not difficult to attract the attention of foreign bankers in Shanghai. However, foreign merchants were not too willing to float such a loan on the credit of either Hu or Tso. They wanted mortgages and more secure guarantees. Tso could easily refer to his assigned subsidies from different sources as mortgage. But the foreign merchants would not take them, unless guaranteed that they could collect. Judging from past experiences, each province had its own way of handling money. Tso was not sure that the different provinces would pay their assigned amounts of subsidy on time. In fact, that was the very reason Tso needed a loan. Considering all these factors, the foreign merchants agreed on having the bonds of a loan indorsed by the governors-general and governors of the related provinces and registered by the Customs and signed to that effect by the foreign Commissioner. In case the assigned amount of money from the provinces should be delayed in delivery, it would be repaid from Customs revenue.⁸²

Theoretically, this loan only helped Tso to advance the funds assigned to him. To the different provinces, they were paying the same assigned subsidy without any substantial change in either the amount or the date of delivery. In practice, however, this put Tso's authority to make loans under the control of the central government. Without the support and help of the Court, Tso would not be able to make foreign loans. On the other hand, the different provinces related to the loans were obliged to pay their assigned funds up to the full amount on time. This was tying the different provinces closer to the central government. The Customs played the key role in the loan, and no doubt it involved numerous troubles. However, Sir Robert Hart, the Inspector-general of the Chinese Customs Service, insisted on participating in the arrangements for the loan. He did so with a purpose.

He desired, if possible, to induce the Central Government to appear as the actual borrower, to issue the bonds in its own name, to give the necessary guarantees for repayment direct to the lending banks, to authorize these banks to carry out the service of the loans from funds to be supplied by the Central Government, to receive into the Imperial Exchequer the moneys subscribed, and to dispense these as needed. Hart believed that if this transformation from semimediæval and orien-

⁸²Tso: *Memorials*, XXI, 64-65. Stanley F. Wright: *Hart and the Chinese Customs*, 365. (Hereafter referred to as Wright: *Hart*.)

*tal to modern and Western methods of Government finance could be effected, it would strengthen greatly the power of the Central Government. . . .*⁸³

In other words, it meant to curtail the authority of the regional forces and bring them under closer control of the central government. Of course this also brought responsibility, influence and prestige to the Customs and its Inspector-general.

The essential data of the arrangement can be summarized as follows.⁸⁴

<i>Issuer of the bonds (The custom house of:)</i>	<i>Indorsers</i>	<i>Amount in Kuan-p'ing taels*</i>	<i>Mortgage (The subsidies from the 7th to the 12th month of the 6th year of T'ung-chih of:)</i>	<i>Interest rate and term</i>
<i>Foochow</i>	<i>The governor-general of Min-che and the governor of Fukien</i>	<i>240,000</i>	<i>Fukien province</i>	<i>All the bonds were carrying a monthly interest rate of 1.3%** To be paid on the date the various provinces deliver their subsidies, i.e., every month.</i>
<i>Canton</i>	<i>The governor-general of Liang-kuang and the governor of Kwangtung</i>	<i>240,000</i>	<i>Kwangtung province</i>	
<i>Chekiang</i>	<i>The governor-general of Min-che and the governor of Chekiang</i>	<i>420,000</i>	<i>Chekiang province</i>	
<i>Hankow</i>	<i>The governor-general of Hu-kuang and</i>	<i>120,000</i>	<i>Hupei province</i>	

⁸³Wright: *Hart*, 366, based on *The Times*, London; No. 29, 453, 1st January, 1879, p. 3, col. 4. C. A. Hart to Campbell, 2nd November, 1877.

⁸⁴Tso: *Memorials*, XXI, 64-65.

*the governor
of Hupeh*

Shanghai *The governor- 180,000 The Custom
general of house of
Liang-chiang Shanghai
and the
governor of
Kiangsu*

*Since the loan was granted and to be repaid in *Kuan-p'ing* taels, (One *Kuan-p'ing* tael equaled 1.013 *K'ü-p'ing* tael, or 583 1/3 grains, or 37.783125 grams) while the monthly subsidies of the various provinces were in *K'ü-p'ing* taels, the difference was to be taken from the later subsidies.

**The interest rate was about 0.2 per cent above the market rate, because "the busy trading season of tea and silk made the funds unavailable at the normal interest rate."⁸⁵

The loan was to be received jointly by Hu Kuang-yung and Ying Pao-shih in Shanghai and then to be sent through the Shansi bankers to Hsieh-chou (解州), Shansi, in draft. All the interest and expense of sending money drafts was to be taken from the loan itself.⁸⁶

This loan was approved by the Court on April 29, 1867.⁸⁷ Though there were some delays, Tso eventually got his money with a discount.⁸⁸

Six months later, on January 9, 1868, when Tso was rushing to

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, The Monthly rate of 1.3% is based on Tso: *Letters*, IX, 17.

⁸⁶Tso: *Memorials*, XXI, 64-65.

⁸⁷Tso: *Memorials*, XXI, 67. *Fang-lüeh* has not included either Tso's memorial or the approval.

⁸⁸Tso: *Letters*, IX, 39. Wright: *Hart*, 363, 389, based on C. A. Hart to FitzRoy, despatch No. 18, Shanghai series, 23rd January, 1868. (C.A. stands for Archives of the Chinese Customs Service.) Cf. Tso: *Memorials*, XXIV, 35. According to the same source, Tso's loan was floated in 1868 and the total sum was Tls. 1,000,000 instead of Tls. 1,200,000. The distribution among the different ports was about the same, except that the figures were lowered. Canton was responsible for Tls. 200,000 instead of 240,000; Foochow for Tls. 200,000 instead of 240,000; Ningpo for Tls. 350,000 instead of 420,000; Hankow for Tls. 100,000 instead of 120,000; Shanghai for Tls. 150,000 instead of 180,000. *Ibid.*, 364. It also describes the procedure of the loan which coincides with what Tso described. The financiers of this loan and the other loans are the Agra Bank, the Oriental Bank, Messrs. Jardine, Matheson, Baring Bros., the Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft, but the establishment which quickly attained an easy supremacy was the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. *Ibid.*, 365.

Shansi to pursue the *Nien*, he was short of funds and pleaded for another loan. He needed the money for numerous reasons: (1) to buy grain for the three months in the spring before the new harvest; (2) to send his troops into Shansi; (3) to settle the surrendered bandits and Moslem rebels in Shensi and Kansu; (4) to start new farms for a rehabilitation program; (5) to discharge soldiers who were no longer fit for duty. He proposed to follow the precedent of the first foreign loan and borrow another 2,000,000 taels on the mortgage of ten months of subsidies from the various provinces.⁸⁹ This was first approved by the Court on January 16, 1868.⁹⁰ But after the case was referred to the *Tsung-li Ya-men* (the equivalent of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time), it was criticized as carrying too heavy interest. Due to the urgency of the need, the Court loaned Tso one million taels of the customs duty without charging him interest and also authorized Tso to borrow one million taels from the foreign bankers in Shanghai as he had planned.⁹¹

From this time on, for quite a few years, Tso floated some small loans from different local Chinese merchants only to tide them over their seasonal needs.⁹² But on November 12, 1874, he found himself in need of 3,000,000 taels. The Chinese New Year was close at hand, and there were numerous obligations to be met. He proposed to mortgage the subsidies from Liang-kiang (Nanking), Chekiang and Kwangtung and to borrow 3,000,000 taels from foreign banks, to be returned within three years.⁹³ Before this loan could be negotiated, he had already been pressed to borrow 1,200,000 taels from Chinese merchants in Shanghai, Hupeh, Shensi, and other places.⁹⁴

This time 1,000,000 taels were borrowed from Jardine, Matheson and Company (怡和洋行) and 2,000,000 taels from Li-ju Company (麗如洋行), both in Shanghai.⁹⁵ The bonds were issued by the cus-

⁸⁹Tso: *Memorials*, XXIV, 33-36; *Fang-lüeh* has not included this document.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, 39. *Fang-lüeh* has not included this document.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, 41. *Fang-lüeh* has not included this document. T. C. 6 y., 12 m., 28 d. (January 22, 1868)

⁹²Tso: *Memorials*, XLV, 69, 71.

⁹³*Ibid.*

⁹⁴Tso: *Memorials*, XLVI, 55-56.

⁹⁵Tso: *Memorials*, XLVI, 55-56. Hosea B. Morse in his *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire* recorded: "China contracted her first imperial loan in 1875-76, for the purpose of Tso Tsung-tang's campaign. It was an 8

tom-houses in Shanghai, Canton and Chekiang, each with a quota of one million taels, with the indorsement of the related governors-general and governors, one sixth of the total to be returned at the end of every sixth month. The total amount was to be returned within three years, carrying an annual interest of 10.5%. The 1,000,000 taels by Jardine, Matheson & Company were to be delivered on April 6, 1875, while the 2,000,000 taels by Li-ju Company were to be delivered on May 19 of the same year.⁹⁶ The Court approved it. The loan was made and returned on time.⁹⁷

In the winter of 1875 to 1876, when Tso Tsung-t'ang was ready to march into Sinkiang, he needed cash again. Up to November of

percent loan issued at par and secured on the customs revenue. £352,700 was issued in 1875, and all taken up in Hongkong and Shanghai; the balance £274,915, was issued in London in March, 1876." (II, 311.) In volume III, on page 448, Morse listed the following loans:

Title	Issued	Amount	Rate of interest	Repayment Begins	Repayment Ends	Principal paid off to Dec. 1911
1. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation	1874	£627,615	8	1875	1884	£627,615
2. Oriental Bank	1874	Tls.2,000,000	9	1875	1884	666,667*
3. Jardine, Matheson & Co.	1875	Tls.1,000,000	8	1876	1885	333,333*
4. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation	1878	£1,604,276	8	1878	1884	1,604,276
5. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation	1878	Tls.1,750,000	8	1879	1884	583,333*

*At exchange £1 = Tls.3.

(1) Since Tso borrowed only Tls. 3,000,000 from the foreign merchants at this period of time, it is highly doubtful that he borrowed the £627,615 mentioned above. However, it is possible that some Chinese merchant who loaned Tso the Tls. 1,200,000 that winter got the money from the foreigners.

(2) Judging from the above information, the so-called "Li-ju Company" was the Chinese name of the Oriental Bank.

(3) Tso paid an interest rate of 10.5% while the foreign bankers received only 8 or 9% annual interest rate; the difference between these two went to the go-between.

⁹⁶Tso: *Memorials*, XLVI, 55-56.

⁹⁷*Fang-lüeh*, CCCVIII, 24; The Board of Revenue; Kuang-hsi 4 y., 9 m., 14 d. confirmed this fact, though the original memorial of Tso was not included in the book.

that year, the overdue subsidies of the various provinces had accumulated to over 27,400,000 taels. Tso pleaded on January 10, 1876, to the Court to approve a loan of 10,000,000 taels from foreign merchants.⁹⁸ He also requested the help of Shen Pao-chen (沈葆楨 1820-1879), the governor-general of Liang-kiang, to arrange the loan.⁹⁹

Shen was Tso's old friend. Shen had fought the T'ai-p'ings in Kiangsi when Tso was doing the same thing in Hunan and Chekiang. After Tso was transferred from Fukien to Shensi, in 1866, he picked Shen as the man most suitable to succeed himself to take charge of the newly established navy yard at Ma-wei (馬尾), near Foochow. In fact, later, when Shen was handicapped by the inadequate and undependable funds of the navy yard, Tso even spared 260,000 taels of his own badly needed funds to support Shen.¹⁰⁰ In 1876, Shen had been promoted to the key position of governor-general of Liang-kiang, Tso trusted that Shen would give him great help in arranging a new loan.¹⁰¹

But to the surprise of Tso, while the Court tentatively approved his proposal without much criticism,¹⁰² Shen raised a major objection to this loan. He pleaded that the interest would be too heavy. To calculate on the basis of 8% annual rate for ten years, Shen figured the interest alone would approach 6,000,000 taels. Furthermore, Shen said, all this money would go to foreigners, and be no profit to China. At the same time, the obligation and involvement would hurt the healthy functions of the custom-houses, as well as the national treasury.¹⁰³ Shen's move certainly aroused Tso's personal feelings against him,¹⁰⁴ but Tso also understood that Shen was a straightforward man. Tso gracefully defended his case before the Court, without saying any harsh words against Shen personally. He pleaded the importance and the justifiableness of the recovery of Sinkiang. He pleaded that it was the cheaper way in the long run, even if the interest was heavy. He

⁹⁸Tso: *Memorials*, XLVII, 49-53.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, 55.

¹⁰⁰Tso: *Letters*, XVI, 28.

¹⁰¹Concerning Shen Pao-chen, see *Ch'ing-shih-kao*, CDXIX (*lieh-chuan*, CC), 4-6; also *ECCP*, 642-644.

¹⁰²Tso: *Memorials*, XLVIII, 15-17. *Fang-lieh*, has not included this document.

¹⁰³Shen Pao-chen: *Shen-wen-su-kung Cheng-shu*, VI, 9-13.

¹⁰⁴Tso: *Letters*, XVI, 8; also 28.

pleaded that the trouble was the delay and shortage of delivery of the subsidies, and not the loan itself. Then he assured the Court of the good morale of his army, and hinted at possible disaster if the funds should be denied to him.¹⁰⁵

Then on March 26, 1876, the Court made a decision. It issued an edict to Tso Tsung-t'ang, gave him its whole-hearted support and best encouragement for his program in Sinkiang. To back up these encouraging words, it allocated 2,000,000 taels to Tso from the treasury of the Board of Revenue, and an advance of 3,000,000 taels from the subsidies of the various provinces, plus permission for a 5,000,000 tael loan from the foreign merchants, to make a total of 10,000,000 taels.¹⁰⁶ This decision was a big boost to the morale of Tso and his army. He announced it before a big banquet of the whole army in Su-chou on April 11, 1876. It was received with thunderous applause. Since he was assured of five million taels, he decided to postpone the loan.¹⁰⁷

One year later, in the summer of 1877, he borrowed 5,000,000 taels from foreign bankers in Shanghai. The bonds were issued by the custom-houses of Chekiang [Ningpo], Canton, Shanghai and Hankow, guaranteeing payment of the capital within seven years, and a monthly interest of 1.25% to be paid once every six months.¹⁰⁸

The deal was complicated because the original party that made the loan, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (滙豐銀行), a British bank, charged only 1% monthly interest, but agreed only to deliver the equivalent of 5,000,000 taels in English sterling at the market price. Because sterling was not acceptable in the interior market, and also because it might involve a possible loss if the price of sterling should rise by the time of repayment, the loan was reindorsed by the T'ai-lai Company (泰來洋行), a Prussian firm in Shanghai. The T'ai-lai Company agreed to take the sterling and to pay to Tso's agent, Hu Kuang-yung, in taels. Then, at the time of repayment, the T'ai-lai Company would take taels from the Chinese government and repay the British bank in sterling. For this service, the T'ai-lai Company charged the extra 0.25% monthly interest to make the total interest rate a monthly 1.25%.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵Tso: *Memorials*, XLVIII, 36-40.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*, 41. *Fang-lüeh* has not included this document.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, 53-55. *Fang-lüeh* has not included this document.

¹⁰⁸Tso: *Memorials*, L, 68-69.

¹⁰⁹Tso: *Memorials*, LI, 10; also *Letters*, XVIII, 56. The information furnished

After Sinkiang was recovered, Tso made an unconventionally strong recommendation to the Court, asking the favor of granting Hu the honor of wearing a yellow jacket. This was mainly to reward him for his effort in raising funds and purchasing all the military supplies in Shanghai. In order to add extra weight to this recommendation, Tso timed it with his own second petition to decline the honor of marquis. Tso freely told people that without Hu's help in arranging the loans, his expedition would not be successful.¹¹⁰ On May 30, 1878, Hu was given the honor requested.¹¹¹

But this was not the happy ending. In the same year, Tso was thinking of borrowing more money from Chinese sources, which would not be so hard in their terms as were the foreign loans. He encouraged Hu Kuang-yung to organize a Chinese-financed Ch'ien-t'ai Com-

by Western sources differs. H. S. Morse recorded: "A second imperial loan, for Tls. 5,000,000 at 7 per cent, was issued in Dec. 1877." *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, II, 311. However, in vol. III, 448, Morse gave the interest rate as eight per cent. The Vice-Consul-General, Baily, of Shanghai reported to the U. S. Department of State for the year 1878 as follows: "In 1877, China, being again a borrower, another public loan for £1,604,276 was floated through the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation at 98, the par of the bonds being £100. These loans were readily subscribed by foreigners, as the annual interest was 8 per cent on the par value, and the payment of the bonds was guaranteed by the hypothecation of the revenue collected by the foreign customs at certain of the treaty ports. The interest on these bonds is paid semi-annually in London or China, and certain of the bonds themselves are paid off each year at public drawings in London, the dates for which are specified, until the entire loan will be liquidated. . . . Other than an investment, these bonds are used by foreign merchants for exchange remittances." (*Cong. Rec.* House of Rep. 45th Congress 3rd session, Ex. Doc. No. 108, pp. 225-226.) In a letter, Sir Robert Hart reported on November 2, 1877 as follows: "Tso has got authority for his *five million Taels*: the Government pays the go-between 15%, the go-between pays the bank 10%, and the bank is issuing it at 95 and with 8% interest As the Oriental Banking Corporation will not help me in these matters, I am forced to go to the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank." (C. A. Hart to Campbell, 2nd November, 1877, as quoted in Wright: *Hart and the Chinese Customs*, 390.) Though these Western reports do not agree with each other exactly, one thing is certain, the Chinese who handled this loan were making a huge profit from it.

¹¹⁰Tso: *Letters*, XX, 30.

¹¹¹Tso: *Memorials*, LII, 87-88.

欽差大臣太子太保陝甘總督部堂一等恪靖伯左為

曉諭事照得本爵大臣督部堂奉

命剿賊師行十二省凡情罪稍有可原者無不曲予矜全以廣皇仁而安反側惟首逆馬化澂父子兄弟以新教惑眾勾結陝甘各回旋撫旋叛自刻為印僭號兩河大總戎偽造王城東府西府抗拒官軍戕害將士日久稽誅仍煩

天誅迨上年鎖圍既合無處逃生始自縛來投本爵大臣督部堂猶賢貸一死勒令盡繳馬械賞財觀其誠偽乃該逆父子仍敢隱藏洋鎗洋燄至一千二百餘桿洋火藥二十餘箱復經官軍擒握呈繳提犯研訊無詞狡賴實屬始終叵測自取滅人業提該首逆父子兄弟盡法懲處查新教本是回教異端自乾隆四十六年剿辦馬明心蘇四三十四十九年剿辦田逆後馬化澂之父馬二復以新教道種惑眾斂錢傳梁教省馬化澂接稱總阿訇兇談更熾是在

朝廷為必討之賊在將士有必雪之憤在回教亦為必鋤之種故飭前敵各軍將首逆元惡一併誅夷助逆夥黨嚴行駢戮非得已而不已也至於各處安分回民固無株連波及之理即從前候被新教煽惑回民如果真心悔悟去匪為良亦准並善兼容不咎既往如敢仍行新教聽從海裏飛等妖徒蠱惑潛相勾煽或妄造謠言謂官軍將盡殲回族盡滅教門恐嚇愚民藉端謀變准爾等即時赴官呈控審訊得實定即立正刑誅爾等試思新教如有靈異何以首逆元惡及親屬夥黨同歸浩劫無一漏逸官軍如肯肆行報戮何以爾等安分守己漢回士民盡蒙寬恤無一冤濫若復稍涉驚疑自生憂懼必致終罹法網枉送性命看似可恨亦覺可憐為此剴切諭知軍民人等一體知悉毋為新教所誤毋為謠言所惑永為良善可保無他凜之慎之毋違特示

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pany (乾泰公司) to raise funds. Tso thought that, since it was Chinese capital, everything could be less formal. He hoped that the future loans would not involve the custom-houses. The bonds were to be issued by the Financial Commissioners of the various provinces subsidizing his army, with the indorsement of the related governor-general and governor. These bonds should not state any definite term nor any definite date of repayment. Tso gave these points as his instructions to Hu in a letter.¹¹² But Hu did not follow Tso's instructions. His Ch'ien-t'ai Company raised 1,750,000 taels, and took in a similar amount of money from the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, the British firm, to make a total of 3,500,000 taels. Both the term and the repayment dates were strictly set, and the custom-houses were involved. Everything followed the old pattern, with the only difference that Chinese capital was given the same privilege for the first time. The interest rate was high too, a rate of 12% (*i-fen-erh-li* 一分二厘).¹¹³ Even Tso was obviously irritated.¹¹⁴

This loan was bitterly criticized by Tseng Chi-tse (曾紀澤 1839-1890), the oldest son of Tseng Kuo-fan and the Chinese minister who had newly arrived at London.¹¹⁵ In Tseng's diary, he mentioned Tso's loan, first on April 15, 1879, then on May 30 of the same year. He said that, at the European market rates, the highest interest would be only 4%, and China was borrowing at the rate of 10%, a loss of 6%. On November 15 of the same year, Tseng recorded a conversation with a friend who told him that Hu Kuang-yung got the loan from foreign bankers at the rate of 8% interest, and then turned it over to Tso and the Chinese government charging a rate of 15%.¹¹⁶ Tseng was very indignant. He said in his diary: "even to confiscate his [Hu's] property and convict him as a traitor would not be excessive."¹¹⁷ There was no evidence to show that he did anything to attack Hu in the open, since Hu remained in his influential position for quite

¹¹²Tso: *Letters*, XX, 50-52.

¹¹³Tso did not indicate whether this was an annual interest rate or a monthly one. Judging by the loan of 1877 before this one, apparently Tso meant a monthly rate here. In that case, it would be 1.2% monthly or 14.4% annually.

¹¹⁴Tso: *Letters*, XXIII, 16-17; 19.

¹¹⁵*ECCP*, 746-747.

¹¹⁶Cf. note 109. Western sources confirm Tseng's accusation.

¹¹⁷Tseng Chi-tze: *Tseng Hui-min-kung I-chi*, Diary, (曾憲敏公遺集 · 日記) II, 11, 20, 32.

a few more years. However, Tseng's wish was realized in a slightly different way. On December 5, 1883, Hu's bank failed.¹¹⁸ He was declared bankrupt and soon died.¹¹⁹

To be fair to Tso and Hu, one must remember that the monthly interest rate of 1.2% was not a high one in nineteenth-century China. After all, the loans did achieve their purposes. Without them, Tso Tsung-t'ang might have failed in his mission.

(f) *The Demand for Surrender*

Fundamentally, Tso Tsung-t'ang believed that the Moslems and the Chinese should be reconciled. But, because there were some stubborn rebels among them, Tso also realized that to handle the matter of reconciliation took great patience, extreme caution and immovable consistency. Immediately after Tso arrived at Shensi in 1867, he issued posters to tell the Moslems what his standard of right and wrong was.¹²⁰

In his posters he promised the Moslems as follows:

- 1) *Those who refused to join the rebellion would be honored with citations.*
- 2) *Those who had long been civil leaders, but were forced to join the rebels because of their religion. . . would be pardoned when they surrendered. If they would arrest some famous rebel leaders, they would be rewarded accordingly.*
- 3) *Those who had been law-abiding subjects, who never had had any trouble with the Chinese, would be pardoned if they could get some Chinese to guarantee their conduct, or if they would arrest some rebels, or help the government in battle.*
- 4) *Those who would guide the army in arresting the rebel leaders would be pardoned and rewarded. Those who would surrender with horses and weapons would be pardoned.*

The above-mentioned Moslems would be given certificates to identify them as law-abiding subjects after their surrender. No Chinese was to mistreat them. If any Chinese dared to kill or injure them, he would be punished as a murderer, according to law. The Moslems

¹¹⁸Yüeh-man-t'ang *Jih-chi*, XLI, 39.

¹¹⁹I-shih: "T'an Hu Hsüeh-yen," *Chung-ho*, IV, No. 6, 32.

¹²⁰Tso: *Letters*, X, 17.

could sue such a person before the officials, but would not be allowed to renew the fighting.

He also warned that he would punish Moslems who did any of the following things:

- 1) *attack or destroy cities, towns or villages;*
- 2) *organize to resist the government forces;*
- 3) *cooperate with the bandits to commit arson or murder;*
- 4) *capture grain or weapons from the government forces;*
- 5) *spread rumors to agitate the Moslems;*
- 6) *plot arson or murder, claiming to avenge old wrongs;*
- 7) *harbor Moslem bandits who committed arson and murder;*
- 8) *kill members of their own family; [so that they could be free to fight against the government]*
- 9) *pretend to surrender;*
- 10) *continue to supply grain, hay, horses and weapons to the Moslem bandits or act in collusion with them after surrender.*

*The above-mentioned people would be punished as rebels.*¹²¹

This program of reconciliation by Tso Tsung-t'ang was not very effective at the moment. The Moslems were insisting on returning to their own homelands, a condition which Tso considered unacceptable. After all, the *Nien* were then still very active, a fact which made the Moslems believe that they were strong enough to continue the fight. They refused to surrender their horses and weapons. They continued to attack towns and steal grain. Tso also continued the fight.¹²² In fact, Tso's conditions for reconciliation were very strict. It was definitely not a program of appeasement, but, on the contrary, a program of asking for surrender. Once, a group of Moslems led by Yü Te-yen (禹得彦), which had been repeatedly defeated, came to the government authorities to arrange for reconciliation, saying, "We ask for reconciliation because we are short of food." Usually, after the Moslems had been defeated, their request for reconciliation would be granted. So Liu Tien, the Deputy Commander, was ready to take them in. But Tso rejected their request and pressed for battle, saying "when the rebels ask for reconciliation merely because they have no

¹²¹Tso: *Kao-shih* (告示), 4-7. (In *Tso-wen-hsiang-kung Ch'üan-chi*, CI.)

¹²²Tso: *Memorials*, XXIV, 33-34.

food, they are not thoroughly willing".¹²³ In other words, Tso would not accept any compromise. It was either surrender or fight. If the Moslems thought that they could have won the war had they not been short of food, then Tso would rather challenge them with another battle until they were thoroughly beaten, and were no more deceiving themselves with the idea that they could win if they would try it some other time.¹²⁴ Judging by this standard, he could not be satisfied with those surrenders arranged by Mu-t'u-shan in Kansu.¹²⁵

However, he was far from the school of thought that required killing all Moslems. He repeatedly criticized the attitude of the Chinese gentry of Shensi:

*The gentry in Shensi hate the Moslems deeply. Whenever they are consulted about the Moslem problem, they always insist on killing all the Moslems. They link the two, the Moslems and total annihilation, as if they are two sides of the same thing. I simply cannot understand their logic! Recently, in the western suburb of Sian, the Chinese local corps called in people and murdered a Moslem family of eight, not even saying one word to the local authorities. The governor [Liu Tien] arrested five ringleaders and executed them according to law, and public opinion criticized him as pro-Moslem. Isn't it strange? . . . The gentry of Shensi always suspect that my army is afraid of the rebels, and that we prefer to appease the Moslems. Whenever they [the gentry] learn about a victory of ours, they doubt it; but when there is a setback, they discuss it with pleasure!*¹²⁶

When the Moslems sincerely surrendered, Tso treated them fairly.¹²⁷ He used them to call in other rebels.¹²⁸ He settled them in special colonies.¹²⁹ He furnished them with food and other essentials. In a word, he sincerely gave them a chance to start all over again.

¹²³Nien-p'u, IV, 54.

¹²⁴Tso: *P'i-cha* (批札), II, 42.

¹²⁵Tso: *Memorials*, XXXII, 9-11.

¹²⁶Tso: *Letters*, X, 17-18; Cf. XIV, 4.

¹²⁷Tso: *Letters*, XXI, 38-39. Also in *Hui-ming-ch'i-i*, IV, 310, "Shen-kan-chieh-yü-lu."

¹²⁸Tso: *Memorials*, XXXVIII, 19; also XXXIX, 34. *Hui-ming-chi-i*, IV, 309.

¹²⁹See below, section i of this chapter.

(g) *The Destruction of the Leading Forces of the Organized Rebellion*(1) *The Military Situation*

Tso Tsung-t'ang returned from Peking to Sian on November 26, 1868. During the following days, he held conferences with responsible military leaders in Shensi. He learned in these talks the general picture of the military situation at the moment. Based on these reports, he briefed the Court as follows:

The area of Yen-an (延安), Yü-lin(榆林), Sui-te (綏德) in north-eastern Shensi has been invaded by numerous bandits from Kansu. Most of them are deserting soldiers and starved common people, occasionally including some Kansu Moslems. Southwest of that area, the Shensi Moslem rebels are squatting at Tung-chih-yüan (董志原), claiming to be "the eighteen battalions." Many Yünnan and Kansu Moslems, who are homeless and enjoying the excitement of rebellion, are there. Some Chinese who have been forced to follow the Moslem religion are also there. Altogether, there are almost two hundred thousand rebels.¹³⁰

Tso also reported that the Moslem rebels in Tung-chih-yüan received their supplies from Chin-chi-pao.¹³¹

(2) *The Military Moves*

As early as 1867, a native Chinese scholar advised Tso that the centers of the Kansu Moslems were Chin-chi-pao in the northeast and Ho-chou in the southwest. Both of these places were hideouts of the Shensi Moslem rebels and the leaders there were purposely using the Shensi Moslems to protect themselves. He suggested starting an offensive to crush the Shensi rebels in Tung-chih-yüan, then to attack Chin-chi-pao and Ho-chou.¹³²

Two years had elapsed since then, but Tso apparently still agreed with the advice. He considered Ma Hua-lung of Chin-chi-pao to be an especially important enemy. Tso summarized the situation as follows:

The vigorous activities of the Shensi Moslems depend on Ma Hua-lung

¹³⁰Tso: *Mem.*, XXIX, 30. *Fang-liieh*, CLXXXV, 17-19.

¹³¹Tso: *Mem.*, XXIX, 31.

¹³²Po Ching-wan: *Feng hsi-t's'ao-t'ang-chi* (柏景偉：灑西草堂集), I, 18.

as their mastermind. Ma is the leader of the "New Sect" of the Moslem religion which has spread from Urumchi of Sinkiang in the west, . . . to K'uan-ch'eng-tzu (寬城子) of Hei-lung-chiang in the east. All the Moslems following the "New Sect" obey his instructions. He has been plotting against the government for decades. Chin-chi-pao is situated between the irrigation canals. As the area is rich and hard to attack, he repeatedly played delaying tactics against the government expeditionary forces by offering peace. He has been successful in doing so because thus far no government general has been able to defeat him. In order to cover up their failures, some of the generals deliberately misinformed the Court that Ma is sincere in offering to surrender, which he is not. But the fact remains that there will be immeasurable danger if he is not destroyed. Not only will he be the cause of sorrow for the northwest, but someday the whole area from Mongolia to Peking will be disturbed because of him.¹³³

Based on this judgment, Tso made a plan to send three forces into Kansu. In the south, he sent the Kansu soldiers to Ch'in-chou and Kung-ch'ang to attack the rebels in southern Kansu. In the center, Tso personally led his own army to Ching-chou to drive away the Moslems from a line starting from P'ing-liang, Ch'ing-yang, Ku-yüan, Hui-ning, An-ting to Lanchow. In the north, he sent Liu Sung-shan from Lo-yang into Shansi, crossing the Yellow River to enter Shensi near Sui-te, then to march through Hua-ma-ch'ih (花馬池) to attack Chin-chi-pao. Of these three, the main emphasis was on the northern route.¹³⁴ Tso believed that once Chin-chi-pao was taken, the other places would not be difficult to conquer.¹³⁵

Liu Sung-shan (劉松山 1833-1870) was a native of Hsiang-hsiang, Hunan. He joined the *Hsiang-chün* as a soldier and by accumulating merits he won the title of general-in-chief in 1861. In 1864, after Nanking, the capital of the T'ai-p'ings, fell, Tseng-kuo-fan decided to disband the *Hsiang-chün*. But Tseng purposely preserved Liu Sung-shan's army, because he felt that Liu's army was the only group of the *Hsiang-chün* which was still "fresh with morning spirit." This army was later known as *Lao Hsiang-chün* (老湘軍), or "the old *Hsiang-chün*." It was one of the original groups that fought under Tseng, and

¹³³Tso: *Wen-chi* (文集), I, 17-18. In *Tso-wen-hsiang-kung Ch'üan-chi*, CII.

¹³⁴*Ibid.*, Cf. Bales: *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 231-232.

¹³⁵Tso: *Letters*, XI, 10.

Tseng had a personal interest in this army as well as in Liu. Soon Tseng sent it to fight against the *Nien*. When the *Nien* invaded Shensi, Liu Sung-shan rushed to Sian. In 1867, he was promoted to be Provincial Commander-in-chief of the land forces of Kwangtung, but remained in Shensi to continue the campaign. The condition of Shensi was very critical because of the defeat of Liu Jung's army near Sian. It was Liu Sung-shan who stabilized the situation. Then the *Nien* escaped into Shansi and Chihli. Liu followed them closely, and participated in campaigns which finally destroyed all the *Nien*. He then returned to Lo-yang, Honan, where he married. He stayed only for a few days and left for this new mission to attack Chin-chi-pao.¹³⁶

Two other generals who later participated in the same mission were Chin-shun (金順 1835-1885) and Chang Yüeh (or Chang Yao 張曜 1832-1891). At the time when Tso was planning his campaign, Chin-shun and his troops were in Yü-lin, Shensi, while Chang Yüeh was on his way to Kansu from K'ai-feng (開封), Honan.¹³⁷

Chin-shun belonged to the Manchu Bordered-Blue Banner. He started his career as a soldier. Beginning in 1853, he participated in campaigns against the T'ai-p'ings. In 1856, he served under To-lung-a as a commander of cavalry, and followed him ever after. In 1862, he went to Shensi with To-lung-a, and had a large share in the conquest of the Moslem forts in 1863. At the time of To-lung-a's death, he had already been promoted to be the Deputy Lieutenant-general of Sian (西安副都統). In early 1865, he joined Tu-hsing-a and Mu-t'u-shan to attack the city of Ninghsia. After the compromise with the Moslems in Ninghsia had been worked out, Mu-t'u-shan moved to Lanchow and Chin-shun was appointed to be the acting Manchu General-in-chief of Ninghsia, on November 2, 1866, to take the place of Mu-t'u-shan. But instead of staying in Ninghsia, a very important strategic city, it is significant that he was keeping his troops in Yü-lin,¹³⁸ obviously a compromise reached between Mu-t'u-shan and the Ninghsia Moslems.

Chang Yüeh was a native of Peking. Starting as a student, he bought the title of Assistant District Magistrate before he went to Honan. In Honan he worked under the district magistrate of Ku-shih

¹³⁶*Ch'ing-shih-lieh-chuan*, LI, 2-5.

¹³⁷Tso: *Memorials* XXIX, 31.

¹³⁸*Ch'ing-shih-lieh-chuan*, LV, 45-47. Cf. pp. 141-142.

from the early years of Hsien-feng. He distinguished himself in organizing the Honan natives into an army, the *Yü-chün* (豫軍) to defeat the *Nien*. With merits accumulated to his credit, he rose rapidly from his low rank. He became a magistrate in 1856; a prefect in 1858; an intendant in 1860, with the title of Judicial Commissioner. Finally, in January of 1862, he became the Financial Commissioner of Honan. In that year some censors accused him of "illiteracy," and the Court moved him from the civil service to become a Brigadier-General. In 1868, he helped to annihilate the last group of *Nien*. A few months later, he was ordered to move to Ningshia to support Chin-shun. In the coming campaign against Chin-chi-pao, he and Chin-shun were responsible for pressing down from the north, fighting along the west bank of the Yellow River.¹³⁹

Liu Sung-shan entered Shensi near Sui-te, and began his campaign first against native bandits. Most of these "bandits" were merely wandering, hungry refugees and it was not too long before he suppressed them and caused one hundred and seventy thousand of them to surrender. Northern Shensi was thus cleared of bandits, and the rear of his army was safe.¹⁴⁰

"The eighteen battalions" of the Shensi Moslem rebels in Tung-chih-yüan were active. This area was the main target of Tso's central forces. After numerous clashes, the climax came in March, 1869. Under increasing pressure from Tso's troops, the Moslems tried to re-enter Shensi on March 18th.¹⁴¹ When they suffered great losses, they returned to Tung-chih-yüan and decided to flee northward. They cut the "eighteen battalions" down into four "big battalions," and started to move their property, women and children on April 3rd. Tso received this information and launched his attack. Numerous Moslems were reported killed. On April 4, Tung-chih-yüan was captured by Tso's army. Before dawn the next day, Tso ordered the chase. Around eight o'clock his army captured Hsi-feng-chen (西峯鎮); on the same day, Chen-yüan was taken. On April 6, his army recovered Ch'ing-yang. The campaign was over on April 11. About 20,000 to 30,000 Moslems were reportedly annihilated. The whole area of Ch'ing-yang and Ching-yang was cleared. The remaining Moslems fled in the general direction of Chin-chi-pao. The victory could have been even

¹³⁹*Ch'ing-shih-lieh-chuan*, LV, 29-31.

¹⁴⁰*Nien-p'u*, IV, 54-55. Cf. Tseng Kuo-fan: *Memorials*, XXXIV, 12.

¹⁴¹Tso: *Memorials*, XXX, 60-61.

more decisive had the army in the north been able to press down at the same time. But just at that time, Tso's northern army suffered some set-backs.¹⁴²

(3) *Two incidents*

Two incidents though not ones directly related happened within eight days at two places. One was in Sui-te and one in Yang-tien-chen (楊店鎮), a town about three hundred kilometers south of Sui-te, and west of the city of I-chün, Shensi. Sui-te was a center of activities along the transportation line behind Liu Sung-shan's forces. When Liu pushed westward, he left soldiers along the line to help in the shipping of food supplies. On March 25, 1869, an officer in Sui-te discovered the organization of *Ke-lao-hui* (哥老會),¹⁴³ a secret society, among the soldiers, and held those involved for execution. But the membership was far more widespread among the officers and soldiers than had been discovered. A mutiny to save their comrades broke out. Once there was a riot, the mutinous soldiers robbed the food bureau and occupied the city. The local authorities fought their way out. For a moment, there seemed to be widespread rebellion among Liu Sung-shan's soldiers, and many unfavorable reports against Liu reached the Court. But the real members of the secret society were limited to several hundred. As soon as Liu Sung-shan returned, the non-members helped to capture five ringleaders, and recovered the city. More than

¹⁴²*Ibid.*, XXXI, 14-17. Cf. Bales: *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 233-235.

¹⁴³*Ke-lao-hui* is a secret society in China. For details see T'ao Ch'eng-chang: *Chiao-hui yüan-lui-k'ao* (陶成章: 教會源流考) collected in Hsiao I-shan: *Chin-tai pi-mi-she-hui shih-liao*, or *The Historical Materials of the Secret Societies in Modern Time* (蕭一山: 近代秘密社會史料), II, Appendix, 4-5. Cf. K. S. Latourette: *The Chinese*, 681; J. S. M. Ward and W. G. Sterling: *The Hung Society, or the Society of Heaven and Earth*; Schlegel: *Thian Ti Hwui The Hung League, or Heaven Earth League*; Hirayama Amame: *The History of the Chinese Secret Societies* (平山周: 中國秘密會社史), 76-146; Lo Er-kang: *T'ien-ti-hui Wen-hsien-lu* (天地會文獻錄), or *A Collection of Documents of the Society of Heaven and Earth*, 2. See also Bales: *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 235-236. But Bales used only the *Nien-p'u*, which mentioned the mutinies vaguely and briefly. He had not read the original documents, hence he did not know that the promoters of the mutinies were members of the *Ke-lao-hui*. He reported: "It is said that these troops, scattered along the road, were the victims of many Mohammedan agents."

one hundred of the members were killed in action. Another 127 members were captured and executed. On April 7, the trouble was all over and order was restored.¹⁴⁴

Without knowing of each other's action, another group of *Ke-lao-hui* started a riot in the area of I-chün. The army commander stationed there was Kao Lien-sheng (高連陞 -1869), one of the ablest generals Tso had. When he noticed the activities of the *Ke-lao-hui* among his soldiers, he ordered the arrest of the ringleaders. Instead of waiting for arrest, the members of the secret society struck first. During the night of April 1, they surrounded Kao's tent and killed Kao as well as some other leading officers. The next day, in the confusion, the mutineers led the other soldiers southward to attack the city of Tung-kuan (同官).¹⁴⁵ They failed to take it, but continued the attack until April 3, when reinforcements of the government came from different directions. The mutineers had tried to cooperate with the Moslems in Tung-chih-yüan. Actually, some Moslems did move east to meet them. But as the Moslems in Tung-chih-yüan were defeated and the mutineers were captured, killed, or dispersed, the incident was over within five days.¹⁴⁶

When the incidents were first reported to Peking, the Court was very much alarmed.¹⁴⁷ It even sent a special order to Tseng Kuo-fan to ask his advice about whether the Hunan army should continue to be used in that field or not. He reported back on June 13, 1869, insisting that Liu Sung-shan was positively dependable, and that a change in the army might bring disaster.¹⁴⁸ With Tseng's moral and material support,¹⁴⁹ Liu Sung-shan's army as well as the whole military force under Tso Tsung-t'ang were no more suspected by the Court, and remained in the field to fulfill their historical mission.

(4) *The Secret Orders*

At this time, the stage for the battle of Chin-chi-pao had been set. On the one hand, all the bandits and rebels blocking the way had

¹⁴⁴Tso: *Memorials*, XXXI, 7-8; also 21-23.

¹⁴⁵A city north of Sian, not the city of Tung-kuan bordering on Honan.

¹⁴⁶Tso: *Memorials*, XXXI, 2-4.

¹⁴⁷*Ibid.*, XXX, 73-75.

¹⁴⁸Tseng Kuo-fan: *Memorials*, XXXIV, 10-13; also *Letters*, XXXII, 15-17.

¹⁴⁹Tseng, as the governor-general of Liang-Kiang, assigned a definite amount of revenue of Kiangsu to support Liu's army.

either surrendered or been driven closer to Chin-chi-pao. On the other hand, Liu Sung-shan's forces were now fit and ready to play the leading role in the offensive. In a secret letter to Liu, Tso gave him the following instructions:

There are three groups of Moslems in Kansu that must be suppressed with military power, namely, . . . Hsi-ning; Ho-chou and Ti-tao; and Chin-chi-pao. Of these three, Ma Hua-lung of Chin-chi-pao is the most cunning. . . . Depending on his wealth, his strong fort surrounded by water, and his high prestige and influence among the Kansu Moslems, Ma claims to have been amnestied by acting governor-general Mu, but secretly conspires with the various groups of Moslem rebels in Shensi and Kansu. His fort, situated on the bank of the Yellow River, makes it possible for him to block all goods and food supplies coming from Ninghsia, . . . Pao-t'ou (包頭) and Kuei-hua (歸化) to Lanchow. . . . As he trades with the rebels in Tung-chin-yüan, the 200,000 rebels there have not suffered shortage of supplies for four years. The money these rebels stole from Shensi mostly found its way to Chin-chi-pao. Ma persuaded these rebels to invade Shensi . . . but last year when he learned that my forces were moving westwards, he advised the rebels in Tung-chih-yüan to negotiate peace with me in order to wait for a more favorable time to rebel again. As I knew this trick well, I rejected their request.

Generally speaking, in order to suppress the Moslem rebels in Shensi and Kansu, we must first attack Chin-chi-pao. The last time Lei Cheng-kuan and Ts'ao K'e-chung failed, because they were cut off from their food supplies. If we attack from the east this time, we must choose a route with ample water and grass and store enough food before we advance. . . . As soon as you settle the trouble in Suite, you should advance from Hua-ma-ch'ih and Tingpien (花馬池定邊) aiming at the north of Chin-chi-pao. Ostensibly you will attack the rebels in Hua-ma-ch'ih and Ting-pien, so as to avoid Ma's suspicion; however, your real aim is to take Chin-chi-pao. Once you close in on that fort, fire a salvo of explosive cannon shells on it and you will break it down. Once you crack this fort, the whole of Kansu will be shaken and complete success will be at hand. . . .¹⁵⁰

¹⁵⁰Tso: Letters, X, 36-37.

Soon after this, another top-secret letter was sent to Liu by Tso, saying: *Chin-chi-pao is a place we must not spare. If we do not act now, we will live to regret it. However, you are not to disclose any of these ideas yet. Keep them secret, consult widely for all possible strategies and carefully work on a plan to be carried out. Notice that Chin-chi-pao is surrounded by water and very hard to attack; and Ma Hua-lung is very tricky—far different from the Shensi Moslems. Furthermore, the more stubborn of the Shensi Moslems are going to help him. You are a good general. With all the brilliant record of the past, you will not hesitate to show others your strength. You must be flexible, ready for any kind of development, and then you will render a great service to the State. . . .*¹⁵¹

These two secret orders revealed that from the very beginning, Tso had made up his mind to consider Ma Hua-lung as the most important organizer behind the rebellion, who must be destroyed.

(5) *The Conflict at Chin-chi-pao*

According to what Tso Tsung-t'ang reported to the Court, the fight in Chin-chi-pao started in the following way:

Liu Sung-shan left Hua-ma-ch'ih on September 4, 1869. On September 7th, he chased the Shensi Moslems to a point about one kilometer north of the city wall of Ling-chou. There Liu sent an order to Ma Hua-lung saying that his force was going to attack only the Shensi Moslems. The Kansu Moslems who had surrendered should keep calm and not be alarmed. Next day [September 8th], Liu marched southward. When he started to fight the Shensi Moslems at Kuo-chia-ch'iao (郭家橋) . . . his troops were fired upon by the road-side forts on their way. . . Liu ordered his troops to chase only the Shensi Moslems, and temporarily neglect the Kansu Moslems. That night, Liu received a petition from Ma Hua-lung, saying that negotiations for the reconciliation of the Shensi Moslems had made progress, and reports to Tso Tsung-t'ang and Mu-t'u-shan were on their way. Liu ordered Ma to report to him what progress had been made. On September 9th, more native Moslems came out to challenge Liu, . . . Liu did not move, but posted more bills warning the native Moslems

¹⁵¹*Ibid.*, X, 52-53.

to keep peace. . . . On September 11th, the Kansu Moslems came again. Liu ordered the attack and the conflict started. Both sides called for reinforcements.¹⁵²

Of course, the other side's report was different.

(6) *Mu-t'u-shan's Quarrel with Tso Tsung-t'ang—Round Two: The Attack on Chin-chi-pao.*

On October 10, 1869, the Court received the first report about the conflict. It was sent in by Ting-an (定安), the Manchu general-in-chief of Sui-yuan (綏遠城將軍), saying:

On September 7th, Liu Sung-shan's troops arrived north of Ling-chou and started killing everyone, without even distinguishing the law-abiding ones from the others. Ma Ch'ao-ch'ing (馬朝清 i.e., Ma Hua-lung) led the Moslems in fighting back. The military supply bureau which Liu had put inside the city of Ling-chou was attacked and all the officers and soldiers there were murdered. . . . The city of Ninghsia may fall at any moment. The local authorities have already rushed urgent demands to Chin Shun and Chang Yueh for reinforcements. . . .

*Liu Sung-shan's troops rebelled in Sui-te sometime ago. Now they are causing the . . . rebellion of the Moslems. . . with their ill-advised advance. . . .*¹⁵³

This report, though in a critical tone, put the blame on Liu and did not challenge Tso Tsung-t'ang and his policy. By this time, Mu-t'u-shan had received the following message from Ma Hua-lung:

*Liu Sung-shan. . . led an army and suddenly arrived at Wu-chung-pao (吳忠堡), robbing and killing without restriction. When I sent a petition to him, Commander-in-chief Liu answered rudely, and it seemed that he was going to kill all the Moslems without discrimination. I am afraid that those Moslems who have already surrendered may start trouble.*¹⁵⁴

¹⁵²Tso: *Memorials*, XXXII, 28-33. Cf. Tso: *P'i-cha*, III, 13 (批札). Concerning the whole campaign of Tso Tsung-t'ang against Chin-chi-pao, see Bales: *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 238-265. It is well presented and the maps are especially valuable.

¹⁵³*Fang-lüeh*, CCI, 3-4; *Shen-chi-ying*; T. C. 8 y., 9 m., 6 d.

¹⁵⁴Tso: *Memorials*, XXXII, 58-59. The same document in *Fang-lüeh*, CCIII, 6, was abridged.

This was a threat and Mu-t'u-shan was much disturbed. He reported to the Court and reviewed the past record with the conclusion that Ma Hua-lung was a loyal subject. He said:

The government forces have now reached Wu-chung-pao. If the army should kill and rob, then both Chin-chi-pao and Ling-chou would be threatened. . . and the Moslems might rebel again. . . . In that case, though I can believe that leaders like Ma Ch'ao-ch'ing would remain loyal, the people under him. . . would be hard to control. If our army could win a total victory, it might be well, but even that would disturb the harmony and peace of the universe and offend Heaven. In case the army should suffer any slight defeat, the Moslem riots would spread everywhere. The precarious condition of Ku-yüan in the east, and the momentarily stabilized situation of Su-chou in the west would all be disturbed. Those in Ho-chou, Ti-hua and Hsi-ning would no doubt take the opportunity to revolt. Soon our army would find that it had its hands full of trouble. This is why we must be very careful before making any move.

I read Your Majesty's past edicts. Your Majesty had repeatedly emphasized that there should be no discrimination against either Moslems or Chinese, but only to distinguish the evil ones from the good ones. Due to their personal losses, the Chinese people in Kansu all insisted on killing every Moslem. Of course, even I myself could wish that all the Moslems were destroyed so that there would be no potential trouble in the future. But since ancient times, it has always been that fighting a war was to achieve peace, not to annihilate a whole race. . . .

When I led my army into Kansu, I personally saw the shocking disruption of the life of the people in Ninghsia and Ling-chou. They lost their homes as well as their jobs. They even had to eat human flesh to avoid starvation. On the other hand, the army was starving too. The city of Ninghsia could not be taken even after a long period of attack. If I had not taken the earliest opportunity to recover the city by means other than using force, the soldiers would have rebelled because of starvation. In that case the Moslem rebels would have become even more unruly and no Chinese would be left alive. For this reason, as soon as the Moslems in that area became frightened

by our military might and ready to come to terms, I negotiated a peace. I ordered them to surrender the ringleaders, weapons and horses, and allowed the others to live a normal life. From the point of view of those Chinese who had suffered personal losses before, I was criticized for appeasing. But they do not realize that, to open a door for the Moslems to give up fighting, has meant saving millions of Chinese lives.

*Later when there was an army riot in Lanchow in the third month of the fifth year, the Ho-chou, Ti-tao, and Shensi Moslems took the opportunity to press on to Lanchow. The price of grain in Lanchow rose to more than thirty taels for one tenth of a tan. Numerous people dropped dead on the wayside because of starvation. The capital's fate was hanging by a thread. Yet not one Moslem in Ling-chou or Ninghsia took the opportunity to go to Lanchow to help the rebels. Hence the local Chinese trusted the Moslems more and more, and countless numbers of them returned to their homes. It has been several years since then. The local Chinese and the Moslems are trading and working as peacefully and friendly as ever. Should these Moslems have any idea of rebellion, the local Chinese would immediately detect it and a panic would arise. How could they get along so well till today? We have been Manchu servants of Your Majesty for generations. Why should I favor the Moslems or hate the Chinese? It is because of the great danger involved that my conscience will not allow me to keep silence. When there are Moslems who sincerely surrender, I plead Your Majesty's mercy for them. Even when I know that they are not sincere, I accept them because I want to save the Chinese from the deep sorrow of war. Since the armed forces cannot possibly go everywhere, we have to pardon the rebels to save more lives. . . .*¹⁵⁵

In short, Mu-t'u-shan presented two strong arguments for his policy of compromise. First, in theory, there was no reason to annihilate the Moslems as a group. Secondly, in practice, the difficult and miserable conditions in Kansu allowed no other choice but to com-

¹⁵⁵Tso: *Memorials*, XXXII, 58-63. Cf. *Fang-liieh*, CCIII, 6-11; Mu-t'u-shan: T. C. 8 y., 10 m., 2 d. Concerning Ma Hua-lung's true attitude, see Wen-djang Chu: "Ma Hua-lung and the New Sect."

promise. In this memorial, Mu-t'u-shan also revealed some significant facts as follows:

1) Mu-t'u-shan admitted that the peace he had arranged in Ninghsia was a compromise. On the one hand, he confessed that as he could not defeat the Moslems and his army was on the verge of mutiny, he had to take the best offer the Moslems gave him. On the other hand, the Moslems, though militarily strong, were short of food; as "they had to eat human flesh to avoid starvation," they offered peace.

2) Mu-t'u-shan admitted that even when he knew that those Moslems he took in were not sincere, he took them in anyway. Even if it should create more danger in the future, he would keep peace with the Moslems, because he believed that it was impossible to solve the problem by force.

3) Because Mu-t'u-shan preferred compromise he defended Ma Hua-lung even when the record was against Ma. For instance, in order to hide the fact that Ma Hua-lung was a ringleader of the rebellion, Mu put all the blame on Ma Chao-yüan, a Moslem long since dead, as if Ma Hua-lung had never taken part in starting the rebellion. But in fact, Ma Hua-lung had been very active from the beginning. In order to present Ma Hua-lung as being loyal to the government, Mu repeatedly told the Court that Ma Hua-lung killed Ma Chao-yüan, who was in fact captured and executed by Wang Ta-kuei.¹⁵⁶ In order to cover up the open battle fought by Ma Hua-lung against the government forces, Mu deliberately represented the battle as a struggle for existence of the Shensi Moslems, and blamed Ts'ao K'e-chung for marching toward Chin-chi-pao.

Tso Tsung-t'ang's view was different from that of Mu-t'u-shan. He checked what Ma Hua-lung had done and decided that Ma Hua-lung was like a "cancer" in the state. He also was convinced that this time, 1869, was the best and might be the only time to have an operation to remove this cancer. If he let this opportunity pass, he believed, the whole northwest might be lost forever. He made it his duty to destroy Ma Hua-lung. As soon as he returned to Shensi in 1868, he regarded Chin-chi-pao as the most important target in Kansu.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁶Fang-lüeh, XXXV, 9; En-lin; T. C. 2 y., 2 m., 13 d.; also Wen-djang Chu: "Ma Chao-yüan."

¹⁵⁷Tso: *Letters*, XI, 7. One of the best analyses of Ma Hua-lung was in Po Ching-wei: *Feng-hsi-ts'ao-t'ang-chi*, III, 6-16.

This proved to be more difficult than Tso first expected. The conflict started September 8, 1869, according to Tso's official report.¹⁵⁸ Ma Hua-lung surrendered on January 6, 1871.¹⁵⁹ The campaign lasted for sixteen months. Liu Sung-shan, the field commander and the bravest, ablest general under Tso Tsung-t'ang, was killed in action.¹⁶⁰ For a moment, it seemed that Tso's whole campaign against the Moslems would collapse.¹⁶¹ The Court was seriously considering the removal of Tso.¹⁶² Actually, for a period of time, Li Hung-chang's troops were sent to Shensi and Li also arrived in person.¹⁶³ But Tso stubbornly refused to admit defeat, and Liu Sung-shan's nephew, Liu Chin-t'ang (劉錦棠 1844-1894),¹⁶⁴ proved himself to be a worthy successor of his uncle; the tide turned. More battles were won and criticism subsided.¹⁶⁵

Even so, Chin-chi-pao was still a hard nut to crack. There were more than five hundred forts and Tso's troops had to take them one by one.¹⁶⁶ Many casualties were suffered on both sides. Yet the main fort of Chin-chi-pao had never been taken by force. Tso tried every trick in the book to attack the fort,¹⁶⁷ yet finally he had to use a long siege, to starve the defenders into surrender. At the end, conditions inside Chin-chi-pao were horrible. Most Moslems were eating a mixture of grass roots, hides and dead bodies.¹⁶⁸ Tso did not

¹⁵⁸Tso: *Memorials*, XXXII, 24-30. But *Fang-lüeh*, CCI, 3; Ting-an, puts the date of the conflict on September 7th.

¹⁵⁹Tso: *Memorials*, XXXVII, 60.

¹⁶⁰*Ibid.*, XXXIV, 61-62. Cf. Bales: *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 245-246; 254-256.

¹⁶¹*Ibid.*, XXXV, 19.

¹⁶²Tseng Kuo-fan: *Letters*, XXXII, 36.

¹⁶³Li Hung-chang: *Memorials*, XVI, 31. Cf. Bales: *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 249; Richtenhofen: *Letters*, 105.

¹⁶⁴Liu Chin-t'ang, a native of Hsiang-hsiang, Hunan, was a nephew of Liu Sung-shan. He followed his uncle to fight the *Nien*, and accumulated enough merit to be appointed as a Sub-Prefect. After he participated in the battles in Shensi, he was promoted to be an Intendant of Circuit. He was in the army when Liu Sung-shan died. Tso wisely picked him as the successor. When Tso wrote to him at the time, suggesting a choice between retreat and attack, he insisted on attacking which proved to be successful. *Ch'ing-shih-kao*, CDLX *lieh-chuan*, CCXLI) 1. Cf. Bales: *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 255-257.

¹⁶⁵Tso: *Letters*, XI, 7.

¹⁶⁶*Ibid.*, XI, 20. Cf. Bales, *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 261.

¹⁶⁷Tso: *P'i-cha*, III, 62-63. Cf. Bales, *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 261-262.

¹⁶⁸Tso: *Memorials*, XXXVII, 59-60. Cf. Bales: *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 257-258; 262-263.

kill Ma Hua-lung at once, because there was still a strong fort resisting. Tso was afraid that the execution of Ma would prolong the resistance of those defenders.¹⁶⁹ Soon after that fort fell,¹⁷⁰ Tso accused Ma of hiding weapons. On March 2, 1871, Ma Hua-lung and his son Ma Yao-pang (馬耀邦 -1871) together with more than eighty others, "officials" appointed by Ma, were executed. More than 3,000 people were moved to P'ing-liang. Among them were merchants, temporary residents who had come from outside, as well as Kansu Moslems whom Ma Hua-lung had forced into Chin-chi-pao. More than ten thousand women, children, and old men of Chin-chi-pao were moved to Kuyüan for the time being, to be resettled later.¹⁷¹

Tso thoroughly carried out his policy of destroying the hardest leader among the Moslems, with the support of the Court.¹⁷² Though developments after the fall of Chin-chi-pao were not as easy as Tso first predicted, one thing proved to be right: that was the fact that after the death of Ma Hua-lung, there was no one Moslem great enough to organize and rally all the Moslems around him. The rebellion turned mostly into scattered local activities. It made it possible for Tso Tsung-t'ang to defeat them one by one.

(h) *The Long and Thorough Preparations Which Brought Fast and Decisive Victories*

During the suppression of the Moslems, every time before Tso start-

¹⁶⁹Fang-lüeh, CCXXXV, 18; Tso Tsung-t'ang; T. C. 9 y., 12 m., 18 d.

¹⁷⁰Tso: *Memorials*, XXXVIII, 1.

¹⁷¹Fang-lüeh, CCXXXVIII, 11-13; Tso and others; T. C. 10 y., 2 m., 2 d. Bales said (*Tso Tsung-t'ang*): "Altogether some 19,000 Shensi Moslems were sent to the Pingliang area, 8,000 Moslems from other parts of Kansu were moved to Pingliang, and 12,000 Chinchipu Moslems were moved to the Kuyüan area." (pp. 263-264.) He got his information from *Nien-p'u*, VI, 1, for the figure 12,000 Chin-chi-pao Moslems. On the same page, *Nien-p'u* mentioned only 3,000 Kansu Moslems and "guest people" (客民), which coincided with the document quoted here. Bales' figure of 8,000 Kansu Moslems might be a misquotation as well as a misprint. The figure of 19,000 Shensi Moslems apparently came from *Nien-p'u*, V, 42, which said, first, that a Shensi Moslem leader led 8,000 Moslems to surrender, and then said that the total number of the surviving Shensi Moslems was over 11,000. The last figure apparently included the 8,000 mentioned before. Concerning the final resettlement, see below.

¹⁷²Concerning the campaign of Chin-chi-pao see Ch'in Han-ts'ai: *Tso-wen-hsiang-kung-tsai-hsi-pei* (秦翰才: 左文襄公在西北), Tai Ai-chen: *Tso Tsung-t'ang-p'ing-chuan* (戴爲真: 左宗棠評傳) and W. L. Bales: *Tso Tsung-t'ang*.

ed a campaign against a new target, he made painstaking preparations for the coming moves. Apparently this had been his habit before, but circumstances and necessities in northwest China made this policy even more significant. More than once, Tso purposely delayed his military actions. These delays became so conspicuous that they often caused speculation and criticism. Jealous competitors accused him of throwing away opportunities, and the Court warned him of wasting funds and time. But no matter how severe the criticisms or warnings might be, he never was influenced by it. He worked quietly on his preparations according to his own schedule. After he finished these preparations, then he moved further and won short and decisive battles. Not all of the campaigns were carried out this way, of course. One exception was the campaign of Chin-chi-pao, which lasted around sixteen months. Another was the campaign of Suchou, which lasted more than two years (counting from the time he first dispatched soldiers to that battlefield). However, as a whole, his policy of making long and thorough preparations for fast and decisive victories prevailed.

It took strong willpower to do so. For instance, after Tso routed the Shensi Moslems in Tung-chih-yüan, he decided to send his troops to their original positions to start farming. This annoyed the Court and on May 18, 1869, it cautioned Tso as follows:

*It might be a sound policy, but after this great victory, our troops' morale is high while that of the Moslems is low You should drive on and finish them up If you delay, the rebels will regroup and organize new resistance and make it more difficult to defeat them. Tso Tsung-t'ang . . . is to drive into Kansu immediately when he straightens out the supply problems with Liu Tien*¹⁷³

The Court repeated this kind of demand to push forward in many edicts. Tso was seldom moved. On July 31, 1869, the Court ordered Tso to advance or move to Ch'in-chou in southern Kansu. It warned: "The capital, Lan-chow, is an important place You are the governor-general, with the entire responsibility for defending it. In case anything should happen to that city, the blame will be squarely on you."¹⁷⁴ Tso refused to go to Ch'in-chou because it was too far south to direct the whole field.¹⁷⁵ He refused to advance into Lanchow, be-

¹⁷³Tso: *Memorials*, XXXI, 31. Liu Tien was then the Governor of Shensi.

¹⁷⁴*Ibid.*, XXXII, 1. Cf. XXXII, 13, 14.

¹⁷⁵*Ibid.*, XXXII, 21-22.

cause it might leave the vital supply line from Ching-chou to Lanchow exposed to the attack of the Moslems. Once that line were cut, he would be trapped in Lanchow just like Yang Yüeh-pin had been, and suffer great loss. At the same time, he reassured the Court that Lanchow would be safe even if he was not there.¹⁷⁶ In other words, he refused to make blind moves before his preparations were complete, even upon an order from the Court.

After the fall of Chin-chi-pao, there was another long wait. The Court became suspicious again. It inquired secretly of Liu Ming-ch'uan (劉銘傳)¹⁷⁷ who was then in Sian watching Tso's every move. On June 11, 1871, Liu secretly reported back:

Though Tso is earnest and a hard worker, very few of his troops can fight. Since the recovery of Chin-chi-pao, his generals have dispersed. Up to now, no date has been set for a new offensive. The bandits' cavalries are looting freely between Kung-ch'ang and Ch'in-chou as if they are entering an area without a man [to resist them].

To fight a war, it is necessary to take advantage of one victory to win more victories. . . . Now Tso is delaying for months, and wasting funds. The bandits are still strong, while the morale of the army has been greatly hurt by the delay. I am afraid that if things go on like this, there will be no end to the campaign, while the mutinous soldiers who had been dispersed and the Moslems who had surrendered may start new riots.¹⁷⁸

No doubt this kind of criticism coming from an able general in the field had weight with the Court. Again, the Court became impatient with Tso's methodical procedure. It put pressure on Tso to march toward Ho-chou, the next target. In the summer of 1871, the Court sent Tso an edict saying:

His Majesty is a little afraid that due to the successful recovery of

¹⁷⁶*Ibid.*, XXXIII, 69-70.

¹⁷⁷Liu Ming-ch'uan (1836-1896) was a native of Ho-fei, Anhwei. When the T'ai-p'ings threatened his home town, he organized a powerful volunteer corps. Later he followed Li Hung-chang to Shanghai. In the spring of 1865, he participated in the campaign against the *Nien*. He played a leading part in the annihilation of both the eastern and the western *Nien*. Late in 1870 Liu was ordered to direct the army in Shensi in place of Li Hung-chang when Li left for Chihli. At this time, Liu was in Sian. See *ECCP*, 526-528; *Ch'ing-shih-kao*, CDXXII, (*Lieh-chuan*, CCIII), 3-4.

¹⁷⁸Liu Ming-ch'uan: *Liu Chuang-su-kung Chou-i* (劉壯肅公奏議), I, 9.

*Chin-chi-pao, . . . the officers and soldiers of your command have suddenly become proud and self-satisfied and relaxed. Or maybe they even deliberately delay action and disobey your orders Now the rebels in Ho-chou are very active. It is high time for you to boost morale and lead your army to destroy these people. You simply cannot stay inactive, wasting time and throwing away opportunities.*¹⁷⁹

To answer this edict, which fully revealed the Court's doubt in his policy, Tso made a plea on June 29, 1871, for the whole-hearted support of the Court, and explained why and how he should carry out this policy of making slow but thorough preparation for a short, decisive victory.

*Concerning this campaign against Ho-chou, . . . I have not yet finished my plan of storing and shipping enough food for my army's needs for three months. Should I advance in a hurry, then my army would consume all the supplies on hand, and would starve after that. The summer harvest in Ho-chou will be at the end of the sixth moon: the fall harvest will be in the seventh or the eighth moon. Should I advance before that time, then the crops will not be in yet. Without food resources available in front of the advancing army, it is a dangerous move. Furthermore, the River T'ao has various widths and depths in different spots. We shall need to build ferry boats and bridges. The necessary materials are so scarce in the badly devastated areas that it is impossible to finish the building of these in a short period of time. On the other hand, in the mountains of Yen-ch'a and Ku-yüan as well as in southern Kansu, there are still numerous bandits in small groups to be taken care of now so as to assure the security of the rear in the next move. In fact, thus far there has never been ten days in which I have not seen my army in action. This army is far from being an idle army remaining inactive to waste money and food.*¹⁸⁰

In this memorial one can see clearly the difference between Tso and Yang Yüeh-pin and other generals before him. He firmly refused either to be lured or driven into a premature, ill-prepared offensive deep into poverty-stricken Kansu. He would rather let Lan-chow take care of itself, instead of driving a large army into that area without food and fodder. Because he had three months food

¹⁷⁹Tso: *Memorials*, XXXIX, 15.

¹⁸⁰*Ibid.*, 17.

and fodder well stored at all strategic points, and had methodically calculated the schedule, so that once his troops reached the target area (in this case, Ho-chou), the new local harvest would feed them well. By this policy, he conquered what had seemed to be an insurmountable handicap in Kansu, the shortage of food. This handicap had defeated T'ao Mao-lin, Lei Cheng-kuan, Ts'ao K'e-chung and Yang Yüeh-pin. Tso's solution was simple, yet it took courage to stand up against the pressure of the Court and the gentry.¹⁸¹

This same principle and practice of the policy of slow and thorough preparation was observed in every campaign of Tso Tsung-t'ang to suppress the Moslems. Sometimes it took three months; sometimes it took one or two years; usually under the same kind of criticism and pressure. He refused to send premature, ill-prepared expeditions to Suchou on July 17, 1871.¹⁸² Not until the Russians occupied Ili did he send twelve battalions under Hsü Chan-piao (徐占彪)¹⁸³ to Su-chou, in advance of schedule.¹⁸⁴

He recovered Su-chou on November 12, 1873, but did not move into Sinkiang until April 7, 1876. During these months he was not spared criticism for delaying. One of the critics was no other than Yüan Pao-heng (袁保恆 1826-1878),¹⁸⁵ Tso's deputy at the moment for managing military supplies for the expeditionary forces in Sin-

¹⁸¹A good example of this kind of criticism was recorded by Baron von Richthofen in his report from Sian in 1872. Richthofen: *Letters*, 105-107. Cf. Bales: *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 232, 252, 264 for his comments on Richthofen's report.

¹⁸²Tso: *Memorials*, XI, 47.

¹⁸³There is very little biographical material about Hsü Chan-piao. At the moment he had the rank of General-in-chief. Seven battalions under him were taken out of the Szechuan Army which used to belong to Huang-ting (黃鼎 -1876), plus three battalions of cavalry under Kuei Hsi-chen (桂錫楨). Tso: *Letters*, XI, 47.

¹⁸⁴Tso: *Letters*, XI, 47.

¹⁸⁵Yüan Pao-heng was a native of Hsiang-ch'eng (項城), Honan, and the eldest son of Yüan Chia-san (袁甲三 1806-1863), a commander fighting the *Nien*. Pao-heng was a *chin-shih* of 1850 and compiler in the Han-lin academy. In 1868, he was sent by the Court to serve under Tso Tsung-t'ang. In 1869, he was appointed to take charge of the military supply bureau in Sian. His main job was to see that the subsidies from various provinces were delivered on time. After Su-chou was recovered, he was appointed in 1874 as the Deputy of Tso Tsung-t'ang in charge of the supplies for the expeditionary forces of Sinkiang. It was at this post that he disagreed with Tso on the methods of handling the problem. Consequently he was removed in 1875 and went to Peking as the Junior Vice-President of the Board of Revenue. *Ch'ing-shih-lieh-chuan* LIII, 12-15; *ECCP*, 950.

kiang.¹⁸⁶ On December 4, 1875, the Court received a memorial from Yüan, advocating an advance of the expeditionary forces into Sinkiang in the next spring. Yüan said:

*Any delay... means there will be the necessity to postpone further action into another year. The addition of one year to the campaign will mean a waste of more than ten million taels of silver.*¹⁸⁷

But no matter how anxious Yüan might have been, action was delayed. One of the main reasons was the fact that Tso was not yet responsible for the military affairs of Sinkiang, and found it difficult to work out an effective solution of the supply problem for which Tso and Yüan were both responsible. However, even after Tso was appointed Imperial Commissioner in charge of the military affairs of Sinkiang on May 3, 1875,¹⁸⁸ he did not move into northern Sinkiang in force until after July 20, 1876. It took him more than fourteen months to complete the necessary preparations.¹⁸⁹ But once he moved, he cleared the whole of northern Sinkiang, except Ili, within four months. Urumchi was recovered on August 18th while Shui-lai was recovered on November 6th.¹⁹⁰

The same thing happened before he sent his troops from northern Sinkiang into southern Sinkiang. He waited from November, 1876, until April 13th, 1877. During this period he was busy in preparations, though on the surface all seemed to be quiet. Then Liu Chin-t'ang left Urumchi on April 13, and by January 4, 1878, the whole campaign was victoriously concluded.¹⁹¹ Sinkiang was cleared except for Ili, which was left for diplomatic action.

With the exception of Chin-chi-pao and Su-chou, the other campaigns followed a similar pattern: a long wait, followed by a quick victory. Chin-chi-pao fell in January, 1871. He waited until September 18, 1871, to start the attack on Ho-chou, and on February 25, 1872, Ma Chan-ao (馬占鰲), the leading Moslem in the area, surrendered.¹⁹² It took Tso just a little more than five months to

¹⁸⁶Fang-lüeh, CCLXXXIX, 25. Cf. Bales: *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 342.

¹⁸⁷*Ibid.*, CCXC, 25-26; Yüan Pao-heng; T. C. 13 y., 11 m., 7 d.

¹⁸⁸*Ibid.*, CCXCIII, 21-22; to the cabinet; Kuang-hsu 1 y., 3 m., 28 d.

¹⁸⁹Tso: *Memorials*, XLVIII, 61.

¹⁹⁰*Ibid.*, II, 3-4; and 58-59.

¹⁹¹*Ibid.*, L, 17 and LII, 26-32.

¹⁹²Fang-lüeh, CCLXI, 11; Tso and Mu-t'u-shan; T. C. 11 y., 3 m., 2 d. Cf. Bales: *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 270-280; Andrew: *The Crescent in Northwest China*, 84-85.

achieve a result his predecessors had not been able to achieve for many years.

Following the campaign of Ho-chou was that of Hsining.' Tso started his preparation for this campaign early. As soon as the battle of Chin-chi-pao was over, Tso sent Liu Chin-t'ang back to Hunan, together with many of his soldiers who were either wounded or too old or had served too long to have good morale. Most of these soldiers were discharged. Then Liu started a new program of recruiting in Hunan. He built up a brand-new army on the traditional *Hsiang-chiün* pattern and brought it back to Kansu, ready to attack Hsining in the summer of 1872.¹⁹³ Yet Tso held the army until September 12, 1872, because he calculated that the harvest time in the area of Hsining was in August. To move in September would make possible the use of local supplies.¹⁹⁴ The battles were vigorously fought. By November 19, the siege of Hsining was lifted.¹⁹⁵ By April, 1873, the whole area was pacified.¹⁹⁶ It took Tso one year and eight months to prepare, but only about seven months to win back the area which had been practically independent for years.

The campaign of Su-chou was an exception. Because of the sudden intervention of the Russians in Ili, Tso was ordered to move a little earlier than he would otherwise have done. He dispatched twelve battalions under Hsü Chan-piao to Su-chou, in the middle of October, 1871.¹⁹⁷ He could not give Hsü his entire support until after the area of Hsining was cleared in April, 1873. Su-chou was a very well fortified city, which made it all the harder to attack. Tso himself found it necessary to go all the way to the front lines in September, 1873, to assure victory.¹⁹⁸ Even after his arrival, the resistance of the Moslems still lasted quite a while. The government forces entered the city on November 12th. This campaign, which started earlier than the campaigns of Ho-chou and Hsining, lasted longer. Counting from the time Tso's forces first participated, it had been more than

¹⁹³Tso: *Memorials*, XLI, 51; and *Letters*, XII, 35.

¹⁹⁴*Ibid.*, XLI, 69.

¹⁹⁵*Ibid.*, XLII, 42-51.

¹⁹⁶*Ibid.*, XLIII, 34-36. Cf. Bales: *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 280-282 and his quotation of Prejevalsky: *Mongolia*, II, 135-6.

¹⁹⁷*Ibid.*, XL, 9.

¹⁹⁸*Ibid.*, XLIII, 85-86. Bales: *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 288-292.

two years.¹⁹⁹ This was then followed by the campaigns of Sinkiang which have been mentioned above.

In 1868, when Tso was granted an audience with the Emperor and the Empress Dowager, he was asked about the time which would be required to suppress the Moslems in Shensi and Kansu. He replied that it would take five years.²⁰⁰ His prediction was realized in 1873, when Su-chou was recovered. It was Tso Tsung-t'ang's deliberate calculation that preparations should be long enough to be thorough, while campaigns should be short, to save time and losses.

(i) *Resettlement of the Surrendered Moslems*

When a group of rebels surrendered, Tso required them to fulfill the following conditions:

- 1) To surrender their ringleaders.
- 2) To surrender all their weapons.
- 3) To surrender horses.
- 4) To surrender grain.
- 5) To repair or to rebuild the public buildings they had destroyed.

If they failed to carry these conditions out, Tso would reject their surrender.²⁰¹

When they actually carried out these conditions, Tso would ask the Moslem leaders to hand in a detailed census registration. Based on the census, the population would be classified into the following groups:

- 1) Native Moslems;
- 2) Moslems who had migrated from outside;
- 3) Native Chinese who had been forced to join the Moslems;
- 4) Chinese kidnapped from outside.

The native Moslems were treated in two different ways. In the Ho-chou area, where most of the natives had been Moslems, they were allowed to stay where they were.²⁰² In Chin-chi-pao and Su-chou, the Moslems were ordered to migrate in groups to new isolated

¹⁹⁹*Ibid.*, XLIV, 5-8.

²⁰⁰Tso: *Letters*, XI, 6; and 51.

²⁰¹Tso: *Memorials*, XLIII, 58.

²⁰²*Ibid.*, XLI, 61.

areas.²⁰³ The difference in treatment may have been due to the fact that Chin-chi-pao and Su-chou were the two places where the Moslems resisted longest and most vigorously, and that Tso preferred to move them to different localities.

Those Moslems who had moved from outside into Chin-chi-pao or Ho-chou since the rebellion, were ordered to move into new isolated areas.²⁰⁴

The Chinese in the Ho-chou area, no matter whether they were natives or outsiders, were ordered to move out to places where there were large Chinese populations, such as Ti-tao, Chin-hsien, An-ting, Hui-ning.²⁰⁵ Those Chinese who were in Chin-chi-pao and Su-chou were allowed to stay.

To stay in their original places was not much of a problem. To force Chinese to migrate to Chinese communities was also comparatively easy. But to transfer surrendered Moslems in mass to another area was quite a problem. The Chinese did not mind having local Moslems moved out, but they objected to having Moslems moved in. This had been an issue even before Tso Tsung-t'ang's arrival. During those years, the officials who preferred to extend amnesty to Moslems had found it impossible to carry out their plan, because they had no place to rehabilitate surrendered Moslems. Most of these Moslems came from Shensi. They were eager to go home, while the Chinese gentry in Shensi vigorously objected to their moving back. In order to carry out their policy of reconciliation, the officials in Kansu, such as Tu-hsing-a and Mu-t'u-shan, proposed that the Shensi Moslems should be allowed to return to their home land.²⁰⁶ On the other hand, the officials in Shensi, such as Liu Jung, backed by the stubborn Chinese gentry, firmly denounced any program of sending the Moslems back to Shensi.²⁰⁷ Because of this objection, the officials who took charge of the resettlement told the surrendered Moslems to stay where they were.²⁰⁸ But the places where they stayed were neither good for farming nor for trade. The only way left to make a living was to rob.

²⁰³Concerning Chin-chi-pao see *Ibid.*, XXXVIII, 24-26. Concerning Su-chou see XLIV, 31 and *P'i-cha* (批札), VII, 44.

²⁰⁴Tso: *Memorials*, XLI, 61.

²⁰⁵*Ibid.*

²⁰⁶*Fang-lüeh*, LXXIII, 16; Tu-hsing-a; T. C. 3 y., 8 m., 3 d.

²⁰⁷*Ibid.*, CXXXI, 20-22; Liu Jung; T. C. 5 y., 4 m., 24 d.

²⁰⁸*Ibid.*, CCIII, 7; Mu-t'u-shan; T. C. 8 y., 10 m., 2 d.

When they did rob, then the Chinese gentry would criticize the whole program of reconciliation. This had been one of the leading reasons why the policy of reconciliation before Tso Tsung-t'ang's arrival failed.

The objections to the Moslems' returning to Shensi were summarized by Liu Jung as follows:

1) The killing in the past had created deep hatred between the Chinese and the Moslems. Whenever the Moslems returned, new riots would start.

2) The property of the Moslems had long since been confiscated and redistributed to the Chinese. The new owner would refuse to give up the property.

3) It was also unreasonable to move the Chinese out of their homes, to make them evacuate their land for rehabilitating the Moslems.²⁰⁹

As these were good reasons, Tso Tsung-t'ang decided not to move them back to their home towns in Shensi. In fact, his policy was not to allow these Moslems to return. Not only were they denied the right to return to Shensi, but those who were originally from Su-chou or Chin-chi-pao were not allowed to return to those areas either.²¹⁰

The difference between Tso and the other officials was in method. Whereas other officials left the problem unsolved, he diligently studied the situation and proposed some positive solutions. He ordered the local authorities of Anting, Hui-ning, P'ing-liang, Lung-te and Ching-ning to search their territory for areas suitable for resettlement and report to him. These areas must be separate units, away from other communities, with enough flat plains, plenty of water and grass, but without owner or cultivators. Then he sent out special agents to investigate and make certain that these areas were really suitable. Tso decided that to resettle these Moslems, the place must be away from the cities and highways, as well as from the Chinese villages. Though these new settlements were strictly limited to Moslems, none of them should be too large. In other words, the Moslems should be divided into smaller, manageable groups living in isolated spots, so that they would not be able to organize a conspiracy again.²¹¹

In this way, Tso moved 9,400 Moslems of Chin-chi-pao into a new

²⁰⁹*Ibid.*, CXXXI, 20-22: Liu Jung; T. C. 5 y., 4 m., 24 d.

²¹⁰Tso: *P'i-cha*, VII, 44-46.

²¹¹Tso: *Memorials*, XLI, 60-62.

settlement called Hua-p'ing-ch'uan (化平川) near P'ing-liang in 1871.²¹² After Ho-chou surrendered, Tso in 1872 moved more Moslems into different areas as stated in the following list.²¹³

Classification	Leader's Name	Number of people	Places of settlement	
			County	District
Shensi Moslems	Yang Wen-yen 楊文彥	253	P'ing-liang 平涼	Hsieh-chia-chuang 謝家莊 T'ao-chia-chuang 桃家莊
Shensi Moslems	Chang Tai-yü 張代雨	291	P'ing-liang 平涼	Chang-chia-chuang 張家莊 Ts'ao-chia-chuang 曹家莊
Shensi Moslems	Pai Ch'ung-hua 拜崇花	537	Hui-ning 會寧	Yao-wang-chia 姚王家 Ch'ü-chia-k'ou 曲家口
Shensi Moslems	Ma Sheng-yen 馬生彥	643	Ching-ning 靜寧 and Lung-te 隆德	Wang-chia-hsia-pao 王家下堡 Liu-tai-chia-shan 劉戴家山
Shensi Moslems	Ma Wen-yüan 馬文元	157	An-ting 安定	Liu-chia-kou 劉家溝
Shensi Moslems	Ma Wei-hsiang 馬維驤	74	An-ting 安定	Shih-chia-p'ing 石家坪
Shensi Moslems	Ma Chen-ch'ing 馬振清	363	An-ting 安定	Hao-ti-chang 好地掌

²¹²*ibid.*, XXXVIII, 24-25.

²¹³Tso: *Memorials*, XLI, 62.

<i>Kansu Moslems</i>	<i>An</i> <i>Hung-ch'ing</i> 安鴻慶	43	<i>An-ting</i> 安定	<i>Liu-chia-</i> <i>kou</i> 劉家溝
<i>Chinese</i>	<i>Chen</i> <i>Fu-kuei</i> 陳富貴	447	<i>An-ting</i> 安定	<i>Ch'ing-feng-</i> <i>shan</i> 青風山
<i>Chinese</i>	<i>Tung</i> <i>Yung-hai</i> 董永海	108	<i>An-ting</i> 安定	<i>Hsin-t'ao-ho</i> 新套河
<i>Chinese</i>	<i>Shui</i> <i>Ying-hung</i> 水映紅	428	<i>An-ting</i> 安定	<i>Hsia-chia-</i> <i>ying-fang</i> 夏家營坊
<i>Total</i>		3,344		

Then, in 1873, Tso moved another 7,200 Shensi Moslems from Hsining to P'ing-liang.²¹⁴ Late in the same year, he moved more than two thousand Moslems from Su-chou to Lanchow, including 208 Uigurs who originally came from Hami. Because the Moslems in Kan-chou and Liang-chou had all died, there was no one who came from those areas.²¹⁵ These were the planned migrations seen on record. There must have been others the records of which were destroyed.

The regulations regarding these moves of the population were as follows:

1) Once the group had arrived at the area for rehabilitation, they were to wait for the local authorities to call the roll for registration and each family would receive a plot of land. The size of the land was in direct proportion to the number of the family members. They were ordered to work hard on their land and were not allowed to loaf.

2) The local authorities would issue a door plate to each family, with the names, ages, native town, sex, of all the members of the family recorded on it. The officials would select one man from each ten families to be the chief of the ten families; . . . one man from each hundred families to be the chief of the hundred families. . . . These chiefs would be responsible for governing and inspecting the families under their supervision.

3) After the settlement, besides giving them land, the government would consider the need to issue seed and tools so they could start farming on time. Food was also to be issued on the basis of half a catty of grain daily for an adult and five *liang* (Chinese ounce) daily

²¹⁴Tso: *P'i-cha*, V, 7.

²¹⁵Tso: *Memorials*, XLIV, 31.

for a minor until the harvest. Those who could support themselves were allowed to trade freely. The local authorities were to protect and attract merchants, so that free trading would be possible.

4) Of those among the immigrants who could not support themselves, because they were orphans, widows, extremely poor, old, sick or disabled, the officials were to ascertain how many of them there were, and put them in a separate file. Grain was to be issued to them even after the harvest.

5) Those Chinese captured by the Moslems should be allowed to go home if they could locate their families. No Moslem was allowed to stop them. Those who did not have homes were to be sent back to their native land at government expense. If any Moslem held any Chinese as a slave and hide the fact, he would be punished according to law. Those Chinese women who had been captured long before and had given birth to children and were willing to stay, would be allowed to do so.

6) Once the Moslems were settled they should be considered good, loyal subjects. All crimes committed in the past were to be forgiven. Not only were the Chinese not allowed to take revenge on account of past disputes, but Moslems who had had disputes in the past would not be allowed to renew their feud. However, any new crime committed after the rehabilitation was to be judged by law. . . .

7) The place of resettlement was to be assigned by the local authorities. The settled Moslems were not allowed to go out or to enter cities without permission. If it were necessary for one to go to the cities or towns to purchase goods or visit relatives, he must apply beforehand through his own chief of the hundred families to the office of the local magistrate for a special numbered "permit stick" to prove that his trip was authorized. Every hundred families were allowed to apply for thirty such numbered "permit sticks."

8) Each "permit stick" generally covered two persons, but definitely no more than three. In case a person had to take trips outside of the country, then he should apply through the chief of the hundred families to the local authorities for a permit ticket, on which was clearly indicated the destination, the mission and the time limit. Each ticket cost four cash. To travel outside the county without this ticket-permit would be punishable. . . . In case a person had to take trips outside of the province, he should apply through the local magistrate to the office of the intendant for issuance of a passport. . . . Travel

outside of the province without a passport would be severely punished.

9) People could follow any occupation . . . but farmers were prohibited from planting opium; students were prohibited from interfering with government business; merchants were prohibited from engaging in opium trade.

10) . . .The old sect was allowed, but the "New Sect" of the Moslem religion was forbidden

11) . . .No one was to hide horses, firearms, or munitions. Once discovered, the horses, firearms or munitions could be confiscated, and the one responsible for holding them could be punished according to law.

12) All visitors from outside must be reported to the chief of the hundred families before being taken into a house. If any family harbored evil men who might cause trouble, the family would be punished as if it had harbored bandits.²¹⁶

These regulations were generally followed. Sometimes there were violations. The Moslems often sneaked out without permits, or, when they did have a permit, they stayed beyond the time limit. More than once these violators were caught and punished.²¹⁷ Tso's attitude toward the surrendered Moslems was firm, but fair. The Moslems were impressed. Actually, they even had deep admiration for Tso. According to Moslem sources, after Tso's pardon of the rebels, the Moslems were so satisfied with his fairness that among themselves they had a common saying whenever a dispute developed: "follow Lord Tso's way, divide it into two equal halves." It indicated that Tso always insisted that disputants should meet each other half way.²¹⁸ Many Moslems trusted Tso and surrendered. They also persuaded other Moslems to surrender.²¹⁹ His policy of reconciliation was successful. One of the eyewitnesses had the following pleasant memory:

When Tso Tsung-t'ang returned from Sinkiang, he passed by P'ing-liang. . . . [Local Moslems] went out to receive him. He talked with the Moslems in a very kindly manner. In the welcoming line, Tso found

²¹⁶Tso: *Kao-shih* (告示) in *Ch'ian-chi*, CI, 13-16. The "permit stick" is a stick made of either bamboo or wood with number and seal marked on it, indicating a special permission for the holder to visit the town.

²¹⁷Tso: *P'i-cha*, VI, 12, 14, 18; *Letters*, XVI, 28.

²¹⁸*Hui-ming-ch'i-i*, IV, 310.

²¹⁹*Ibid.*, IV, 309.

many children. He said: "I presume these children have been born since I left P'ing-liang last time. Is that right?" Then he ordered each child to be given five hundred cash as a gift.--- I was one of those children who received five hundred cash. Ha, ha, ha!-- Everybody was very happy.²²⁰

In a word, Tso had carried out his poplcity of resettling the Moslems in a strict, yet quite friendly, way.

(j) *Toleration of the Religion*

Very naturally, when the Moslems rebelled, many Chinese hated not only the Moslem people but also their religion. Some Chinese believed that the source of all the trouble was the religion, which made the Moslems so different from the Chinese. To cure the disease, they reasoned, it was necessary to remove the cause. One of the typical spokesmen for this school of thought was Yüan Pao-heng who wrote to Tso Tsung-t'ang, saying:

*The way to handle them [the Moslems] now, besides urging them to farm, is to promote education. This includes a program forbidding them ever to build mosques, or to study the Koran, or to institute priests, or to wear sharp-pointed caps.*²²¹

Yüan was not the only one. A certain Chao Lü-hsiang (趙履祥), who was the assistant magistrate of Liu-pa, Shensi, petitioned Tso in 1873 to force the surrendered Moslems to eat pork and to intermarry with Chinese.²²² Tso firmly rejected these ideas, though he favored teaching the Moslems Confucian doctrine and prohibiting the "New Sect." He said there was nothing wrong with the old sect.²²³

The differences between the old sect and the "New Sect" were superficial, according to both Tso Tsung-t'ang and Chinese Moslem sources. In a memorial requesting the prohibition of the "New Sect," Tso traced the development of the "New Sect" as follows:

Earlier, in 1781, two Moslems, Ma Ming-hsin (馬明心) and Su Ssu-

²²⁰*Ibid.*, IV, 308.

²²¹Yüan Pao-heng: *Letters*, I, 20-21.

²²²Tso: *P'i-cha*, V, 25.

²²³*Ibid.*

shih-erh(蘇四十二) returned from the West, claiming that they had received the secret of salvation from Arabia. They started the "New Sect" and plotted rebellion. In 1784 another Moslem, T'ien-wu (田五) again led the movement. . . . During the period of Chia-ch'ing there was one, Mu A-hung (穆阿渾)²²⁴ who worked together with Ma Hua-lung's father, Ma Erh (馬二) to teach the "New Sect" secretly. Since Ma Hua-lung took over, the sect has become prosperous. Under the disguise of businessmen, he sent out people to spread this evil religion everywhere. According to the testimony of lately captured Moslem rebels, there are missionaries of the New Sect in Peking (near Ch'i-hua-men 齊化門), Tientsin, Heilungchiang, K'uan-ch'eng-tzu in Kirin (吉林寬城子), Pao-t'ou in Shansi, and Hankou in Hupeh who spread the faith. Their missionaries are called Hai-li-fei (海裡飛) . . . and Man-la (滿拉) . . . their ranks are all lower than "A-hung" (阿訶). Ma Hua-lung claimed to be the "General Grand A-hung" (總大阿訶). The religious beliefs of the New Sect are about the same as the old sect. The old sect followers put their palms together and raise them upward when they recite the Koran, whereas the New Sect followers turn their palms upward, but do not put them together. The old sect followers sit calmly and quietly while reciting, whereas the New Sect followers would read out loud in a group, shaking their heads and shrugging their shoulders. In the funerals, the old sect do not take off their shoes, whereas the New Sect does so. All these trivial points really do not make much difference. However, the reason why the New Sect must be prohibited is that it claims to be from God, and makes ridiculous prophecies. This group's behavior is strange, and often lures foolish Moslems into willing slavery. The victims often are trapped into conspiracy without knowing how, and are even willing to face execution without the slightest regret. . . . This makes the New Sect a potential danger to the Empire. . . .

I have carefully questioned the captured Moslems from Chin-chi. Some testified that Ma Hua-lung could know things of the future. For instance, when visitors came from afar, he would predict the number of their companions beforehand. The last time government forces attacked Ninghsia and Ling-chou, Ma led his family and all the other Moslems to resist. He predicted that the army would retreat and the Moslems would be safe, etc. Others testified that Ma Hua-lung

²²⁴A-hun (阿渾) or A-hung (阿洪, 阿訶) is the Moslem priest.

often revealed his divine nature. He healed disease and granted children to those who prayed for the birth of children. Still others testified that those who joined the New Sect would confess their sins before Ma Hua-lung. Ma would then whip them with leather whips, present their repentance to God and then grant them redemption. Generally the Moslems were unusually suspicious. But once they accepted the New Sect, they embraced the doctrine as if they were crazy, and nothing could change their faith. At the time when Chin-chi was under long siege, the Moslems suffered starvation and often had to kill people and eat their flesh, but no one dared to criticize Ma Hua-lung's family, who still kept ample grain for themselves. When the situation became hopeless, they still comforted each other, saying that the General Grand A-hung must have some way to save them. Ma Hua-lung finally gave himself up. . . . yet numerous Moslem leaders came to see him daily. When they saw Ma, they prostrated themselves before him and would not get up unless Ma ordered them to do so. Now, fortunately, these people have either been executed or have migrated. . . . If we do not do something to prohibit it, I am afraid that sometime later there will be another rebellion. . . . I have arrested and punished the [religious leaders]. . . and posted notices in the area to prohibit the New Sect. . . . When the New Sect is eliminated, . . . then Shensi and Kansu can expect to be safe for a hundred years. . . . In other provinces, the propaganda of the New Sect is comparatively new. . . . If the government prohibits it now, certainly it will prevent future troubles.²²⁵

Tso's description of the New Sect is confirmed by many other sources. In brief, the New Sect developed because of the decadence of Islam in China, such as wearing white clothes for funerals and reading the Koran for money in a fashion similar to that of Buddhists and Taoists. "The reformers (Hsin Chiao, or New Sect) will not read for money, or come for any other purpose than to read the Koran. On account of having their livelihood taken away from them, the Old Sect are bitterly antagonistic."²²⁶ These enthusiastic reformers intended to return to a more fanatic way of worship according to Islam. This was illustrated in the following description:

²²⁵Tso: *Memorials*, XXXVIII, 62-65. Cf. Bales: *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 216-218; E. H. Parker: "Islam in China" in *The Asiatic Quarterly Review*, 3rd series—Vol. XXIV, Nos. 47 & 48, July-October, 1907, pp. 80-83.

²²⁶Martin Taylor: "Ningshia, Ningshia" in *Friends of Moslems*, X, No. 2, 31-32.

*The New Sect . . . practiced their exercises by shaking their heads, baring their feet, moving their hands to and fro and looking upward toward the sky. They claimed that whosoever died under the golden light, would be translated to a good place . . . If any one hesitated to join them, they all rose to attack him, threatening him with sword and spear until he gave way. Even if the rejector were a father and the believers were his sons, the sons would kill their father . . .*²²⁷

Because this group was more violent and extreme in its faith, it took a firm religious stand against Chinese culture and Chinese authorities. Its members sincerely believed that their religious leader was a prophet, and showed their loyalty to him with fanatic religious zeal. They formed a strong regional force, which conflicted in interest with that of the central government, as well as with Tso Tsung-t'ang. Hence, it is quite understandable why Tso's toleration of the Moslem religion was limited to the more compromising old sect. Tso ordered a strict prohibition of the New Sect in Shensi and Kansu, where he had direct control. He requested the Court to extend this prohibition of the new sect all over the nation.

On this point the Court decided not to follow Tso. It discovered in old files that similar suggestions had been presented to Emperor Ch'ien-lung, who had rejected them on the grounds that the prohibition would cause unnecessary disturbances. On June 23, 1871, the Court issued an instruction to Tso, rejecting his request.²²⁸

Hence, the old policy of total toleration of the Moslem religion prevailed over Tso's suggestions throughout the country. However, in the area under Tso's jurisdiction, toleration was limited to the old sect.²²⁹

(k) *The Program to Assimilate the Moslems*

Ever since Tso Tsung-t'ang had taken charge of suppressing the Moslems, he had noticed that the people in Shensi and Kansu, Moslems as well as the Chinese, were coarse and lacked education. Many of them looked upon murder and robbery as routine. Whenever there

²²⁷*Hui-Ming-ch'i-i*, III, 9-10. quoting anonymous: *P'ing-hui-chi-lüeh*.

²²⁸Tso: *Memorials*, XXXVIII, 65-66.

²²⁹See Plate.

was a dispute, they called in people and took the law into their own hands. If the government should carry out the law, then not many of the subjects would be innocent. There were so many different people mingled together that foreign ways of living had permeated Chinese life. In order to help save the situation, Tso established a printing office in Hupeh. There he ordered the printing of the Four Books, the Five Classics and other fundamental beginners' textbooks. Then he issued these books to the local authorities in Shensi and Kansu. Wherever his army reached, he ordered the local officials to establish free public schools for Chinese as well as Moslems. By 1873, numerous Chinese and Moslems had been educated in these schools.

During the Moslem rebellion, for ten years, no civil examination had taken place in Kansu. After Tso recovered the province, he persuaded the government to make up the missed tests. Up to 1873, no less than ten thousand new "students," or *hsiu-ts'ai* (秀才), had been qualified through the primary examinations. Many of these were Moslems.

In order to encourage even more people to enter school and learn moral teachings, he suggested the establishment of a separate provincial examination in Kansu, so that the people both in Shensi and Kansu would have better chance to pass the examinations and enter civil service. Before this time, the provincial examinations for both provinces had been held together at Sian, Shensi.²³⁰

Tso's suggestion was accepted and, in 1875, Kansu had the first provincial examination in its history held in its capital, Lanchow.²³¹ Before this time, Kansu students had to go at least eight hundred Chinese *li* (里 nearly three hundred miles) to Sian to take the examinations. For those who lived in the western part of the province, such as in Su-chou or An-hsi, the journey would be four thousand *li*. Since Urumchi was then under the jurisdiction of Kansu too, students from that area had to travel nearly six thousand *li* to Sian. The distance was not only far, but covered deserts and mountains. The means of transportation was limited to wagons, animals or foot. The expenses were far beyond what most students could afford. In fact, less than one-third of the Kansu students could attend the provincial examinations in Sian. By moving the examinations to Lanchow, it

²³⁰Tso: *Memorials*, XLIV, 73-77. Cf. Bales: *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 283.

²³¹*Ibid.*, XLVI, 57.

should encourage tremendous interest among the people to get education.²³² When more Moslems had been educated in the Chinese way, the violence of the Moslems was expected to decrease. When the young Moslems became more and more interested in studying Confucian teaching and taking civil examinations, a new foundation for bringing the Moslems to terms would have been established.²³³

²³²Tso: *Memorials*, XI.IV, 73-74.

²³³*Ibid.*, 76.

Chapter V

THE RECOVERY OF SINKIANG

After the outbreak of the Moslem rebellion in Shensi in 1862, the Manchu officials in Sinkiang were practically isolated. In June of 1864, the Moslems in Kucha (庫車) rebelled.¹ This touched off a chain of mutual massacres between the Chinese and the Moslems and soon spread to the large part of the area. The Manchu officials in charge of the affairs in Sinkiang proved to be no equal to the challenge. The Tartar city of Urumchi fell on October 3rd, 1864; Ili fell on March 8, 1866 and Tarbagatai followed the same fate on April 11, 1866.² With the leading officials killed or taken flight, Sinkiang was in turmoil.

Buzurg Khan, a descendant of the former Khoja ruling house of Kashgar, came into Sinkiang from the neighboring Khokand in January 1865. He made himself the king of Kashgar. Before long he was replaced by Yakoob Beg, his chief of staff.³ This new king expanded his kingdom into northern Sinkiang in 1870 and soon controlled Urumchi, Ch'ang-chi, Hu-t'u-pi, Sui-lai. Only Barkol (巴里坤), Hami, Ch'i-t'ai, Ku-ch'eng and Chi-mu-sa were still under the control of the Manchu government or the native Chinese.⁴ In the summer of 1871, the Russians invaded and occupied Ili.⁵

1. THE DECISION TO RECOVER SINKIANG

After Urumchi fell into the hands of the Moslem rebels and Ili was isolated, Barkol, or Chen-hsi, became a front-line town. Two

¹*Fang-lüeh*, LXVIII, 1, I-ch'i-li; T. C. 3 y., 6 m., 9 d.







²*Ibid.*, LXXX, 19; Pao-heng; T. C. 3 y., 10 m., 8 d.; CXXXIV, 1; Tsung-li Yamen; T. C. 5 y., 5 m., 17 d.; CXXXIII, 16-17; T'u-k'u-erh; T. C. 5 y., 5 m., 16 d. Cf. Eugene Schuyler: *Turkistan Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Gukhara, and Kuldja* (hereafter referred to as Schuyler: *Turkistan*), 182.


³Emetrius C. Boulger: *The Life of Yakoob Beg*, 85-86; 103-104; 116-117.

⁴Tseng Wen-wu: *Chung-kuo Ching-ying Hsi-yü Shih*, 325-327.

⁵Schuyler: *Turkistan*, 185-187.

MAP III TSO'S TRANSPORTATION LINES

-  National Border
-  Provincial Border
-  River
-  Old Highway
-  New Transportation Lines
Used by Tso
-  City



Manchu officials responsible for the defense of the area were Narchi (納爾濟), the Commandant of Barkol, and Wen-lin (文麟 -1876), the Intendant of Chen-hsi and Tihua.⁶ They were apparently alarmed. In 1865, they advised the Court as follows:

*To suppress the Moslems and recover Sinkiang would take several hundred thousand good soldiers and tens of millions of taels, fighting for several years and indoctrination for several years before peace and order could be temporarily restored. Yet it would only be temporary and not lasting. We suggest Your Majesty ask the princes, dukes, cabinet members, heads of departments as well as the censors to discuss what should be done and announce the decision in an edict so that we can obey.*⁷

This was a suggestion for the government to give up Sinkiang. The Court did not like the idea, and rebuked them with sharp and pointed words as follows:

*The rebellion of the Moslems in Sinkiang positively should be suppressed at once. What else can be done? What is there in your mind when you make such suggestions? You are simply rash and stupid. From now on, unless you leave no stone unturned in solving problems, His Majesty will punish you for evading duties and hold you responsible for things that go wrong.*⁸

Narchi and Wen-ling were not the only ones who thought of giving up Sinkiang. Li Yün-lin, the acting military Governor of Ili after the city's fall, mentioned in a memorial the following idea:

Concerning the problem of Sinkiang today, we shall know what to take and what to give. . . . Now the country is exhausted both in the

⁶There is very little biographical material about Narchi. Wen-ling (文麟 -1876) belonged to the Manchu Plain Blue Banner. In the year 1842 he passed an examination to be qualified as Secretary of the Grand Secretariat (內閣中書) and later became a Sub-Reader of the Han-lin (侍讀). In 1858, he was sent out to be the Intendant of Lanchow, and later moved to be the Intendant of Chenhsi and Tihua. In 1865, the Moslem rebels occupied Ku-cheng. Battles occurred. Wen-ling won a few, but lost Ch'i-t'ai and Hami. He was demoted to be Subaltern of the Guards, wearing the blue feather (藍翎侍衛) and agent at Hami (哈密辦事大臣). He successfully recovered Hami, and defended it against the attacks of the Moslems, driven out of Chia-yü-kuan by Tso Tsung-t'ang. He died in 1876. *Ch'ing-shih-kao*, CDLX, (*Lieh-chuan*, CCXLI), 12.

⁷*Fang-lüeh*, CVIII, 8-9; Narchi, Wen-ling; T. C. 4 y., 6 m., 29 d.

⁸*Ibid.*, CVIII, 15; to Tu-hsing-a, Mu-t'u-shan and others; T. C. 4 y., 6 m., 29 d.

*military and in the financial sense. Instead of giving the people a rest, Your Majesty intends to be aggressive in an area of desolate frontier. This is not the way to run the country. It is better to give up Sinkiang.*⁹

The Court again disapproved this suggestion on the ground that to give up Sinkiang would endanger national security.¹⁰

The above suggestions did not become a serious issue at the moment. The Court was too occupied by troubles in China proper to act on Sinkiang. But after the *Nien* were destroyed, and the Moslems east of Su-chou suppressed, the problem of Sinkiang became a main issue, in 1874. The group which preferred to give up Sinkiang was led by Li Hung-chang, the world-famous diplomat. The opponents were led by Tso Tsung-t'ang.

In that year, sponsored by Prince Kung¹¹ and Wen-hsiang,¹² the *Tsung-li Yamen* listed six items of reform to the Court for discussion. All leading politicians of the day were asked to participate in the discussion. One of the items referred to the raising of funds. Li Hung-chang, then the governor-general of Chihli, used this opportunity to attack the policy of retaking Sinkiang. He said:

Besides the difficulties involved in the original military conquest, since the seizure of Sinkiang, from the time of Ch'ien-lung, every year we need to spend three million or more taels for military expenses there even in peacetime. It is poor economics to gain several thousand li of wild territory, thus increasing a financial burden for thousands of years. Furthermore, the land adjoins Russia on the north, with various Moslem countries such as Turkey, Arabia and Persia on the west; and is close to British India in the south. The neighbors are growing stronger and stronger, while we are getting weaker and weaker, a condition quite different from the earlier days. Even if we do barely recover the land, we will never be able to keep it long. I read in foreign newspapers and receive other information from the West, that

⁹Fang-lieh, CXXXVII, 19-20; Li Yün-lin; T. C. 5 y., 7 m., 4 d.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, CXXXVII, 29-30; to Ling-hsin, Li Yün-lin and others; T. C. 5 y., 7 m., 4 d.

¹¹Prince Kung, I-hsin (恭親王奕訢 1833-1898), *ECCP*, 380-384. *Ch'ing-shih-kao*, CCXXVII (*Lieh-chuan*, VIII), 9-11.

¹²Wen-hsiang (文祥 1818-1876), *ECCP*, 853-855. *Ch'ing-shih-kao*, CCXCII (*Lieh-chuan*, CLXXIII), 2-7.

the Moslem chief in Kashgar (喀什噶爾) has recently received Turkey's protection and also concluded commercial treaties with Great Britain and Russia. That means he has already linked up with the various powers. . . . Judging by this situation, both. . . Russia. . . and Great Britain. . . will not like to see China's success in the west. Considering our own strength, it is really not enough to protect the west frontier. . . . Tseng Kuo-fan once suggested giving up the area west of Chia-yü-kuan for the time being, so that we can concentrate our strength on suppressing the rebels inside the Great Wall. It was really a piece of wise, experienced, loyal advice. Now, though we have sent out an expeditionary force, our military and financial strength will never enable us to recover the land. May I suggest that Your Majesty order all the commanders to stay strictly inside the present front line, and use their soldiers for farming instead of marching forward. At the same time, the government should appease those Moslem chiefs in Ili, Urumchi and Kashgar and permit them to have their own state as long as they will nominally use our calendar.¹³ . . . To live and let live will be beneficial to both sides. Russia and Great Britain will then have no excuse for annexing this area, while China will save future effort in the use of force. Perhaps this is the best way to get along in a lasting manner. Besides, even if Sinkiang should not be recovered, it will not hurt the whole nation. On the contrary, if we do not defend the coast, the danger will directly threaten the heart of the country. Which one is the more important will be easy to decide. Once this policy is decided, we can cut down the forces on both sides of the Great Wall. The funds saved can then be used in coast defense. Otherwise, there is only a given amount of funds. To take care of both the long coast line in the southeast and the long supply line in the northwest is simply impossible.¹⁴

Before further study of this topic, it is necessary to analyze Li's opinion from several angles. Fundamentally, there was a practical conflict between Li Hung-chang's own responsibility and the enterprise of retaking Sinkiang. Li was then the governor-general of Chihli

¹³In the Chinese tradition, this meant to surrender their sovereignty to China.

¹⁴Li Hung-chang: *Memorials*, XXIV, 18-19. Concerning Li Hung-chang (February 15, 1823-1901, November 7) see *ECCP*, 464-471 . Cf. Bales: *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 343.

and concurrently the minister superintendent of trade for the northern ports (直隸總督兼北洋通商大臣). He was responsible for the coastal defense in his area, as well as for building up both a modern army and a modern navy. All this took considerable money. Due to the shortage of funds, a tael spent in Sinkiang would almost certainly mean a cut of that much from his expenses. He did not like it. This practical conflict involving both power and money between two regional forces was magnified by the conflict of two strong personalities. Both Li and Tso were very proud and smart. They had been serving as independent commanders-in-chief in separate fields against the T'ai-p'ings. They achieved similar victories and received similar honors. They were on the same level, and no doubt jealousy had developed. Neither one respected the other. Openly and privately, they criticized each other. Because of this, it was no surprise to find Li Hung-chang objecting to the recovery of Sinkiang at every turn.

Compared with Peking and Tientsin, Sinkiang was much less important to the Manchu government. Even Tso held this view. But when Li Hung-chang, in the above memorial, emphasized that to retake Sinkiang would endanger "the heart of the country," he was trying to confuse the issue and mislead the Court. At that moment, there was no war going on along the coast, but there *was* one in Sinkiang. To withdraw from Sinkiang at the moment was the same as leaving a patient half way through an operation on the grounds that to stop the operation would save his blood. The later success of Tso Tsung-t'ang also proved that Sinkiang could be retaken without endangering China proper.¹⁵

Li Hung-chang believed that in case China should allow the Moslems to build up semi-independent states in Sinkiang, it would prevent Russia and Great Britain from annexing those states. This involved considerable wishful thinking. Later developments proved that the reconquest of Sinkiang kept both Great Britain and Russia away from the area, instead of prompting them to attack and annex it.¹⁶ On the contrary, the semi-independent status would encourage foreign

¹⁵Tso: *Memorials*, II, 3-4, 58-59; L, 17; LII, 26-32. Tso successfully recovered Sinkiang without either endangering China proper or involving China in a war against foreign powers.

¹⁶*Ibid.* The attitude of Great Britain became more and more friendly to China in proportion to Tso's military successes in Sinkiang. In 1873, Great Britain

invasion. This was also proved by later developments in Outer Mongolia.¹⁷

Li was trying to spread defeatism to scare the Court. He repeatedly said, "Our military and financial strength will never be able to recover the land," and "Even if we do recover the land, we will never be able to keep it long." These predictions were disproved by later developments.¹⁸

Li also twisted obvious facts to an interesting degree. For instance: Li quoted Tseng Kuo-fan's suggestion: "to give up the area west of Chia-yü-kuan for the time being, so we can concentrate our strength to clear out the rebels inside the Great Wall." With the phrase "for the time being," obviously Tseng meant to recover Sinkiang as soon

sent a Forsyth Mission to Kashgar to give support to the independent movement of Yakub Beg. (Bales: *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 307-308.) An English paper in Shanghai publicly promoted the idea that the Chinese Sinkiang campaign should by all means be abandoned. It also repeatedly spread the rumor that Tso's army had been defeated and driven back through the pass at Chia-yü-kuan. (Bales, 360 quoted *Nien-p'u*, VIII, 17. Cf. Tso: *Letters*, XVII, 25-26.) After Tso's troops recovered Urumchi in 1876, the British Minister in Peking, Sir Thomas Wade, "approached the Tsungli Yamen with the proposition that Yakub Beg would surrender to the Chinese if he were allowed to keep his kingdom under the overlordship of China." (Bales, p.360) In answering this proposal, Tso suggested to the *Tsungli Yamen*: "If England wanted a Moslem kingdom set up in Central Asia, she should furnish the territory, of which she had an abundance in northern India." (Bales, 361 quotes *Nien-p'u*, VIII, 18, 27.) In the last stage, after Tso crushed all the rebels in 1878, the English people made another about-face. In May, 1878, an English paper gave a glowing account of Tso's campaign, and stated that the very fact that Kashgar had been recovered by the Chinese proved that Kashgar was definitely a piece of Chinese territory. (Tso: *Letters*, XX, a letter to *Tsungli Yamen* quoted in *Nien-p'u*, IX, 1-2; Cf. Bales, 377.) Before Ili fell, the Manchu government had repeatedly requested the Russians to give aid to the garrison in Ili, but the Russians did nothing. As soon as the rebels occupied Ili, the Russians announced that they would send an expeditionary force to "recover Ili for China." (*Ch'ing Mu-tsung Shih-lu* 清穆宗實錄 CLXXVII, 12; T. C. 5 y., 5 m., 17 d.) They took Ili in 1871 and claimed that they would return the area to China as soon as China could maintain order there. Hence, as long as Chinese forces could not reach Ili, Russian troops believed that they had an excuse for staying there. It was Tso's victories over the Moslems in Sinkiang that made it possible for the Chinese government to negotiate for the return of Ili. (Latourette: *The Chinese*, 368-369. Concerning the negotiation for the return of Ili see "Tseng Chi-tse" in *ECCP*, 746-747.)

¹⁷Latourette: *The Chinese*, 414, 423; *China Handbook 1951*, pp. 363-364.

¹⁸Tso: *Memorials*, II, 58-59; LII, 26-32. Ever since Sinkiang was recovered it has been kept as a part of Chinese territory up to now.

as the inland was clear. But Li used Tseng's suggestion as a basis to reach a very different conclusion, namely, even after the inland was clear, China should never recover Sinkiang.¹⁹

Since the conquest of Sinkiang in the reign of Ch'ien-lung, that area had also not necessarily been a place of financial loss. On the contrary, it had been a profitable area, as Ch'ien-lung himself quoted figures to prove.²⁰ Yet Li made a blanket statement to deny these facts.

Furthermore, it was not true that "It is poor economics to gain several thousand *li* of wild territory thus increasing a financial burden for thousands of years." In the first place, Sinkiang was a rich land. In the second place, Sinkiang had been financially profitable in the past, and definitely could be profitable in the future. To make a statement to cover "thousands of years," was misrepresenting facts. Thirdly, most of the expense in keeping Sinkiang would not be saved, even if Sinkiang were thrown away. As Ch'ien-lung mentioned in his edict, most of the expenses were for maintaining the army. This sum would have to be spent, no matter whether the army was stationed in Sinkiang or in Shensi, unless the nation was to be stripped of its defense. In fact, because of the strategic advantages of the natural defense line along the western frontier of Sinkiang, the recovery of Sinkiang would discourage any possible foreign invasion. In the long run, it saved more money than to move the frontier inland and so invite numerous international wars.²¹

As a whole, Li deliberately evaded the most important argument for recovering Sinkiang, namely, its strategic value to the Chinese national defense. To Li, Sinkiang was not only unimportant, but to hold it was an evil. All the evil he could explain, however, was limited to the economic field, and even this contention, as discussed above, was inaccurate. Furthermore, in universal history financial gain is usually not the only reason for keeping a piece of territory.

Tso Tsung-t'ang could easily see what the real motive of Li was behind all those arguments. In a private letter to T'an Chung-lin (譚鍾麟 1856-1905), the governor of Shensi, Tso said:

Mr. X . . . really knew nothing about foreign affairs, but talked as if

¹⁹Li Hung-chang: *Memorials*, XXIV, 18-19.

²⁰Wei Yüan: *Sheng-wu-chi*, IV, 13-15.

²¹*Ibid.*; also Tso: *Letters*, XVIII, 48.

THE RECOVERY OF SINKIANG

he were an expert. The authority [Li Hung-chang] copied what Mr. X said and reported to His Majesty, because Li wanted to scratch every penny to feed his "rifle team" (洋槍隊). The Court's recent appointment of Liu K'un-i (劉坤— 1830-1902) as the governor-general of Liang-Kiang made Li very unhappy. Li was afraid that Liu's appointment would take privileges away from his own inactive army [Li's Huai Chün 淮軍]. In fact, Li's army has already wasted too much of the funds of the state. A cut in its expenses has been long overdue.²²

This kind of personal slap against each other was very common between Li and Tso. Tso seldom, if ever, said good things about the Huai-chün, Li's army. Li was the same way toward Tso's military forces. Even after Tso cleared the whole of Shensi and Kansu, preparing for the great campaign in Sinkiang, Li's comment on Tso was: *Tso is as weak as an arrow at the end of its course. Now the Court asks him to carry a heavy burden for a long distance. How can one expect him to do better than drag his feet? Yet he will not allow other people to do the job. . . .*²³

However, concerning the discussion of whether Sinkiang should be recovered, Tso did not start the argument. On January 12, 1875, Emperor T'ung-chih (Tsai-ch'un 載淳 1856-1875)²⁴ died. A young boy of not quite four years old, Tsai-t'ien (載恪 1871-1908)²⁵ was put on the Throne, mainly because he was young, and was the son of Empress Dowager Hsiao-ch'in's younger sister, as well as the son of the late Emperor Hsien-feng's brother. The result was that the power was retained in Empress Dowager Hsiao-ch'in's hands. However, the one who played an important part in the decision of the government policy toward Sinkiang was Wen-hsiang.²⁶ Through the influence of Wen-hsiang, who was then one of the ministers in the Grand Council (軍機大臣), a secret decree was sent to Tso Tsung-t'ang on March 10, 1875, saying:

²²Tso: *Letters*, XV, 8-9. Liu K'un-i was a Hunanese who faithfully supported Tso by sending his share of subsidy regularly to Tso when he was the governor of Kiangsi. *ECCP*, 523-524.

²³Li Hung-chang: *Letters*, XIII, 31.

²⁴*ECCP*, 729-731.

²⁵*Ibid.*, 731-734.

²⁶Cf. note 8; also Nien-p'u, VII, 36-37, quoting Li Yün-lin: *Hsi-ch'ui su-lüeh* (李雲麟：西陲述略).

Somebody²⁷ suggested: "Sinkiang adjoins Russia on the north, with various Moslem countries such as Turkey, Arabia, and Persia on the west; and is close to British India in the south. May I suggest to Your Majesty to order the commanders on the western front to stay strictly inside the present lines instead of marching forward. Once this policy is decided, we can demobilize all the unnecessary troops both west and east of Chia-yü-kuan."

Somebody else suggested²⁸: "The trouble along the coast does not come without reason. People are watching our military moves on the western frontier. If we succeed there, they will keep quiet along the coast. If we fall there, they are going to move in the east. We must exert our whole effort in winning this western campaign."

Under the present situation, if we can suspend the western campaign, we will save some funds for coastal defense, and release the pressure on our strained finances. However, if China does nothing to recover Urumchi, both the northern and western frontiers will be in constant danger. Besides, if we retreat from Sinkiang, there is no way to guarantee that the Moslem rebels will not come in and disturb areas near Chia-yü-kuan. When the rebels are very active outside the Great Wall, it will be impossible for China to close the door, even if the Court wants to do so. What should be done to deal with the present situation is a problem you must think over thoroughly and report back to the Throne.²⁹

Tso received this decree on March 19th, and reported back on April 12th as follows:

When the Western nations unite to plot against our country, their aim is to trade and . . . not to capture our territory and population. Because they know that to capture territory will increase their need of garrison forces, and to increase population under their control will require new administrative agents. Both will cost money, a fact contrary to their main purpose of making profit. . . . Since the conclusion of the commercial treaties, ports have been opened to all. Nations

²⁷Obviously referring to Li Hung-chang.

²⁸According to Weng T'ung-ho: *Weng-wen-kung-kung jih-chi* (翁同龢：翁文恭公日記), or *The Diary of Weng T'ung-ho*, XIV, 32, this was referring to Wang weng-shao (1830-1908). *ECCP*, 48.

²⁹Tso: *Memorials*, XLVI. 10.

have been enjoying the benefits, as well as the foreign merchants. They will not like to disturb the existing treaties, because they know that would hurt them all. Ever since we started to build our own steamships, what the foreigners used to threaten us has been within our ability to own [Tso meant that since the Chinese could build steamships, they had mastered the same weapon which Western powers had used to threaten China. There should be no more worry for the Chinese on this point.] Furthermore, we are concentrating our mind and will to seek all good techniques and tools to improve our defense. Under normal reasoning, it is hard to imagine that foreigners will still insist on starting trouble.

People suggest that the government should demobilize the expeditionary forces in the west in order to increase the funds for the coastal defense. I will first analyze the necessary funds for the coastal defense. There are two items under this heading, namely, establishment and maintenance. The establishment funds include the expense of buying and building steamships, cannon, guns, defensive materials and the construction of forts. The maintenance funds include the pay of the servicemen, the training expenses and the maintenance expenses of ships. The shipyard in Fukien has already had a good start. With its future extension and improvement, we can expect to build more ships and then the expense of buying ships can be saved. The rent of ships can also be saved for maintenance. Hence, both establishment and maintenance funds in the budget are enough. . . . [To train local people to be the sailors and soldiers would not be too expensive.] . . . That is all we need to raise for coastal defense. Yet people are suggesting the demobilization of the land defensive forces so that the coastal defense can be secured. This might be correct, if there were more urgent emergencies along the coast, or if the troops in Kansu had more funds than those spent on coastal defense. Let us check the latter first. Since I came back to Shensi, I have requested 4,000,000 taels of dependable funds each year. In this sum, 600,000 taels are reserved for Shensi, the balance is used for my army. . . . Later, the Board of Revenue assigned some Likin from various provinces and custom houses for my army, and then the total of funds was boosted to 8,000,000 taels a year. Yet all the expenses of discharging soldiers, rehabilitating the surrendered bandits and Moslems, have been drawn from this sum. . . . Roughly speaking, since I came to Shensi and

Kansu, I have actually received less than 5,000,000 taels each year, but the expenses necessary are not less than 8,000,000 taels a year. . . . The deficits have been accumulating year after year, and have become a huge sum. That has been the reason why I could issue only two months' full pay to my men at first, and have barely been able to make one month's full pay lately. . . . Yet up to the end of the twelfth year of T'ung-chih, (February 16, 1874), there were 8,200,000 and more taels of back pay overdue, plus a shortage of 300,000 taels in the pension fund. On the other hand, the various provinces and custom houses were short of delivery to my army by more than 30,000,000 taels of overdue subsidies. . . . Therefore it is now even harder to get along than it was in the past years. The coming campaign in Sinkiang will require longer hauls for supplies, and will cost even more money. . . . Not only is there no reason to demobilize the land defensive forces before recovering the strategic city of Urumchi; even if that city should be recovered, . . . it would still require many soldiers to defend the area. . . . No matter how, there is little possibility of cutting the funds for defense on the land. I recall that when Emperor Ch'ien-lung first took over Sinkiang, there was quite a number of objections raised in the Court alleging that the action would cost too much money. But His Majesty Ch'ien-lung was not moved, because there were reasons to establish the boundary as he did.

I have observed that the two "routes" of T'ien-shan, the northern and southern, contain what they used to call "eight rich cities," and "eight poor cities." From Urumchi southwestward to Aksu, the land is fertile, the springs are sweet, the products are plentiful. This area is the so-called "eight rich cities." From Urumchi eastward, there are four cities situated on high and cold locations, with many mountains and valleys but few plains. From Hami southward then westward toward Aksu, there are four cities with considerable desert and little cultivable land. These are the so-called "eight poor cities." From the strategic point of view, however, the eight northern cities dominate larger areas than the eight southern cities. The northern area can control the southern area, but this southern area cannot control the northern area. [. . . this has been proved by historical facts]. . . . When His Majesty took over the rich area of southern Sinkiang, it became possible to use local resources to furnish stationary forces and even save some expense for those troops stationed east of Urumchi. If we

would satisfy ourselves with a defensive program, then, without the recovery of Urumchi, it is strategically difficult to set up an effective defense. When we do recover Urumchi, the whole defense system will require heavy forces to be stationed at Barkol, Hami, and Tarbagatai. Then we can develop military and civilian colonies to reinforce the defense system. After that, demobilization will be possible, and funds can be cut down to normal without endangering security. On the contrary, should we now demobilize the army to save money, as soon as our defense is lax, the enemy will invade. Not only Kansu would be in danger, but even Kobdo and Uliasutai would also be disturbed. The program of demobilizing the land forces might not do much good for coastal defense, but it positively would do much harm to national security in the northwest. . . . The occupation of Ili by the Russians happened when we were occupied with internal disturbances. They claimed that they were coming to protect the city for the Chinese, but their real motive was booty. They knew that the area of Ili was unusually rich, and it was close to their southern border, so they could come and go without much trouble. Since our forces recovered Su-chou by a total victory, which was followed by the liberation of Anhsi, Hami, Barkol and Chi-mu-sa (濟木薩), only the area of Urumchi is still in the hands of the rebels. . . . Russia is a great state. . . . It is hard to imagine that she will risk everything in order to go all the way across to Urumchi. . . . to help the Moslems fight against us. . . . Turkey is even farther, situated west of India, several thousand miles away from Kashgar. . . . The newspapers in Shanghai reported that the Moslem chief in Kashgar has joined Turkey and traded with Russia and Great Britain, but we have no such information here. Even if we do follow the newspapermen's opinion that. . . we should give up Kashgar, it is a decision to be made in the future. Not until Urumchi has been recovered and the whole situation carefully considered, can we reach that conclusion. To stop all the troops outside and inside the Great Wall at present does not make sense. Your Majesty said: . . . "If China does nothing to recover Urumchi, both the northern and western frontiers will be in constant danger. Besides, if we retreat from Sinkiang, there is no way to guarantee that the Moslem rebels will not come in and disturb areas near Chia-yü-kuan. When the rebels are very active outside the Great Wall, it will be impossible for China to close the door, even if the Court wants to do so. . . ." Your Majesty knows the situation so clearly that I really do not have to say much more.³⁰

³⁰*Ibid.*, XLVI, 32-38.

Soon afterwards, on April 4, 1875, Tso Tsung-t'ang was appointed Imperial Commissioner in charge of the military affairs of Sinkiang, with Chin-shun as his deputy.³¹

Another round of discussion started after the recovery of Urumchi.³² Critics of Tso claimed that it was the time and place to stop. In a letter to T'an Chung-lin, the governor of Shensi, Tso said:

*Some people complain that as it takes too much money in the western campaign, they propose to quit. They do not realize that the subsidies to Kansu and Sinkiang have always been more than five million taels every year. Even if we stop where we are and advance no more, this sum of five million taels is still needed. To give up the fertile land of the eight cities in southern Sinkiang and hold only the cold, barren area east of Urumchi can not last long. His Majesty Ch'ien-lung conquered Sinkiang because it would secure the western defense, as well as save military expense. If it was necessary to do so during a period of prosperity as under Ch'ien-lung, how much more shall we do now when we have so much trouble on the sea and are so short of funds? . . . When there is good opportunity to take the whole of Sinkiang and we neglect it, how can we defend our border and keep strong neighbors out? In case history condemns those responsible in the future, I cannot take it. I am going to send in a memorandum to the Court to clarify the issue.*³³

On July 26, 1877, Tso sent in the following memorandum:

Since ancient times there has been more trouble along the northwestern frontier of China than along the southeastern side. The southeastern border has been the big sea—a natural defense line easier to defend. On the contrary, the northwestern frontier covers vast lands. Security there entirely depends on military strength. If there is too small an army, the invaders will come. If there is a big army, the national finances will be strained. There is little topography in the area helpful in building up an effective defense. There is also little water transportation to benefit an offense. . . . The history of the past offers numerous silent testimonies. . . . Our dynasty settled down with Peking as its capital. As the Mongolian tribes guarded the north,

³¹*Ibid.*, XLVI, 53.

³²Urumchi was recovered on August 18, 1876. *Ibid.*, XLVIII, 76.

³³Tso: *Letters*, XVIII, 48.

there have been no invasions for almost two centuries. Not only the so-called frontiers of the ancient days [the line along the Great Wall] have become inland, but the garrison forces have actually spread out from Chang-chia-k'o (張家口 | Kalgan) to Uliasutai and Kobdo, and the area of Peking has been well defended. This security was granted by the past Emperors who accomplished the successful conquest of Sinkiang. Hence, stress on Sinkiang means an effective defense of Mongolia, and the effective defense of Mongolia means the sound security of Peking. The geographical situation in the northwest is like an arm from shoulder to the finger-tips. When the whole arm is safe, everything works out smoothly. If Sinkiang is not secure, Mongolia will be in trouble; then not only Shensi, Kansu, and Shansi will often be disturbed, the people in the area of the national capital will not have a good night's sleep. Furthermore, the present situation is even worse than before. The Russians are expanding daily. Stretching from the west to the east, their territory borders our frontier for thousands of miles. Only in the central section do the Mongolian tribes more or less function as a buffer zone. . . . We have to make early preparation to face this fact.

When His Majesty Ch'ien-lung conquered Sinkiang, he added about twenty thousand square li of territory. There were quite a number of officials who doubted the wisdom of this, and complained that the expansion had cost too much money. His Majesty Ch'ien-lung never changed his mind, because he was sure of his wisdom in expanding from the old sterile area to the new fertile land. The number of garrison soldiers was the same, and the military expenses were the same, but the defense line could be established and held forever. Now, in northern Sinkiang, with the exception of Ili, we have recovered the whole area of Turfan. The only resisting groups left are some remnants under Pai Yen-hu (白彥虎)³⁴ along the western bank of K'ai-tu

³⁴There is very little biographical material on Pai. His name was mentioned here and there in the government documents in *Fang-lüeh* and Tso's memorial. By these documents, Pai was one of the leaders of Shensi Moslems who fled from Shensi to Kansu, then to Hsining, then to Su-chou, then to Hami, then joined the forces of Yakoob Beg and finally fled to Russia after Kashgar was taken. He was cunning and attacked only when the government forces were weak, but never put up a real fight before a big army. Cf. *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, II, 720, under "Kansu."

River (開都河) and some rebels in Kashgar. All the other cities have fallen into our lap like children come back to their mother, and need no fighting. As soon as we harvest the autumn crop, we can easily drive west to recover the whole area. . . . Among the southern cities, Turfan is a rich place. With the exception of Kharashar (喀喇沙爾), which is barren, all the other areas are much more fertile than those in northern Sinkiang, though the space is not so vast. After the recovery of Urumchi and Turfan, we have controlled the strategic positions suitable for stationing of troops. However, less than one-third of the fertile land is in our hands. If we can recover all Sinkiang and put it under an able administration, both food and funds can be raised from local resources. Then the worries of the past can really pass by forever.³⁵

This proposal was readily accepted by the Court.³⁶ Eventually it led to the complete recovery of southern Sinkiang in January, 1878.³⁷

2. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE EXCLUSIVE DOMINATION BY THE MANCHUS IN SINKIANG

(a) *The Traditional Policy*

Traditionally, all the leading officials in Sinkiang were "banner men," if not strictly Manchus. No Chinese was used as a leading official in the area.³⁸ This tradition worked smoothly until the Manchus degenerated. When it came to this period of the Moslem rebellion, most Manchus failed to meet the challenge. Consequently Tso Tsung-t'ang considered this traditional policy to be one of the main reasons why there were so many failures. Tso did not hesitate to tell people what he thought. In a private letter he wrote:

No doubt the shortage of funds and the oversized but incompetent army caused the failures. . . . However, the lack of leadership also played an important part. The leading officials traditionally are limited to Manchus. Not only are they not used to military and civil affairs, but they have been deeply infected by their own corrupting habits.

³⁵Tso: *Memorials*, L, 75-77.

³⁶*Ibid.*, L, 79.

³⁷*Ibid.*, LII, 26-30.

³⁸*Hsüan-t'ung Sinkiang T'u-chih*, XXVII, 1-15. See the following tables.

Leading Officials in Sinkiang Before 1874

Name of the post	Total Number	Banner men	Possibly Chinese*	Chinese
Military Governor of Ili 伊犁將軍	25	25	0	0
Assistant Military Governor at Ili 伊犁參贊大臣	17	17	0	0
Assistant Military Governor at Tarbagatai 塔爾巴哈臺參贊大臣	28	28	0	0
Military Lieutenant-Governor of Urumchi 烏魯木齊都統	32	30	2	0
Agent at Hami 哈密辦事大臣	10	9	1	0
Intendant of circuit of Chen-hsi and Ti-hua 鎮迪道	21	21	0	0
Agent at Kashgar 喀什噶爾辦事大臣	24	23	1	0
Assistant Military Governor at Yarkand 葉爾羌辦事大臣	24	23	1	0
Agent at Ush 烏什辦事大臣	18	18	0	0
Agent at Aksu 阿克蘇辦事大臣	8	8	0	0
Agent at Kuche 庫車辦事大臣	8	8	0	0
Agent at Kharashar 喀喇沙爾辦事大臣	13	13	0	0
Agent at Hotien (Khotan) 和闐辦事大臣	6	6	0	0
Total	234	229	5	0

Even the Chinese portion of the army, the so-called Green Banner (綠旗), or Green Camp (綠營), was dominated by officials who belonged to the Banners.

Name of the post	Total Number	Banner men	Possibly Chinese*	Chinese
General-in-chief of Urumchi 烏魯木齊提督	19	14	5	0
Brigadier General of Barkol 巴里坤鎮總兵	25	17	7	1**

Brigadier General of Ili 伊犁鎮總兵	22	11	11	0
Brigadier General of Kashgar 喀什噶爾總兵	3	3	0	0
Colonel of Manass 瑪那斯協副將	3	1	2	0
Colonel of Hami 哈密協副將	5	2	3	0
Total	77	48	28	1

*These were people with Chinese names. But since some of the family names were shared by both Chinese and the Banner men, these people still might be Banner men.

**This was Ho Kuan (何瑄), a native of Kan-chou, Kansu. He was a Major at the time when the Moslem rebels attacked Barkol in 1864. Acting as Brigadier General he successfully defended the city and was later promoted to Brigadier General. *Hsüan-t'ung Sinkiang T'u-chih*, CIX, 10.

*They know nothing except quarrelling with each other over selfish interests. That is the reason why conditions are getting worse and worse. Whereas internal disturbances have not been solved, foreign aggressors have well been attracted.*³⁹

Because of this tradition, even after Tso Tsung-t'ang successfully suppressed the Moslems of Kansu, he was not granted authority to clear Sinkiang. The job was given to two banner men, Ching-lien⁴⁰ and Chin-shun on August 23, 1874,⁴¹ whereas Tso was responsible

³⁹Tso: *Letters*, XVII, 73. Similar ideas were expressed also in *Letters*, XIII, 43; XIV, 3, 11; XX, 11, 46.

⁴⁰Ching-lien (景廉 -1885) belonged to the Manchu Plain Yellow Banner. He received his degree of *Chin-shih* in 1852, and entered the *Han-lin-yüan* as a Bachelor. Within five years he reached the high office of Junior Vice-President of the Board of Works. In 1859, he was appointed Assistant Military Governor of Ili, and later was transferred to be the Assistant Military Governor at Yarkand. In 1864 he resigned and left his post before the Court granted him the permission to do so. He was punished for this offense and lost his commissions. In 1866 the Court reassigned him as the Assistant Agent at Hami, but he was not able to reach the city until 1869. In 1871, he was appointed as Military Lieutenant-governor of Urumchi, a city still in the hands of the rebels. The best he could do was to move his troops to Barkol, and later in 1873, to Ku-ch'eng. The next year, he became the Imperial Commissioner in charge of the military affairs of Sinkiang. *Ch'ing shih-lieh-chuan*, LIII, 1-5.

⁴¹*Fang-lüeh*, CCLXXXIX, 1; to the Cabinet; T. C. 13 y., 7 m., 12 d. Bales did not realize that Ching-lien had been appointed as the independent agent responsible to direct the whole campaign in Sinkiang and mistakenly thought that he was an adviser of Tso. Cf. Bales: *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 342.

only for the shipment of food and funds into Sinkiang, with Yüan Pao-heng (袁保恆 1826-1878) as his deputy.⁴² Among the Manchus, Ching-lien and Chin-shun seemed to be the best choices the Court could find. As the traditional policy of using only banner men in key positions of Sinkiang stood, they were so appointed. This was not a surprise to Tso Tsung-t'ang. Even before the appointment, Tso wrote to Ching-lien, saying, "Only you can take up and finish the task in Sinkiang. It is the unanimous opinion of both the Court and the general public."⁴³ Deep in Tso's heart, however, he resented this old policy, because he was convinced that no Manchu could ever "finish" the work in Sinkiang, though they were the only ones allowed to "take up" the job. This feeling was reflected in one of his private letters to a friend:

*The commander on the frontier traditionally must be a Manchu. I, the old man, staggering among them, am easy to draw blame. I expect that as soon as the area inside the Great Wall [that is, east of Chia-yü-kuan] is clear, everybody will jump to take my unfinished work away.*⁴⁴

In a letter to another friend, Tso wrote: "It is required to use Manchus to lead the expeditionary forces outside of the Great Wall.

... At present I cannot find anyone who has the qualifications. This is the thing which bothers me most."⁴⁵

The problem of the Moslem rebellion inside and outside Chia-yü-kuan was the same. Tso Tsung-t'ang had long been convinced that he himself was the man destined to solve it completely. He had ideas. He had plans. Now, he was stopped half-way.

(b) *The Thorny Problem of Food Supplies*

Trouble soon developed. Ching-lien found the new assignment difficult. He reported that due to the destruction of war, the food production in the whole area from Hami to Ku-ch'eng had sharply decreased. The local supply was barely enough to maintain the army already there. If

⁴²Fang-lüeh, CCLXXXIX, 24-25; To Cabinet; T. C. 13 y., 8 m., 25 d.

⁴³Tso: *Letters*, XIV, 12.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, XIII, 43.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, XIV, 3.

Chin-shun's army should arrive, there would be no food. He requested the Court to order Tso Tsung-t'ang to send three thousand *tan* of grain and feed every month to Ku-ch'eng for the use of Chin-shun's army.⁴⁶ For the moment, the main part of Chin-shun's army stayed in Anhsi to wait for supplies and means of transportation, as did the army under Chang Yüeh. With these armies delayed in Kansu, Ching-lien could hardly do much.⁴⁷

It was simple to ask for grain on paper. But shipping grain from western Kansu to Sinkiang was expensive. Grain from Liangchou would cost more than eleven taels of silver a *tan* in Anhsi. This included the original cost and the shipping expenses. To ship one *tan* of grain from Anhsi through Hami to Ku-ch'eng would add another ten taels and more. Calculating on this basis, the grain needed by the army of Chin-shun alone would be 63,000 taels a month. Tso considered this sum as too expensive and suggested getting food supplies from the area north of Ku-ch'eng, since the price there was reported to be only eleven taels a *tan*.⁴⁸

In another letter which Tso wrote to Chang Yüeh, he said that according to his information, the weight of a *tan* in the area of Kobdo and Uliasutai (the northern area) was three hundred and thirty catties, which was much more than the normal *tan* of one hundred catties. To buy a *tan* of grain from that area and ship it to Ku-ch'eng would cost a little more than eleven taels, which was a price much cheaper than that of the cost of grain shipped from Kansu, let alone the advantage of a heavier weight. "Yet instead of doing so, Ching-lien left the grain in that area to rot and insisted on asking me to ship grain from Kansu." Tso was very much disgusted.⁴⁹

Tso's indignation was increased when he learned that Yüan Pao-heng, his deputy, was making a gigantic plan to supply the Sinkiang expeditionary forces through Su-chou. For the past six years, Yüan had collected and managed the subsidies from different sources for Tso. Thus far the two had cooperated smoothly. However, it seemed that after years of this monotonous and unpleasing work, the ambitious and aggressive Yüan became less satisfied with his status than before. Out-

⁴⁶Tso: *Memorials*, XLV, 28.

⁴⁷*Fang-lieh*, CCLXXXIX, 5; Ching-lien; T. C. 13 y., 7 m., 12 d.

⁴⁸Tso: *Letters*, XIV, 35-36.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, XIV, 42-43.

side lures became more attractive. In a letter sent on June 15, 1873, Li Hung-chang, the great rival of Tso, wrote Yüan in a very thoughtful and intimate way, saying:

*It soon will be five years since your Excellency took up the responsibility of logistics. After Kansu is cleared, it seems wise to suggest the abolition of your office. The Military Supply Bureau for Sinkiang traditionally has been established in Su-chou. Any intendant or commissioner can take care of the work. It is meaningless to grow depressed on the job and waste your time. You can easily pick up a ministry in Peking or take over a governorship outside. But unless you get rid of your present burden, you will hardly be able to fly high.*⁵⁰

There was no evidence that Yüan took this hint as a signal to rebel against Tso. However, he soon did irritate Tso with his actions.

Immediately after Yüan received the news of his appointment as Deputy chief to Tso Tsung-t'ang, in charge of the supply and transportation for the expeditionary forces of Sinkiang, he drew up a plan to do the job. In doing so, he had not consulted Tso beforehand, nor left his desk in Sian to investigate the real needs and problems of the supply line. He relied upon his own book knowledge of past history to conclude that supplies should be sent out through Su-chou. On this supposition, he reported to the Court the following figures:

<i>Number of stations (each station represents one day's journey) between Chia-yü-kuan and Urumchi</i>	36
<i>Total expeditionary forces including infantry, cavalry, carriers.</i>	50,000 men
<i>Counting each man's daily consumption as 0.01 tan of grain, each horse's consumption of feed as 0.03 tan, the total amount of grain and feed daily consumed</i>	800 tan
<i>Counting the capacity of load of each camel or donkey to be 2 tan, then including the return trip, the number of camels or donkeys needed in each station</i>	800
<i>Total number of camels or donkeys needed</i>	30,000
<i>Price of each camel or donkey</i>	40 taels
<i>Total price of 30,000 camels or donkeys</i>	1,200,000 taels
<i>Cost of wagons, saddles, loading bags, etc.</i>	200,000 taels

⁵⁰Li Hung-chang: *Letters*, XIII, 9-10.

<i>Daily cost of feeding an animal, plus wages and food of the driver</i>	0.2 tael
<i>Yearly cost of the last item (not including the expenses inside the Great Wall)</i>	2,160,000 taels
<i>Total cost of the grain each year (counting the average price as between 3 to 4 taels a tan, and the yearly need of grain from 280,000 tan to 290,000 tan)</i>	1,000,000 taels
<i>Expense of building up military colonies</i>	from 500,000 to 600,000 taels
<i>Cost of uniforms, munitions, pensions, miscellaneous</i>	500,000 taels
<i>Cost of transportation inside the Great Wall</i>	from 500,000 to 600,000 taels
<i>Total expenses of the first year</i>	6,260,000 taels

He also requested the Court to grant him two million taels immediately to start the plan moving.⁵¹

This plan was very different from what was in Tso's mind. Fundamentally, Tso questioned the wisdom of supplying the expeditionary forces in Sinkiang through Su-chou. This was the very point he was arguing with Ching-lien. After carefully computing the distances and expenses, he found the cost of transportation through Su-chou was not the cheapest.⁵² Furthermore, he did not even think that it was necessary to set up a gigantic bureaucracy in Su-chou to take care of this work, as Yüan proposed. Since the sources of funds were limited, to waste any money unnecessarily on transportation would mean a cut in the essential expenditures of the expeditionary forces. Tso also did not believe that there would be two million taels ready cash to be handed down from the Court as Yüan requested.⁵³ Besides, Yüan's plan in many points conflicted with or overlapped what Tso had already done.⁵⁴

Yüan Pao-heng did not pay serious attention to Tso's objections, and continued to press the Court to follow his plan. In his anxiety, he warned that any hesitation would cause the postponement of military action for another year. "One year's delay would mean a waste of ten million taels in feeding the inactive army."⁵⁵

⁵¹Yüan Pao-heng: *Memorials*, IV, 28-30.

⁵²Tso: *Memorials*, XLV, 60-61.

⁵³Tso: *Letters*, XIV, 43.

⁵⁴Tso: *Memorials*, XLV, 75.

⁵⁵Fang-lüeh, CCXC, 25-26; Yüan Pao-heng, T. C. 13 y., 11 m., 7 d.

Of course, Tso's policy was not to act until preparations were complete. When Tso found that Yüan was taking the whole thing up and acting without his approval, he did not like it. When Yüan accused him of delaying the campaign and wasting public funds, Tso could hardly stand it any more. Tso proposed to the Court the following points:

(1) Tso guaranteed that what he had set up in Su-chou for transportation would work as well as any other organization. There was no need to move Yüan's bureau to Su-chou.

(2) As there were enough camels in the northern route from Kobdo to Ku-cheng, there was no need to buy camels for that route. There was also plenty of grain in the northern route, especially in Kobdo and Uliasutai.

(3) The center of supply should be somewhere along the northern route, because it was nearer to the front than Su-chou. The northern route was better than the route from Su-chou, also, because it had more pastures for camels on the way. It would not only save feeding the camels with the precious grain carried on their backs, but eventually would keep them in healthier condition than otherwise.

Based on these facts, Tso suggested to Yüan to choose one of the three northern cities, namely, Uliasutai, Kobdo or Barkol, to be the center of supplies and move Yüan's bureau over.⁵⁶

When these discussions were partially ascertained by Ching-lien, who was then in Sinkiang, he reported to the Court:

The grain for the expeditionary forces should be shipped immediately from Su-chou. Of the areas outside Chia-yü-kuan, such as Hami, Barkol, Ch'i-t'ai, Ku-ch'eng, Chi-mu-sa (濟木薩), half of them are desert and produce very little grain. It is impossible for these areas to supply the expeditionary forces, especially after the destruction of the war. . . . I beg Your Majesty to order Tso Tsung-t'ang to manage the supplies according to the traditional precedents. It is possible to use wagons from Liang-chou to Hami. However, it is necessary to use camels from Hami to Ku-ch'eng because of the mountains. I heard that Tso has already bought several thousand camels, as well as several thousand wagons for shipment of grain. Thus it should not be

⁵⁶Tso: *Memorials*, XLV, 73-76. Cf. Bales: *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 342-343.

*too difficult for him to manage the shipment. In case these wagons and camels are not enough, he can hire some privately-owned wagons and camels to help in the shipping of the grain. To allow these owners to bring goods with them without taxation will be enough to encourage them to come. This practice will also encourage the arrival of merchants and bring prices down.*⁵⁷

In this memorial there are three points worthy to be pointed out. First, he denied that there were abundant grain supplies in the area under his control. It contradicted Tso Tsung-t'ang's information. Judging from the conditions, Ching-lien was correct on this point.

Secondly, he insisted that the supplies must come through Su-chou, and put all the responsibilities of shipping grain on Tso. Later developments proved that Ching-lien's judgment was wrong.

Thirdly, he suggested the use of privately-owned means of transportation by allowing the owners to bring goods with them. Of course, if this applied to return trips only, there was nothing wrong. But since goods were mostly going west, the amount of goods carried would replace that amount of grain or military supplies the expeditionary forces needed. Since the load of a wagon or a camel was very limited, the encouragement to ship goods would hurt the shipment of grain and military supplies. Obviously this was what happened in Ching-lien's practice. When Chin-shun later took over Ching-lien's command, Chin-shun found that there were only smuggled goods and no funds at all. The practice of smuggling goods broke down the discipline, caused disturbances among the merchants and subjects, and cut down the supply of the essential needs of the army.⁵⁸

By this time Yüan had learned of Tso's objection. He modified his plan and agreed to move the center of military supplies to Barkol instead of Su-chou. Nevertheless, he still thought of having an elaborate organization set up in the area, and requested permission to bring several battalions of soldiers with him to the center.⁵⁹

After Ching-lien was fully informed of Tso's memorial, he emphatically denied that there was any basis to the report that he had ordered 20,000 *tan* of grain for Chin-shun's army. He said that Chin-shun had tried to buy 7,000 and more *tan* of grain in Ku-ch'eng and Chi-

⁵⁷Fang-liieh, CCXCI, 2-3; Ching-lien; T. C. 13 y., 11 m., 11 d.

⁵⁸Tso: *Letters*, XVII, 6.

⁵⁹Yüan Pao-heng: *Memorials*, V, 6-10.

mu-sa, but actually collected only four thousand-odd *tan*. Furthermore, he himself did not have the cash needed to order grain for Chin-shun. He also dismissed the possibility of buying grain from Uliasutai and Kobdo, because they did not produce grain. Barkol was finding it difficult even to collect three thousand-odd *tan* of grain for Chin-shun. The price there soared to more than ten taels a *tan*, without there actually being any commodity to be delivered. Ku-ch'eng and Chi-mu-sa were a little better off, but had only recently recovered. With only several hundred families around, it was also impossible to produce enough. Due to this shortage of food, there were more than ten battalions of Chin-shun's army left behind in Su-chou and Anhsi, a place where they could get food, but without much need of such a big army. The forces under Chang Yüeh and Sung Ch'ing (宋慶) required Tso to furnish their supplies too. If Tso would only furnish them east of Hami, Ching-lien said, these armed forces would not do much good, since the main battles would be fought west of Hami. In a word, Ching-lien wanted the Court to put pressure on Tso so that Tso would supply grain to all the troops in Sinkiang.⁶⁰

The exchange of arguments revealed some misinformation. It was clear by this time that no grain could be purchased in sufficient quantity either in Kobdo, Uliasutai or Ku-ch'eng. However, to face the problem Ching-lien simply held Tso responsible for the trouble, and claimed that without supplies, he could not carry out the mission given to him.⁶¹

To answer Yüan, Tso reported back to the Court as follows:

Though Yüan Pao-cheng agreed to move the supply center to Barkol, . . . his main effort is still in trying to ship the grain through Su-chou. He has rushed the order to build wagons, and bought three thousand donkeys. These donkeys and wagons are now moving westward from Sian, and an accomplished fact has been established. Nevertheless the fact remains that these heavily loaded grain wagons can never cross the mountain passes of the T'ien-shan. . . . Even if we do follow Yüan's ideas, ready to pay any price to carry out his plan, I predict that not one grain of the shipment will reach Barkol. Starting from Su-chou, by way of Anhsi to cross Hami, there are twenty-four

⁶⁰Fang-lüeh, CCXCII, 6-9; Ching-lien; Kuang-hsü (hereafter abbreviated as K. H. for 光緒) 1 y., 1 m., 25 d.

⁶¹*Ibid.*

stations, or 2,200 li⁶² in distance. It covers a great deal of desert, and the caravan can stop and eat only where there is water and fuel. . . . Even under pressure, it must take more than thirty days to reach Barkol. Each donkey has to take eight catties of feed a day, and each driver has to eat two catties of food. West of Lanchou. . . the feed of animals is limited to grains. Thus, the feed of animals is the same as the food of men. A wagon carries a maximum load of six hundred catties. For a journey of more than thirty days, the two donkeys will eat up five hundred and more catties of grain, while the driver will consume another sixty catties. The whole load of the wagon will be gone before it reaches its destination. If we insist on holding the grain for use in Barkol, then where shall we get the feed and fodder on the road? This is what I call waste, no matter how you look at it. In a word, the best means of transportation in the northwest are camels, because they eat less and carry more, and are able to cross the difficult mountain passes and deserts. Within the Great Wall, a camel needs only about two or three catties of grain each day. Leaving them on the pastures in the daytime, and moving them only during the night will provide all the necessary feed, besides the grain. Furthermore, one man can take care of five camels, and save food. Once they get out of the Great Wall, the camels can depend almost entirely on natural feed and need grain only in rare cases when they are really tired. . . .

In my opinion, the proper thing for Yüan to do is first to investigate thoroughly all the possibilities of supply lines by way of Uliasutai, Kobdo, or any other place, then to pick the best northern route and use all the camels already on hand to ship the grain to Barkol. After a considerable quantity has accumulated, then move the supply center to that city, and keep on moving grain through the same route. Only then can he send camels down from Barkol to Su-chou to pick up grain there. By that time, it will be close to the fall harvest and easier to get grain. Otherwise if he merely stays in Su-chou. . . he will waste much money and get no supplies to the front lines. Those wagons and donkeys already bought. . . can be transferred for the use of the posts. . . .

There are already enough soldiers in Barkol, . . . as well as along the supply line, for protection. . . . As it is unnecessary for Yüan Pao-

⁶²Each li (里) is about 1/3 of a mile or 1/2 of a kilometer.

*heng to take soldiers with him, funds can be saved. . . . Furthermore, his sole duty is to ship supplies. It is not necessary for him to conflict with the military command. . . .*⁶³

In order to meet practical needs, instead of evading responsibility, Tso reported in the same memorial that after thorough investigation, he had learned that there was a possible route between Kuei-hua, Pao-t'ou and Barkol. It was not a route officially established, and no governmental posts were there. But along this route, there was much grain and many camels. Tso had sent officials to Kuei-hua to try this out.⁶⁴ This route later proved to be the one that solved the dilemma. It furnished the bulk of the grain needed in Sinkiang during those crucial months, with comparatively low expenses.⁶⁵ It was certainly much lower than what Yüan Pao-heng had first proposed. This was recorded in a memorial to the Court by Tso, on July 26, 1876:

*The purchasing and shipping headquarters is in Kuei-hua. The branch office is in Pao-t'ou. After experimenting for more than one year, five million and more catties of grain have been purchased and shipped. Adding to those purchased and shipped from Ninghsia, the total has been more than seven million catties delivered and stored in Barkol. All the needs of the expeditionary forces, including Chin-shun's army, have been furnished by this line. During the same period of time, the grain accumulated and shipped along the line Kan-chou, Kao-t'ai, Su-chou, An-hsi, Hami has reached the amount of more than twenty million catties. This latter amount is certainly very huge. . . . but the real benefit for the soldiers in the front line has been very little. Recently we have tried to ship the grain along this line to Ku-ch'eng. . . . After suffering tremendous trouble and losses, ruining numerous carts as well as animals, we. . . have shipped up to July 20, 1876, the same amount as what Kuei-hua, Pao-t'ou, Ninghsia line had delivered to Barkol, i.e., seven million catties. But the shipping expense from Su-chou to Ku-ch'eng was fifteen taels and more for each hundred catties . . . whereas that along the line of Kuei-hua, Pao-t'ou to Barkol was only eight taels and more. The expense was almost double. It proves that the . . . northern line is the better line. . . .*⁶⁶

⁶³Tso: *Memorials*, XLVI, 19-25.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*

⁶⁵Some grain was ordered from Russia but only in supplementary quantity.

⁶⁶Tso: *Memorials*, XLVIII, 69-70. In 1875, when a Russian army officer, Sos-

The argument about the transportation of supplies between Ching-lien, Yüan Pao-heng, and Tso Tsung-t'ang was so serious that in 1874 and the beginning of 1875, it almost put the whole expedition in jeopardy. Tso was annoyed by Yüan, but the real road block was the old system of using only Manchus in Sinkiang.⁶⁷ Tso frankly complained in his correspondence as follows:

*The expeditionary forces are ready, but the one who is stationed in Hami is deliberately blocking the way by complaining about the shortage of food. Without any move, the troops are eating up all the grain which was moved into Sinkiang under the most difficult conditions. Yet I can do nothing. With all my good intentions. . . I cannot help. That is what irks and worries me. The idea for me to return to Su-chou was unnecessary for the time being, because the rebels have fled to Sui-lai, leaving the vast area from Chia-Yü-kuan to Hami and Barkol without a single rebel. The most difficult problems of Sinkiang are not the rebels, but rather the hardship involved in transportation and the lack of leadership.*⁶⁸

"The one who is stationed in Hami" referred to Ching-lien. Tso was irked and worried because he could do nothing about the situation. Nevertheless, the very problem of transportation of supplies ruined Ching-lien's career in Sinkiang and opened the way for Tso. By the wise insistence of Wen-hsiang (文祥), the great Manchu statesman who was then Grand secretary, Tso was appointed on May 3, 1875, Imperial Commissioner in Charge of the military affairs in Sinkiang with Chin-shun as his deputy. Ching-lien, as well as Yüan Pao-heng, was recalled to Peking.⁶⁹ This was much more than a personal triumph over his political rivals. It marked the change of a traditional policy which had been deeply rooted in the heart and mind of

nowsky, visited Tso Tsung-t'ang at Lanchow, Tso made a deal with him. Sosnowsky contracted to deliver three million catties of Russian grain from the district of Zaisan at Ku-ch'eng at 7.5 taels per hundred catties. By April, 1876, the Russians actually delivered about four million catties. This certainly helped Tso's army. Bales: *Tso Tsung-t'ang*, 336-337. Cf. *Nien-p'u*, VII, 41; VIII, 5; Tso: *Memorials*, XLVII, 5-6; *Letters*, XV, 46-48.

⁶⁷Tso: *Letters*, XIV, 60.

⁶⁸Tso: *P'i-cha*, V, 26-27.

⁶⁹Tso: *Memorials*, XLVI, 53. *Fang-lüeh*, CCXCIII, 18-21; to Tso; 21-22; to the Cabinet; K. H. 1 y., 3 m., 28 d.

the Manchu Court. It marked the end of Sinkiang as a colony reserved for Manchus. Tso Tsung-t'ang was appointed to take charge of the affairs, not because he was a Chinese, but because he was the ablest man to handle the problems. With this breakdown of the Manchu monopoly, came the possibility of a new era for Sinkiang.

3. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PROVINCIAL SYSTEM IN SINKIANG

Up to the time of Tso Tsung-t'ang, Sinkiang had been under a special political system. It was not a province, but was under the control of the military governor of Ili (伊犁將軍) with the help of three assistant military governors (參贊大臣) stationed respectively at Ili, Tarbagatai, and Yarkand; five Commandants of the Forces (領隊大臣) at Ili, and one Commandant of the Forces each at Tarbagatai, Ush, Yarkand, Urumchi, Turfan, Guchen (Ku-ch'eng) and Krukara Usu; six Agents (辦事大臣) at Kashgar, Kharashar, Kuche, Aksu, Khotan and Hami; two Assistant Agents (幫辦大臣) at Ush and Hami. All of these were Manchus or at least Bannermen.⁷⁰ The civil administration was mainly entrusted to native chiefs. They were granted the titles of "Beg" (伯克) and "T'ai-chi" (臺吉) and allowed to rule their own tribes with a free hand.⁷¹

This was not the regular administrative system in China. There were three reasons for establishing this special system in Sinkiang. First, considering the natives to be a conquered people, the Manchus thought that it was necessary to keep them under strict military rule. The whole area was thus put under close watch of a strong garrison force to avoid any possible rebellion. Secondly, considering the natives to be uncivilized and unworthy people, the Manchu Court left them in the hands of native chiefs. It did not care nor bother to find out what the native chiefs were doing for (or maybe against) the people. Thirdly, considering Sinkiang to be a colony reserved for Manchu exploitation, the Court intentionally put it under a system of exclusive Manchu bureaucracy. In none of these three cases was the system good for the natives.

Judging from the point of view of China as a nation, the old system was a bad system too. It alienated the natives and handicapped the

⁷⁰W. F. Mayers: *The Chinese Government*, 101-103.

⁷¹Tso: *Letters*, XXI, 8-11.

healthy development of the great "melting pot," which should treat no one as a secondary citizen or subject.

Even judging from the Manchu view point, the old system missed its original goal of holding Sinkiang, once the garrison forces had become weak and corrupted.

Consequently, as the years went by, more thoughtful people began to think of changing the system into the regular provincial system practiced in other parts of the country.

Wei Yüan⁷² (魏源 April 23, 1794-1856) in his *Sheng-wu-chi* argued vigorously not only for holding Sinkiang, but also for the establishment of a regular administrative system of counties and prefects throughout the area.⁷³ Another outstanding advocate of the idea was Kung Tzu-chen (龔自珍 August 22, 1792-1841, September 26).⁷⁴ Kung presented a long article to the public about how to establish a province in Sinkiang. He suggested transferring the idle Banner men and the extra population in China proper to Sinkiang. He proposed to divide Sinkiang into eleven Prefectures (*fu* 府) and three Independent Departments (*Chih-li-chou* 直隸州). Among these, nine Prefectures and the three Independent Departments would be new. The other two Prefectures, Chen-hsi (Barkol) and Ti-hua (Urumch'i), had already been under the regular administrative system. The twelve new units would be subdivided into forty-six counties (*hsien* 縣) and two Departments (*Chou* 州). There would be a Governor-general stationed at Ili, and a governor stationed at Urumchi. Under these two there would be a Financial and a Judicial Commissioner just as in the other provinces. The eastern boundary of the new province would be west of Anhsi. In other words, the area stretching west from Barkol to Urumchi would be taken away from Kansu and put under the jurisdiction of the new provinces.⁷⁵ Kung's proposal was just his personal opinion, but it proved to be the forerunner of later official decisions.

After Sinkiang was recovered, Tso Tsung-t'ang felt that it was necessary to change Sinkiang into a regular province and abolish the old system. However, as he did not like to bear the entire responsi-

⁷²Wei Yüan, historian and geographer, was a native of Shao-yang, Hunan. *ECCP*, 850-852.

⁷³Wei Yüan: *Sheng-wu-chi*, IV, 13.

⁷⁴Kung Tzu-chen, scholar, poet, reformer, was a native of Hangchow. *ECCP*, 431-434.

⁷⁵Kung Tzu-chen: *Ting-an Wen-chi* (定盦文集), II, 4-11.

bility for the decision, he proposed the idea, but requested the Court to present the program to the cabinet as well as to the chiefs of offices in Peking and governors-general and governors in the various provinces.⁷⁶ In a letter which he wrote to Liu Chin-t'ang, the field commander in Sinkiang, in 1878, the idea became more concrete. He said:

No matter whether the officials in the Court agree or disagree, the only good way to have permanent peace and order is to establish a province there. I am thinking of sending in a draft of a program to the Court and request His Majesty to appoint the governor-general and the governor of Sinkiang first. Then have the details worked out so that things can move faster. . . . The governor-general of Sinkiang is to be stationed at Urumchi, the governor at Aksu. The military governor is to stay at Ili, with the help of a general-in-chief (提督): A Manchu Brigadier-general (副都統) is to be stationed at Tarbagatai. All the traditional posts of assistant military governors, agents and others can be abolished. At Kashgar, a general-in-chief is to be established. In all other cities where there have been Commandants of the Forces, the official shall be replaced by Brigadier-generals (鎮) and Intendants (道). All the posts shall be filled by either Chinese or Manchus without discrimination.

The garrison forces should gradually be replaced by natives, so that the natives can gradually be transformed and become strong enough to resist invaders. The boundary line between Sinkiang and Kansu should be clarified. The area west of Hami should belong to Sinkiang, that east of Anhsi and Tun-huang should belong to Kansu. . . . The army inside the Great Wall should be sifted so that unfit soldiers can be discharged. . . . The funds thus saved should be spent in Sinkiang. The old system of "Beg" (伯克) and "T'ai-chi" (臺吉) among the Moslem tribes in Sinkiang should continue, but anyone unfit for the work should be discharged. These Moslems should be considered. . . as hired helpers but not as officials of the government. They should be paid for their services and strictly forbidden to blackmail the common people. Terms of service may be set up to limit their power. . . .

After His Majesty Ch'ien-lung conquered Sinkiang, he left the authority to collect taxes in the hands of Akim Begg (阿奇木伯克), or Local Governors. The idea was to keep the old traditions to avoid confusion. . . . But many abuses have since developed and the common subjects

⁷⁶Tso: *Letters*, XX, 26-27; and 32-33.

have been helplessly exploited by the Akim Beks. When the Manchu officials came, they would in turn press the Akim Beks for money. There has been a lot of extra money paid outside of the regular tax. When the government might have taxed ten taels the actual payment by the Moslem subjects would be twenty; and these people suffered. When we are talking about the establishment of provinces, we are intending to rule them in the same way as we do in China proper. Then we shall also practice the same system of unified tax there. The old severe system of head tax should be abolished and the tax be levied from land. By doing so, the tax will be definite and both the rich and the poor will pay their fair share. . . . The tax should be light (about ten percent) . . . and no extra should be charged. . . . The receipt should have the name of the taxpayer and the quantity of tax paid written in the Moslem language, so that the Moslems can recognize it. Those who plant cotton should be allowed to pay in money instead of kind. . . .

Besides, we are planning to levy likin in Sinkiang as we are doing in the interior. . . . The miscellaneous taxes which can be abolished must be cancelled as soon as possible.⁷⁷

However, a concrete detailed program for the establishment of a province in Sinkiang was not sent to the Court until May 26, 1880.⁷⁸ It arrived in Peking on June 8, 1880, and was pigeon-holed by the Court on the ground that this program was not practical, inasmuch as Ili was still in the hands of the Russians.⁷⁹ On August 11th, Tso Tsung-t'ang was called to Peking to take up his job as Grand Secretary and Minister of the Council of State. He was also asked to recommend his successor.⁸⁰ By his strong recommendation, Liu Chin-t'ang was picked over Chin-shun to become Imperial Commissioner in charge of military affairs in Sinkiang. Liu went to Hami to take over the seal on November 14th.⁸¹ A little more than a year later, T'an Chung-lin (譚鍾麟), the new governor-general of Shen-kan, suggested to establish more counties and departments as the first step toward the estab-

⁷⁷Tso: *Letters*, XXI, 8-11.

⁷⁸Tso: *Memorials*, LVI, 34-37; *Fang-lüeh*, CCCXIII, 8-13; Tso Tsung-t'ang; K. H. 6 y., 5 m., 1 d.

⁷⁹*Fang-lüeh*, CCCXIII, 13; to Tso; K. H. 6 y., 5 m., 1 d.

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, CCCXIII, 23; to Tso; K. H. 6 y., 7 m., 6 d.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, CCCXIII, 24; Liu Ching-t'ang; K. H. 6 y., 11 m., 24 d.

lishment of Sinkiang province. He proposed changing seven more cities in southern Sinkiang into the regular administrative system of counties and departments as in China proper. Two Intendants were added, one stationed at Kashgar and one at Aksu.⁸² This proposal was restated in more detailed form a few months later by a joint memorial of Liu Chin-t'ang and T'an Chung-lin.⁸³ They also proposed to abolish the old system of Akim Beks as soon as the new county system materialized.⁸⁴ On the same day, September 4, 1882, the Court received a report that Ili had been returned on March 22.⁸⁵ The original reason for objecting to the establishment of a province in Sinkiang was thus removed. Yet the new proposal was opposed by some officials who warned that the population in the area was too scattered and too small to support the proposed system.⁸⁶ Both the proposal and the objections were sent to the Board of Civil Office (吏部) for review. On December 24, 1882, the report came back approving generally what Liu and T'an suggested regarding the establishment of local officials but it disapproved the idea of abolishing Akim Beks.⁸⁷ This report was approved by the Court.⁸⁸

Several months later, in 1883, Liu and T'an again suggested that the Akim Beks with higher ranks should be allowed to keep their ranks and treated as gentry. The other Beks with lower ranks should be appointed subordinate officials in the county offices, working together with other Chinese subordinates.⁸⁹ This was again sent to the Board of Civil Office for review. The Board reported back expressing doubt as to the wisdom of this move and feared that it might cause a new rebellion.⁹⁰ The Court thus withheld action.⁹¹

On November 16, 1884, the Court finally approved the proposal to establish a governor and a Financial Commissioner in Sinkiang. With a few reservations, it also abolished the numerous Assistant

⁸²*Ibid.*, CCCXV, 9-12; T'am Chung-lin; K. H. 8 y., 2 m., 27 d.

⁸³*Ibid.*, CCCXV, 12-15; Liu and T'an; K. H. 8 y., 7 m., 22 d.

⁸⁴*Ibid.*, CCCXV, 15-18; Liu and T'an; K. H. 8 y., 7 m., 22 d.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*, CCCXV, 18; Chang Yüeh; K. H. 8 y., 7 m., 22 d.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, CCCXV, 23-24; Liu Hai-ao; K. H. 8 y., 8 m., 3 d.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*, CCCXV, 26-34; Board of Civil Office; K. H. 8 y., 11 m., 15 d.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, CCCXV, 40; same date.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, CCCXVI, 13; Liu and T'an; K. H. 9 y., 5 m., 13 d.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, CCCXVI, 16; Board of Civil Office; K. H. 9 y., 5 m., 13 d.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, CCCXVI, 18; same date.

Military Governors, Commandants of the Forces, Agents, Assistant Agents.⁹² Liu Chin-t'ang was appointed as the first governor.⁹³

Another year elapsed and on October 16, 1885, the power of the Military Governor of Ili was modified, and it became as that of a Manchu General-in-chief stationed in Inland China. In other words, the office took charge of the Manchu garrison forces but not the civil administration. The Assistant Military Governor at Ili was abolished, and Manchu Brigadier-generals were established just like the system in China proper. By this time, the establishment of a province in Sinkiang was accomplished.⁹⁴

⁹²*Ibid.*, CCCXVIII, 28; To the Cabinet; K. H. 10 y., 9 m., 29 d.

⁹³*Ibid.*, CCCXVIII, 31; Liu Ching-t'ang; K. H. 10 y., 12 m., 18 d.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*, CCCXIX, 15-17; Chin-shun; K. H. 11 y., 9 m., 9 d.

Chapter VI

SUMMARY

China, as a "melting pot," has absorbed numerous tribes and clans, as well as various religions into her civilization during her long history. The *Uigurs*, as a group of people, came to China centuries ago. Islam, as a religion, also had a long record in China's past. When the *Uigurs* embraced Islam, the relation of the two became so close that in later days the Chinese often mistakenly took the two, the people and the religion, to be inseparable. Many of the *Uigurs*, of course, were partially assimilated into the Chinese civilization. They spoke Chinese; they wore Chinese clothes. Yet they remained different from their fellow Chinese. Usually they were very stubborn in holding on to their religious faith, which was illustrated in their daily life. They would not allow their daughters to marry the "heathen." They would not tolerate a bit of pork or lard in their houses. They would not smoke opium. They would not drink wine. No doubt there were always individual exceptions, but as a whole, they remained clearly distinct from other Chinese. This group, the partially assimilated *Uigurs*, was called Chinese Moslems, or "Tungans." Many of them lived in northwest China. Because of their stubborn loyalty to their faith, the friction, misunderstanding and hostility between them and the "heathen Chinese" were constantly there. Often a little spark touched off the accumulated hatred and exploded into sanguinary violence which decimated the population. The Moslem rebellion, which started in 1862 in this area, was one of the most significant cases.

The conquest of China by the Manchus in the seventeenth century made the Manchus the masters of the nation. With their fresh, vigorous fighting spirit and their political skill, the Manchus built up a great empire which extended its western boundary far into central Asia. During the process of conquest and consolidation, the basic policy of the Manchus toward the Moslems and northwest China emerged. On one hand the Manchu government insisted on holding

Sinkiang; on the other, it tried to keep a delicate balance of power among the different groups of people in the area to check each other, so that the Manchus, as conquerors of all, could stay on top and exploit the conquered.

The western frontiers of Sinkiang were very mountainous and had a cold climate. In many places the border would be closed by snow for nearly half the year. It was a natural border, easy to defend but hard to cross. The eastern side of Sinkiang, on the contrary, was different. It was a vast flat desert, with oases scattered far apart from each other. To defend this area effectively was virtually impossible. An enemy with proper means, such as a strong cavalry, could penetrate the vast area at any place and at any time at will. If the enemy were determined enough, he could invade deep into the heart of the Chinese Empire. For this strategic reason, the Manchu government chose to hold Sinkiang once it had conquered the area.

The Manchus were conscious that they were a minority. They used their best military forces to conquer and hold the land. But they also understood that it was difficult for them alone to hold everybody down forever. Taking advantage of the differences and suspicions between the various groups of people, the Manchu court deliberately moved various groups of people into strategic areas, such as Ili, in Sinkiang. The Manchus did not encourage conflicts between the various peoples, because as the common master they preferred to have peace and order among their subjects. However, by playing the delicate balance of power between the various groups of people, the Manchus were more assured of their position, because they would be the only weighty influence that could rule over all.

For a long while these two points of the basic Manchu policy had been successful. In the first place, the Manchu military forces were strong enough to hold Sinkiang. In the second place, the Manchus, as foreign conquerors, were fair enough to all those they conquered.

But when the Manchus gradually lost their past virtues, their basic policy in northwest China began to collapse. Their physical strength declined. Their fighting spirit dimmed. Then they found it difficult to hold Sinkiang. Their assimilation with the Chinese deepened. Their prejudices against the Moslems increased. This prejudice was not limited to the local officials, but was shared by the Manchus from the Empresses Dowager down. When the ruling class began to take sides,

the Manchu government was no longer a fair master over all. Unconsciously it helped the Chinese suppress the Moslems. This was a policy diametrically contrary to the basic policy laid down by the earlier Emperors. The dissatisfaction of the Moslems grew. As long as the military and political power of the government were strong enough to hold the Moslems in hand, the troubles were limited to tension and short-lived local riots. But the main military forces of the Manchu government, the Eight Banners and the Green Battalions, had both declined. All kinds of local leaders built up military forces of their own, usually in the form of *T'uan-lien*, or local corps. Thus both the Moslem leaders and the Chinese gentry had organized manpower under their command. When an incident happened in 1862 between local Moslems and Chinese in Shensi, it touched off a large scale rebellion which soon spread all over the northwest.

In the area of Shensi, the policy of the government toward the Moslem rebels was a temporizing one. Under Governor Ying-ch'i and Commander Sheng-pao, the policy wavered between military suppression and peaceful reconciliation. The government preferred to execute all the rebels, but was too weak in military strength to carry this policy out. Hence it found it necessary to make gestures of reconciliation toward the Moslems. Yet neither the government officials nor the influential Chinese gentry had faith in the Moslems. They used reconciliation only when they found themselves too weak to fight against a strong Moslem force. This kind of truce was made either to be broken whenever the proportion of strength on both sides changed, or to draw more resentment and contempt from the Moslem rebels. This wavering policy drove the peaceful Moslems away from the government, because it was usually the peaceful ones whom the government forces could reach and kill, and gave the radical rebels an excellent chance to rally more and more co-religionists to their cause.

After To-lung-a arrived in Shensi and took over the command, the policy was no more a wavering one. He fought bitter and bloody battles, and destroyed numerous Moslem bases as well as Moslem people. He carried out a policy of military suppression with a soldier's determination. Right or wrong, he achieved one thing, *i.e.*, the Moslem rebels never did come back to Shensi in any permanent way. But his achievement was limited. Even before his untimely death, owing to a wound suffered in a battle against the T'ai-p'ings in Chou-chih, he decided to restrain his main forces in Shensi. He had no intention of repeating his performance in Kansu.

In Kansu, the situation regarding policy-making was quite similar to that of the earlier days of the rebellion in Shensi. Both En-lin, the acting Governor-general, and Hsi-lin, the governor-general, were too weak to fight and too prejudiced to attempt a reconciliation. A temporizing policy resulted, with the rebellion spreading far and wide.

In the area of Ninghsia, the local authority, the Chinese Intendant Hou Yun-teng, followed a policy of armed defense. The Chinese local corps managed to defend themselves. Then the Court appointed Ch'ing-yun to be the Manchu General-in-chief of Ninghsia. Ch'ing-yun influenced the Court and successfully transferred local authority into his own jurisdiction. Believing that the trouble in the area was caused by the Chinese local corps, he disbanded them. This resulted in the fall of Ninghsia and the murder of Hou Yun-teng, when the Moslems attacked again.

After Tu-hsing-a and Mu-t'u-shan took over the command of the area, Ch'ing-yun died a natural death. These two Manchu generals tried to suppress the Moslem rebels by force, but the best they could achieve was a stalemate. The long war exhausted everybody, and due to the shortage of the food supply, the Moslems offered to negotiate peace. Mu-t'u-shan and the weary army were ready to accept it, but Tu-hsing-a preferred to fight. Mu-t'u-shan won the day. Tu-hsing-a, who had already been transferred to a post in Mukden, had left the command to Mu-t'u-shan. Mu appeased the Moslem leaders, Ma Hua-lung of Chin-chi-pao and Ma wan-hsuan of Ninghsia, and the area temporarily returned to "normalcy" with the Moslems dominating most matters.

While the above-mentioned developments were going on in Ninghsia, the situation in Kansu as a whole was deteriorating. Lei Cheng-kuan, Ts'ao K'e-chung, and T'ao Mao-lin, the three generals sent into Kansu by To-lung-a, had good military successes in the first stage. But soon they were defeated one after another by the same basic weakness—the shortage of resources in Kansu. Not only were there no funds, but also no food. T'ao's troops mutinied first. Then Lei and Ts'ao suffered a major defeat near Chin-chi-pao. After Lei was reprimanded by the Court for this defeat, his troops mutinied too. Yang Yueh-pin, the new governor-general who succeeded Hsi-lin, tried but failed to achieve any military success. The economic exhaustion was so critical that even the soldiers in Lanchow, the provincial capital, mutinied. Yang managed to recover Lanchow, but

could not stay in the post much longer, and resigned. By this time, the Moslem rebellion was no longer the only problem of Kansu. Famine, refugees and mutineers complicated the situation.

Tso Tsung-t'ang was appointed to succeed Yang, but since he was then far away in Fukien, Mu-t'u-shan was ordered to move from Ninghsia to Lanchow, to replace Yang before Tso could go. Mu, with a successful record of reconciliation in Ninghsia, found conditions in Kansu extremely difficult and naturally tended to follow a policy of compromise.

Tso Tsung-t'ang, a veteran hero in the suppression of the T'ai-p'ing rebellion, had had a special interest in northwest China even before he received his new assignment. He had studied the area and its problems, and had a definite program to attack the situation.

At the moment when Tso arrived in Shensi, both the *Nien* and the Moslems were strong. But Tso assumed that the Moslems would stay in their local areas, whereas the *Nien* would endanger the heart land of the Empire. He decided to destroy the *Nien* before attacking the Moslems in force.

After the *Nien* were annihilated, Tso faced the problem of having too many troops designated for the northwest. Tso knew that the basic difficulty in the area was the shortage of funds and supplies. Hence he firmly refused to take extra troops with him. He kept a constant watch over those troops already in the area and continuously demobilized those who had become unfit for duty.

Though Tso impressed people as a boastful man, he was not one who liked to utter empty words. Later facts proved that Tso was firm in his policy of retaking Sinkiang, yet when he was in Shensi, he refused even to discuss it. Repeatedly he received requests from Sinkiang and orders from Peking to reinforce that faraway district. He did not even bother to answer them. To him, it was ridiculous to talk about saving Sinkiang when Kansu was still in the hands of the rebels. To send a lonely expeditionary force across a distant hostile territory was considered a suicidal move by Tso. Furthermore, after all, the interior was still more important than the frontier. So he decided to clear the interior first and then drive, step by step, to the west.

The cold fact that the barren plateau of Kansu, and the vast desert of Sinkiang, would never be able to supply the needs of a big expeditionary force was well-known. Thus, Tso insisted on having enough

funds before he would start the campaign. He argued that the rich, southeastern part of China had an obligation to support the military campaign in the northwest.

After the Court followed his advice and assigned substantial funds from the various provinces for his campaign, he learned by bitter experience that these funds seldom were delivered in full amount and on schedule. Should he wait for their delivery, his army would suffer. He decided, in spite of criticism and financial losses, to borrow money from Chinese merchants and foreign banks. This made it possible to raise enough funds in cash and on time to carry out his plans. At the same time, incidentally, the necessity of securing an indorsement of the loan by the Customs Service through the Court, cut down Tso's power and increased the authority of the central government and the Inspector-general of the Customs Service.

Another important decision in policy was the age-old question of whether to fight or make peace. The Moslems rebelled openly. They had committed murder, arson and numerous other crimes. Should they be properly punished according to law? If so, how could one expect them to surrender themselves peacefully to sure death? If not, how could the government guarantee the security of the common people in the future? To force the Moslems to surrender required military victories. Yet military victories, which often meant the killing of most of the able-bodied Moslems in those days, was not only inhuman, but required considerable effort, if it were at all possible. Tso's policy was to beat the Moslems soundly in battle, then to accept their offer of peace on his own terms. His terms usually included the surrender of the leaders, weapons and horses; the destruction of the fortifications; and a blanket guarantee of peace and order in the future. In other words, Tso was ready to use force, harshly and bloodily if necessary, but with the aim of making peace with the Moslems in the end.

Tso believed in the traditional idea that "cutting off the head of a snake will make the remaining part of the snake harmless." In each individual case of surrender, he insisted on arresting the leaders of the group. In Kansu as a whole, he picked out Ma Hua-lung, the "New Sect" leader, as the most dangerous foe. His victory over Chin-chi-pao was costly, but it removed a threat from the rear in the later campaign, and eliminated a potential danger to the Empire in the future.

As has been mentioned above, Tso was a careful planner. He

seldom made risky moves. His campaigns were always thoroughly prepared. Knowing the difficulty of the food situation in Kansu and Sinkiang, he methodically raised crops in the field and painstakingly accumulated grain by long hauls. He made long and thorough preparation before he would strike. But once he moved, he usually accomplished victories decisively and fast.

After military victory and surrender of the enemy, Tso resettled the Moslems in exclusive colonies. The lands, the houses, tools, animals, seed, and food required to start new farms were all provided by the government, free. Before Tso came, the surrendered Moslems had been left to starve, and often rebelled again. By Tso's plan of rehabilitation, the Moslems found better living than they had had for years. Therefore, once a group of Moslem rebels surrendered to Tso, it seldom rebelled again.

Many people suggested prohibiting the Moslem religion. Tso did not agree with the idea. However, when he found that Ma Hua-lung was commanding the "New Sect" followers with a mysterious power, Tso decided to forbid people to follow the "New Sect." This policy was eventually presented to the Court, which took a more liberal attitude and directed Tso to tolerate the "New Sect" as well as the Old.

Tso had faith in Confucian teaching and the Chinese educational and civil examination system. He promoted schools in the conquered districts. He issued books to the Moslems. He sponsored provincial civil examinations in Lanchow. He requested an increase in the quota of degrees granted to the conquered area. By their education and participation in the government, Tso expected the Moslems to remain loyal.

After Tso had successfully recovered Kansu, the solution of the problem of Sinkiang became imminent. Many politicians, notably Li Hung-chang, suggested giving up Sinkiang. Behind the scenes there was a conflict of interests between regional groups. Li and his group were eager to secure the limited government funds for their own program along the coast instead of for Tso's expedition in Sinkiang. Tso, however, knowing the strategic value of the area, argued forcefully against Li. The Court followed Tso's advice. By doing so, an important part of the original basic policy was restored.

But the old policy of using only Manchus as high officials in Sinkiang, in order to reserve the area for Manchu exploitation, became a

constant handicap. A Manchu, Ching-lien, was appointed commander-in-chief to recover Sinkiang. But he was no match for the assignment. There was not enough food to feed a large army, so Ching-lien forbade the advancing reinforcements to enter Sinkiang. Without substantial reinforcement from the interior it was impossible for anyone to reconquer Sinkiang. Ching-lien repeatedly requested the Court to order Tso Tsung-t'ang to ship grain by way of Su-chou, An-hsi, and Hami. This was a long way through the desert, and very costly. After the grain reached Hami, there was still the trying test of shipping it across the T'ien-shan mountains, which were almost insurmountable for loaded carts and wagons. So Tso advised Ching-lien to try some other way. Months passed and Ching-lien got nowhere. On the advice of Wen-hsiang, the Court removed Ching-lien, and appointed Tso to take charge of the military affairs of Sinkiang. With this breakdown of Manchu monopoly, came the turning point of the Sinkiang situation. Tso successfully shipped enough grain into cities north of T'ien-shan from Pao-t'ou, Kuei-sui, Ninghsia and Russia. After the supplies were ready, his troops rapidly recovered Urumchi. Then Liu Chin-t'ang and Chang Yüeh crossed the T'ien-shan to enter southern Sinkiang, and defeated Yakoob Beg. By 1878, all the rebels had either been driven out of China or suppressed. Only the area of Ili, under Russian occupation, was not returned until later, through diplomatic negotiations.

In order to preserve Sinkiang, Tso proposed to establish the provincial system. This was not adopted by the Court until 1884. By the establishment of the provincial system, Sinkiang was promoted to a position equal to the other provinces, inalienable and inseparable from the nation.

The minority groups in China have always been a problem for the political rulers. The Moslems, both the Uigurs and the Chinese Moslems, are particularly stubborn in resisting Chinese assimilation. The differences in faith, culture, customs, and many other points make the Moslems irritating to the average Chinese and *vice versa*. There is, however, no fundamental reason for believing that the two groups can not have a peaceful coexistence. Rivalry between the two groups can cause jealousy and bloody riots and rebellions. Nevertheless, this same rivalry can also be directed into healthy competition and stimulate the improvement of both groups.

When there is a strong government with a wise policy, life between Moslems and Chinese is at least on a basis of mutual tolerance. In many instances, there is harmonious co-operation. On the other hand, when a government becomes weak and biased, many trivial incidents are unnecessarily allowed to develop into big and dangerous troubles. On these occasions, the minority group becomes a strong element of disintegration and often breaks down the empire.

In northwestern China, due to the extreme poverty of most of the area, and the distance and hardship of travel through the desert, disintegration is often fast and complete. However, the strategic necessity and geographical background which make northwestern China an inalienable part of the state lead every empire-builder back to the old frontier. As soon as a government is strong enough to control China proper, it will most likely attempt to take Sinkiang. To leave Sinkiang to a strong contender means an invitation to constant trouble. This is the basic reason behind the northwestern policy of all the Chinese governments, from the Han dynasty to the Republic of China; from the Mongols and the Manchus to the Communists of today. The Moslem problem, thorny and stubborn though it may seem to be, is really not unsolvable. Peaceful co-existence and harmonious cooperation can be worked out under any strong central government.

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- Wang, Hsien-ch'ien, ed.: *Tung-hua-lu*, 88 volumes. Shanghai, 1899. An abridgment of *Ta-Ch'ing Li-ch'ao Shih-lu* from the beginning of the dynasty to 1874.
王先謙：東華錄。光緒二十五年石印本。
- Chu, Shou-p'eng, ed.: *Tung-hua-hsü-lu*, 220 *chüan*, Shanghai, 1909. An abridgment of *Ta-Ch'ing Li-ch'ao Shih-lu* from 1875 to 1908. It is not so voluminous as the original, but many facts, including some important ones, are omitted. It was valuable before the original was available to the public.
朱壽朋：東華續錄。宣統元年上海圖書集成公司鉛印本。

*The other part, reference books not directly used, is omitted as being too voluminous.

I-hsin and others, ed.: *Ch'ing-ting P'ing-ting Shen-Kan Sinkiang Hui-fei Fang-lieh*, 320 *chüan* text plus 1 *chüan* extra. Peking, 1896. A collection of documents relating to the suppression of the Moslem rebellion, arranged in chronological order from the eighth moon of the fifth year of Hsien-feng to the ninth moon of the fourteenth year of Kuang-hsü. It is a rich source of first hand materials, but some important documents have been left out. These official documents of the Manchu government often furnished the best information. There are, however, several common defects. First, the government officials who made the reports were directly involved in the issues. They usually had the tendency to cover up mistakes, defeats, corruptions, while exaggerating victories and successes. Secondly, they viewed everything from the angle of the ruling class. Very little of Moslem opinion was presented. 奕訢等：欽定平定陝甘新疆回匪方略。

Ching-ting Hui-chiang Tse-li, 1908. The laws and regulations of southern Sinkiang.

欽定回疆則例·光緒三十四年排印本。

U. S. 45th Congress, 3rd Session: House of Representatives. Ex. Doc. No. 108. *Report upon the Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign Countries for the year 1878*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1879. China. 209-279. *Report, by Vice-Consul-general Bailey of Shanghai, on the commerce, navigation, and industries of China, its trade with the United States and other foreign countries, for the year 1878*.

Sir T. Douglas Forsyth's *Report* of his visit to Yarkand, in *Parliamentary Papers*, House of Commons, London, 1871, Vol. LI.

Report of a Mission to Yarkand in 1873 under command of Sir T. D. Forsyth ... with historical and geographical information regarding the possessions of the ameer of Yarkand. Calcutta, printed at the Foreign Department Press. 1875.

Yüan, Tung-li compiled and edited: *Russo-Chinese Treaties and Agreements Relating To Sinkiang 1851-1949*. Hongkong, 1963.

袁同禮校訂：新疆研究叢刊第四種：中俄西北條約集。

2. *Private Papers and Works*

Anonymous: *Ping-Hui Chi-lieh*, in Pai Shou-I, ed.: *Hui-ming Ch'i-i*, III. It was written by a minor official in Kansu. The author participated in the defense of Lanchow against the Moslems. This book refers to the fighting against the Moslems in Kansu.

佚名：平回紀畧·見回民起義第三冊。

Chang, Chi-hsin: *Liu-tung Chi-shih*, in *Hui-ming Ch'i-i*, III. It originally was one part of Chang's Autobiography. In 1858, Chang left Kansu and went to Shensi. This article tells what he learned in Shensi.

張翼善：臨潼紀事·見回民起義第三冊。

Chang, Chao-tung: *Shou-ch'i Chi-shih*, in *Hui-ming Ch'i-i*, IV. Chang was the Prefect of Feng-hsiang when that city was under attack and siege by the Moslems from 1862-1864. This book describes the defense of Feng-hsiang.

張兆棟：守岐紀事·見回民起義第四冊。

- Ch'ien, Ting-ming: *Ch'ien Ming-su-kung Tsou-i*, 7 *chüan* of text plus 1 *chüan* extra. 1878. A collection of the official papers of Ch'ien, a governor.
錢鼎銘：錢敏肅公奏議。卷首一卷，七卷。光緒四年版。
- Forsyth, Sir Thomas Douglas: *Autobiography and Reminiscences of Sir Douglas Forsyth*, edited by his daughter. London, B. Bentley and Son, 1887. Forsyth was the English official who went to Kashgar to sign the commercial treaty with Yakoob Beg.
- Hsüeh, Fu-ch'eng: *Yung-an Ch'üan-chi*, 21 *chüan*. Shanghai, 1901. A collection of writings of Hsüeh, a famous contemporary writer and a government official. (1838-1894)
薛福成：庸齋全集。二十一卷。光緒辛丑（二十七年）年上海書局石印本。
- Fu-k'e: *Hsi-hsing So-lu*, in *Hsiao-fang-hu-tsai Yü-ti Ts'ung-ch'ao*, Series VI, Vol. IV, 300-304. A description of what a German advisor saw when he was invited to visit Hami by Tso Tsung-t'ang in 1880.
福克：西行瑣錄。見小方壺齋輿地叢鈔六帙四冊。
- Kung, Tsu-ch'en: *Ting-an Wen-chi*, Hangchow, 1868. A collection of articles written by Kung (1792-1841).
龔自珍：定盦文集。同治七年夏五雕，仁和本。
- Lei, Cheng-kuan: *To-chung-yung-kung Ch'in-lao-lu*, in *Hui-ming Ch'i-i*, IV. Lei was an officer under To-lung-a. After To died, he edited this book to record To's campaigns. Lei himself participated in many of these campaigns against the Moslems.
雷正綰：多忠勇公勤勞錄。見回民起義第四冊。
- Li, Ts'u-ming: *Yüeh-man-t'ang Jih-chi*, Peking, 1920. This is a diary written by a contemporary official. There is some good information concerning Hu Kuang-yung, the merchant who arranged loans for Tso Tsung-t'ang's campaigns.
李慈銘：越縵堂日記五十一冊。北京浙江公會發行。上海商務代售。
- Li, Hung-chang: *Li Wen-chung-kung Ch'üan-chi*, 100 volumes. Nanking, 1908. Edited by Wu Yu-lun. A collection of the papers of Li Hung-chang (1823-1901).
李鴻章：李文忠公全集。一百冊。光緒三十一年四月。金陵付梓。三十四年五月印行。吳汝綸編。
- Liu, Chin-t'ang: *Liu Hsiang-ch'in-kung Tsou-ka'o*, Changsha, 1898. A collection of memorials of Liu Chin-t'ang (1844-1894), the general who conquered Chin-chi-pao, Hsi-ning, and Sinkiang.
劉錦棠：劉襄勤公奏稿。光緒廿四年長沙刻本。
- Liu, Ming-ch'uan: *Liu Chuang-su-kung Tsou-i*, 6 volumes, Peking, 1906. A collection of memorials of Liu Ming-ch'uan (1836-1896), the leading general of the *Huai-chün* under Li Hung-chang. Liu was in Shensi with the *Huai-chün* when Tso Tsung-t'ang was fighting the Moslem in Kansu.
劉銘傳、劉壯肅公奏議。陳澹然編。光緒三十二年十月北京鉛印，六冊。卷首一卷，奏稿十卷。
- Liu, Jung: *Yang-hui-t'ang Wen-chi*, 10 *chüan*, 1877. A collection of works of Liu Jung (-1873), the governor of Shensi from 1863-1866.
劉蓉：養晦堂文集十卷。光緒丁丑（三年）仲春思賢講舍校刊。
- Ma, Hsin-i: *Ma Tuan-ming-kun Tsou-i*, Foochow, 1893. A collection of memorials of Ma Hsin-i (1821-1870), the governor of Chekiang and later the 馬新貽：馬端敏公奏議。光緒甲午（十九）年冬月閩浙督署校刊。

governor-general of Liang-Kiang.

Po, Ching-wei: *Feng-hsi-ts'ao-t'ang-chi*, 8 *chüan*, Nanking, 1924. A collection of the works of a member of the native gentry of Shensi. He was in the army of Ts'ao K'e-chung when Ts'ao attacked Chin-chi-pao. Later he served as an adviser of Tso Tsung-t'ang.

柏景偉：灑西草堂集八卷。民國十三年刻於金陵。思過齋鈔版。

Richthofen, F. von: *Baron Richthofen's Letters (1870-1872)*, reprinted in Peking, 1941 from second edition, Shanghai; printed at the "North-China Herald" Office, 1903. This is a collection of letters written by Richthofen, who was travelling in China during the said period. In 1872 he spent more than a week in Shensi. From Sian he wrote a letter reporting what he heard about the Moslem rebellion. Much of his information came from biased sources.

Schuyler, Eugene: *Turkistan: Notes of a journey in Russian Turkistan, Khorand, Bukhara, and Kuldja*. 2 vols. 1st edition 1876; 2nd ed. 1877. N. Y. Scribner, Armstrong & Co. Schuyler travelled through the Russian-occupied area in the eighteen-seventies. This book furnished excellent information on the conditions before and after the Russian occupation of Ili.

Shan, Hua-p'u: *Shen-Kan Chieh-yü-lu*. In *Hui-ming Ch'i-i*, IV. This is a collection of anecdotes recorded by Shan of an oral report of Ma Liu-shih, a Moslem "ahung" of P'ing-liang. Ma was a child when he met Tso Tsung-t'ang.

單化普紀錄，馬六十口述：陝甘劫餘錄，見回民起義第四冊。

Shen, Pao-chen: *Shen Wen-su-kung Cheng-shu*, Soochow, 1880. A collection of the official papers of Shen Pao-chen (1820-1879), the governor-general of Liang-Kiang who was a close friend of Tso Tsung-t'ang, but an opponent of Tso's policy of floating foreign loans.

沈葆楨：沈文肅公政書。光緒六年仲冬吳門節署排印。

Shih, Tzu-chou Translated: *Koran in Mandarin*, Taipei, Formosa, 1958.

時子周譯：國語古蘭經，臺北，中華叢書委員會。

Ting, Pao-chen: *Ting Wen-ch'eng-kung Tsou-kao*, Peking, 1893. A collection of the memorials of Ting Pao-chen (1820-1886), the governor of Shantung.

丁寶楨：丁文誠公奏稿。陳洵慶等編。光緒十九年刻成於京師。

Tseng, Chi-tze: *Tseng Hui-ming-kung I-chi*, 17 *chüan*. Shanghai, 1893. A collection of the works of Tseng Chi-tze, eldest son of Tseng Kuo-fan, and Chinese minister to Great Britain. Tseng was later sent to Russia to negotiate the revision of a treaty to return Ili.

曾紀澤：曾惠敏公遺集十七卷。光緒十九年秋江南製造總局刊本。

Tseng, Kuo-ch'üan: *Tseng-ch'ung-hsiang-kung Ch'üan-chi* 1903. A collection of works of Tseng Kuo-ch'üan (1824-1890), the conqueror of Nanking and governor of Shansi from 1877 to 1880.

曾國荃：曾忠襄公全集，蕭榮爵編，奏議三十二卷。光緒廿九年仲春刊本。

Tseng, Kuo-fan: *Tseng-wen-cheng-kung Ch'üan-chi*, 160 *chüan*, 1876. A collection of works of Tseng Kuo-fan (1811-1872).

曾國藩：曾文正公全集，一百六十卷，李瀚章編。光緒二年秋傳忠書局刊。

Tso, Tsung-t'ang: *Tso Chi-kao Po-hsiang P'ing-hui Tsou-kao*, 3 volumes, in long hand. Now in the Far East Library of the University of Washington.

An incomplete collection of memorials of Tso Tsung-t'ang on the suppression of the Moslem rebellion.

左宗棠：左季高伯相平回奏稿，不分卷抄本三冊。

Tso, Tsung-t'ang: *Tso K'o-ching-po Tsou-kaio*, 38 *chüan*, 1868. Another edition of Tso's memorials.

左恪靖伯奏稿三十八卷，同治七年刊本。

Tso, Tsung-t'ang: *Tso Wen-hsiang-kung Ch'üan-chi*, 1888-1897. The complete works of Tso, comprising 134 *chüan*, including 64 *chüan* of memorials, 26 *chüan* of letters and dispatches, 7 *chüan* of literary works, 12 *chüan* of other official papers (including *Kao-shih*, *P'i-cha*, etc.), 10 *chüan* of memorials drafted for Lo Ping-chang, 4 *chüan* of memorials drafted for Chang Liang-chi, 1 *chüan* of table-of-contents, and 10 *chüan* consisting of a chronological biography of Tso written by Lo Cheng-chün, under the title *Tso Wen-hsiang-kung Nien-P'u*. This collection is one of the main sources for the study of the policy of the Manchu government in the suppression of the Moslem Rebellion in northwestern China.

左文襄公全集，一百三十四卷。光緒十四年仲春至三十三年刊本。

Tso, Tsung-t'ang: *Tso Wen-hsiang-kung Shu-tu*, 28 volumes. Nanking. Another edition of Tso's letters, more complete.

左文襄公書牘二十六卷，附家書兩卷，鉛印本二十八冊。南京汪時景評校本。

Wen-k'ang: *Erh-nü Ying-hsiung Chüan*, Shanghai, 1932. A contemporary novel written by a Manchu official who had a splendid family background. Though he was not in line to inherit the family rank of Marquis, he succeeded in acquiring government posts in other ways. "The novel is historically interesting because of its vivid portrayal of the thoughts and activities of the inhabitants of North China, particularly the Bannermen, in that day." ECCP, 7, 444-445, 853.

文廉：兒女英雄傳，上海亞東圖書館民國十四年十二月初版，廿一年十二月四版。

Weng, T'ung-ho: *Weng Wen-kung-kung Jih-chi*, Shanghai, Commercial Press. A very complete diary of a key statesman of the day. Though very little about the Moslem rebellion is mentioned, what it does mention is very valuable. Weng (1830-1904) was the tutor of both Emperor T'ung-chih and Emperor Kuang-hsü, and later a Grand Councilor.

翁同龢：翁文恭公日記，上海涵芬樓景印本。

Yang, Yüeh-pin: *Yang Yung-ch'üeh-kung I-chi*, 17 *chüan*. 1896. A collection of the memorials of Yang Yüeh-pin (1822-1890), the governor-general of Shen-Kan.

楊岳斌：楊勇愨公遺集十七卷。光緒二十一年冬十一月間竹軒刊。

Yü, Shu-ch'ou: *Ch'in-Lung Hui-wu Chi-lüeh*, 8 *chüan* in *Hui-ming Ch'i-i*, IV. Yü was a staff member serving under Chang Chao-tung when the latter was defending Feng-hsiang. This book is a detailed report of the defense.

余澍畴：秦隴回務紀畧，八卷。光緒六年刊於鎮平縣署。見回民起義第四冊。

Yüan, Pao-heng: *Wen-ch'eng-kung Tsou-i* in *Hsiang-ch'eng Yüan-shih Chia-chi*. 6 *chüan*, Hsiang-ch'eng, Honan, 1911. A collection of the works of Yüan Pao-heng (1826-1878), who was in charge of the supplies for Tso Tsung-t'ang's army from 1869 to 1875.

袁保恆：袁文誠公奏議六卷，其他四卷。宣統三年夏清芬閣編刊頂城袁氏家集鉛印本。

III. LOCAL GAZETTES

- Shensi Hsü T'ung-chih Kao*, 225 *chüan*, 1934. A provincial gazette of Shensi covering the period of the Moslem rebellion.
陝西續通志稿。二百廿五卷。民國二十三年十二月印成。宋伯魯等纂。
- Kansu Hsin T'ung-chih* (Hsüan-t'ung), 105 *chüan*. A provincial gazette of Kansu covering the period of the Moslem rebellion.
甘肅新通志(宣統)安維峻等纂。
- Sinkiang T'u-chih*, 116 *chüan*, 1923, Peking. A provincial gazette of Sinkiang covering the period of the Moslem rebellion.
重校訂新疆圖志百十六卷。癸亥(民國十二年)東方學會據志局本重校正增補。天津博愛印書局印行。宣統三年十二月纂成。王樹枏總纂。
- Shuo-fang-tao Chih*, 32 *chüan*, 1926, Tientsin. A gazette of the district of Ninghsia covering the period of the Moslem rebellion.
朔方道志。天津華泰印書館印。民國十五年馬福祥主修。
- T'ung-wei Hsien Hsin Chih*, 13 *chüan*, (Kuang-hsu), 1893, T'ung-wei, Kansu. A gazette of the county T'ung-wei in Kansu covering the period of the Moslem rebellion.
通渭縣新志。光緒十九年冬通渭縣署刊。
- Ta-t'ung Hsien Chih*, 1919, 6 volumes. A gazette of the county Ta-t'ung in Chinghai covering the period of the Moslem rebellion.
大通縣志六冊。民國八年三月。
- Ch'in-chou Chihli-chou Hsin-chih* (Kuang-hsü), 25 *chüan*, 1889. A gazette of the Independent Department Ch'in-chou in Kansu covering the period of the Moslem rebellion.
秦州直隸州新志。光緒十五年仲秋月刊本。
- Tan-ke-erh T'ing Chih* (Hsüan-t'ung), 8 *chüan*, 1910. A gazette of the Independent Sub-Prefecture of Tan-ke-erh, Kansu, covering the period of the Moslem rebellion.
丹鳴爾廳志。宣統庚戌(二年)甘肅官報書局排印。
- (Ch'ung-hsiu) *Kao-lan Hsien Chih* (Küang-hsü), 31 *chüan*, 1892. A gazette of the county Kao-lan (Lanchow), Kansu, covering the period of the Moslem rebellion.
重修皋蘭縣志。光緒十八年楊昌濬序。
- Kao-t'ai Hsien Chih*, 9 *chüan*, 1921. A gazette of the county Kao-t'ai, Kansu, covering the period of the Moslem rebellion.
新纂高臺縣志。民國十年印。
- Ku-yüan Chou Chih* (Hsüan-t'ung), 12 *chüan*, 1909. A gazette of the Independent Department Ku-yüan, Kansu, covering the period of the Moslem rebellion.
新修固原州志。光緒丁未(三十三年)開修。宣統己酉(元年)告成,十二卷。

IV. SECONDARY WORKS

1. *Semi-Official History*

- Ch'ing-shih-kuan: *Ch'ing-shih Lieh-chuan*, 80 *chüan* and index. Shanghai, Chung-hua Book Co., 1928. It is a collection of biographies of more than 4,000 people of the Ch'ing period, mainly based on materials collected by the Bureau for Compiling the History of the Ch'ing dynasty.
清史館：清史列傳八十卷附索引。民國十七年十二月上海中華書局鉛印本。
- Chao, Erh-sun, Ko, Shao-min and others: *Ch'ing-shih-kao*, 529 *chüan*. Mukden, 1937. The draft of the Official History of the Ch'ing dynasty.
趙爾巽·柯劭忞等撰：金梁續撰：清史稿五二九卷。目錄五卷。民國二十六年瀋陽鉛印本。一三一冊。
- Chen, Ch'ang: *T'ing-chün Chi-lüeh*, 16 *chüan*. Shanghai, 1882. A history of Pao Ch'ao's army.
陳昌：霆軍紀畧十六卷。上海申報館仿聚珍版印。光緒八年三月序。
- China Handbook Editorial Board: (The) *China Handbook 1951* Taipei, Taiwan, China Publishing Co., 1951. A handy reference book which contains a lot of important data up to the year 1951.
- Chu, K'ung-chang: *Chung-hsing Chiang-shai Pieh-chüan*, 30 *chüan*. Nanking, 1897. A collection of the leading government generals during the period of T'ung-chih and Kuang-hsü.
朱孔彰：中興將帥別傳，三十卷。光緒丁酉（二十三年）江寧刻本。
- Huang, Ping-k'uan and others, ed: *K'an-ting Sinkiang Chi*, 8 *chüan*, 1899. A history of the rebellion and the recovery of Sinkiang, edited by staff members under Wei Kuang-t'ao, mainly based upon official documents.
黃丙焜等纂：勘定新疆記八卷。光緒己亥（二十五年）鉛印本。
- Pai, Shou-i, ed.: *Hui-ming Ch'i-i*. Volumes III and IV. The first two volumes refer to the Moslems in Yunnan. Shanghai, 1952. Since the Communists took over the mainland, apparently they intend to rewrite the whole of Chinese history. Under the leadership of some old Party members, a "Chinese Historical Association" was formed. Some history scholars were invited to join the project. The Association edited and published a series of books which are collections of old books. The fourth in the series of *The collection of Materials of Modern Chinese History* is this *Hui-min Ch'i-i*. The editor, Pai Shou-i, is a Moslem scholar. Apparently these history scholars had an important hand in preparing these books. Thanks to their training and habits, they have preserved the old contents with no changes. The party interpretation and opinion are separated from the text. Because the whole series was edited with a view to present the case of the rebellious side, it is significant to find that very meager materials were found in this collection to present the Moslem case. Only two entries, among a total of sixteen, came from the Moslems. These two, *Chi-shih* (), and *Shen-Kan Chieh-yü-lu* (see above) are no match for the other fourteen entries, either in quantity or in quality. They are, however, valuable because they present the Moslem views.
白壽彝主編：回民起義。卷三、四。中國史學會主編。上海神州國光社出版中國近代史資料叢刊第四種。一九五二年十二月初版。

- P'eng, Hsün, ed.: *I-chün Chi-lüeh*, 1 volume, Ch'ung-yang, Hupeh, 1886. A history of the army under Huang Ting from 1863 to 1877, based on the documents of Huang. Huang (-1867) was one of the generals under Tso Tsung-t'ang.
彭詢：彝軍紀畧一冊。光緒丙戌（十二年）崇陽刊本。
- Wang, K'ai-yün: *Hsiang-chün Chih*, 16 *chüan*, Chengtu, 1886. A book describing the organization and history of the Hunan Army.
王闈運：湘軍志十六卷。光緒十二年成都墨香書屋刻本四冊。
- Wang, Ting-an: *Hsiang-chün Chi*, 20 *chüan*, 1889. A book describing the history of the Hunan Army.
王定安：湘軍記。二十卷。光緒十五年江南書局刊本。八冊。
- Wei, Yuan: *Sheng-wu Chi*, 14 *chüan*, 1842. A collection of the history of the different military campaigns of the Ch'ing Dynasty up to the period of Chia-ch'ing.
魏源：聖武記十四卷。道光二十二年古微堂刊本。十二冊。
- Yang, Yü-hsiu: *P'ing-hui Chi*, 8 *chüan*, 1889. In *Hui-ming Ch'i-i*, III, 53-235. A chronological history of the suppression of the Moslem rebellion in northwestern China from 1862 to 1887. It is divided into three parts, the first two *chüan* cover Shensi, the next four for Kansu, the last two for Sinkiang. The part that covers Kansu is more in detail and better written. This book is mainly based on official documents brought back from the northwest by Yang's friends.
楊毓秀：平回志八卷。光緒巳丑（十五年）劍南王氏刊本見回民起義第三冊。
- Yi, K'ung-chao and others: *P'ing-ting Kuan-Lung Chi-lüeh*, 1877. A semi-official history of the complete campaign against the Moslems in Shensi and Kansu after their rebellion in 1862. It was edited by the staff members of Yang Ch'ang-chün and Wei Kuang-t'ao, both lieutenants under Tso Tsung-t'ang. It was mainly based on the official documents, though some other sources were apparently used also.
易孔昭等纂：平定關隴紀畧。光緒十三年刊本。
- Yin, Keng-yün and others: *Yü-chün Chi-lüeh*, 12 *chüan*, 1872. A history of the Honan Army.
尹耕雲等：豫軍紀畧，十二卷。同治十一年春季鶴年序。

2. Books in the Chinese Language Prepared by Individual Scholars

- Ch'ai, O: *Fan-t'ien-lu Ts'ung-lu*, Shanghai, 1936.
柴尊：梵天廬叢錄。
- Chia, Shih-i: *Min-kuo Ts'ai-cheng Shih*, 2 volumes. Shanghai, 1917. A history of public finance of the Republic of China. It refers to the public loans floated by Tso Tsung-t'ang.
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A LIST OF CHINESE NAMES AND TERMS USED IN THIS WORK

- A-hung* 阿洪，阿渾，阿訶。
- Adjutant colonel commanding the brigade of the Green Battalions of the office
of the governor-general 署督標中協
- Agents 辦事大臣
- Akim Beg* 阿奇木伯克
- Aksu* 阿克蘇
- Amur* 黑龍江
- An Hung-ch'ing* 安鴻慶
- An-hsi* 安西
- An-pien* 安邊
- An-ting* 安定
- Anhwei* 安徽
- Anking* 安慶
- Arab 阿拉伯人
- Assistant Agents 幫辦大臣
- Assistant Military Governors 參贊大臣
- Banner men 旗人
- Barkol* 巴里坤
- Battalion 營
- Battalion commander 營官
- Battalion commander's guards 營官親兵
- Baturu* 巴圖魯
- Beg* 伯克
- Big Hodja* 大和卓木
- Board of Ceremonies 禮部
- Board of Civil Office 吏部
- Board of Revenue 戶部
- Brigadier-general 總兵，鎮
- Burhan-al-din* 布拉尼敦
- Burmese 緬甸人
- Candidate-intendant of Fukien 福建補用道
- Canton 廣州
- Chahars 察哈爾
- Ch'an Hui 纏回
- Ch'an t'ou Hui-hui 纏頭回回
- Chang Chao-tung 張兆棟
- Chang Chi-hsin 張集馨
- Chang Fei 張芾
- Chang Jui-chen 張瑞珍
- Chang Liang-chi 張亮基

- Chang Pao-lung 張保澧
 Chang Tai-yü 張代雨
 Chang T'ao 張濤
 Chang Tsai-shan 張在山
 Chang Tsung-yü 張總愚
 Chang Yüeh (Chang Yao) 張曜
 Chang Yüeh-ling 張岳齡
 Ch'ang-chi 昌吉
 Chang-chia-ch'uan 張家川
 Chang-chia-chuang 張家莊
 Chang-chia-k'o 張家口
 Ch'ang-wu 長武
 Changsha 長沙
 Chao Lü-hsiang 趙履祥
 Chao Yen-lang 趙延琅
 Ch'ao-i 朝邑
 Chekiang 浙江
 Chen 鎮
 Ch'en Fu-kuei 陳富貴
 Ch'en P'ei-yeh 陳丕業
 Ch'en T'ien-yu 陳天佑
 Ch'en Yü-ch'eng 陳玉成
 Ch'en Yung 陳墉
 Chen-hsi 鎮西 (巴里坤)
 Chen-yüan 鎮原
 Cheng Ch'eng-kung 鄭成功
 Ch'eng-lu 成祿
 Ch'eng-ming 成明
 Cheng-ning 正寧
 Ch'i Chi-kuang 戚繼光
 Ch'i-hua-men 齊化門
 Chi-mu-sa 濟木薩
 Ch'i-shan 琦善
 Ch'i-t'ai 奇臺
 Chia-ying 嘉應
 Chia-yü-kuan 嘉峪關
 Ch'iang 羌
 Chiang I-li 蔣益澧
 Chiang Jo-no 蔣若訥
 Ch'iang-pai-chen 羌白鎮
 Ch'iao Sung-nien 喬松年
 Chieh-chou 階州
 Ch'ien-lung 乾隆
 Ch'ien-t'ai Company 乾泰公司
 Ch'ien-yang 沂陽
 Ch'ih 尺
 Chihli 直隸
 Chih-li-chou 直隸州
 Chin-chi-pao 金積堡
 Ch'in-chou 秦州
 Chin-hsien 金縣
 Ch'in-ling 秦嶺

- Chin-shih* 進士
Chin-shun 金順
China 中國
China Proper 中國本部
Chinese 漢人
Chinese city 漢城
Chinese Eight Banners 漢軍八旗
Chinese Turkistan 新疆
Ch'ing 清
Ch'ing-jui 慶瑞
Ching-chou 涇州
Ch'ing-feng-shan 青風山
Ching-lien 景廉
Ching-ning 靜寧
Ching-pien 靖邊
Ch'ing-ting *Huang-yü Hsi-yü T'u-chih* 欽定皇輿西域圖志
Ching-yang 涇陽
Ch'ing-yang 慶陽
Ching-yüan 靖遠
Ch'ing-yün 慶昫
Chinghai 青海
Chou 州
Chou Fa 周法
Chou Hsien-ch'eng 周顯承
Chou-chih 熬屋
Chu Wen-djang (Wen-djang Chu) 朱文長
Ch'u-chün 楚軍
Chu-ke Liang 諸葛亮
Ch'u yung 楚勇
Ch'ü-chia-k'ou 曲家口
Chü-jen 舉人
Chüan 卷
Ch'uan-chün 川軍
Chuang Yü-sung 莊裕松
Chuang-lang 莊浪
Chung-chiang 中江
Ch'ung-hsin 崇信
Colonel 副將
Commandants of the Forces 領隊大臣
Company 哨
Corporal 什長
County 縣

Department 州
Department Magistrate 知州
Deputy Lieutenant-general of Sian 西安副都統
Dungans 東干人 (回人)
Dzungaria 準噶爾
Dzungarians 準噶爾人

Earldom of the first rank with the designation K'o-ching 一等恪謹伯
Eight Banners 八旗
Eight Banner system 八旗制度

Empress Dowager 皇太后 (慈禧) (慈安)

En-lin 恩麟Erh-nü Ying-hsiung Chuan 兒女英雄傳Fan Ming 范銘Fang Chao-ying 房兆楹Feng-hsiang 鳳翔

Financial Commissioner 布政使，藩司，藩臺

Foochow 福州Formosa 臺灣

Fu 府

Fu-yi 撫彝Fukien 福建General Grand *A-hung* 總大阿訇

General-in-chief 提督

General-in-chief in Urumchi 烏魯木齊提督

Governor 巡撫

Governor-general 總督

Grand Secretary 大學士

Great Wall 長城Green Banners 綠旗Green Battalions 綠營

Group 起 (半營)

Guchen 古城

Guest people 客民

Hai-li-fei 海裏飛Hai-yüan 海原Hami 哈密Han Hui 漢回Han-chung 漢中Han-lin 翰林Hangchow 杭州Hankow 漢口Hao-ti-chang 好地掌He Chuang-t'u 赫壯圖He Ming-t'ang 赫明堂Hei-lung-kiang 黑龍江Heng-yang 衡陽Ho-chou 河州Ho-fei 合肥Ho Kuan 何瑄Ho-ling 鶴齡Ho-shui 合水Honan 河南Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 滙豐銀行Hou Yün-teng 侯雲登Hsi-feng-chen 西峯鎮Hsi-lin 熙麟Hsi-ning 西寧Hsia-chia-ying-fang 夏家營坊Hsiang-ch'eng 項城

- Hsiang-chün 湘軍
 Hsiang-hsiang 湘鄉
 Hsiang-yin 湘陰
 Hsiao Kung-ch'üan 蕭公權
 Hsiao-ch'in 孝欽
 Hsiao-i-chen 孝義鎮
 Hsieh-chia-chuang 謝家莊
 Hsieh-chou 解州
 Hsien 縣
 Hsien-feng 咸豐
 Hsien-yang 咸陽
 Hsin 汛
 Hsin-ning 新寧
 Hsin-t'ao-ho 新套河
 Hsiu-ts'ai 秀才
 Hsiung-nu 匈奴
 Hsü Chan-piao 徐占彪
 Hsüan-wei ch'in-chün 宣威親軍
 Hsüeh 協
 Hu Ch'ing-yü-t'ang 胡慶餘堂
 Hu Kuang-yung 胡光墉
 Hu Lin-i 胡林翼
 Hu-hsien 鄆縣
 Hu-Kwang 湖廣
 Hu-t'u-pi 呼圖壁
 Hua-chou 華州
 Hua-ma-ch'ih 花馬池
 Hua-p'ing-ch'uan 化平川
 Hua-yin 華陰
 Huai-chün 淮軍
 Huan-chün 皖軍
 Huang Ting 黃鼎
 Hui-ch'ü-pao 輝渠堡
 Hui-ning 會寧
 Hunan 湖南
 Hunan Army 湘軍
 Hunanese 湖南人
 Hupeh 湖北
 I-cheng 儀徵
 I-chün 宜君
 I-fen-erh-li 一分二厘
 I-liang 奕梁
 I-hsin 奕新
 Ili 伊犁
 Imperial Agent at Hsi-ning 西寧辦事大臣
 Imperial Commissioner 欽差大臣
 Independent Department 直隸州
 Independent Sub-Prefecture 廳同知
 India 印度
 Indo-Chinese 安南人
 Inner Mongolia 內蒙古

- Intendant of Chen-hsi and Ti-hua 鎮迪道
 Intendant of Ninghsia 寧夏道
 Intendant of P'ing-Ch'ing-Ching circuit 平慶涇道
 Intendant of the Su-Sung-T'ai circuit 蘇松太道
Jalan 扎攔，甲喇
 Jardine, Matheson and Company 怡和洋行
 Jehol 熱河
 Jen Lao-wu 任老五
 Judicial Commissioner 按察使，臬司，臬臺
 Junior Vice-President 右侍郎
 K'ai-feng 開封
 K'ai-tu River 開都河
 Kalgan 張家口
 Kan-chou 甘州
 Kan-ch'üan 甘泉
 K'ang-hsi 康熙
 Kansu 甘肅
 Kao Lien-sheng 高連陞
 Kao-lou-pao 高樓堡
 Kao-t'ai 高臺
 Kashgar 喀什噶爾
 Ke-lao-hui 哥老會
 Kharashar 喀喇沙爾
 Khokand 浩罕
 Khotan 和闐
 Khozi Khan 霍集占
 Kiangsi 江西
 Kiangsu 江蘇
 Kingdom of Kashgaria 喀什噶爾王國
 Kirin 吉林
 Kobdo 科布多
 Koran 可蘭經 古蘭經
 Koreans 高麗人
 Krukara Usu 庫爾喀喇烏蘇
 Ku-ch'eng 古城
 K'u-p'ing 庫平
 Ku-shih 固始
 Ku-yüan 固原
 K'uan-ch'eng-tzu 寬城子
 Kuan-p'ing 關平
 Kuan-wen 官文
 Kuang-feng 廣鳳
 Kuang-hsü 光緒
 Kucha 庫車
 Kuei Hsi-chen 桂錫楨
 Kuei-hua 歸化
 K'ung Kuang-shun 孔廣順
 Kung Tzu-chen 龔自珍
 Kung-ch'ang 鞏昌
 Kuo Pao-ch'ang 郭寶昌
 Kuo-chia-ch'iao 郭家橋

- Kwangsi 廣西
 Kwangtung 廣東
- Lan Ta-shun 藍大順
 Lan-t'ien 藍田
 Lanchow 蘭州
 Lao Hsiang-chün 老湘軍
 Lei Cheng-kuan 雷正綰
 Li 里
 Li Hui-wu 李輝武
 Li Hung-chang 李鴻章
 Li Yün-lin 李雲麟
 Li-chün-pao 李俊堡
 Li-ju Company 麗如洋行
 Liang 兩
 Liang-chou 涼州
 Liang-Kiang 兩江
 Liang-Kwang 兩廣
 Lien-chieh 聯捷
 Lien-ch'ing 連慶
 Lien-hua-ch'eng 蓮花城
 Lieutenant-Colonel 參將
 Likin 厘金
 Lin Chih-wang 林之望
 Lin Shou-t'u 林壽圖
 Lin Tse-hsiü 林則徐
 Lin-t'ung 臨潼
 Ling-chou 靈州
 Ling-t'ai 靈臺
 Little *Hodja* 小和卓木
 Liu Ch'ang-yu 劉長佑
 Liu Chin-t'ang 劉錦棠
 Liu Jung 劉蓉
 Liu K'un-i 劉坤一
 Liu Ming-ch'uan 劉銘傳
 Liu Sung-shan 劉松山
 Liu Tien 劉典
 Liu-chia-kou 劉家溝
 Liu-pa 留壩
 Liu-tai-chia-shan 劉戴家山
 Lo Erh-kang 羅爾綱
 Lo Hung-yü 羅宏裕
 Lo Ping-chang 駱秉章
 Lo Wen-chün 羅文俊
 Lo-yang 洛陽
 Local Corps 團練
 Local Governors 阿奇木伯克
 Lu-chou 盧州
 Liu-ying 綠營
 Lung-chou 隴州
 Lung-hsi 隴西
 Lung-shan-chen 龍山鎮

Lung-te 龍德

Ma Chan-ao 馬占鳌

Ma Ch'ao-ch'ing 馬朝清

Ma Chao-yüan 馬兆元

Ma Chen-ch'ing 馬振清

Ma Erh 馬二

Ma Hsi-lu 馬錫祿

Ma Hsin-ch'eng 馬新成

Ma Hsin-yi 馬新貽

Ma Hua-lung 馬化龍 (馬化龍)

Ma Ming-hsin 馬明心

Ma Pai-ling 馬百齡

Ma Piao 馬彪

Ma Sheng-yen 馬生彦

Ma Te-chao 馬德昭

Ma Wan-hsüan 馬萬選

Ma Wei-hsiang 馬維驥

Ma Wen-yüan 馬文元

Ma Yao-pang 馬耀邦

Ma-wei 馬尾

Magistrate 知縣

Man-la 滿拉

Manchu 滿(洲)

Manchu Bordered Blue Banner 滿州鑲藍旗

Manchu Bordered White Banner 滿州鑲白旗

Manchu Bordered Yellow Banner 滿州鑲黃旗

Manchu Brigadier-general 副都統

Manchu Eight Banners 滿洲八旗

Manchu General-in-chief of Foochow 福州將軍

Manchu General-in-chief of Ninghsia 寧夏將軍

Manchu General-in-chief of Sian 西安將軍

Manchu General-in-chief of Sui-yüan-ch'eng 綏遠城將軍

Manchu Plain Blue Banner 滿洲正藍旗

Manchu Plain White Banner 滿洲正白旗

Manchuria 滿洲

Manchus 滿洲人

Mei Chin-t'ang 梅錦堂

Miao P'ei-lin 苗沛林

Miao Shu-pen 繆樹本

Military and civilian colonies 屯田(軍屯, 民屯)

Military Governor of Ili 伊犁將軍

Military Governor of Sheng-ching 盛京將軍

Military Lieutenant-Governor of Urumchi 烏魯木齊都統

Military Secretariat 營務處

Military Supply Bureau of Ch'ing-yang 慶陽糧臺

Min-che 閩浙

Ming 明

Ministers in the Grand Council 軍機大臣

Minister of the Council of State 軍機大臣

Minister Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports

北洋通商大臣

Mongolia 蒙古

- Mongolian Eight Banners 蒙古八旗
 Mongols 蒙古人
 Moslems 回人
 Mou 畝
 Mu A-hung 穆阿渾
 Mu-t'u-shan 穆圖善
- Nanking 南京
 Narchi 訥爾濟
 New Sect 新教
 Nien 捻
 Ning-chou 寧州
 Ning-shuo 寧朔
 Ning-yüan 寧遠
 Ning-hsiang 寧鄉
 Ningshia 寧夏
 Ningpo 寧波
 Niru 牛永
 No-ch'in 訥欽
 Nurhaci 努爾哈齊
- Oirats 額魯特
 Opium War 鴉片戰爭
- Pa-li-k'un 巴里坤
 Pai Ch'ung-hua 拜崇花
 Pai Yen-hu 白彥虎
 Pai-chi-chen 白吉鎮
 P'ang-ku-chuang 龐谷莊
 Pao-an 保安
 Pao-chi 寶鷄
 Pao-feng 寶豐
 Pao-t'ou 包頭
 Peking 北京
 Persians 波斯人
 Piao 標
 Pin-chou 邠州
 P'ing-fan 平番
 P'ing-liang 平涼
 P'ing-lo 平羅
 P'ing-ting Shen-kan Sinkiang Hui-fei Fang-lüeh 平定陝甘新疆回匪方略
- P'ing-yüan-so 平遠所
 Prefectures 府
 Prince Kung 恭親王
 Provincial Commander-in-chief 提督
 Provincial Director of Education 學政
 P'u-ch'eng 蒲城
- Rifle team 洋槍隊
- San Fan 三藩
 San-yüan 三原
 Secretary of the Grand Secretariat 內閣中書
 Seng-ko-lin-ch'in 僧格林沁

- Senior Vice-President of the Censorate 左副都御史
- Sergeant 把總
- Shan-hua 善化
- Shang-ch'iu 商丘
- Shanghai 上海
- Shansi 山西
- Shantung 山東
- Shao 哨
- Shen-an-chen 陝安鎮
- Shen-Kan 陝甘
- Shen Pao-chen 沈葆楨
- Shensi 陝西
- Sheng-pao 勝保
- Sheng-wu-chi 聖武記
- Shih-chang 什長
- Shih-chia-p'ing 石家坪
- Shih-tsui-tzu 石簞子
- Shui Ying-hung 水映紅
- Shun-chih 順治
- Sian 西安
- Sibe 錫伯
- Sinkiang 新疆
- So-p'ing-fu 朔平府
- Solon 索倫
- Special Commissioners 欽差大臣
- Student 諸生
- Su Ssu-shih-erh 蘇四十二
- Su-chou 廬州
- Su-shun 廬順
- Sub-Director of Studies 訓導
- Sub-Reader of the *Han-lin* 侍讀
- Subaltern of the Guards, wearing the blue feather 藍翎侍衛
- Sui-lai 綏來
- Sui-te 綏德
- Sun Yi-pao 孫義保
- Sung Ch'ing 宋慶
- Szechwan 四川
- Ta-ch'ing Shih-lu* 大清實錄
- Ta-li 大荔 (同州)
- T'ai-chi 臺吉
- T'ai-lai Company 泰來洋行
- T'ai-p'ing 太平天國
- Tan 擔
- T'an Chung-lin 譚鍾麟
- T'an Yü-lung 譚玉龍
- T'ang 唐
- T'ao Mao-lin 陶茂林
- T'ao-chia-chuang 桃家莊
- Tarbagatai 塔爾巴哈臺
- Tartar city 滿城
- Team 隊

- Three Feudatories 三藩
 Ti 氏
 Ti-hua 迪化 (烏魯木齊)
 Ti-tao 狄道
 T'i-tu 提督
 Tibet 西藏
 Tibetans 西藏人
 T'ien Shan Nan Lu 天山南路
 T'ien Shan Pei Lu 天山北路
 T'ien-wu 田五
 Tientsin 天津
 Ting-an 定安
 T'ing-k'o 亭口
 Ting-pien 定邊
 To-lung-a 多隆河
 Tsai-ch'un 載淳
 Tsai-t'ien 載湉
 Ts'an-ling 參領
 Ts'ang-t'ou (chen) 倉頭 (鎮)
 Ts'ang-t'ou-tsui 倉頭寨
 Ts'ao K'e-chung 曹克忠
 Ts'ao-chia-chuang 曹家莊
 Ts'ao-tien 草店
 Tseng Chi-tse 曾紀澤
 Tseng Kuo-fan 曾國藩
 Tso Tsung-t'ang 左宗棠
 Tso-ling 佐領
 Tsung-li Ya-men 總理衙門
 Tsung-ping 總兵
 Tu-hsing-a 都興阿
 Tuan-hua 端華
 T'uan-lien 團練
 Tui 隊
 Tun-huang 敦煌
 Tung-chih-yüan 董志原
 Tung Yung-hai 董永海
 T'ung-chih 同治
 T'ung-chou 同州
 T'ung-hsin-ch'eng 同心城
 T'ung-kuan (east Shensi) 潼關
 T'ung-kuan 同官
 T'ung-wei 通渭
 Turfan 吐魯番
 Turkey 土耳其
 Uigur 維吾兒
 Uliasutai 烏里雅蘇臺
 Urumchi 烏魯木齊
 Ush 烏什
 Wan Nien-hsin 萬年新
 Wang Hai-yang 汪海洋
 Wang K'ai-t'ai 王凱泰

- Wang Po-hsin 王柏心
 Wang Ta-kuei 王大桂
 Wang T'ai-lai 王泰來
 Wang Wen-shao 王文韶
 Wang-chia-hsia-pao 王家下堡
 Wang-ko-ts'un 王閣村
 Wei River 渭河
 Wei Yüan 魏源
 Weinan 渭南
 Wen-djang Chu (see Chu Wen-djang)
 Wen-hsiang 文祥
 Wen-lin 文麟
 Wen-yü 文煜
 Wu Shih-mai 吳士邁
 Wu-chung-pao 吳忠堡
 Yakoob Beg 阿古柏
 Yang Ch'ang-chün 楊昌濬
 Yang Hsiang 楊祥
 Yang Ping-ch'eng 楊柄銜
 Yang Tsai-fu 楊載福
 Yang Wen-chih 楊文治
 Yang Wen-yen 楊文彥
 Yang Yüeh-pin 楊岳斌
 Yang-tien-chen 楊店鎮
 Yangchow 揚州
 Yangtze River 揚子江
 Yao-wang-chia 姚王家
 Yarkand 葉爾羌
 Yellow Riding Jacket 黃馬褂
 Yellow River 黃河
 Yen-ch'a-t'ing 鹽茶廳
 Yen-kuan 鹽關
 Yen-sui-chen 延綏鎮
 Yen-an 延安
 Ying 營
 Ying Pao-shih 應寶時
 Ying-ch'i 瑛棨
 Ying-kuei 英桂
 Yü Te-yen 禹得彥
 Yü-chün 豫軍
 Yu-fang-chieh 油坊街
 Yü-lin 榆林
 Yü-men 玉門
 Yü-t'ung 玉通
 Yü-wang-ch'eng 預望城
 Yüan 元
 Yüan Chia-san 袁甲三
 Yüan Pao-heng 袁保恆
 Yün-Kwei 雲貴
 Yung-cheng 雍正
 Yünnan 雲南

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